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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the tension inherent in the relationship between the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as Member States Parties of the GATT/WTO 
and the GATT/WTO regime.  It focuses specifically on the tension triggered off by the 
requirements of Article I – the Most-Favoured-Nation principle (MFN) and Article III – the 
National Treatment principle (NT) GATT 1994.  It shows that while the non-discrimination 
principles are meant to promote trade liberalisation and economic growth, they produce the 
opposite effect in developing and least developed countries like ECOWAS and aggravate the 
tension between those countries and the WTO.  It argues that the MFN is used to deny market 
access to the developing countries by exposing them to stiff but unequal competitive 
conditions and the NT to deny national governments the policy space to protect and promote 
national industries, employment and economic growth.  It challenges the general assumption 
that the MFN and the NT are good and in the interest of all the WTO Members and rather 
identifies them as lynch-pins of economic development in the ECOWAS region. It also 
shows, contrary to the assumption of non-participation, how the ECOWAS High Contracting 
Parties are adapting their trading systems and harmonising their laws to the key provisions of 
Articles I and III of the GATT.  It shows that the principles of non-discrimination are the 
outcome of the standard-setting procedures legally formulated as the SPS and TBT 
Agreements which favour the developed countries and how the Dispute Settlement Body has 
rejected the ‘aims-and-effect’ approach, taken a literal approach, overly emphasising trade 
liberalisation to the neglect of market access and economic development. 
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This dissertation concludes that it is pre-mature for ECOWAS to assume Articles I and III 
obligations and recommends using the provisions of Article XXIV to build up effective 
influence through regional organisations and incrementally uniting to transform the GATT.   
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1.1 Introduction 
The provisions of Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
1
 1994 on 
the ‘Most-Favoured-Nation2 (MFN) Treatment’ and Article III on the ‘National Treatment’3 
are ironically anti-development and constrain developing countries Members States Parties of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) because of their requirement of non-discrimination.  
While the WTO makes ‘redistribution claims,’4 it is accused of fostering a ‘hegemonic 
agenda’5 of the powerful states and capitalist transnational corporations by relocating 
sovereign powers of states in international institutions and thereby denying the states the 
policy space they need for economic growth and development. 
 
                                                          
1
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 1A, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter 
GATT 1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125 at 1144. 
2
 Article I of the GATT 1994.  Other provisions of the GATT 1994 containing MFN or MFN-like treatment are 
i. Article III:7 – on internal quantitative regulations, 
ii. Article V – on freedom of transit, 
iii. Article IX:1 – on marking requirement, 
iv. Article XIII – on the non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions, and 
v. Article XVIII – on state trading enterprises, as well as Article XX the ‘General Exceptions’ which 
are MFN-like. 
The following multilateral agreements also contain MFN treatment obligations 
i. The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, 
ii. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement, and 
iii. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
3
 Article III GATT 1994. 
4
 The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation. 
5
 Bhupinder Chimni, ‘The WTO, democracy: a view from the South,’ in Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed) Making 
Gobal Trade Governance Work for Development, Perspectives and Priorities from Developing Countries 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 278.  Generally see also Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: 
International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press 2000) and Shervin 
Majlessi, ‘From realpolitik of international trade to the Geneva Consensus,’ in Sarah Joseph, David Kinley and 
Jeff Waincymer (eds) The World Trade Organisation and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspective (Edward 
Elgar 2009) 365-376 
4 
 
The tensions inherent in the multilateral trade regime for developing countries manifested 
early in the first decade of the GATT as three founding members: China, Lebanon and Syria 
withdrew from the Agreement.  The GATT responded by establishing a panel of eminent 
economists that published the Haberler Report.
6
  The report pointed out that the GATT was 
skewed in favour of the industrialised North and against the interests of the developing 
countries due to the absence of any binding ‘provisions on commodities and industrial 
development’7 as well as market access.  The GATT regulates the world trading system and 
as such ‘controls which development policies can be implemented in conjunction with 
international trade and the way in which they are implemented.’8 For example, it is estimated 
that there are ‘155 special and differential treatment provisions in the WTO’9 that have the 
potential to hinder the economic growth of developing and least developed countries.  Under 
the GATT, Uruguay persistently complained of ‘576 restrictions maintained by developed 
countries that allegedly nullified and impaired Uruguayan exports.’10 There is an inherent 
tension between the needs of developing countries and the anti-discrimination principle; 
juridical equality is equality in the abstract that does not translate into capacity to benefit 
economically. 
 
                                                          
6
 G Haberler, R Campos, JE Meade and J Tinbergen, Trends in International Trade: A Report by a Panel of 
Experts (GATT, Geneva, 1958).  The report named after (Gottfried Haberler) the chairman of the panel of four 
eminent economists led to the setting up of three committees one of which was charged with looking into the 
problems facing the developing countries in international trade. 
7
 Andrew Lang, World Trade After Neoliberalism: Re-imagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 45. 
8
 KO Kufuor says that the WTO has a ‘considerable authority over its members.’ See Kufuor, World Trade 
Governance and Developing Countries (Blackwell Publishers 2004) and also Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming 
Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press 2006) 4. An example of the control of 
the activities, legal framework and development policies of Member States is US–Shrimp Turtle 
WT/DS58/AB/R adopted 6 November 1998 where the Appellate Body decided that unilateral trade measures 
could be used to deny market access to exports of developing countries. 
9
 BS Chimni, ‘Developing Countries and the GATT/WTO System: Some Reflections on the Idea of Free Trade 
and Doha Round Trade Negotiations,’ in Chantal Thomas and Joel P Trachtman (eds) Developing Countries in 
the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press 2009) 39. 
10
 Yong-Shik Lee above p. 32. 
5 
 
The ‘Leutwiler Report’ – Trade Policy for a Better Future11 adumbrated the challenges facing 
developing and least-developed countries in the world trading system when it stated very 
bluntly as part of its recommendations that the ‘[d]eveloping countries receive special 
treatment in the GATT rules.  But such special treatment is of limited value.’12  It pointed out 
that 
Far greater emphasis should be placed on permitting and encouraging developing countries to 
take advantage of their competitive strengths, and on integrating them more fully into the 
trading system, with all the appropriate rights and responsibilities that this entails.
13
 
 
To achieve that, the Report pointed out the inadequacy of the GATT as a stand-alone solution 
and emphasised the need for greater co-operation, co-ordination and consistency between 
world economic institutions.  It stated how interdependent and mutually re-enforcing the 
macro-economic policies and budgetary and fiscal policies are to each other: 
The health and even the maintenance of the trading system, and the stability of the financial 
system are linked to a satisfactory resolution of the world debt problem, adequate flows of 
development finance, better international co-ordination of macroeconomic policies, and 
greater consistency between trade and financial policies.
14
 
 
The GATT is based on three principles: non-discrimination, open markets and fair trade
15
 and 
numerous rules that make up the covered agreements.  Commenting on the Leutwiler Report, 
Roessler observes a missing link: while ‘the GATT aims at the integration among markets’ 
by discouraging ‘measures that discriminate against imports or in favour of exports, it does 
not significantly limit other forms of intervention in the economy,’16 for example, subsidies, 
yet 
The theory of optimal intervention teaches that the most efficient policy to counter market 
distortions is a policy that attacks directly the source of the distortion.  Since most market 
                                                          
11
 See Appendix 11 attached. 
12
 Recommendation 10, The Leutwiler Report in Trade Policies for a Better Future – Arthur Dunkel, The 
‘Leutwiler Report’, the GATT and the Uruguay Round (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 14 (hereinafter The 
Leutwiler Report). 
13
 ibid. 
14
 Recommendation 15, The Leutwiler Report. 
15
 Frieder Roessler, ‘The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System,’ in Arthur Dunkel (ed) (n 12) 
72. 
16
 ibid 76-77. 
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imperfections arise within the national economy, the measures needed to attack the source of 
such distortions directly are generally not border measures but domestic policies, for instance 
policies to control monopolies or cartels or to subsidise or tax certain activities.
17
 
 
The developing counties and the least-developed countries such as members of ECOWAS are 
severely at a disadvantage in the GATT because the GATT does not prohibit dumping but 
merely regulates the use of anti-dumping, does not guarantee free access to the supplies of 
other countries, does not formulate or impose any particular foreign policy goals on the 
Contracting Parties, does not oblige any country no matter how rich to give tariff preferences 
to developing or least-developed countries and ‘does not prescribe any system of 
ownership;
18’ all that matters is if the economy is planned economy or a market economy.  
But it is [o]nly if the economic agents are autonomous competing entities do tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions et cetera play a role and only then do the GATT commitments 
regarding these policy instruments become relevant.’19  So despite the fascination of fair trade 
advocates and writers of economic textbooks with ‘a fair distribution of economic sacrifice’ 
and ‘adjustment assistance programmes,’20 the GATT is not about either of them.  Instead of 
any of those, Roessler explains the real function of the GATT thus: 
A government needs a framework of constraints on its policy options to defend not only the 
country’s interests but also its own. ….a government, whatever its structure or colour, 
effectively resolve in its trade policy the perennial conflicts between short-term political 
expediency and long-term national welfare, between the interests of producers and the 
interests of consumers or between society’s desire for economic growth and its desire to avoid 
the structural adjustments needed for growth.
21
 
 
Patel, one of the authors of the Leutwiler Report takes up ‘the adjustment problem’ by first 
pointing out that ‘[i]f protection is to be rolled back in reality, we would certainly need to 
                                                          
17
 ibid 77-78. 
18 ibid 79-81.  At page 79  Roessler notes: ‘The provisions on restrictive business practices in the 
Charter for the proposed International Trade Organisation, the Havana Charter , were not taken into 
the GATT, which in effect is the Charter’s commercial policy provisions’ 
19
 ibid 81. 
20
 ibid 82. 
21
 ibid 84. 
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arrive at a new and more enlightened consensus on the management of the macro aspects of 
the major economies of the world; and it is this which makes monetary, financial and trade 
issues so irrevocably intermixed.’ 22  Secondly, ‘low savings in the developed countries and – 
perhaps as a consequence – less willingness to share them with developing countries may 
well be the main bottleneck in constructive adjustment leading to sound growth all round.’23 
 
Although the GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel stated that the seven eminent people 
who authored the Leutwiler Report ‘represented a spread of relevant disciplines’ and ‘came 
from many different regions of the world,’ none of them came from any of the fifty-four 
countries in Africa, the whole continent was left out.
24
 
 
Ostensibly the support of the developed countries for the Haberler and Leutwiler Reports and 
the recalibration of the GATT in 1994 was to redress the GATT regime to cater for the 
interest of the developing countries, but as Steinberg notes, the primary reason was the 
geostrategic goals of the United States and the West: to make the developing countries 
attaining independence in large numbers embrace the neoliberal market economy and turn 
away from Soviet communism.  He observes: 
By the late 1950s, many in the US Congress and State Department were concerned about the 
geopolitical alignment of the developing countries, a concern that became even more 
pronounced in the trade context after Soviet efforts to strengthen the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in the early 1960s.  This was a primary US consideration in 
supporting the work embodied in the Haberler Report and expanding GATT membership to 
the developing countries.  US policymakers thought it would be impossible to reach 
agreement on a weighted voting formula and expand the GATT into a broad-based 
organisation that could attract and retain developing countries.  Moreover, decision-making 
                                                          
22
 IG Patel, ‘The Adjustment Problem,’ in Dunkel (n 12) 92.  See also Recommendation 15 The Leutwiler 
Report, Appendix 11. 
23
 ibid 94. 
24
 Arthur Dunkel (n 12) 2.  There was a good representation of developing countries in the eminent persons 
group: Inderapasad Patel (India) Mario Simonsen (Brazil) and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (Indonesia).  Europe 
alone was represented by three persons Pehr Gyllenhammar (Sweden), Guy de Lacharriere (France) and Fritz 
Leutwiler (Switzerland); North American had a representative in the person of Senator Bill Bradley of the 
United States. See Appendix 11 for the qualifications of the seven eminent persons who wrote the Leutwiler 
Report. 
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rules that were consistent with the principle of sovereign equality carried a normative appeal, 
particularly for less powerful countries.
25
 
 
Therefore, even though rational institutionalists
26
 say that the quest for Pareto-improving co-
operation among states is the spur, if not the basis, for committing to international 
institutions, ECOWAS Member States and the other developing and least-developed 
countries are yet to gain the market access recommended in the reports.  The Sutherland 
Report
27
 marking the tenth anniversary of the WTO still decried the same disadvantageous 
position in its conclusions and recommendations numbers 8, 13, and 27.
28
  Nothing changed. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem between the GATT Regime and ECOWAS 
                                                          
25
 Richard H Steinberg, ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining ad the Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO,’ International Organisation 56, 2, Spring 2002, 344-345.  Steinberg states that ‘in trade 
negotiation, relative market size offers the best first approximation of bargaining power,’ not sovereign equality 
despite its appeal to weak states (p.347). 
26
 See generally Robert O Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes,’ in Stephen D. Krasneer (ed) 
International Regimes (Cornell University Press 1983) 141-172, and also by the same author, After Hegemony 
(Princeton University Press 1984). See also Arthur A Stein Why Nations Cooperate (MIT Press 1993). 
27
  The Future of the WTO: Addressing the Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium – Report by the 
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi 2005 (hereinafter the Sutherland Report).  
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/future_wto_e.htm.  The Sutherland Report was 
aimed at addressing ‘institutional challenges’ in the WTO; it concerned decision-making and one of its most far 
reaching suggestions was to allow for ‘variable geometry’ in WTO law (Recommendation 26). The Consultative 
Board used the phrase ‘variable geometry’ in the sub-heading to this section of their report and the ‘principle of 
plurilateral’ and ‘GATS “scheduling” approach’ in Number 26 of their Principle Conclusions and 
Recommendations.   As reported by Van den Bossche, Thomas Cottier has questioned whether the Sutherland 
Report would have a similar influence to the Leutwiler Report.  It will not; it was not intended to have a similar 
influence.  According to Jackson, the Consultative Board was not established by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference or the General Council but by the Director-General as a body to advise him.  Jackson was reported 
as saying, ‘the Board was not supposed to look at any issue on the agenda of the Doha Development Round 
negotiations.  The Director-General did not want a report that would interfere with the ongoing negotiations but 
a report that would form the basis for a discussion over a long period of time on systemic problems facing the 
WTO.  There was no intention to drive towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Report.’  See 
Peter Van den Bossche, ‘Debating the Future of the World Trade Organisation: Divergent Views on the 2005 
Sutherland Report,’ JIEL 2005 8(3) 759-768. 
28
 Twenty years after the Leutwiler Report was first published, the Director-General of the GATT Supachai 
Panitchpakdi constituted the Consultative Board that wrote the Sutherland Report named after the chairman.  
The members of the Consultative Board were Peter Sutherland (Chairman), Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi 
Botchwey, Naill FitzGerald, Koichi Hamada, John H Jackson, Celso Lafer and Theirry de Montbrail.  Their 
report touched on the peculiar challenges facing the developing and the least-developed countries: ‘The 
developing countries, as they increasingly turn to trade liberalisation, often cannot afford the adjustment 
mechanisms to cushion the short-term impact on employment and other aspects of social welfare 
(Recommendation 8);’A special effort should be made to assist civil society organisations dealing with trade 
issues in least developed countries especially in Africa’ (Recommendation 13); ‘Whenever possible, new 
agreements reached in the WTO, in future, should contain provisions for contractual right, including the 
necessary funding arrangements, for least-developed countries to receive adequate and technical assistance and 
capacity building aid as they implement new obligations’ (Recommendation 27).   
9 
 
The GATT imposes the MFN and National Treatment obligations which trigger off tension 
and conflict with the trade and development aspirations of ECOWAS as Contracting Parties. 
Even though there are exceptions to the principles,
29
 it is important to examine the direct and 
indirect incidence of Articles I (MFN) and III (‘National Treatment’) because their scope 
‘determines how often governments can rely on the Article XX (‘General Exceptions’) in 
order to justify their laws and practices.’30  Therefore, this dissertation undertakes a case 
study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and examines the 
tension between the WTO regime and the perceived interest of developing states which 
Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel refer to as ‘the current level of dissent about the relationship of 
trade liberalisation to economic development.’31  ECOWAS is a regional economic group 
founded in 1975 ‘to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity,’ 
including ‘commerce;’32 but while it shares common objectives with the WTO in the area of 
trade promotion, it has other economic development objectives covering transport, 
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, monetary and financial 
integration as well as social and cultural matters.  The tension is debilitating and therefore 
unsustainable for the following reasons: 
 
Firstly, while ‘the core feature of the GATT/WTO is the requirement of non-
discrimination,’33 Articles I and III of the ‘GATT are designed to protect expectations of 
competitive relationships, not actual trade flow;’34 therefore, trade facilitation is not one of 
the remits of the GATT/WTO and this leaves states without the capacity to engage in 
                                                          
29
 Article XX GATT 1994. 
30
 Lother Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment – or Equal Treatment? Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/01, 27. 
31
 Robert Howse and Ruti G Teitel, ‘Beyond the divide: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Political Rights and the World Trade Organisation,’ in Joseph, Kinley and Waincymer (n 5) 42. 
32
 <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en > accessed 24 March 2012 
33
 Howse and Ruti (n 31) 9. 
34
 Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in 
WTO Law: An Overview,’ in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds) Regulatory Barriers and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination in WTO Law (The University of Michigan Press 2000) 32. 
10 
 
international trade on their own.  According to Jackson, Davey and Sikes, ‘the objective and 
purpose of Article I:1 is to prohibit discrimination among like products originating in 
different countries;’35 it does not help in increasing the volume of trade originating in any 
country.  
 
Secondly, the scope of Article I is too pervasive and leaves Members of the WTO with little 
room for manoeuvres for economic growth or recovery.  Tension exists between an absolute 
principle of trade liberalisation and the need for protective measures to enable economic 
growth for vulnerable economies before they are exposed to the full rigours of competition. 
According to the Appellate Body (AB) in Canada – Autos: 
Article I:1 requires that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territory 
of all other Members.’  The words of Article I:1 refer not to some advantages granted ‘with 
respect to’ the subjects that fall within the defined scope of the Article, but to ‘any 
advantage’, not to some products, but to ‘any product’; and not to like products from some 
other Members, but to like products originating in or destined for ‘all other’ Members’36 
(original AB emphasis). 
 
Yet ‘[i]t does not, however, apply to the “right of establishment” (often found in FCN 
treaties)’37  as is the case in the European Union38 where the European Court of Justice has 
ruled that equal treatment with nationals is one of the fundamental legal provisions of the 
Community.
39
  Therefore, while citizens of a WTO Member State can export their goods to 
another country and demand MFN and National Treatments, citizens of one WTO Member 
State cannot go and set up a professional business or practice in another WTO Member State 
                                                          
35
 John H Jackson, William J Davey and Alan O Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, (4
th
 edn West Group, 2002) 435/36 
36
 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS/139 & 
142/AB/R adopted by the DSB on 19 June 2000, para 79. 
37
 John H Jackson, The World Trading System (The MIT Press 1997) 161.  ‘Right of establishment’ confers 
freedom to provide services or the pursuit of an economic activity by a person from one Member State in  
another Member State. 
38
 Article 52 of the EEC Treaty (Article 49 TFEU).    
39
 Jean Rayners v Belgian State, Case 2-74, EC Reports 1974 00631. 
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on the basis of the MFN.  So while Article I covers ‘any product,’ nothing in it whatsoever 
applies to any person and as such people from low income countries cannot seek jobs in high 
income countries based on the MFN or National Treatment.  People who temporarily go to 
another WTO Member for purposes of employment are characterised as ‘service providers’ 
rather than workers.
40
 
 
Thirdly, as pointed out by Jeff Waincymer, the ‘question to ask in tandem is what is the 
philosophical justification for trade liberalisation.’41  The commentator answers that it is the 
‘economic premise’ which libertarian free market advocates such as Robert Nozick42 base 
their argument.  Therefore it is important to examine the application of the principle of non-
discrimination on a particular group of WTO Member States, the ECOWAS, to assess 
whether the Agreement as it stands delivers economic growth.  ‘The first level of analysis,’ 
Jackson states, ‘asks which rules of the GATT explicitly discriminate against the trade of 
developing countries.  The answer to this question is generally none’43 (italics added).  
Nevertheless, Jackson admits that the assessment of the impact of the GATT on ‘countries 
with low living standards and low wages … involves the expertise of economists rather than 
lawyers.’44  Many economists are unequivocal that the GATT is detrimental to the economic 
development of developing countries, that it ties them to a status of perpetual 
underdevelopment.
45
 
 
Fourthly, as the Pogge/Rawls debate over the interface between international law and 
economic growth shows, even the claim of redistribution by the WTO is suspect and 
                                                          
40
 Robert Howse and Ruti G Teitel, in Joseph, Kinley and Waincymer (eds) (n 5) 56. 
41
 Jeff Waincymer, ‘Trade and Human Rights Debate: Introduction to an interdisciplinary analysis, in Joseph, 
Kinley and Waincymer (eds) (n 5) 22. 
42
 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974) 
43
 Jackson, (n 37) 320. 
44
 ibid 319. 
45
 See Part II, chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this dissertation. 
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arguable.  Pogge asserts that international law in general and international economic law in 
particular is implicated in reproducing massive poverty but Rawls takes issue with that 
assertion.
46
 
 
Fifthly, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) coerced other nations into 
signing the WTO Agreement.
47
  The key results of the Uruguay Round of international trade 
negotiations, namely, the GATT 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),
48
 the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
49
 and the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding
50
 (DSU) were presented to former GATT Contracting 
Parties and new Members of the WTO as a single undertaking
51
 leaving no options for 
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in Bernard M Hoekman and Simon J Evernett (eds) Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation 
(London and Washington: Palgrave Macmillan; World Bank, 2005); Pierre Pettigrew and others, ‘The 
Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?’ (University of Warwick: Report of the first Warwick 
Commission December 2007); Robert Z Lawrence, ‘International Organisations: The Challenge of Aligning 
Missions, Means and Legitimacy’ (2008) 31 World Economy 1455-70.  Lastly, Stuart E Eizenstat and Grant D 
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nations to sign on to what they wanted.  It has been pointed out that ‘TRIPS is an odd 
inclusion in WTO agreements, given that its implementation mandates the restriction of trade 
rather than trade liberalisations.’52   The developing countries objected to bringing GATS and 
TRIPS under the multilateral trade regime but immediately the US and the EU signed the 
new WTO Agreement on 15 April 1994, they ‘burnt the bridge’ by withdrawing from the 
GATT so that those who refused to sign the new Agreement would not demand the MFN and 
National Treatments from the two biggest markets and trading nations.  The effect of that, 
Kenneth Shadlen stated, was that  
Any country that did not sign the Uruguay Round’s Final Agreement and join the WTO 
would, formally, retain their rights under GATT 1947, but since the largest countries with the 
most important markets were no longer bound by GATT 1947, non-joiners would be left with 
empty rights.  The result of this is that MFN-based market access is only available to 
countries that joined the WTO, thereby consenting to TRIPS, TRIMS, GATS, the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and so on
53
 (italics added).  
 
This is not uncharacteristic of the US and the EU with its constituent states.  The US 
withdrew from the International Labour Organisation in November 1977 and the US and the 
UK withdrew from UNESCO at a time.
54
   Reasons: they failed to bend the organisations to 
carry out their biddings.  
 
Lastly, the ‘WTO procedures and processes’55 including ‘Articles I and III as traditionally 
interpreted’56 are biased in favour of commercial trade interests and developed states and are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Aldonas, ‘Transatlantic Leadership for a New Global Economy’ (Atlantic Council of the United States: Policy 
Paper, April 2007) claim that the Doha Round will be the last ‘round’ of international trade negotiations.  
52
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336 
53
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54
  Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Claredon Paperbacks 1986) 90 
55
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 William J Davey and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of 
its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of “Like Product”’ in 
Cottier and Mavrodis (eds) (n 34) 41.  For the adjudication of the MFN and National Treatment at the WTO see 
chapter 6 of this research. 
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against the economic growth of developing states.  Chapter 6 will elaborate with specific 
cases on how the panels and the Appellate Body appear to pander to the wishes of the 
corporations and kowtow to the big trading countries as if trade liberalisation were an end in 
itself instead of a means to an end – ‘raising standards of living’ by ‘expanding the 
production and exchange of goods.’57   
 
Yet there is no ‘community duty’ which stipulates that disadvantaged states should be 
assisted by industrialised countries and multilateral corporations.
58
 The present discordant 
debate within the international law epistemic community involving not only lawyers but 
international economists as well which Renato Ruggiero described as a ‘dialogue of the 
deaf’59 is due to the coexistence and a clash of two principles: the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
international law, the former not recognising the ‘right to development’ and the latter 
asserting a ‘right to development’.  Power, observes Cassese, is with the former but 
momentum is with the latter.  The ‘old’ flaunts a claim to legality but not legitimacy as it is 
construed to be ‘inconsistent with the general values of the present world community.’60  The 
world trading system is ‘geared to coexistence rather than cooperation.’61 
 
But the situation across the developing world is dire and cries for explanations, 
why global inequality is increasing so rapidly that substantial global economic growth since 
the end of the Cold War has not reduced income poverty and malnutrition – despite 
substantial technological progress and global economic growth, despite huge reported poverty 
reductions in China,
62
 despite the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’,63 despite substantial 
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declines in real food prices, despite official development assistance, and despite the efforts of 
international humanitarian and development organisations.
64
 (original italics) 
 
Therefore, the most important legal task confronting international economic and trade law 
experts, arguably, is how to mediate the imbalance in international economic relations.
65
  
Like slavery/slave trade, colonialism and apartheid before it, the task seems insurmountable 
at the beginning but the conviction that it is possible provides the impetus for this work.  This 
dissertation posits that the problem is rooted in the law governing world trade, in the GATT, 
specifically in Articles I and III.  This is a new turn in the theory and practice of international 
economic law and provides the justification for the substance of this work; and as for its 
focus on ECOWAS, the reason is that the fifteen-member Economic Community of West 
African States provides a typical example of a regional trade area that is made up of 
developing and least developed countries that lack both the political power and the economic 
leverage to exact influence and extract favourable trade concessions from their trading 
partners.  This will help us assess how the GATT protects the weak and vulnerable against 
the industrialised and powerful trading nations because Article 3:2 DSU states categorically 
that ‘the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.’  ECOWAS is representative of regional trade areas within Africa and around 
the world made up of developing countries. 
  
But counterarguments do exist that state that the GATT is good for every nation, especially 
developing countries.  Howse and Teitel contest both the normative and empirical 
foundations of Pogge’s argument that international law plays a role in reproducing massive 
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poverty, describing it as an ‘imaginary counter-vision’66 of the world economic order.  GATT 
economists strongly support the MFN or non-discrimination principle and argue that it has 
the following five significant benefits from ‘economic’ and ‘not-so-economic’ or political 
viewpoints:
67
 
 
First, ‘[f]rom the economic viewpoints, (the MFN principle) ensures that each country will 
satisfy its total import needs from the most efficient sources of supply, allowing the operation 
of comparative advantage.’68  In simple terms, this means that the MFN principle minimises 
market distortions because states assuming the GATT discipline will apply trade restrictions 
uniformly without regard to the country of origin of the goods. 
 
Second, ‘[f]rom the trade policy viewpoint, the MFN commitment protects the value of 
bilateral concessions and “spreads security around” by making them the basis for a 
multilateral system.’69  The thrust of this argument is that the MFN engenders more liberal 
trade policies as more and more nations accede to the GATT, that is, that the MFN has a 
multiplier effect. 
 
Third, ‘[f]rom the international-political viewpoint, the commitment to the MFN clause 
mobilises the power of the larger countries behind the main interest and aspiration of the 
smaller ones which is to be treated equally.  It represents the only way to realise the ideal of 
sovereign equality of nations; in more practical terms, it guarantees the access of newcomers 
into international markets.’70  This is the selling-point of the MFN to the developing countries 
                                                          
66
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that it gives economic power to small economies without the large market and influence 
needed to get what they want in a competitive market environment.   
 
Fourth, ‘[f]rom the domestic-political viewpoint, the MFN commitment makes for more 
straightforward and transparent policies and for greater simplicity of administration of 
protection.’71  The reduction in transaction costs, the argument goes, comes as a result of the 
fact that customs officers would have no need to ascertain the origin of the goods controlled 
by MFN at the border. 
 
Fifth, ‘[u]ltimately, the unconditional MFN commitment is a constitutional significance.  It 
serves as the safe constraint on the delegated discretionary powers of the executive branch in 
trade matters.’72 A commentator has stated that the greatest merit of the GATT/WTO is its 
role in global economic governance rather than its pure economic advantages. The MFN 
contributes to domestic and international peace: at the domestic level, it checks the trade 
policies of the government in power irrespective of its political leanings and at the 
international scene, it dowses tension by making it ‘illegal’ for governments to resort to 
short-term economic measures that put other nations at a disadvantage, escalate tensions or 
fuel wars around the world.
 73
 
John Fischer William provided the justification for international economic regulations and 
illustrated the raison d’être of trade rules such as the GATT as follows: 
… It is open to any State without violating a legal rule, except in so far as it may be bound by 
commercial treaty, to take any measures which it may think fit in the sphere of international 
commerce.  It may stretch out its hand into the economic life of its neighbour by destroying 
without compensation such part of its neighbour’s trade as consisted in export to its own 
domestic market.  The inhabitants of a particular district in one country may have for many 
years made their living by the supply of some article to another country; that other country 
may then suddenly and without warning put on a prohibitive duty against the import of the 
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particular article so supplied, and a peaceable group of producers in the first country is ruined 
without redress, by action over which its own government, in spite of its ‘sovereignty’, had in 
fact no sort of control.
74
 
 
Despite the above benefits, this dissertation will argue that at best, for the developed 
countries, they are confronted with a ‘second-best’75 option, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’76 and 
for the developing countries that Articles I and III of the GATT on the MFN and National 
Treatments function as ‘binding constraints on (economic) growth’77 because instead of 
bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, developed and developing countries, the 
WTO maintains and actually accentuates ‘the prevailing international division of labour.’78  
As Cassese put it, ‘international law was modelled in such a way as to “codify”, legitimise 
and protect the interests’ of ‘the Great Powers’.79  In fact, to the developing countries it is 
‘the frustration of (development) under WTO law acquired after protracted negotiations.’80  
Sauvé and Subramanian called the GATT a ‘peace treaty among mercantilists’81 which raises 
the question whether ‘major economic powers would be more or less able to exploit the poor 
absent a regulatory mechanism such as the WTO’82 or conversely if the developing countries 
would have done better outside the GATT/WTO legal system? 
 
The arguments I will advance in the following chapters will show that the GATT is based on 
‘legal fictions (MFN and National Treatments) which’ are based on juridical equality of 
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states that ‘have no place on the international scene’ because they do not confer rights erga 
omnes and are by their nature ‘synallagramatic’ in that they impose reciprocal obligations 
between Contracting Parties.
83
  As Jackson points out, ‘[e]ven when an MFN policy is 
ostensibly being carried out, an examination beneath the surface can sometimes detect a 
strong bilateral effect.’84  Even though trade liberalisation generates apparent benefits, it 
merely contemplates transfers but does not mandate them, not even within states and least 
between states. 
 
Again what Cottier described as ‘the deepest conceptual flaw and irony of the international 
human rights system,’ namely, ‘the implications of imposing standards that cannot be met by 
current levels of development’ is equally plaguing the GATT principle of non-
discrimination.
85
  I will argue that liberalising trade without the domestic infrastructure to 
support efficient distribution of its dividends is equally flawed. 
 
Furthermore, that the world trading system and the GATT/WTO regime that supports it is 
one-sided and starkly adverse to the developing and least developed countries of the world 
appears to have been acknowledged by even the WTO itself by the addition of Part IV to the 
GATT 1994 on ‘Trade and Development,’86 the Agreement on Safeguards87 aimed at 
addressing the ‘conditions’ emanating from ‘the disciplines of GATT’ that ‘cause or threaten 
to cause serious injury to domestic industry;’88 Articles XVI GATT and XV GATS on 
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subsidies,
89
 the Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health,
90
 the Generalised System of 
Preferences (the Enabling Clause),
91
 the Special and Deferential Treatment and the naming of 
the Doha trade negotiations the ‘Development Agenda;’ and, in international law through the 
adoption of the UN resolution on ‘conflict diamonds.’92  International law seems to have 
admitted that trade should deliver economic growth and development through the 
establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and the 
promulgation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1966.
93
 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
My research questions examine various dimensions of the application of the GATT legal 
policies of the MFN and National Treatment enshrined as Articles I and III on ECOWAS.  
Some of the questions were generated from Hudec’s Developing Countries in the GATT 
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Legal System (1987),
94
 the seminal book on the tension between the GATT/WTO regime and 
the developing countries which was followed twenty-two years later with a celebratory and 
similar title Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (2009)
95
 by scholars paying 
tribute to the man regarded as the pioneer and leading-figure of GATT law   
i. Do the new legal undertakings under Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 create 
new trade opportunities for developing countries?
96
 
ii. Why did the United States which refused to accede to and ratify the Charter of the 
International Trade Organisation take the initiative for the GATT rounds of trade 
negotiations? 
iii. If the GATT 1994 is detrimental to the economic interests of the developing 
countries, as claimed, why did they sign up to it? 
iv. What efforts have the developing countries made to entrench economic 
development as a legal right recognised by the international community? 
v. Can international institutions such as the WTO serve as a façade and an 
acceptable public explanation for decisions taken for other reasons, in situations 
where the other reason would itself be difficult to defend politically?
97
 
vi. How does the harmonisation of trade rules through international standard-setting 
affect ECOWAS? 
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vii. How do ECOWAS Member States use the trade policy space provided by the 
GATT? 
viii. Has the interest in the legal theory of the WTO exceeded its practical relevance? 
and 
ix. What are the emerging dynamics between the agreements, states’ practices and the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in facilitating or frustrating trade and 
economic development in developing countries? 
In sum, what does the experience of ECOWAS demonstrate about the actual and potential 
integration of development into the GATT/WTO legal system? 
 
1.4 The Aims and Scope of the Study 
This study aims to provide answers to the research questions above and thereby fill the gap in 
literature with the response, practice and harmonisation of particularly ECOWAS Member 
States with the international trade regime under the GATT.  It is my aim to show that even 
though the GATT was not set up to address the problems confronting developing countries 
like ECOWAS; it could be renegotiated and reconstructed to cater for the interests of both 
developed and developing countries now that an overwhelming majority of the membership 
of the WTO (with an appreciable volume of the world trade) are developing and least 
developed countries. 
 
It is also aimed at explaining the underlying current behind the key GATT rounds of 
international trade negotiations, why the US took the lead and how the international standard-
setting procedures and the WTO adjudication process frustrate market access and end up 
making it impossible for the least developed countries to creep out of poverty. 
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Equally important and from a legal perspective, this study aims to make it clear that the key 
thing impeding economic growth and development are the provisions of Articles I and III of 
the GATT 1994 providing for the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment and National Treatment 
respectively.  I do not suggest that the GATT or indeed international law is solely responsible 
for the poverty and gross human security crisis in the ECOWAS sub-region or in other 
developing countries.  My point is that taken on its own and given the crucial role of 
international trade in any economy, the GATT contributes immeasurably to 
underdevelopment, economic stagnation and even recession.  
 
In scope this study covers the fifteen West African countries that make up ECOWAS.
98
  The 
rationale for choosing ECOWAS is that no study before this has examined how the regional 
group adjusts and harmonises its policies with the GATT.  Another reason is that ECOWAS 
could be regarded as a microcosm of the WTO.  They both have the common aim of trade 
liberalisation.  Moreover, the WTO has actively encouraged regional trade agreements and 
markets as building blocks for its own edifice and therefore it is necessary to examine how 
this particular economic area feed into the WTO objective of trade liberalisation. 
 
Again with the exception of Liberia which is negotiating to join the WTO,
99
 all the other 
ECOWAS Members States are Member States of the WTO and only three countries (Ghana, 
Ivory Coast and Nigeria) are categorised as ‘developing’ while the rest are classified as least 
developed countries (LDCs).  It will be both intriguing and revealing to evaluate whether the 
‘legal’ platform provided by the GATT has helped this group of developing and LDCs realise 
the promises held out to them in the preamble to the GATT and WTO agreements.  
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Therefore, it is my aim to assess how far the GATT has been ‘mutually advantageous’ in the 
‘elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.’100 
 
My research analyses the growth of the WTO legal framework through the key GATT rounds 
of trade negotiations
101
  It will find answers to why the so called ‘Doha Development 
Agenda’102 is floundering and why the WTO is plagued by both the apprehension of the 
developed countries who are keeping their agricultural subsidies despite the ‘Most-Favoured-
Nation’103 and ‘National Treatment’104 principles and the scepticism of the developing 
countries that see the organisation as a post-colonial colonialism with an ostensibly 
operational headquarters in Geneva. With agriculture being the recurring exception to the 
GATT rules on anti-dumping (Art. VI), quantitative restrictions (Art. XI), subsidies (Art. 
XVI) and emergency action (Art. XIX), the principles seem to lack depth and substance.  My 
aim is to provide a legal analysis that is not usually found in textbooks and general treatises 
on international economic law
105
 by showing what the original club of twenty-three trading 
nations can and cannot do for its present membership that is over 150 countries.
106
   
 
My intention is to go beyond academic prescriptions of reforms by presenting, through the 
provisions of the GATT and case-law (such as India – Quantitative Restrictions)107, an 
exposé and a perceptual approach to the WTO to proffer solutions to the excessive or 
misplaced optimism coming mainly from the developing countries that are making demands 
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from an organisation that was not set up with them in mind.  ‘By its nature, the reciprocal 
bargaining that is at the heart of the process of trade liberalization in the GATT framework is 
a game to be played by countries that have something to bargain with.’108  Rorden Wilkinson 
argues that the collapse of the WTO Ministerial conferences and missed deadlines are part of 
a deeper crisis and states that the GATT and subsequently the WTO have evolved in the 
service of its main architects (the US and the EU), thus creating ‘asymmetry of opportunities’ 
for the majority of its developing country members. 
 
Lastly, this study, as the titles says, is limited to a ‘legal analysis’.  Therefore, the detailed 
examination of the trade ‘impact’ or ‘proximate cause’ of the measures complained of ‘on the 
economy of developing country Members concerned’109 is, in my view, in the realm of 
economics and outside the scope of this study.  A legal analysis is ‘about competitive 
opportunities, not actual trade flow’ according to DiMascio and Pauwelyn, and as such, ‘there 
is no need to demonstrate how such laws or regulations specifically target or affect the rights 
of individual foreign traders or businesses.’110  As the Appellate Body stated in Japan – 
Alcohol,  
[T]he trade effects of the trade differential between imported and domestic products, as reflected 
in the volumes of imports, are insignificant or even non-existent; Article III protects expectations 
not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal competitive relationship between 
imported and domestic products.
111
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Again and of equal importance, ‘it is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended 
objective…. This is an issue of how the measure in question is applied,’112 (original 
emphasis). 
 
1.5 Methodology 
My choice of methodology here is a combination of historical, inductive and empirical 
(panels and AB cases) analyses that are cognate in addressing the research questions posed 
above.  It is not an ex ante analysis of what the likely effects of the GATT will be but an ex 
post analysis of what it has been thus far.   
 
Petersmann probes ‘why past doctrinal disputes’ among legal scholars’ have lost much of 
their relevance for interpreting IEL’ (International Economic Law) and asks, ‘[i]s it possible 
to share a common methodology for IEL research without a common theory of IEL?’113  
Although he maintains that ‘legal methodology in IEL research remains contested, he favours 
the empirical method which I adopt here because IEL is ‘multi-disciplinary … blending legal 
analysis with political science, economics and other fields.’114  The contestation arises 
because what is ‘justice’ in the context of IEL is contested and so ‘methodology in IEL 
research remains contested.’115 
 
The main reason for my adoption of the historical, empirical and inductive method of 
analysis is due to the nature of the study which relies heavily on primary data (trade policy 
review reports and Panel and Appellate Body reports) and demands a factual exposition of 
what happened and not a conjecture or hypothesis of what might have happened.  The focus 
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is on substantive provisions of the WTO Agreements and ‘on matters of legal 
interpretation’116 that is, the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements
117
 to uncover ‘the factual basis and basic rationale underlying the findings118 of 
both the Panel and the Appellate Body.  The empirical and historical method is expository, 
holistic and somewhat exhaustive; analysing events, delineating causation, questioning 
assumptions and evaluating claims.  
 
Another reason for adopting the empirical and historical analysis is because it is ‘helpful,’ 
according to the arbitrator in US – FSC, ‘in understanding the overall architecture of the 
Agreement’119 (emphasis added).  Therefore this method of analysis lends itself to unearthing 
both the ‘object and purpose,’120 and ‘the circumstances of (the) conclusion’121 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO and its key provisions of non-discrimination in 
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994.   
 
The methodology adopted here is without prejudice to different approaches taken by some 
eminent scholars in their analysis of Public International Law generally and International 
Economic Law and regional economic blocs in particular.  While Cassese
122
  adopted the 
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historical analytic method to explore the role of international law in a divided world, 
Kufuor
123
 deployed the New Institutional Economics and Ordoliberalism theories and 
subjected the Economic Community of West African States to a thorough institutional 
analysis; yet Lang
124
 primed into the future of the world trade regime by re-imaging the 
global economic order after neoliberalism.  Irrespective of the methodology adopted, Lang 
maintains that ‘[w]hat is at stake is, also – much more importantly – the ways in which the 
projects, values, mandates, and normative biases of the trade regime are constituted in the 
first place’125 hence my choice of a. methodology which goes beyond how the world trade 
regime was ‘constituted’ and looks at the ‘overall architecture’ too.  When he resorted to 
historical analysis Kufuor stated that ‘[t]he use of history is valuable in that it enables 
scholars and decision-makers to avoid a misunderstanding of current economic problems.’126 
I am in full accord because ‘the success of the WTO as an effective international institution is 
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not dependent upon acceptance of a particular set of economic theories’ in the face of ‘highly 
contested uncertainties.’127 
 
Trade liberalisation and economic development of developing and least developed countries, 
the thrust of my study, is different from WTO debates in other fields known as ‘linkage’ or 
‘trade and …’ debate.  Even though there might be similarities in tone, I do not intend to 
approach this study from a human rights perspective because a ‘human rights approach to 
trade … implies a different normative standpoint in choosing between different kinds of trade 
policy: in a human rights approach, the imperative is not to choose the policy which 
maximises growth or wealth, but rather that which maximises the enjoyment of human 
rights.’128   
 
This is not to say that economic development is not richer with human rights and social 
dimensions added to it.
129
  It is my position that ‘economic development’ having been used in 
the opening paragraph of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, that a legal argument can be 
founded solely on the economic dimension without leaning on the International Convention 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the attendant debates about their hierarchy and 
justiciability.  Although he was writing about foreign direct investment, what Oliver De 
Schutter said applies with equal measure to the GATT.  His framework on how to advance 
the responsibilities of corporations is that we should move the discuss from ‘micro’ to 
‘macro’ level, for our present purposes, the law that applies to international trade.130   
According to him, ‘the right to development, defined by the human rights it facilitates, is 
quite distinct from the question whether, as foreign investors, transnational corporations 
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respect the full panoply of internationally recognised human rights (law) in their 
operations.’131 
 
The approach adopted in this study is from an entirely different normative standpoint.  While 
‘trade and human rights’ sounds like asking the WTO to engage in something that ‘cannot be 
core objectives of a trade regime’132 (original italics), ‘trade and economic development’ is 
challenging the WTO to ensure at all levels: policy, process and adjudication that its stated 
objective of enhancing economic development is not undermined.  In this perspective, the 
principle of non-discrimination is seen as a means to an end and not an end in itself. Again, 
legally speaking, not much has been achieved in terms of development as a human right and 
as noted by a commentator, ‘it would seem difficult to argue that the right to development, 
despite its aspiration … (and) … moral dimension … has succeeded even in changing the 
terms of the debate.’133 
 
The methodology is causal, historical, case-law based and selective: the analysis will focus 
on WTO disputes where the parties complained of ‘less favourable’134 treatment on the bases 
of the MFN and National Treatment such as EC – Bananas III (US),135 Brazil – Aircraft136 
and Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes137 which they alleged constituted a 
‘nullification’ or an ‘impairment’ of the ‘benefits accruing to them directly or indirectly 
under the covered agreements.’138  I will, through the use of the research questions be 
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‘searching for historical patterns, constructing theories to explain them’139 and testing the 
theories against WTO decided cases.  This approach or methodology is inductive
140
and 
scientific rather than deductive
141
 and presumptive.  John Stuart Mill states that ‘all inference, 
consequently all Proof, and all discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions, and 
the interpretation of inductions,’ and defines ‘Induction properly so called, … may, then, be 
summarily defined as Generalisation from Experience.’142 
 
My research methodology is mainly library research drawing from such sources as textbooks, 
academic journals, WTO case-law and other resources and the publications of non-
governmental organisations such as Oxfam and Consumer International.  Again my 
methodology is multidisciplinary drawing from history, politics, economics, literature and 
philosophy because the ‘study by academic lawyers of ECOWAS as an institution embedded 
in the socio-political history of West Africa, contributes to understanding its objectives, its 
institutional design and its failings.’143 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
The most outstanding limitation of this study is lack of decided GATT/WTO cases involving 
ECOWAS Member States as complainants or respondents (first or second parties).  A few of 
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them have appeared as third parties only in a few cases and even at that without filing long, 
logical and sustained briefs stating their views and positions.  Therefore, the validity of the 
contested legal principles notwithstanding, the cases analysed in this study are tangentially 
applicable to ECOWAS as a regional economic group. 
 
Again ECOWAS is only one of the fourteen regional groups in Africa.  Time and resources 
would not allow the study of other similar groups within the continent or even outside the 
continent such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to compare any of 
them with ECOWAS. 
 
1.7 Outline of dissertation 
This study is in seven chapters that are divided into three parts.  Part I contains the 
preliminary chapters which are chapters 1, 2 and 3 which adopt the historical, causal and 
inductive method of analysis.  Chapter 1 covers the introduction which concludes with this 
outline.  Chapter 2 is in three sections and the first section gives the historical background to 
the key GATT rounds of trade negotiations, namely, the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay 
rounds; the second section traces the history of the most-favoured-nation principle in 
international economic relations; and, the third and final section concludes with the national 
treatment principle.  Chapter 3, the last chapter in Part I, examines the contested concept of 
development in international law.  It analyses international covenants and declarations on the 
right to development as well as its legal status. 
 
Part II forms the substantive part of this study and covers chapters 4, 5 and 6.  Chapter 4 
examines the legal regime of the WTO with respect to international standard-setting and 
evaluates the operation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
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(SPS) Measures
144
 and the Agreement of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
145
  The 
international organisations involved in setting standards and the implications of their work on 
the developing and least developed countries are the main focus of the chapter.  Chapter 5 is 
on ‘Trade Policy Reviews’ and seeks to correct the impression that ECOWAS Member States 
do not make use of the GATT.  It explains that due to their level of economic development, 
ECOWAS Member States make use of the administrative rather than the judicial mechanism 
of the WTO or engage in what Kufuor calls ‘tactical participation.’146  The concluding 
chapter of this part is on WTO adjudication.  Through detailed case analysis, it shows that the 
dispute settlement process is mechanistic, pro-trade liberalisation and seems to purse a 
neoliberal agenda different from the stated object and purpose of the WTO and is used to 
stifle the economic growth and development of developing countries. 
 
Part III which is only chapter 7 makes some findings and concludes this study. 
 
This chapter has introduced the focus of this work which is the tension between the 
requirement of trade liberalisation based on the non-discrimination principles in Articles I 
and III of the GATT 1994 and the quest for market access and economic development based 
on the Preamble and Articles XXXVI to XXXVIII of the same GATT 1994.  The tension 
divides the membership of the WTO between economic lines of developed and developing 
countries; the former aggressively support the WTO policy of trade liberalisation, the latter 
insists that economic development should be at the heart of the WTO, otherwise their 
membership would be useless.  The developing countries complain that they are severely 
                                                          
144
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 1A (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures) (hereinafter the SPS Agreement) 
145
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 1A (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade) 
(hereinafter the TBT Agreement) 
146
 Kofi Kufuor, World Trade Governance and Developing Countries – The GATT/WTO Code Committee 
System (Royal Institute of International Affairs and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 55 
34 
 
constrained by Articles I and III and so cannot attain any appreciable level of economic 
development with the rules applied in their present form. 
 
The next chapter will explore how the GATT came to be and how the MFN and National 
Treatment principles came to be the cornerstones of the GATT.
147
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Chapter 2 
The Evolution of the GATT and the Development of the Most-Favoured-Nation and 
National Treatment Principles 
Part I – A Short Teleology of the GATT/WTO 
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Part I A Short Teleology of the GATT/WTO 
 
“Have you forgotten?... 
For the world’s events have rumbled on since those gagged days 
………… 
Look up, and swear by the green of the spring that you’ll never forget.” 
- Siegfried Sassoon “Aftermath” 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Why study the teleology of law?  What are laws for?
1
  Franck provides functional and 
purposive answers.  Firstly, he states that ‘[s]uch basic questions are the meat and potatoes of 
jurisprudential inquiry;’ secondly, and arguably more importantly, he declares that ‘[a]ny 
legal system worth taking seriously must address such fundamentals.’2  For our purposes 
here, what is the teleology of the GATT 1994? 
 
A lot has been written about ‘The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation’ (WTO) 
to use Peter Van den Bossche’s book-title3 that time has come to ask, what are we talking 
about?  As George Orwell demonstrates in his Animal Farm, antipodal stances like ‘all four 
good, all two bad’ is not a sustainable proposition.   By the same token, ‘trade liberalisation is 
good, protectionism is bad’ may be nothing more than the surface truth.  It is for this reason 
that philosophy strives towards the fundamental understanding of whatever it is that exists 
and our experience of it, including the WTO and its law and policy.  It questions the 
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fundamentals we normally take for granted.
4
  What I set out to do here may be just a scratch 
of the surface recognising the circumspection that a journal article or a book chapter allows 
but if it offers a starting point and incites more people to wonder, inquiry and study, then my 
effort would have translated from activity to productivity.  The aim of this chapter is to 
explain the main reason behind the initiation of the GATT Rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations leading up to the WTO.  The ambit of this chapter will be limited to how it all 
began; why it all began: to find markets for the goods of the developed economies, 
particularly the United States, will become obvious in the following sections.  Although 
philosophy appeals to reason, it is nonetheless a speculative science that relies on the 
deductive and inductive methods. ‘This is not to deny the normative character of international 
economic law.  But international economic law – like all law but perhaps more so – is a 
process.  Any attempt to define the law as of a given moment cannot help but distort.’5 
 
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions begins with this generic paragraph which applies to 
the WTO as to any other international organisation: 
The development of international organisations has been, in the main, a response to the 
evident need arising from international intercourse rather than to the philosophical or 
ideological appeal of the notion of world or global government.  The growth of international 
intercourse, in the sense of the development of relations between different actors – both 
private and public, natural and legal – has been a constant feature of maturing societies; 
advances in the mechanics of transport and communications combined with the desire for 
trade and commerce have produced a degree of intercourse which ultimately called for 
international regulation by institutional means
6
 (emphasis mine). 
 
Contrary to this seminal revelation, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation posits that the WTO has an underlying philosophy or ideology by opening with 
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‘The Parties to this Agreement, Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living… 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand… designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of international trade…’7  This preamble which is the same in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947/94 gives the impression that the GATT/WTO system 
would (not could) be of benefit to both developed and developing countries, but more so to 
the developing countries.  This notion of the GATT/WTO being a grand and clever design 
may not be apparently wrong as the substantive provisions of the GATT has Part IV of it 
devoted to ‘Trade and Development.’  The justification for the resort to the Preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement is because ‘[a] government (for our purposes here, an organisation) is 
only recognised for what it claims to be.’8  However, Andrew K. Rose in his extremely 
quantitative study submits evidence that the WTO does not even make trade more stable and 
predictable: 
I have searched for indications that membership of the WTO and its predecessor the GATT 
lowers trade volatility.  My hunt has been unsuccessful; I find no reliable evidence that 
membership increases the predictability of trade flows.  I use both bilateral and multilateral 
data sets that span over 175 countries and 50 postwar years.  I use a number of different 
econometric techniques, relying extensively on estimators that include fixed effects, and 
control for a host of potential factors.  Yet despite an extensive search and a number of 
robustness checks, I have not been able to find strong indications that he GATT/WTO makes 
trade more stable and predictable.
9
 
 
Sarah Joseph states that ‘[t]he underlying rationale of the WTO is to preside over the 
reduction of trade barriers between nations, thereby promoting global free trade.’10  The 
putative title of a subsection of her book gives the ‘Raison d’être of the WTO’ as being the 
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benefits of globalisation: making goods available ‘at least in the developed and urban areas of 
many developing States.’  However, she sounds somewhat sceptical of the objectives of the 
WTO as declared in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement by stating reservedly that ‘[a]t 
first glance, the WTO’s mission seems utterly compatible with the promotion, protection and 
enjoyment of human rights’ and points out that ‘free trade should be a means to desirable 
ends rather than an end in itself’11 (emphasis added).  We notice a note of incredulity as to the 
veracity of comparative advantage in her mock epic tone by a derisive testament attributing 
the concurrence that comparative advantage is ‘arguably the single most powerful insight into 
economics’ to an undated advertorial hoisted on the WTO website.12  A leading American 
economist states that the fascination of the public with comparative advantage is ‘due mainly 
to the fact that the general public does not read economic textbooks.’13  
 
Again contrary to the notion of helping ‘developing countries, and especially the least 
developed among them’ to reap the benefits of international trade and development 
assistance, Lowenfeld makes it ‘clear … that no state is obliged to provide (either trade, 
technical or) development assistance to another state.  Even if A is a developed and B a 
developing state, A has no duty to establish a foreign assistance program, or if it has such a 
program, to include B within it.’14  
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Still more, the civil society is restive and rife with suspicion of the true motives behind the 
formation of the WTO from Cancún to New Delhi and waving banners reading ‘shut down 
the WTO’,15 ‘no concessions to WTO against India’s interest’, ‘our world is not for sale’, ‘no 
to market access for US-EU agribusiness’, ‘no to WTO dictates’, ‘no to FDI in banking and 
insurance’, ‘improve the food rationing service by providing affordable food items.’16  The 
outcry against the WTO is not limited to ‘hungry protesters’ or the ‘irresponsible action of a 
tiny minority’17 to borrow a phrase from Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky of the US while 
apologising to the ministers and officials who were harassed during the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle in 1999.  Respected international organisations working in the areas of 
poverty reduction, justice and development such as Oxfam, the South Centre and ActionAid 
have equally questioned the motives behind the WTO.
18
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The credo ‘GATT is good for all’ finds its intellectual support in the economic theory of 
comparative advantage.
19
 Lowensfeld explains, ‘the GATT … is clearly based on the 
perception that international trade is beneficial, that the gains to society from trade outweighs 
the losses to those who are hurt by competition from abroad, and that value is created through 
specialisation and exchange in open markets.’20  In 1993 the Nobel Prize for Economics was 
awarded to two distinguished economists Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North ‘for having 
renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods 
in order to explain economic and institutional change.’21  Simply put, their work gave a boost 
to international institutions and organisations like the GATT/WTO by validating their 
importance and showing that there is a corresponding relationship between organisations and 
economic performance. 
 
Since it is only a theory and not a law, what are its premises or basic assumptions?  Miller
22
 
offers us three contrasting world views: the WTO market model, the multi-centric 
organisational model and the classical Marxist model.  The last one will be left out as it does 
not reflect the world view espoused by the WTO.  According to Miller, the Market Model 
rests on the seven premises of free, rational individuals, decision-making via aggregation of 
individual choices, the three functions of money as a medium of exchange, a measure of 
value and a store of value, material gain, mobility, competition and government support.
23
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By contrast the Multi-Centric Organisational Model sees the market as oligopolistic and 
predatory and one of its proponents Galbraith outlines its eight controlling strategies as the 
control of consumer demand, profit, labour, prices, growth, universities, government and 
popular culture.
24
 
 
The Multi-Centric Organisational (MCO) Model is the school of thought challenging the 
Market Model and its intellectual base of comparative advantage.  The seven premises of the 
MCO Model are as follows: 
i. Basic actors are organisations  
ii. Choices are made through the exercise of organisational power 
iii. Money represents power 
iv. Wealth and power are the driving objectives.   
v. Power rivalry characterise interaction   
vi. Institutional power controls access   
vii. Government is a major organisational player.25 
 
The International Economic Law epistemic community has not yet come up with a history of 
the GATT/WTO despite the breath-taking efforts of some scholars like Steve Charnovitz that 
have shed some light on the development of International Economic Law;
26
 but even if we 
were to have such a piece of work, history is usually the victors’ version of events, the 
conquerors’ perspective, despite the platitudes of civility and oaths to impartiality. Whoever 
writes one, it would nonetheless be a and not the history of the GATT/WTO.  The wind is in 
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our sail now because most of the architects of the GATT/WTO are not only still alive but 
writing.  Therefore the account that follows will draw heavily from the works of GATT/WTO 
negotiators, trade diplomats and participant-scholars.  The aim is to aid undertaking and to 
foster realistic expectations of the WTO to reduce the incidence of aborted ministerial 
conferences and stalled trade rounds because the WTO ‘is an extraordinary model in many 
ways … there is no government …. that really knows what it has gotten into.’27 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) started as a club of twenty-
three
28
 trading nations, many of who were colonies of European powers; the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) from its name and objectives was set up as a ‘world’ body, for all 
nations: developed, developing or in-between.  How far does the provision that ‘The GATT 
1994 shall consist of the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dated 30 
October 1947’29 cater for the interests of the new members most of who are developing 
countries from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and South America? 
 
This research seeks to clarify whose interests the WTO was set up to serve and the increasing 
challenges facing the multilateral trading system.  Part II examines the antecedents to the key 
trade negotiations under the GATT, namely, the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.  Part 
III is on the WTO Ministerial Conferences.  Part IV concludes with the synthetic 
(posthumous) views of Nobel Laureates in Economics on how the WTO could stimulate trade 
in developing countries while stabilising trade in developed countries. 
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2.2  The Pre-GATT World of Unilateralism  
Poverty anywhere is poverty everywhere. 
- The Philadelphia Declaration, the ILO Constitution 
 
 
Before the GATT, most states maintained policies which stood as obstacles to free trade.  The 
introspective policies were, among others, in the form of excessive customs and excise duties, 
restrictive quotas, requirements for inspection, certification and registration, prohibitive 
licensing conditions and even outright bans.  They were aimed at foreign traders while at the 
same time hedging and protecting or in some cases exempting completely their nationals 
from the same regime imposed on foreigners.  The hurdles and frustrations faced by foreign 
traders were much and were thought of as being capable of crippling foreign businesses 
completely that they came to be known as ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies.’30  
 
The GATT, the predecessor of the WTO was ‘a product of World War II, or to be more 
precise, the perceptions of the Allied planners of the post-war world.’31  The British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and the US President Theodore Roosevelt had thought that the 
failure of the United States (US) to join the League of Nations was the major cause of its 
collapse and so any prospect for peace must be based on the establishment of a multilateral or 
universal organisation of which the US would play a leading part.  A meeting was held in 
Bretton Woods in July 1944 to design post-World War II financial and economic institutions 
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and organisations and so came into being the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development better known as the “World Bank”. 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) and the US officials had discussed setting up a trade organisation 
in 1943 but no details emerged.  Riding in the euphoria of victory the US government 
unilaterally issued a document entitled “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and 
Employment” meant for consideration by an International Conference on Trade and 
Employment even though it was purported to represent a consensus reached between the US 
and the UK governments in the two preceding years.
32
  Not long after the Proposals, the US 
nudged fifteen countries
33
 to enter into negotiations with a view to reaching conclusions on 
multilateral trade agreements.  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment 
adopted the US proposals and appointed a 19-country Preparatory Committee to draft a 
document for the conference.  Either by quirk or influence, the Preparatory Committee started 
work from a suggested charter drafted by the US at a series of meetings convened in London 
in October-November 1946, in New York in January-February 1947 and in Geneva, in 
August 1947.  The draft produced by the Preparatory Committee became the basis on which 
the United Nations convened a Plenary Conference on Trade and Development in Havana, 
Cuba, in November 1947.  Despite the Second World War undermining faith in international 
organisations, 53 countries signed the Final Act of the Havana Conference that was entitled 
the Charter of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) “after so much debate and 
acrimony”34 but without the US.  Due to a number of reasons prominent of which was non-
approval by the US Congress, the ITO Charter never entered into effect.  President Truman 
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could not get Congress to approve it
35
 and the other nations who were waiting for the US to 
sign the Charter before they would join the ITO withdrew. 
 
However, while the Preparatory Committee of the ITO Charter was at work, one-on-one 
tariff-cutting negotiations were going on among the participants that led to the production of 
a provisional document the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which 
contained the concessions made, schedules of the bindings, a code of conduct to safeguard 
the undertakings to commit every participant to a common standard of behaviour and most 
importantly the understanding that any concessions reached between two counties would be 
passed on to all other members participating in the talks and negotiations, the principle of the 
most favoured nation.  Therefore, the GATT was an ad-hoc arrangement in 1947 to be used 
till the completion of the ITO Charter the following year but when the Charter became still-
born it continued in operation till the WTO agreements came into effect on 1 January 1995.  
In itself and own capacity ‘the GATT treaty never came into effect.’36  The pertinent question 
to ask is has the accidental nature of its birth ‘affected the operation and vigour of the GATT 
and …the new WTO?’37  At its birth on 30 October 1947 only 23 countries38 signed the 
GATT.  The GATT was therefore a “conundrum” with “flawed constitutional beginnings”39 
destitute in both legitimacy and democracy as an international organisation but nonetheless a 
de facto one.  Worse still the American negotiators in Geneva were under clear instructions 
that “the president could not accept a GATT if it had attributes of an organisation…the 
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negotiators returned to Geneva and scrubbed the then draft of GATT’s ‘organisational’ 
attributes… the word ‘member’ was taken out, and replaced by ‘Contracting Party’.”40 
 
Although the GATT was never meant to be an intergovernmental organisation, Article XVI 
of the WTO agreement clearly states that “the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, 
procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 
1947”.41  But if the GATT was made the way the Americans wanted it, the WTO which 
follows more or less the same principles cannot be said to be an entirely different 
establishment. 
 
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation aims through the 
framework of the WTO at ‘raising the standards of living … , ensuring … steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand … to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development’42 (italics added).  These 
lofty aims seem to give the impression that the WTO is to spread the benefits of international 
trade and ‘sustainable development’ to countries around the world whether rich or poor.  It 
was seen as a genuine desire to found a rules-based trade organisation, beneficial to all parties 
willing to forgo their pecks, privileges and pomposities by giving or doing to all members 
what they have done to a member – this is the cardinal principle of the most favoured nation 
(MFN) on which the WTO was founded.  As the MFN bait dangled tantalisingly, states 
swallowed line, hook and sinker all the WTO agreements without reservations believing the 
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developed countries had come to dinner with the developing countries on the table of, not just 
equality, but also of brotherhood.  The results so far prove the notion wrong that Sarah Joseph 
asks do developing countries ‘trade to live or live to trade?’43 Some commentators have 
pointed out that the WTO needs ‘to avoid being eclipsed into irrelevance’ by regional trade 
agreements and bilateral investment treaties which ‘have proliferated globally’ as if they 
present more relevant and preferred alternatives.
44
    
 
The GATT 1947
 45
 was preceded by the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations 
Organisation (UNO) – 1944/45 and the League of Nations – 1919.  The WTO architecture is 
crafted on a tripod of agreements: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 
1994), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) all propped up by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).  I will contextualise the WTO by exploring, in a historical order, the 
events that gave rise to its formation.   
 
The First World War was unprecedented in the savagery, horror and suffering that it 
unleashed on mankind.  After the slaughter (reflected on by Sassoon in the poem partly 
quoted at the outset and immortalised with a plaque at the Euston station in London) there 
arose a sense of duty so that such a calamity would not happen again.
46
  Statesmen owed it to 
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the dead to build a better world and its most important institution was the League of Nations 
set up by  
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, in order to promote international co-
operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of 
obligations not to resort to war by the prescription of open, just and honourable 
relations between nations by the firm establishment of the understandings of 
international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the 
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings 
of organised peoples with one another.
47
  
The saying that ‘International law is what other countries break’48 is not just the cynic’s 
perspective but an oblique justification of international law of which international economic 
law generally and WTO law in particular is undeniably a part.  Wood credits international 
law with ‘two greatest achievements’, namely, ‘the restriction on the use of force embodied 
in the Pact of Paris and the United Nations Charter’ and ‘the development of human rights 
and humanitarian law and their enforcement’49 overlooking the glaring harmonisation and 
ordering of international private and public economic relations as if forestalling the outbreak 
of wars and enforcing human rights are the only preoccupations of international law.  Trade 
and commerce form the centrepiece of international law today and the need to conduct world 
trade in a predictable and rules-based manner was the reason for the establishment of the 
WTO with an enforcement mechanism the DSU. 
 
The setting up of the GATT and its successor the WTO evinces a strong determination by the 
Contracting Parities to the GATT and Member States of the WTO to conduct international 
trade on an arithmetic or other objective manner as opposed to the random and rat-race-like 
manner that was characteristic of international trade before and after the Second World War.  
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How genuine was the desire?  Was it borne out of a noble intention to bring order to a 
hitherto chaotic situation that engulfed the word before the WTO or was it a façade for a 
benign but nevertheless ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy that marked the pre-WTO era?  Put in 
other words was the WTO set up to offer a new, predictable and justiciable platform for 
international trade or is it a rebranding and the legitimisation of the old order? 
 
2.3 The GATT Era (1947-1994): The Beginning of Multilateralism and Keynesianism  
It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a law….all the laws of England have been made 
by the Kings of England, consulting with the Nobility and Commons in Parliament, of which 
not one of twenty was a Learned Lawyer. 
- Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of Common Laws of 
England.
50
 
 
The GATT era of multilateral trade negotiations witnessed eight rounds of trade talks: 
Geneva, Annecy, Torquay, Geneva II, Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.  The 
last three were the most important rounds and in the following sub-sections, I will analyse 
how domestic economic situations in the United States and certain developments in the world 
combined to push the US that ditched the ITO Charter to play a central role in the launching 
of each of the rounds and the major achievements of those remarkable years of international 
trade diplomacy. 
 
2.3.1The Kennedy Round (1964 – 1967) 
This part of borrows heavily from a book
51
 on the Kennedy Round and the practical 
experience of a GATT participant-observer John W. Evans who was the chairman of the 
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United States delegation to the first meeting on the GATT and has given a comprehensive 
analysis of the post-war trading system covering the United States foreign commercial policy, 
the history of tariff negotiations, negotiation techniques, governmental motivations and trade 
theory.  
 
The United States faced a dire economic situation in 1930; imports fell to 33 per cent of their 
1929 value.  But to increase imports, exports have to be increased too otherwise the nation 
would face a huge trade deficit.  At first the government considered unilateral reduction of 
tariff but ‘a number of considerations led to the Roosevelt administration’s decision to seek 
reduction in the high Smoot-Hawley
52
 rates, but only in exchange for “reciprocal” reductions 
by others.’53  This decision was combined with a ‘fundamental decision to continue the 
existing policy of avoiding discrimination among sources of supply.’54  This policy, under the 
GATT, metamorphosed as the principle of the most favoured nation.
55
  Therefore, to give a 
legislative backing to its foreign trade policy, the United States Congress enacted the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 with its express purpose being ‘to obtain foreign markets for U.S. 
exports in exchange for reductions in the United States’ tariff’56 (italics mine). Also 
noteworthy, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 reaffirmed the policy of extending the MFN 
treatment to virtually all countries.  But the US was mindful to limit such tariff reduction on 
products supplied principally by the trading partner so as to avoid ‘unrequited benefits’ going 
to other countries. 
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Again to show that the US did not set out to spread ‘the blessings’ of international trade to the 
rest of the world, Evans explains how the country tried to avoid spreading the benefits of the 
MFN to every country by devising an ingenious solution called ‘ex-ing out’.  Thus ‘… many 
countries produce and export chinaware; but the United Kingdom had a virtual monopoly on 
expensive bone china.  By reducing the duty only on bone china sold at more than a stated 
minimum price, the benefit of the reduction could be denied other china exporters without 
technical violation of the MFN.’57   Also the desire to protect domestic industry informed the 
choice of negotiation on item-by-item basis.
58
  The US pursued its trade policy of implied 
discrimination aggressively and from 1934 to 1945 concluded twenty-seven
59
 bilateral 
negotiations with different countries. 
 
Another remarkable development within the Kennedy Round was that the worsening 
economic situation in the US contrasted sharply with the economic growth in the European 
Economic Community (EEC).  As Evans puts it: 
During the first three years of its existence the European Common Market had achieved 
spectacular successes, which coincided with economic frustrations in the United States.  While 
the members of the new economic bloc in Europe had accumulated gold and foreign exchange, 
the United States had been steadily losing gold and increasing its liquid liabilities to 
foreigners.
60
 
 
The Americans thought that they were losing the trade game because the EEC was not open 
to competition and were determined that ‘something should be done’.  If, it was thought, the 
growing market in Europe could be made more accessible to outside competition, the 
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disappointing performance of American exports could be corrected.’61  In other words, the 
Americans pursued the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations aggressively so as to spread the 
contagion of their external trade deficits to other countries, especially to the EEC.  By so 
doing, they hoped, a level playing field would be created by cancelling the advantages of the 
EEC’s internal market, and thereby helping the United States maintain its dominant position 
in world trade.  Finally, when Prime Minister Macmillan announced in the House of 
Commons at the end of July 1961 that Her Majesty’s government would seek membership of 
the Common Market, the Americans were gripped with ‘both the dangers and opportunities 
inherent in the resurgence of Europe.’62  So the situation in the United States, especially its 
foreign policy, moved from admiration because the ‘creation of a Europe able to stand on its 
own feet bad been the purpose of the Marshall Plan’ to envy and jealousy because the six 
original members of the EEC were able within the first three years of the Common Market to 
‘collectively, increase their reserves by over $6.5 billion’63 
 
The major achievement of the Kennedy Round was the reduction of tariffs to an average of 8 
to 10 per cent.  This is monumental bearing in mind that ‘the U.S. tariff rate in 1933 stood at 
54 per cent following the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930.’64  It is also to the 
credit of the Kennedy Round that the US anti-dumping measure was brought into compliance 
with the GATT rules.  Again what was called the American Selling Price, a method of 
customs valuation applied primarily to benzenoid chemicals, was also dismantled during the 
Round. 
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2.3.2. The Tokyo Round (1973 – 1979)  
The Tokyo Round was also an idea conceived in the United States but born in Tokyo. 
On May 21, 1970, President Nixon appointed the Commission on International Trade 
and Investment Policy (known as the Williams Commission) to ‘study the principal 
problems, … assess U.S. policies, and produce a set of policy recommendations for the 
1970s which would take full account of the changes that have taken place on the world 
economic scene since World war II.
65
 
 
The Tokyo Round has been described by Robert S. Strauss, former United States Special 
Trade Representative (STR) as ‘an exercise in domestic American politics at its best.’66  
Strauss worked very much with Congress as much as he worked with foreign trading partners 
during the multilateral trade negotiations.  The United States negotiators were aware of the 
non-ratification of the Havana Treaty of the ITO by the Congress and eager to avoid a repeat 
of ‘where diplomats have achieved substantial accomplishments at the negotiating table only 
to have their final product rejected by the Congress and the American people.’67  At the 
international level the US negotiators knew that in any MTN ‘[t]here must be economic 
losers, as well as winners, in any trade negotiations. Ultimate success must be measured, 
when it’s all added up by whether or not there are net economic benefits from the final 
agreement.’68  It is not surprising that President Jimmy Carter signed the Trade Agreements 
Act (TAA) implementing the results of the Tokyo Round into law on 26 July 1979. 
 
The focus on the United States is because modern trade law and policy is intertwined with 
American foreign trade policy.  According to the Ray Group ‘the radical change in 
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international economic relations was originally based very largely on the resolve and 
generosity of the United States.  Given the position in which the European countries and 
Japan found themselves in 1945, economic co-operation with the United States was bound to 
be a one-sided affair.’69  However, the economic truth is that the United States was facing 
serious threats from the EC and Japan.  In the EC, intra-Community trade quadrupled 
between 1960 and 1970 while Japan’s economic growth from 1950 to 1970 was described as 
an ‘unprecedented performance’ because its economy was growing at a rate higher than 10 
per cent per year in real terms.
70
  It was clear that the formation of the EC presented non-
members with ‘trade disadvantages’ while the rapid recovery of Japan after the Second 
World War was no less a bad omen and a threat to US trade.  Obviously the debate changed 
in the United States form free trade to fair trade. 
 
What were the new landmarks reached in the Tokyo Round that made it appeal to all parties 
and made it sail through Congress with minimum opposition? (Its margin of success was 395-
7 in the US House of Representative and 90-4 in the Senate
71
).  The agenda for the Tokyo 
Round were further reduction of tariffs especially on agricultural goods, subsidies and 
countervailing duties, nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as ‘buy America’ and the role of the 
developing countries now acceding to the GATT.  According to Steinberg, ‘the Tokyo Round 
was closed with law-based bargaining’72 to the advantage of the developing and least-
developed countries because the Tokyo Codes were not presented as a single undertaking.  
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2.3.3. The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) 
The major achievements of the Uruguay Round are the extension of GATT-like rules to trade 
in services (GATS), trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), the 
introduction of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), a complete overhaul of the 
GATT dispute settlement system with the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding – DSU – for short, and the 
establishment of the WTO with the full apparatus of an international organisation. 
 
Like in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, the United States again had to take the initiative.  
Explaining why they had to do so Isaiah Frank writes: 
More than a decade has passed since 1982 when the United States took the initiative to 
propose the agenda for an eighth round of GATT trade negotiations as a follow-up to 
the Tokyo Round that concluded in 1979.  During that period, the pace of change in the 
nature and composition of international trade has accelerated.  International trade no 
longer conformed to the textbook model of an exchange of British cloth for Portuguese 
wine.  The specialisation of national firms in particular products is being increasingly 
replaced by the globalisation of production, in which different processes required for 
the production of individual goods and services are performed in different countries. 
An American automobile may be designed in Japan, assembled in Canada or Mexico, 
and consist of parts manufactured in Taiwan, Brazil, or just about anywhere.
73
 
 
In one phrase it was ‘the threat of globalisation’ especially what was then perceived in the 
United States as the ‘Japan problem’74 that made the United States initiate the Uruguay 
Round.  According to Frank, ‘Globalization’ … ‘means increased trade in parts, components, 
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and semi-finished goods.’75 Therefore, production must be spread around the world to make 
the products competitive and commercially sensible; the United States must secure the entire 
world for that purpose, legally and legitimately. 
 
Two other developments outside the control of the United States government helped spur 
America into action in lunching the Uruguay Round, namely, ‘the rapid advances in 
communications technology’76 and ‘the rapid rise in the importance of trade in services.’77  In 
other words, the United States took the initiative for the Uruguay Round ‘to extend the 
horizon … of (American) firms to conduct their operations worldwide’78 and being an 
industrialised country to reap bountiful harvests from the emerging market in intellectual 
property.  These prospects explain the establishment of TRIPS as part of the WTO and its 
enforcement through the DSU. 
 
Will Martin and Alan Winters hailed the Uruguay Round as ‘a milestone for developing 
countries.’79  This is highly debatable, but suffice it now to note that developing counties took 
more active parts in the Uruguay Round than in the previous rounds and so issues impinging 
on development that were of interests to them featured in the agenda even if perfunctorily 
touched or never discussed entirely. 
 
                                                          
75
 Ibid 241 
76
 ibid. 
77
 ibid. 
78
 ibid. 
79
 Will Martin and L. Alan Winters, ‘The Uruguay Round: a Milestone for Developing Countries,’ in Martin and 
Winters ed, The Uruguay Round and Developing Counties (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996) 1 
58 
 
As a result of noticeable roles or the presence of the developing countries an agreement was 
reached on agriculture but short chained with the conversion of nontariff barriers into tariffs.  
Other agreements were on substantial liberalisation of manufactured goods which developing 
countries would not benefit much from due to lack of manufacturing capacities; GATS 
establishing trade discipline in virgin territory though developing countries have little to 
export in this sector; TRIPS but not covering traditional knowledge and so of little benefit to 
developing countries – the barber’s swivel chair syndrome, all motion but no movement.  
According to Steinberg, ‘[m]ost developing countries got little and gave up a lot in the 
Uruguay Round’80 which he stated was ‘imposed imperially’81 because the US and the EC 
chose ‘to coerce by exiting the GATT and reconstituting the new system… they withdrew 
from the GATT 1947 and thereby terminated their GATT 1947 obligations (including the 
MFN guarantee) to countries that did not accept the Final Act and join the WTO.’82  The 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation makes all the trade agreements 
concluded in the Uruguay Round ‘integral parts’ of the WTO legal system and ‘binding on all 
Members’83 but ‘the GATT 1994 is legally distinct from the GATT 1947’84 (emphasis 
added).  By these provisions nobody could sue the EU or the US relying on the GATT 1947 
and so everybody was compelled to sign up to the onerous obligations of the GATT 1994 
even if thought to be against their national interest. 
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2.4. The WTO Era (1995 to date)  
I said there was a society of men among us, bred up from their youth in the art of proving by 
words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white, according as they 
are paid.  To this society all the rest of the people are slaves.  
 - Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels.85 
2.4.1 The infancy period (1995-1998) 
The transformation of the GATT into the WTO in 1995 was a watershed in the development 
of international economic law and trade policy.  This is because ‘the WTO is both a 
mechanism for exchanging trade policy commitments, and agreeing on a code of conduct’86 
standing on the tripod of the GATT-1994, the GATS, and the TRIPS with seven underlying 
principles: single undertaking, tariffs are the only permissible form of protection, non-
discrimination, reciprocity, enforcement of obligations, transparency and safety valves.
87
  
However, the WTO neither seeks to manage trade flows nor to determine its outcomes
88
 
contrary to the expectations of many not familiar with the law and policy of the organisation. 
 
Structurally, the WTO with its headquarters in Geneva seeks to achieve its aim through an 
organigram of which the Ministerial Conference is at the apex.  The Ministerial Conference 
meets at least once in two years and some of the conferences have ended in failure or 
disillusionment.  Under the Ministerial Council is the General Council which could meet as 
the Dispute Settlement Body when adjudicating on trade disputes or as the Trade Review 
Body when reviewing trade policies.  The General Council has got under it three specific 
councils: Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services and Council for Trade-
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property with committees on trade and environment, trade and 
development and sub-committees, for example, on least-developed countries (LDCs).
89
   
  
Article IV:1 of the WTO Agreement states: 
There shall be a Ministerial Conference composed of representatives of all the 
Members, which shall meet at least once every two years.  The Ministerial 
Conference shall carry out the functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to 
this effect.  The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to take decisions on 
all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested by a 
Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decision-making in this 
Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement. 
 
Therefore, the Ministerial Conference is the supreme body of the WTO but ‘it is not clear 
whether this very broad power to make decisions, in fact, enables the Ministerial Conference 
to take decisions that are legally binding on WTO Members’90 (italics in the original).  
Although the WTO Ministerial Conferences are meant to be held ‘at least once every two 
years,’ it has not been so. The following eight Ministerial Conferences have been held so far: 
Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998), Seattle (1999), Doha (2001), Cancún (2003), Hong Kong 
(2005) and Geneva (2009 and 2011). 
 
2.4.2 The Seattle Ministerial Conference 1999 
The Seattle Ministerial Conference opened with an apology by Ambassador Charlene 
Barshefsky (US) to all ‘the ministers and officials who were harassed’ during a 
                                                          
89
 WTO, Understanding the WTO, 5
th
 edn 2010,103 
90
 Van Den Bossche (n 3) 120 
61 
 
demonstration which she said the United States deplored as the ‘irresponsible action of a tiny 
minority.’91  Surya P. Subedi called the events in Seattle a ‘debacle’.92 
 
Slated for discussion at the Conference was agriculture which has proved to be very divisive 
from the days of the GATT due to the controversial topic of subsidies in developed countries 
and market access for the farm produce from developing countries.  On the first day (1 
December 1999) the ministers tried to discuss the text of the draft ministerial declaration 
which dealt with whether agricultural produce should ultimately be treated the same as 
industrial products, provisions for developing countries, further reduction in subsidies, 
protection and nontariff measures affecting market access and investment and competition 
policy.
93
 
 
A group of 45 Member States, mainly developing countries, ‘expressed concern and called 
for action regarding (a) difficulty in implementing certain WTO Agreements and asked for 
extension of deadlines in TRIPS, TRIMS, Customs Valuation, and (b) imbalance in certain 
Agreements and called for changes in certain provisions of the anti-dumping, subsidies and 
textiles agreements.’94  While Jamaica said that the 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries were marginalised regarding certain WTO issues, Japan said that improvement of 
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the Anti-Dumping Agreement was a lynchpin of the new Round.  The Conference ended in a 
deadlock as the ministers and officials neither agreed on developing countries issues nor on 
the industrialised countries demands. 
 
Regretting the failure of the Conference to reach any agreement, the WTO Director-General 
said, ‘I feel particular disappointment because the postponement of our deliberations means 
the benefits that would have accrued to developing and least-developed countries will now be 
delayed.’95  Again the underlying statement is still that the WTO is more beneficial to the 
developing countries and the LDCs.  Really? 
 
The editors of the Journal of International Economic Law characteristically ask legal scholars 
and observers of WTO Ministerial Conferences to give their ‘reaction comments’.  In the 
‘Reactions to Seattle,’ Gary Horlick96 reports that ‘the glass was more than full’ but qualifies 
it with ‘as much as the political will is present.’  He points out that the purpose of trade is ‘to 
raise living standards’ but fires a salvo at developing countries because they ‘came to Seattle 
with the unrealistic expectations that they could use the launch for immediate release from 
existing WTO obligations’ (much like Pip in Dickens’ Great Expectations).  Unfortunately 
none of the four observers published in the journal is from a developing country to give the 
journal’s very large readers a developing-country perspective and balance the reportage.  
Nonetheless, Horlick concedes that the Seattle Ministerial was marred by ‘evident rivalry 
between the US and the EU’ and ‘colourful protests in the streets of Seattle’ which ‘had little 
direct effect on the negotiations beyond wiping out the opening ceremony.’  Yet the 
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commentator observes that those ‘who lost at Seattle’ were fish, poor people, the US 
economy and the Clinton administrations’ – again there is a continuation of the meta-
narrative that the poor or the developing countries are the people the WTO was set up to help.  
By way of redeeming the pangs of distress of the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial on the 
poor, Horlick recommends (among others) ‘immediate agreement on market opening for 
poor-country products’ while the developed countries ‘especially the US, EU and Japan 
(should) talk like mercantilists but act like liberalisers.’  
 
Ernest H Preeg called the Seattle Ministerial ‘a watershed for the world trading system.’  He 
accounts for the ‘failure to agree on an agenda for a new round of trade liberalising 
negotiations’ as ‘a fundamental reorientation of national interests and relationships’ showing 
that the WTO is now truly multilateral’ because the ‘[d]eveloping countries have indeed 
become fully engaged in the WTO, and play a decisive role in all important decisions.’97  He 
traces the failure of the Seattle Ministerial to dashed hopes, unfulfilled expectations or 
‘unbalanced implementation’ (as he chose to call it) of the Uruguay Round Agreements.  He 
says: 
The principal commitment by industrialised countries to developing countries in that round 
was to progressively phase out import quotas on textiles and apparel over 10 years.  But after 
five years almost nothing has happened. 
Market opening by industrialised countries in the proposed new round was equally none-
forthcoming from the developing country point of view.
98
 
 
Instead of any of those, the US and other industrialised countries offer reduction in non-
agricultural tariffs which of course is of no benefit to developing countries most of which 
export primary products only.  Preeg testifies that he ‘made no converts to free trade’ in 
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Seattle and sums up that ‘the North still holds the trump cards.’99  It was hard to detect 
whether that was in a celebratory or despondent note, and harder still to contradict him. 
 
2.4.3 The Doha Ministerial Conference 2001: Taking Development to the WTO 
The result of the raucous ending of the Seattle Ministerial Conference is the acceptance by 
the developed countries that the WTO should have development as one of its major agenda 
items; therefore, the next Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar, ended with a 
ministerial declaration: the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
100
 formulated very much in 
language and objectives like the Marrakesh Agreement acknowledging that: 
(Paragraph 2) The majority of WTO Members are developing countries.  We seek to 
place their needs and interests at the heart of the Working Programme adopted in this 
Declaration.  
 (Paragraph 3) … recognise the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries 
and the special structural difficulties they face in the global economy. We are 
committed to addressing the marginalisation of least-developed countries in 
international trade and to improving their effective participation in the multilateral 
trading system. 
 
The Work Programme specifically mentions agriculture in paragraph 13 to work ‘to establish 
a fair and market-oriented trading system…to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions 
in world agriculture … (to undertake) substantial improvements in market access; reductions 
of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies … (and to address) non-trade 
concerns.’  
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It is not only developing countries’ trade ministers and diplomats that believe that the WTO 
should be concerned with development, international economic law scholars from developed 
and developing countries alike agree that the WTO should do development.  Tomer Broude 
states that ‘under the general appellation of ‘International Economic Law’ we should include 
many areas of international economic activity whose international legal regulation differs in 
intensity and depth, such as trade, investment, aid, monetary policy, labour migration and 
development.’101 
 
In respect of the Doha Ministerial, two groups of observers furnish us with comments: one 
from legal scholars (published in the Journal of International Economic Law) and the other 
from the NGOs in Oxfam briefing papers. 
 
The Journal of International Economic Law repeated the practice of asking legal scholars and 
observers of a Ministerial Conference to give their ‘reaction comments’ after the Doha 
Ministerial.  Jeffrey J Schott gave a general comment, Gary N Horlick questioned if the 
speedbump he noticed in Seattle had be jumped over, Alan Wm Wolff asked a direct 
question: ‘What did Doha Do?’;  Steve Charnovitz explored the legal status of the Doha 
Declaration, and Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillion examined the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
on the TRIPS and public health. 
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Jeffrey J Schott’s assessment of the Doha Ministerial is neither positive nor negative.  
According to him, ‘[t]he most conclusive statement one can make about the results of the 
Doha Ministerial is that the member countries of the WTO agreed to launch new trade 
negotiations’ not in a clear language but in a language ‘rich’ in ‘constructive ambiguity.’102  
The Ministerial ‘allowed very one to take home a trophy for their political constituencies’ and 
ended up being of a doubtful impact with members being uncertain as to whether ‘to accept 
the Doha results as a ‘single undertaking.”’103  He regards the Declaration as ‘merely a 
political document with ambiguous and possibly insignificant legal implications’104 a point 
Steve Charnovitz addresses in his contribution to the series of comments. 
 
Gary N Horlick continues his ‘speedbump’ metaphor and expresses his uncertainty as to the 
outcome of the results of the Doha Ministerial in a question: ‘[o]ver the bump in Doha?’  
Doha ‘is only a launch, no outcomes are guaranteed:’ market access remained a mirage 
because ‘no decision was made on the modalities for tariff cutting-formula, or request-and-
offer.’105  Again after all the talking when it came to implementation ‘most of the 
implementation issues were folded into the future.’106 
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Answering the question, ‘what did Doha do? Alan Wm Wolff says it ‘missed the 
opportunities’ to address ‘perhaps the most glaring problem with the current world trading 
system: the deeply flawed WTO dispute settlement system, … did not address in any 
substantive way the problem of restrictive business practices that impair market access, e-
commerce, agriculture, investment and taxation of trade ‘based on 1947-era rules that make 
no economic sense whatsoever.’107  He noted lack of goodwill and faith in the world trading 
system because the developing countries wanted to ‘pause from trade liberalisation,’ Europe 
‘to introduce goals regarding competition and environmental policies, and Japan ‘to 
undermine the foundation for tolerating open trading in industrial products’ that to him, in 
comparison with prior rounds, Doha might be called ‘The Retrenchment Round’ rather than 
‘The Development Round.’ 
 
Arguments fall on both sides as to the legal status of a declaration of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference.  Whether it is a mere political statement or legally binding was weighed by Steve 
Charnovitz.  His conclusion is that ‘[t]he legal status of the Doha Declarations is 
ambiguous.’108 
 
The question that is still left hanging after a decade of launching the DDA as Surya P Subedi 
puts it is, ‘Is it going to be a “Development Round” in more than a name?’109  Back in 2005 
Oxfam was of the view that ‘the rich countries squeezed development out of the WTO Doha 
negotiations.’110  The Round is still mired in controversies more than ten years after. 
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2.4.4 Cancún Ministerial 2003 
The Cancún Ministerial Conference was the first conference after the launch of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), but despite that, it was another conference that ended in failure 
because members remained entrenched, particularly in the ‘Singapore’ issues which were the 
four issues introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996 Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore: trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government 
procurement, and trade facilitation.
111
 
Perhaps coming with excessive optimism because of the gains they made at Doha in pushing 
development into the forecourt of international trade talks, the WTO members from the 
developing countries arrived in Cancún with the aim of consolidating their gains but that was 
not to be.  The issues that are of interests to them such as TRIPS and public health and 
poverty reduction as well as a sectoral initiative in favour of cotton proposed by Burkina 
Faso, Benin, Chad and Mali were sidelined.  
Like Seattle, Cancún also ended in a deadlock, without agreements.  However, the world 
noted one thing: developing countries stood together and spoke with one voice and their 
impacts were felt around the globe. 
 
2.4.5 The Geneva Ministerial Conference 2009 in the British Press 
The WTO received bad press in Britain in 2008 following serious disagreements among 
members on development that even the Director-General Pascal Lamy supported a call ‘to 
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suspend the Doha negotiations.’112  The Independent in its editorial declares, ‘The trade talks 
are over.  What now?’ stating that when the DDA  began ‘the world was much simpler and 
the issues appeared clearer … the whole map has been altered by the industrial take-off of 
China and India.’113  Explaining what the talks hinged on and why they collapsed, the paper 
says, ‘the developed countries led by the US have pressed even harder for access to those 
rapidly-developing markets, they in turn have proved much tougher in their negotiations, 
arguing that the western nations were able to grow rapidly only with a degree of initial 
protection of their markets.  So must the developing world.’114  As if blaming the developed 
countries for the collapse of the trade talks the paper headed its news story ‘Trade talks fail 
over US farm feud,’115 hailing the poorer countries for ‘standing up to the West, concluding 
that ‘No deal is better than a bad deal,’116 according to Matthew Coghlan, of ActionAid. 
 
The Times proclaims, ‘Peasant armies bring down the powerhouses behind the new world of 
global trade, brick by brick’ noting that ‘[t]he solution preferred in Delhi and Beijing is 
protection’ because while India accuses the West of ‘looking for commercial interests and 
enhancing prosperity rather than looking for content which reduces poverty,’ China ‘wants 
protection for its rice and soy bean farmers.’ The conclusion: ‘[i]t is political fear that ended 
the trade talks in Switzerland, fear of the countryside rampant.’117 
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While The Guardian came with the headline, ‘WTO talks collapse after India and China 
clash with America over farm products,’118 The Financial Times captured it cryptically as 
‘The blindfolds that wrecked a deal to boost global trade.’119  Again as the FT explains, 
‘Among rich nations, domestic politics militate against trade liberalisation,’ pointing out that 
‘[i]n the previous trade rounds, the rich nations set the rules and the rest could take it or leave 
it.’120  Summing up the Geneva fiasco Philip Stephens says that ‘Doha has been a story with 
few heroes.’121 
 
After the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, it was expected that 
another ministerial would be held before the end of 2007 but nothing happened until 
December 2009.  At the World Economic Forum in Davos, world leaders were trading 
accusations and counter accusations as to who dashed the DDA that the Financial Times 
headed its news item ‘Acrimony dashes Doha hopes’122  Lamy blamed the quagmire on the 
financial crisis of 2007/08 which ‘made it both easier and more difficult to conclude the 
round: easier because the crisis underlined the importance of the round, but more difficult for 
countries to make concessions that might harm parts of their electorate.’123  While the Indian 
Prime Minister blamed ‘the US election’ Celso Amorim, Brazil’s foreign minister, attributed 
the failure to ‘economic nationalism’ such as the ‘buy America’124 provisions in the fiscal 
stimulus package in the United States; but the Americans ironically point in a different 
direction, saying distractively, ‘[i]t will be very difficult to proceed in Doha unless we make 
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progress on labour and environmental standards,’125 according to Howard Dean, former 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee. 
 
Although the Seventh Ministerial Conference did take off in Geneva on 30 November 2009, 
it was more to make a political statement than to advance multinational trade negotiations.  
The Director-General of the WTO himself said it was not a negotiating session but ‘a 
platform for ministers to review the functioning of the house,’126 in other words, a 
stocktaking session – the DDA is still in the doldrums at the time of writing – a decade after 
its launch.   
 
In Geneva 2009 nothing concrete was said about the DDA except a statement by the 
Director-General Lamy that ‘the desire expressed by the ministers to conclude the Doha 
Round quickly has provided the “political energy” needed.’  But while the political energy 
may be there what is obviously lacking is the political will to conclude the Doha trade 
negotiations for economic recovery and poverty alleviation in developing countries. 
 
2.5 Summary 
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the 
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics. 
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
127
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‘Whose WTO is it anyway?’128 is the question asked by the WTO itself in the last chapter of 
its introductory brochure ‘Understanding the WTO.’  This chapter started by probing the 
‘why’ and ‘what’ of the Organisation and through extensive analysis showed why it came to 
be, its stated objectives and what it actually does.  In answer to their own question, the 
brochure says ‘[t]he WTO is “member-driven,” with decisions taken by consensus among all 
member governments’ which suggests it is a very democratic organisation.  The same WTO 
brochure contains an alternative view of Jeffrey J Schott that ‘an organisation with more than 
150 member countries cannot be run by a ‘committee of the whole.”’129  He suggests that in 
order to work more efficiently, the WTO should have an executive board, permanent seats for 
the major industrial countries on the board and weighted voting like the IMF and the World 
Bank.  If the suggestion is followed, the whole of Africa may not have one permanent seat 
contrary to the WTO meta-narrative of ‘ensuring that developing countries, especially the 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade’?130 
 
Jane Kelsey extends the question slightly further by asking, ‘Serving whose interests?’131  
She sees the GATS as ‘the tools of contemporary global capitalism.’  Although her book 
focuses on the GATS, what she says applies to the GATT, TRIPS and other appurtenances of 
the WTO.  It needs to be pointed out that capitalism is not bad in itself and that laws or 
agreements are put in place to check the abuse of the system or ameliorate the incidence of 
human activities on other people and the environment – hence the place of the WTO. 
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The Ministerial Conferences in Seattle
132
  1999, Doha 2001 and Cancún 2003 were marred in 
controversies over the relevance of the WTO to developing countries.  It is over ten years 
since it was launched,
133
 yet the Doha Development Agenda of trade negotiations is yet to be 
concluded due to lack of the political will to create a level playing field for all members.  
 
As shown above, the WTO was not established to do development but to extend the market 
of its developed states-founders.  If it is to serve the interests of developing countries, the 
initiative to recreate it must come from those not present at its creation, not from the hopeless 
goodwill of the founders. 
 
If the great economists Keynes, Hayek and Lewis could be incarnated and invited to attend 
the next WTO Ministerial Conference, what would be their advice to the Director-General on 
the way forward on the thorny issue of trade and development? In my opinion based on what 
we know about them and their works, they would most likely offer the following advice: 
 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1888 – 1946, died before the Nobel Prize in Economics was 
introduced in 1969): Reiterate the original remit of the World Bank; let it assume the name it 
had on the day it was set up as International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  As 
with the stimulus package for Europe called the Marshall Plan, draw up a Lamy Plan for 
developing counties and LDCs excluding Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and 
South Korea for ten years to stimulate economic growth and trade in other parts of the world.  
But note, and I say this with extreme caution, as the different results of the Marshall Plan in 
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Germany and the United Kingdom shows that a development plan is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic growth.  The enabling environment must be present.  
 
FRIEDRICH AUGUST von HAYEK (1889 – 1992, joint winner of the Nobel Prize in 
Economics 1974 for his ‘pioneering work and penetrating analysis of the interdependence of 
economic, social and institutional phenomena’): If you keep relying on the WTO Member 
States to get international economic law and policy right, the Doha Round will never be 
concluded and you will keep having protests and patch-ups especially if you choose venues 
within easy reach of protesters and with ample human rights conventions as shields for them 
– that was partly responsible for the absolute failure of Seattle and the modest success of 
Doha.  Liquidate the pecks of the victorious Allied Powers.  Japan has overtaken Britain and 
France looks up to China with envy.  The United States is still in the driving seat but without 
the seatbelt it had in 1947. 
 
SIR ARTHUR LEWIS (1915 – 1991, joint winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics 1979 for 
his ‘pioneering research into economic development with particular consideration of 
problems of developing countries’):  The WTO is fundamentally different from the GATT.  
Therefore, the GATT rules should no longer apply without modifications; same for GATT 
jurisprudence.  Panels and the Appellate Body should be pro-development in their decisions 
just as the European Court of Justice is pro-EU integration, citizens’ rights and the economic 
interests of Europe in its judgments.  Findings in favour of multi-national corporations
134
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hiding behind influential WTO Member States are an abdication of legal responsibilities to 
those the WTO was set up to serve, as stated in the Preamble of its establishment Agreement.  
 
Many states have suffered from discriminatory treaties skewed against them.
135
   At the 
moment that is where developing countries are in the law and policy of the WTO.  So far the 
Doha Development Agenda is not a ‘done deal’.  It is better stalemated, as it presently is, to 
show lack of the political will to make trade just and fair to all by the leading members of the 
WTO than concluded with three-quarters of the WTO membership bound to poverty.  As 
shown above, previously the United States initiated the rounds, selected the agenda and 
determined the outcomes which invariably were most favourable to its national interests, all 
stamped ‘world trade law.’  It is time other nations’ interests were considered. 
 
Part II The Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment 
2.6.1 Introduction to the Development of the MFN Principle  
The MFN originated as a treaty between two states to accord each other best terms of trade 
given to any other nation.  Strictly speaking the term is a malapropism and inappropriate in a 
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multilateral agreement covering almost all the nations of the earth.  Originally, the ‘MFN was 
very much a form of discrimination as only a few nations benefited from a given MFN 
clause.’136  However, Jackson states that ‘[d]espite the confusion over the phrase “most 
favoured” – which seems to imply a specially favoured treatment – the concept is one of 
equal treatment.’137  Therefore, from the outset it is important to draw attention to the words 
that may be somewhat misleading in the phrase, namely, ‘most’ and ‘favoured’ when, in 
reality, what it is meant is neither unique nor special but just equal hence it is now commonly 
characterised simply as ‘non-discrimination’ which, in my view, is a better description of the 
principle.  The aim of this part is to set out the context and current state of affairs of the MFN 
rule in the GATT; a detailed consideration of the GATT jurisprudence on the MFN is carried 
out in chapter 6 of this study.  This part will only consider the flow and ebb of the application 
of the MFN principle. 
 
2.6.2 Conditional and Unconditional MFN 
Classic examples of conditional and unconditional MFN have been given by Jackson, Davey 
and Pauwelyn.  Under conditional MFN, Jackson explains, ‘when country A grants a 
privilege to Country C while owing MFN to country B, then country A must grant the 
equivalent privilege to B – but only after B has given A some reciprocal privilege to ‘pay for 
it.’’138 
Under unconditional MFN, using the same illustration above, A must grant the equivalent 
privilege to B without expecting B to reciprocate by way of concessions.  As Davey and 
                                                          
136
 William J Davey and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of 
Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of “Like Product,”’ in 
Thomas Cottier and Petros C Mavroidis (eds) Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in 
World Trade Law,  (The University of Michigan Press 2000) 13 
137
 Jackson, (n 21) 156 
138
 ibid 161 
77 
 
Pauwelyn explain, ‘any advantage of the type covered by the obligation that State A grants to 
State C must also be afforded by State A to Sate B.  This obligation is unconditional.  State B 
benefits from the advantage whether or not it grants a similar advantage to State A.’139 
 
The practice in Europe had been unconditional MFN which ‘necessarily coincided with the 
decline of mercantilism’ till the birth of the United States of America in the 18th century, the 
industrial revolution and the ascent of capitalism.
140
  The GATT is based on unconditional 
MFN and the Keynesian economic theory of a free market. 
 
2.6.3 The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Law 
The MFN has a long history dating back to the twelfth century and has been speculated to be 
a ‘shorthand’ means of avoiding a litany of things in Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
treaties.
141
  But its long history notwithstanding, it could be asked whether an MFN or 
economic non-discrimination obligation could arise and assume a life of its own outside a 
treaty in customary international law.  Without an agrement such as the GATT, it is within 
the sovereign right of a nation to discriminate against other nations in their economic 
relations.  Thomas Franck explains that only ‘a rule which derives from a perception on the 
part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right 
process’ that is emanating or perceived as coming from ‘valid sources’ and also 
‘encompasses literary, socio-anthropological and philosophical insights’142 can lay claim to 
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legitimacy under customary international law (original italics).  Hudson’s143 five elements of 
custom of 
(i) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling 
within the domain of international relations, 
(ii) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time, 
(iii) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international 
law, 
(iv) general acquiescence in the practice by other States, and  
(v) the establishment of the presence of each of these elements by a competent authority 
do not seem to have settled the debates about the graduation of a practice into customary 
international law.  According to Chigara, ‘[t]he standard of sufficiency for each of the 
elements of customary international law remains undetermined.’144  In sum, the argument is 
not so much about the sources of customary international law but rather about its contents 
and whether a particular source has achieved a binding legal status.
145
 
 
  The MFN Treatment appears as Article I in the GATT,
146
 Article II in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
147
 and as Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
148
  It does not feature in any of the 
articles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM).  So it is good for 
GATT, for GATS and for TRIPS but not for TRIM, unlike National Treatment which appears 
in all four. 
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The MFN treatment which requires that ‘any favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties’ did not originate with the WTO.  Some researchers 
say it has its origins in medieval times’ bilateral commerce and trade treaties.149  A prominent 
example of the inclusion of the MFN principle in a treaty of commerce in the nineteenth 
century was in the Cobden-Chevalier (Anglo-French) Treaty of 1860 which was also 
bilateral.
150
  It was later appropriated
151
 by the GATT ‘club’ of twenty-three152 trading 
nations and later adopted by the WTO with the aim of exporting it to the whole world as a 
total package
153
 with ‘national treatment.’  
 
2.6.4 Object and Purpose of Article I (MFN) GATT 1994 
The object and purpose of the MFN obligation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is ‘to ensure 
equality of opportunity to import from, or to export to, WTO Members.’154  The Appellate 
Body referred to it as a ‘cornerstone of the GATT’ and ‘one of the pillars of the WTO trading 
system.’155 
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But the central position of the MFN obligation notwithstanding, the principle appears to be 
more honoured in breach than in observance as it has been very much vitiated by regional 
trade agreements.  As the WTO itself noted: 
By July 2005, only one WTO Member – Mongolia – was not party to a regional trade 
agreement.  The surge in these agreements has continued unabated since the early 1990s.  By 
2005, a total of 330 had been notified to the WTO (and its predecessor, GATT.  Of these 206 
were notified after the WTO was created in January 1995, 180 are currently in force; several 
others are believed to be operational although not yet notified.
156
 
 
The Sutherland Report on The Future of the WTO concluded that in the face of too many 
exceptions to the MFN obligation due to regional trade agreements entered into by WTO 
Members, the non-discrimination principle could now be rightly regarded as the exception 
rather than the rule.  In their words: 
[N]early five years after the founding of the GATT, MFN is no longer the rule; it is almost the 
exception.  Certainly, much trade between the major economies is still conducted on an MFN 
basis.  However, what has been termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of customs unions, common 
markets, regional and bilateral free trade areas, preferences and an endless assortment of 
miscellaneous trade deals has almost reached the point where MFN treatment is exceptional 
treatment.’157 
 
Article I:1 covers both de jure (origin-based) EC – Bananas III158 and de facto (superficially 
origin-neutral) measures as both the GATT Panel in EEC – Import of Beef159 and the 
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Appellate Body in and Canada – Autos160 made clear.  The first type (de jure and origin-
based) involves the likeness of the products at issue, while in the second type (de facto and 
origin-neutral) the MFN granted to one country is alleged to result in actual discrimination 
against like products form yet another country. 
 
2.6.5 The Scope of the MFN Obligation in the GATT 
Article I:1 GATT 1994 provides: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other Members.  
 
In addition to Canada – Autos161 mentioned in chapter 1, the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas162 
stated that ‘[n]on-discrimination obligations apply to all imports of like products, except when these 
obligations are specifically waived or are otherwise not applicable as a result of the operation of 
specific provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Article XXIV… irrespective of their origin.’ 
 
A likely consequence of the provision of Article I GATT 1994 is increasing the complexity of 
classification.  A classic example is the 1904 Swiss-German treaty providing for ‘a large dapple 
mountain cattle or brown cattle reared at a spot at least 300 metres above sea level and having at least 
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one month’s grazing each year at a spot at least 800 meters above sea level’163 all in an attempt to get 
some importer in and others out depending on their countries of origin.  Two GATT cases Japan – 
SPF and Spanish Coffee illustrate the confusion attendant on classification. 
 
In Japan – Tariff on Import of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber Canada complained that 
Japan’s tariffs on certain lumber cut to specific dimensions violated the MFN in the GATT.  While 
some species of coniferous trees was tariff-free in Japan, the type exported by Canada was dutiable at 
eight per cent.  Canada demanded that Japan accord the SPF timber it exports the same zero tariff 
accorded the others.  The GATT Panel held that tariff differentiations are ‘basically a legitimate 
means of trade policy’ and that ‘a contracting party which claims to be prejudiced by such practice 
bears the burden of establishing that such tariff arrangement has been diverted from its normal 
purpose so as to become a means of discrimination in international trade.’164  It then concluded that 
reliance by Canada on the concept of ‘dimension lumber’ was ‘extraneous to the Japanese’ and as 
such ‘not an appropriate basis for establishing ‘likeness’ under Article I of the GATT. 
 
Conversely in Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee,165 the Spaniards after 1979 subdivided 
its classification of unroasted, non-decaffeinated coffee into five parts three of which were slammed a 
duty of seven per cent.  (The Spanish tariff was not bound under GATT Article II on ‘Schedules of 
Concessions’).  Brazil which was the principal supplier of the type with duty imposed on it 
complained that Spain was in violation of the MFN principle.  After examining all the arguments 
advanced by the parties on the justification or otherwise of different tariff treatment, the Panel noted 
that ‘the arguments mainly related to organoleptic differences resulting from geographical factors, 
                                                          
163
 Jackson (n 21) 151  
164
 Japan – Tariff on Import of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, GATT Panel Report adopted 19 July 
1989, 36
th
 Supp. BISD 167 (1990) 
165
 Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, GATT Panel Report adopted 11 June 1981, 28th Supp. BISD 
102 (1982)  
83 
 
cultivations methods, the processing of the beans, and the genetic factor.’  It then concluded that such 
differences were not ‘sufficient reason to allow for a different tariff treatment.’166 
 
Noting the divergence in the decision of the GATT Panel, Jackson, Davey and Sikes ask, ‘was the 
discrimination challenged in SPF and Spanish Coffee the type of discrimination that the clause was 
designed to combat? Or should countries be free to classify products as finely as they wish for tariff 
purposes?’  Opinions are divided.  Among scholars within what Majlessi labelled ‘Jakson’s Paradigm’ 
the view is that the purpose of the MFN tariff negotiations is to encourage ‘narrower and narrower 
classification of goods’ and therefore the SPF case was a better decision.  However, among scholars 
who are pro-market access such as Chimni, Dillon and Pogge, their view is that Spanish Coffee 
reflects the purpose of the GATT and should be applauded.   
 
As stated at the outset, ‘economists have argued that there are fundamental, efficiency-
enhancing properties to trade agreements having MFN’167 but my underlying argument is that 
there is an economic threshold in international trade which a country must reach in order to 
be competitive.  Otherwise it may be better off outside the GATT.  ‘The central issue is,’ 
according to Hudec, ‘whether developing countries would do better by accepting the same 
GATT discipline as everyone else.’168 In Hudec’s view, ‘the GATT’s current policy is 
harming developing countries more than it is helping them.’169  This is due to the fact that the 
developing countries that accede to the GATT/WTO regime and submit to its disciplines 
cannot protect their infant industries based on Articles XVIII and XX which offer ‘general 
exceptions.’  If they did, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would declare it GATT-
inconsistent. 
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2.6.6 GATT Exceptions and Waivers 
There are three major exceptions to the MFN obligations in the WTO agreements: the general 
exceptions in Article XX GATT, the exceptions for customs unions and free trade areas in 
Article XXIV and the Special and Differential Treatment of developing countries following 
the redrafting of Article XVIII at the 1954-55 GATT Review Session.
170
 
i. Article XX GATT, General Exceptions 
The chapeau of Article XX GATT reads:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures:  
and is followed by ten conditions that would constitute legitimate exceptions to the GATT 
some of which are the protection of public morals, the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health, products of prison labour and the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value.  These provisions could be resorted to by any Contracting 
Party to the GATT whether a developed or a developing country. 
 
ii. Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas 
Article XXIV GATT provides a loophole that forms an exception to the Agreement.  While 
in a customs union, customs duties between the parties are eliminated and a common tariff 
with regard to third counties is adopted, in a free trade area, the parties only eliminate tariffs 
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between themselves but not adopt a common external tariff.
171
  Both free trade areas and 
customs unions by their very nature discriminate against non-members as we shall see in 
Turkey – Textiles in chapter 6.  While the GATT recognises the ‘desirability of increasing 
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration 
between economies of the countries parties to such agreements,’ it also recognises that they 
could constitute ‘barriers to trade’ between the constituent territories and other Contracting 
Parties.
172
  However, while the GATT does not prohibit the formation of free trade areas and 
customs unions, the Agreement demands specifically that  
duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such unions or 
interim agreement in respect of trade with Contacting Parties not parties to such union or 
agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of 
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such a union.
173
  
  
It is not clear how Article XXIV:5(a) expects nations to go into customs unions and free trade 
agreements
174
 but not impose on third countries duties ‘higher’ than the ones on their 
members.  This seems to defeat the purpose of having such a union or area.  Expectedly the 
interpretation of Article XXIV has been fraught with controversies over what I would like to 
call systemic issues.
175
 
 
iii. The Special and Differential Treatment and the Generalised System of Preferences (the 
Enabling Clause)
176
 
What the GATT/WTO agreements mediated by the WTO have failed to achieve in the over 
sixty years of their existence is integrating the developing and least developed countries into 
                                                          
171
 Article XXIV:8 GATT.  See also Jackson (n 21) chapter 6 ‘The Most-Favoured-Nation Policy’ particularly n 
34. 
172
 Article XXIV:4 GATT 
173
 Artciel XXIV:5(a) GATT 
174
 The GATS also allows for ‘economic integration’ in Article V. 
175
 The cases are discussed in chapter 6 of this work. 
176
 See Appendix 2. 
86 
 
the world trading system.  According to Edwini Kessie, the ‘developing countries as a group 
have not benefited significantly’177 from the world trading system and even though their 
share of world trade is said to have increased by 25 per cent, the beneficiaries have been a 
few countries, namely, Brazil, China, India, South Korea and South Africa; the forty-eight 
countries making up the LDCs have rather seen their share of world trade decline to less than 
0.5 per cent, a confirmation of their marginalisation in the world trading system.
178
 
 
The Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) is therefore a measure aimed at helping to 
integrate developing and least-developed countries into the world trading system.  The 
conceptual premise underlying the SDT is that ‘developing countries are intrinsically 
disadvantaged in their participation in international trade, and therefore, any multilateral 
agreement involving them and developed countries must take into account this intrinsic 
weakness in specifying their rights and obligations.’179  The purpose of the SDT 
notwithstanding, the debates surrounding it have been about its effectiveness and legal status. 
As stated at the outset, the former is outside the ambit of this work but the latter is within the 
purview and it is to the legal status that I devote the rest of this section. 
 
First I would like to examine briefly the fundamental shift in the attitudes of developing 
countries towards SDT.  Right from the moment they joined the GATT developing countries 
have always expressed the structural disadvantages they face in the world trading system and 
have demanded to be treated slightly differently.  However, the emergence and integration of 
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China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore into the world trading system made some 
developing countries question the rationale and overall effectiveness of import substitution, 
quantitative restriction and other trade restrictive policies.  Some felt that the costs 
outweighed the benefits and concluded that they would be better under a multilateral trading 
system conferring unconditional MFN to everybody.  Even before the start of the Uruguay 
Round in 1986 a good number of developing countries such as Nigeria had had to subject 
their countries to Structural Adjustment Programmes nigerialised as ‘otanisi’ (Igbo for a 
‘head bite’ which expresses the seriousness of the austerity measures) administered by either 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.
180
 
 
Again the proliferation of regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties which 
were perceived by the developing countries as a kind of divide-and-rule policies in addition 
to spiralling contingency protection measures made the developing countries feel more and 
better protected under a reinforced multilateral trading system which promised a more level 
playing field.  According to Gibbs, 
[W]hile seeking to preserve the differential treatment in their favour, they also began to 
defend the integrity of the unconditional MFN clause, obtaining MFN tariff reductions, and 
strengthening the disciplines of GATT … so as to prevent the restriction and harassment of 
their trade.  Particular emphasis was laid on an improved dispute settlement mechanism, as a 
means of defence against bilateral pressures from their major trading partners.  At 
UNCATAD IV (Belgrade 1983), all countries recognised the need to strengthen the 
international trading system based on the MFN principle (italics added).
181
 
 
So, slowly but surely the developing countries moved from open hostility to mild enthusiasm 
for the multilateral trading system with less emphasis on SDT.  An eminent persons group 
had earlier expressed the view that SDT had done nothing to advance the interests of the 
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developing countries but had instead produced perverse effects, on the developed countries, 
‘the tendency to treat them as being outside the system;’ and on the developing countries, 
‘allow(ing) themselves to be distracted by the idea of preferences … as an easy substitute for 
action in more essential areas.’182  The developing countries then fell under the spell of trade 
liberalisation and strengthened dispute settlement system but not a reinforced and legally 
binding Part IV
183
  on Trade and Development. 
 
Furthermore, two other factors made the developing countries acquiesce in the multilateral 
trading system.  First, the General System of Preferences from the developed countries to the 
developing countries such as the Lomé Convention all had expiry dates and were on the 
verge of running out.  Second, as explained in chapter 1, the GATT and the WTO 
Agreements were presented as a ‘Single Undertaking’ with no optional provisions.  
Therefore, as Kessie points out, ‘it is not entirely correct to assert that they (the developing 
countries) voluntarily accepted a dilution of SDT in exchange for market access and 
strengthened rules’184 because there were only the General Agreements or nothing. 
 
There are five kinds of SDT: provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities through 
market access,
185
 provisions requiring WTO Members to safeguard the interest of developing 
countries,
186
 provisions allowing flexibility to developing countries in rules and disciplines 
                                                          
182
 F Leutwiler et al, Trade Policy for a Better Future: Proposals for Action (Geneva, GATT Secretariat) 34 
183
 Part IV, GATT 1994  was drafted by the Committee on Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in 
Relation to LDCs and finalised in a Special Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES between 17 November 
1964 and 8 February 1965.   Effective de facto 8 February 1965 but de jure on 27 June 1966, 
184
 Kessie (n 177) footnote 23 
185
 Article XXXVII, GATT 1994 
186
 Article 9.1 Agreement on Safeguards 
89 
 
governing trade measures,
187
 provisions allowing longer transitional periods to developing 
countries,
188
 and provisions for technical assistance.
189
 
 
Irrespective of its kind, while the developing countries have always insisted on legal 
enforceability of all SDT provisions,
190
 the developed countries see them as no more that 
‘best endeavour’ clauses or gentlemen’s agreements wholly dependent on the whims and 
caprices of the giver and therefore not legally binding.  Their desire to see SDT enshrined in 
law notwithstanding, the language of the SDT provisions seem to undermine the position of 
the developing countries as they are couched in the phraseology of best endeavours.  For 
example, under the so called ‘commitments’ Article XXXVII GATT 1994 deploys ‘to the 
fullest extent possible,’191 ‘compelling reasons’ and ‘make it possible’ to wash off any 
illusion of legality in respect of all the obligations mentioned in Part IV. 
 
Expectedly, GATT/WTO jurisprudence on SDT is inconclusive.  In United Kingdom – 
Dollar Area Quotas
192
 the United States challenged quantitative restrictions imposed by the 
UK on grapefruit juice and orange juice which the UK claimed it did to protect vital 
economic interests of Commonwealth Caribbean countries.  The Panel avoided the 
substantive issue, namely, the compatibility of the measure with Part IV of the GATT and 
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merely ‘requested the parties concerned to actively seek a mutually acceptable solution to the 
problem which especially would pay due regard to the importance of the Caribbean countries 
and territories.’193 
 
Norway’s argument that the quantitative restriction it applied was done in the interests of six 
developing countries was flatly rejected by the GATT Panel in Norway – Restrictions on 
Imports on Certain Textile Products.
194
  According to the Panel, Part IV cannot be relied 
upon to avoid or circumvent GATT obligations in Part II, a ruling considered as meaning that 
Parts II and IV are disjunctive.  
 
However, in EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Desert Apples a similar line of argument by 
Chile hinged on the provision that ‘the developed contracting parties shall to the extent 
possible … refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, customs duties or non-
tariff import barriers on products currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-
developed contracting parties’ persuaded the Panel to hold that the EEC did not make 
‘appropriate efforts to avoid taking protective measures on apples originating in Chile’ and 
interestingly that Part IV is conjunctive with Parts I and II but without stating categorically 
that the EEC was in breach of Part IV.  An opportunity to advance the status of Part IV was 
missed in the following laconic but carefully chosen words ostensibly grounded on judicial 
economy: 
[T]he commitments entered into by contracting parties under Article XXXVII were additional 
to their obligations under Parts I – III of the General Agreements, and that these commitments 
thus applied to measures which were permitted under Parts I – III.  As the  EEC’s import 
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restrictions [were] inconsistent with [its] specific obligations … under Part II of the General 
Agreement, it … [was unnecessary] to pursue the matter further under Article XXXVII195 
(emphasis added). 
 
However, under the reinforced rules of the WTO, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
stated in EC – Tariff Preferences196 that the Enabling Clause is not binding but entirely at the 
discretion of the nations giving the preferences. 
 
Therefore, with respect to the SDT and their legal status, what the Appellate Body stated in 
Japan – Apples197 about the doctrine of precedent could be said to apply to special and 
differential treatments, that is, they merely ‘create legitimate expectations among WTO 
Members’ but not legal rights.  This is because while Article 3.9 of the DSU states that ‘[t]he 
provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek 
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making 
under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement,’ 
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement states that ‘[t]he Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements.’  It is the political organ (the Ministerial Conference) and 
not the judicial arm (the Dispute Settlement Body) that has the final word and that can adopt 
a Panel or an Appellate Body report. 
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iv. The problem with unconditional MFN 
The problem with unconditional MFN is that it seems to give too much power to countries 
with a very minor if not inconsequential share of the world trade.  Again the greatest trading 
nation the United States is more inclined towards conditional MFN and the corresponding 
reciprocity instead of the altruistic unconditional MFN as the following statement of 
Ambassador Yeutter reveals:  
We simply cannot afford to have a handful of nations with less than 5 percent of the world 
trade dictating the international trading destiny of nations which conduct 95 percent or more 
of international commerce in this world…  Services in particular must be in the round or we 
are just not going to have a new GATT round from the US standpoint; and we will have to 
confront those issues in a different way – plurilaterally or multilaterally.’
198
    
 
While the later part sounds bossy, the first part, it must be conceded, has both economic and 
moral weight to it.  Again the following statement of President Regan does not show an 
intention for a GATT that works well for all but one that is specifically geared towards the 
interests of the United States: 
To reduce the impediments to free markets, we will accelerate our efforts to launch a new 
GATT negotiating round with our trading partners, and we hope that the GATT members will 
see fit to reduce barriers for trade in agricultural products, services, technologies, investments 
and in mature industries.  We will seek effective dispute-settlement techniques in these areas.  
But if these negotiations are not initiated or if insignificant progress is made, I am instructing 
our trade negotiators to explore regional and bilateral agreements with other nations.
199
 
 
If these statements evince the real intentions of the US Government, then unconditional MFN 
is no more than a smoke-screen in international trade diplomacy. 
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2.6.7 ‘Like Product’ in Article I GATT 
Article I:1 makes it clear that the basis for demanding MFN treatment is that the products are 
alike and as such should be granted the same ‘favour, privilege or immunity’ irrespective of 
country of origin.  The Appellate Body has used the imagery of the accordion to characterise 
the concept of ‘like product’ showing that it is taken on a case-by-case basis whether what is 
alleged is de jure or de facto discrimination.  According to the Appellate Body, 
[t]he concept of ‘likeness’ is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion.  The 
accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the 
WTO Agreement are applied.  The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be 
determined by the particular
200
 provision in which the term ‘like’ is encountered as well as by 
the context and circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provisions may 
apply.
201
 
 
2.7 Summary 
The MFN underpins the principle of non-discrimination in the GATT.  Nations started with 
conditional MFN and acquiesced in the unconditional MFN under the multilateral trading system but 
that has not eliminated the tendency for some countries to resort to actions in breach of the obligations 
under the GATT.  The next subsection will examine the principle of National Treatment. 
 
Part III The National Treatment Principle 
2.8.1 Introduction 
The National Treatment principle complements the MFN as the second arm of the principle of non-
discrimination on which the multilateral trading system under the GATT regime rests.  It anchors the 
philosophy of the General Agreement that protection should be transparent and only by way of 
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tariffs.
202
  While the MFN deals with tariffs prohibiting discrimination between goods from different 
countries, the National Treatment clause outlaws the use of internal taxes or regulations to 
discriminate between domestic goods and imported ones.
203
   It stipulates that imported products 
should be treated in the same way as domestic products once they have been cleared through the 
customs.  The National Treatment clause dates back to ancient laws and agreements and has been 
identified in ancient Hebrew Law,
204
 treaties of commerce between England and other countries in the 
Middle Ages,
205
 the German city states making up the Hanseatic league and somewhat recently 
between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries in shipping treaties amongst European powers.
206 
 
In Article III GATT 1994 the National Treatment provision is primed towards two measures 
considered to be counter-productive to international trade, namely, internal tax measures
207
 
and regulatory measures.
208
   Article III:1 states: 
The contracting parties recognise that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic products.
209
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95 
 
The rationale behind the National Treatment principle was to hedge in the MFN principle, to 
protect concessions made in tariff bindings based on the MFN principle from being sabotaged 
by internal taxes or other regulatory measures otherwise the MFN would in itself be rendered 
nugatory or ineffectual.
210
  Therefore, once the products originating in a contracting state has 
entered the market of another contracting state, ‘it shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, 
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.’211  This is meant to prohibit not only formal de jure 
discrimination, but also de facto discrimination.
212
 
 
But the GATT extended the National Treatment principle; instead of applying the principle to 
only cases of imports that were subject to tariff bindings, it extended National Treatment to 
internal taxes and regulatory measures that impacted on imports discriminatorily.  So apart 
from internal taxes on imported products, regulatory measures on domestic products which 
confer on domestic products some advantages and have discriminatory effects on imported 
products all come under Article III of the GATT. 
 
The key provisions of Article III are paragraph 1 establishing the general principle, paragraph 
2 requiring National Treatment in respect of internal taxation, paragraph 4 requiring ‘no less 
favourable’ treatment of imported products than like domestic products and paragraph 8 
which creates exceptions to the National Treatment principle with respect to (a) government 
procurement and (b) subsidies.  ‘The significant difference between the national treatment 
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obligations set forth in Article III:4 and Article III:2,’  Michael Trebilcock points out, ‘is that 
Article III:4 in its wording only applies to “like” products and not to “directly competitive or 
substitutable” products.’213 
 
2.8.2 The National Treatment Principle under the GATT Dispute Settlement System 
As will be reviewed in chapter 6, there have been many GATT/WTO panel and Appellate 
Body rulings on the interpretation of Article III but the two most important ones are probably 
Italy – Agricultural Machinery and US – Section 337 both of which were GATT panel 
reports.  Their importance lies in the fact that the former delineated the provisions of Article 
III early in the life of the GATT and the latter consolidated the legal principles laid down 
thirty years after the first interpretation.  Taken together, they provide answers as to the scope 
of Article III.   
 
In Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery
214
 the United Kingdom 
challenged an Italian law (No 949) pursuant to which the Italian Government had established 
a fund, used to grant special credit terms for the purchase of agricultural machinery made in 
Italy.  The loans were granted at 3 per cent for a period of five years to finance up to 75 per 
cent of the cost of the Italian agricultural machinery.  However, should the purchasers wish to 
buy foreign machinery, the credit terms would be less favourable.  The UK indicated that the 
commercial credit rate stood at 10 per cent. 
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The UK alleged a breach of Article III:4.  They would not challenge the consistency of the 
Italian Law No 949 with the General Agreement on subsidies which the Italian Government 
was minded to provide domestic producers of tractors as that would be in line with Article III 
paragraph 8(b).  The complaint of the UK hinges on the fact that in this case the assistance of 
Italy was not given to producers but purchasers and as such was not covered or protected by 
the provisions of paragraph 8(b).
215
 
 
Italy had defended its law and action by stating that the General Agreement was a trade 
agreement with its scope limited to ‘measures governing trade’ and as such that Article III:4 
applied only to laws, regulations and requirements which were concerned with the actual 
conditions for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use and should not be interpreted 
extensively.  
 
Italy also argued that ‘it would be inappropriate for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
construe the previsions of Article III in a broad way’ because to do so ‘would limit the rights 
of the contracting parties in the formulation of their domestic economic policies in a way 
which was not contemplated when they accepted the terms of the General Agreement.’216 
 
The Panel noted that the provisions of Article III:4 were not exactly the same in its French 
and English originals and it was the French version which provides that the imported 
products ‘ne seront pas soumis à un traitement moins favorable’ that was submitted to the 
Italian Parliament as against the English which reads ‘the imported product shall be accorded 
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treatment no less favourable’ and so that might have influenced the contention of the Italian 
Government.
217
   
 
However, both in English and French the text of paragraph 4 refers to laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting internal sale and other activities and not to law, regulations and 
requirements governing the conditions of sale or purchase.  According to the Panel,  
[t]he selection of the word ‘affecting’ would imply … that the drafters of the Article intended 
to cover in paragraph 4 not only the laws and regulations which directly governed the 
conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations which might adversely modify 
the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported products on the internal 
market.
218
 
 
The Panel then suggested to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to ‘draw the attention of the 
Italian Government to the adverse effects on the UK exports of agricultural machinery, 
particularly tractors, of those provisions of Law 949 limiting the prescribed credit facilities to 
purchasers of Italian produced machinery.’  Lastly, the Panel recommended that the Italian 
Government should ‘consider the desirability of eliminating within a reasonable time the 
adverse effects of the Law on the import trade of agricultural machinery by modifying the 
operation of the Law.’219 
 
Secondly, in the United Sates – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930220 the European 
Communities complained that the Section 337 of the US Tariff Act violated Article III of the 
GATT.  The Act declared as unfair and unlawful any acts or methods of competition which 
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had ‘the effect or tendency to (1) destroy or to substantially injure an industry efficiently and 
economically operated in the United States, (ii) prevent the establishment of such an industry, 
or (iii) restrain or monopolise trade and commerce in the United States.’221 
 
The facts as put to the Panel are that, in patent infringement cases, proceedings before the 
United States International Trade Commission (USITC) under Section 337 are only 
applicable to imported products alleged to infringe a United States patent, and they are 
markedly different from those applying to products of US origin challenged in a federal 
district court for patent infringement.  The EC maintained that the differences in proceedings 
amounted to a treatment less favourable for imported products and therefore inconsistent with 
Article III:4 of the GATT and unjustifiable under Article XX(d). 
 
The Panel had to consider the relationship of Article III to Article XX(d).  Both the US and 
the EC agreed that Article III:4 applies to substantive patent law as it affects ‘internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use’ of imported and domestic 
products.  Again the parties agreed that what was at issue was not the consistency of 
substantive provisions of US patent law.  They also agreed that in cases of alleged patent 
infringement, Section 337 is applied to secure compliance with US patent law.  The 
contention of the parties, however, centred on whether a measure aimed at securing the 
compliance with US patent laws, as opposed to the part of the substantive patent law itself, is 
covered by Article III:4. 
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Although the Panel ‘found that some elements of Section 337 are inconsistent with the GATT 
obligations of the United States, it found no evidence that these elements had been 
deliberately introduced so as to discriminate against foreign products.’222   Nonetheless, ‘the 
Panel concluded that Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 is inconsistent with Article 
III:4 … and … cannot be justified under Article XX(d).’223 
 
Therefore, the Panel was of the view that Article III:4 makes no distinction between 
substantive and procedural laws, regulations or requirements; that enforcement procedures 
cannot be separated from the substantive provisions that they enforce,
224
 and that the ‘no less 
favourable’ treatment requirement set out in the article is ‘unqualified’.225 
 
2.8.3 ‘Aims and Effects’ versus National Treatment 
The GATT/WTO jurisprudence favours trade liberalisation over the ‘aims-and-effect’ test.  
The only GATT case where the ‘aims-and-effect’ principle was applied was in US – Malt 
Beverages but the Panel report was never adopted by the CONTRACTING PARITES and so 
it cannot be cited as an authority even for persuasive purposes only.
226
  In Japan – Alcoholic 
a WTO panel rejected the ‘aims-and-effect’ test while interpreting Article III:2 mainly 
because it was not couched in treaty language and that its application would have rendered 
Article XX superfluous.  According to the Panel: 
Article III:2, first sentence does not refer specifically to Article III:1.  There is no specific 
invocation in this first sentence of the general principle in Article III:1 that admonishes 
Members of the WTO not to apply measures ‘so as to afford protection.’  This omission must 
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have some meaning.  We believe the meaning is simply that the presence of a protective 
application need not be established separately from the specific requirements that are included 
in the first sentence in order to show that a tax measure is inconsistent with the general 
principle set out in the first sentence.
227
  
 
However, with respect to the second sentence of Article III:2 which refers specifically to 
Article III:1, the demonstration of trade-distorting effect becomes crucial but this mentions 
only ‘taxes and other internal charges’ and not ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ 
mentioned in Article III:1. 
 
Under the GATS, the WTO Appellate Body also rejected the ‘aims-and-effect’ test in EC – 
Bananas
228
 with respect to Article III:4 which refers only to ‘like products’ and not to 
directly competing products.  The Appellate Body said,  
We see no specific authority either in Article II (MFN Treatment) or in Article XVII 
(National Treatment) of the GATS for the proposition that the “aims and effects” of a 
measure are in any way relevant in determining whether that measure is inconsistent with 
those provisions.  In the GATT context, the ‘aims and effects’ theory had its origins in the 
principle of Article III:1 …. There is no comparable provision in the GATS.229 
 
William J Davey and Joost Pauwelyn describe the rejection of the aims-and-effect test of the 
contested measure in Japan – Alcohol as ‘a positive development’ because, in their view, 
when it comes to determining whether two products are ‘like,’ the objective characteristics of 
the product itself are what should matter.  Again, in their view, ‘a decision on likeness can 
never be completely objective and the concept of equal treatment is tautological.’230 
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Logical, nonetheless, but the argument of the United States in US – Section 337 and the 
ruling of the GATT Panel in the case shows that a measure that was conceived entirely for 
some innocuous reasons that have nothing to do with protectionism could be found to be 
inconsistent with the General Agreement.  Therefore, this limits the policy space available to 
governments for economic growth and development.  
 
2.8.4 National Treatment and Foreign Investment 
As demonstrated in the immediate preceding section, foreigners who take their goods to other 
GATT Contracting States Parties insist on and do get the National Treatment for their 
products which is a ‘treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin.’231  In respect of the goods, all that matters is the preservation of effective 
equality of competitive opportunities so as not to disturb the equilibrium between domestic 
and foreign like products.  However, when the same foreigners take their capital to other 
countries to invest, they demand a treatment higher than that given to nationals and this 
causes friction and the position of international law on this is far from being settled.  This 
‘relative lack of international regulation,’ Cassese points out, ‘favours the economic 
development of the more powerful States.’232 
 
As Emmanuel Laryea notes, ‘the current construction and application of the principle, 
requiring importing countries to treat imports and exports equally, clearly favours exporting 
countries, and disadvantages importing countries…. The NT principle is, thus, more 
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beneficial to developed economies.’233  If the application of National Treatment to trade in 
goods demanding equality of competitive opportunities is disadvantageous to developing 
countries, National Treatment in international investment which demands a more favourable 
treatment of foreigners in cases of expropriation or nationalisation is even more 
disadvantageous and expectedly has been met with stiff opposition all around the world. 
 
The protection of foreign property has been an incessant cause of friction between nations.  
Following the birth of the USSR and the rise of communism in October 1917 (by the old 
Russian calendar) the new Soviet Government nationalised all foreign property and 
businesses without any provision for compensation.  There was no distinction made between 
property owned by Russian nationals and foreigners.  The United States protested in its own 
right and on behalf of others that they ‘all considered that the decrees on the repudiations of 
Russian State debts, the confiscation of property and other similar measures were without 
effect as regards their nationals.’234  Later the Soviet Union was compelled to provide some 
form of indemnity or compensation for the nationalised assets, the so-called Litvinov 
Assignment, but did not higher than affected Soviet citizens got. The Western powers, on 
their part, had to make some form of compromise; they never accepted the Soviet position as 
legal but had to come to terms with the ‘facts on the ground’ and the United States formerly 
extended recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933.
235
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Following the success of the Mexican Agrarian reform of 1927 a different revolution swept 
across Mexico in the late 1930s and by a decree of 18 March 1938 the Mexican Government 
seized the property of the American, British and Dutch oil companies operating in the 
country.  The Mexican government justification of its action had this logic and tempo: 
There does not exist in international law, any principle universally accepted by countries, nor 
by the writers of treatises on this subject, that would render obligatory the giving of adequate 
compensation for expropriations of a general and impersonal character.  Nevertheless, Mexico 
admits, in obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed under obligation to indemnify in an 
adequate manner; but the doctrine which she maintains on the subject, which is based on the 
most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises on international law, is that the time and 
manner of such payment must be determined by her own laws.
236
 
This note of the Mexican Foreign Minister represents the position or view of the developing 
countries.  
 
The Western view as expressed by the US Secretary of States Cordell Hull in subdued 
indignation, rebuttal and threat states:  
I do not hesitate to maintain that it is the first occasion in the history of the western 
hemisphere that such a theory has been seriously advanced.  In the opinion of my 
Government, the doctrine so proposed runs counter to the basic precepts of international law 
and of the law of every American republic, as well as to every principle of right and justice 
upon which the institutions of the American republics are founded.  It seems to the 
Government of the US a contention alien to the history, the spirit and the ideals of democracy 
as practised throughout the independent life of all nations of this continent.  
If such a policy were to be generally followed, what citizen of one republic making his living 
in any of the other twenty republics of the western hemisphere could have any assurance from 
one day to the next that he and his family would not be evicted from their home and bereft of 
all means of livelihood?  Under such conditions, what guarantees or security could be offered 
which would induce the nationals of one country to invest savings in another country, or even 
to do ordinary business with the nationals of another country.
237
 
 
What came to be known as the Hull formula and the prevailing Western view is that 
compensation should be ‘prompt, adequate and effective.’ 
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While many jurists supported the Western view, the Mexican position did not lack 
intellectual support from the leading legal minds of the time.  Among the distinguished 
scholars who did not take the official view of the Great Powers were ‘the British Sir John 
Fischer Williams and Brierly, the Italian Cavaglieri, the Belgian Rolin and the Frenchman 
Duguit.’238  Their position was that no government is under any obligation to pay 
compensation if expropriating or confiscating private property for public good unless it had 
entered into a treaty to that effect.  This partly accounts for the current proliferation of 
investment treaties both bilateral and regional.  Fischer Williams perceptively and articulately 
argued: 
If Sates have not the same freedom to deal by law with the property of aliens as with the 
property of their own nationals, by what act or omission of their own have they been deprived 
of it?  Whiteacre belongs to a British subject: the British Parliament is sovereign to 
expropriate him how and when it pleases.  The British subject sells Whiteacre to an alien: 
Parliament has lost a portion of its former power.  But Parliament has done nothing and has 
omitted nothing.  On what principle must it suffer an abridgement of its authority by the act of 
third parties – a British vendor and an alien purchaser – both of whom are in this respect 
persons subject to its power?
239
 
 
Cassese argues that the ‘prevailing view voiced by Fischer Williams and the other jurists 
referred to above were different from those underlying the Third World assault on the duty of 
compensation.’240   Granted that the jurists underscored the fact that the expropriation should 
be for ‘the common good’, he is silent on the Russian ‘assault’ (if that is what we must call it) 
of 1917 and the agrarian reform in Rumania in 1921 which were blatant confiscations without 
compensations.  Cassese even seems to have conceded that faced with the great slump of 
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1929 the ‘intervention of the State proved necessary to avert a worsening of the economy’241 
in the United States. 
Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist argued, 
[i]t is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same right to 
protection as nationals, but they ought not to lay claim to a protection more extended.  If they 
suffer any wrong, they ought to count on the government of the country prosecuting the 
delinquents, and not claim from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any 
pecuniary indemnity.  
… 
The rule that in more than one case it has been attempted to impose on American states is that 
foreigners merit more regard and privileges more marked and extended than those accorded 
even to the nationals of the country where they reside. 
The principle is intrinsically contrary to the law of equality of nations.
242
 
 
This doctrine which has found acceptance and is enshrined in some Latin American 
constitutions
243
 is contested in the West and is far from being ‘certain’.  It has also spread to 
Africa as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977 which were aimed at 
indigenising the ownership of companies based in the country show.
244
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In interpreting the article, the Supreme Court of Mexico ruled,  
[Article 27] sought to eliminate the classical concept which defined the right of property as an absolute 
untouchable right, and to replace it with a concept which recognises private property as a social function.  Thus, 
private property would not be the exclusive right of one individual, but a right subordinated to the common 
welfare. 
 
In Chile a similar provision Article 10(10) of the Constitution of 1925 only adopted in 1967 reads:  
No one may be deprived of his property except by virtue of a general or special law which authorises 
expropriation for reasons of public utility or social interest determined by the legislature. … The law shall 
determine the norms for fixing compensation, the tribunal which shall hear claims concerning the amount of 
compensation according to law, the form of satisfying the obligation to compensate, and the opportunities and 
manner in which the expropriating agency shall take material possession of the expropriated property.  
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In Europe and North America, the prevailing view has found judicial support in arbitral 
awards and judicial rulings.  In a dispute between Norway and the United States where the 
US requisitioned ships being constructed in American shipyards for war during World War I, 
the US agreed to pay for only the value of the materials actually taken which they estimated 
at $2.6 million.  The Norwegian owners of the shipyard demanded the full value of the ship 
including interests, all amounting to about $18 million.  The arbitral tribunal under the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration found essentially for Norway and stated: 
Whether the action of the United States was lawful or not, just compensation is due to the 
claimants under the municipal law of the United States, as well as under the international law, 
based on the respect of private property.
245
 
 
It is interesting that the award referred directly to both US law and international law.  The 
United States paid the amount awarded but Secretary of States Hughes (later Chief Justice of 
the US) wrote that ‘the award cannot be deemed by this Government to possess an 
authoritative character as precedent.’246 
 
In another war-related dispute, the Chorzow Factory
247
 case grew out of boundary 
adjustments between Germany and Poland and the subsequent Polish government takeover of 
a nitrogen factory erected in Poland when the territory was part of the German Reich based 
on a Geneva Convention on the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles authorising it.  
The property in Silesia was credited to Germany as part of her obligations to make 
reparations for the war.  The Polish position was that the Chorzow factory had been owned 
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by the German government, or that it had fraudulently transferred it to individuals.  The 
World Court found in favour of Germany that she was entitled to the full value plus interests.  
It ruled: 
It follows that the compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily limited to 
the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of 
payment ….  
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a principle which 
seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed.
248
 
 
The Chorzow Factory case is quoted incessantly by various groups in support of various 
propositions: (a) as an enunciation of the principle of compensation in cases of State 
expropriation of private foreign property, (b) as showing that unlawful expropriation in 
violation of express treaty provisions demands higher compensation than lawful ones carried 
out in exercise of State sovereign powers in public interest, and (c) that the case was brought 
pursuant to the Peace Treaty and the Geneva Convention of 1922 and as such should not be 
taken as stating a rule of customary international law.
249
  
 
2.9 Summary  
This chapter started with an overview of the formation of, first, the GATT; then, the WTO, 
and how each fitted into the Bretton Woods structure of post-World War II Keynesian 
economic order.  It analysed how against the backdrop of the collapse of the League of 
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Nations and the International Trade Organisation efforts were made to tailor the GATT/WTO 
to suit the foreign economic policy of the United States and the dominant European powers. 
 
The second part analysed in some detail how the United States started with conditional MFN 
but later changed to unconditional MFN and persuaded other countries to have it enshrined as 
the key provision of the General Agreement.  My analysis shows how efforts were made to 
ameliorate the constraints of the MFN principles by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES 
so that they will have the much needed policy space for growth by building in the so-called 
general exceptions which the States are yet to use to found an action that would otherwise 
have been considered to be GATT-inconsistent. 
Lastly, Part III has shown how the National Treatment principle has been used to demand for 
equal treatment with national products of foreign goods but an extended treatment above that 
given to nationals when it comes to foreign investment and the ensuing arguments on all 
sides. 
 
The next chapter will explore the concept of growth and economic development which are 
what the MFN, the National Treatment or the GATT generally is meant to deliver as a 
dividend from the multilateral trade agreement.  
110 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Development Debate in International Trade Law 
 
Outline 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 The Evolution of the Right to Development 
3.3 Hierarchy of Rights? 
3.4 Current Debates and Declarations 
3.4.1 The Views of International Economic Lawyers 
3.4.2 The UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development 
3.4.3 The Millennium Declaration  
3.4.4 The Monterrey Consensus  
3.4.5 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
3.4.6 The Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement 
3.4.7 The Open-Ended Working Group 
3.4.8 The High Level Task Force 
3.4.9 The UN General Assembly Resolution 63/178 on the Right to Development 
 
3.5 The Legal Status of the Right to Development 
3.6 The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights 1981 
3.7 The WTO Ministerial Conferences 
3.8 The MFN and Development 
3.9 The National Treatment Principle and Development 
3.10 The Development Dimension of the National Treatment Principle 
3.11 National Treatment and TRIPS 
3.12 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body and Development 
3.13 Oxfam on the WTO and the Right to Development 
3.14 Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The debate about trade and development is analogous to the debate about economic 
(austerity) measures and growth which saw Françios Hollande elected as Socialist President 
of France
1
 and led to an inconclusive election in Greece.  However, one major difference 
between the two is that while world leaders have been forced by the French electorate to 
concede that austerity should have a growth dimension, the same world leaders are yet to 
agree that development should underpin the GATT.
2
  Another contrast between the two is 
that while the economic interests of the biggest trading nations are tied to the Euro-zone 
economy, ECOWAS seems to be at the fringes of world trade.  Prime Minister David 
Cameron stated that the Euro-zone crisis ‘carries huge risks for everyone’ and the Governor 
of the Bank of England Sir Mervyn King was quoted as saying that ‘[o]ur greatest trading 
partner is tearing itself apart with no obvious solution.’3  Therefore, it appears that the interest 
in the Euro-crisis stems from the fear of contagion, the spread of the crisis to Britain and 
other countries.  Labour Party leader Ed Milliband went as far as declaring that it was ‘time 
to end the arrogance of “Camerkozy” economics,’4 referring to the economic policies pursued 
by the British, German and French leaders without any significant boost to the economy.  
Even a re-run of the election in Greece on 17 June 2012 has been referred to as a ‘referendum 
on euro membership’.5  There is no corresponding desire and genuine political will to see 
growth and development in ECOWAS and other developing countries as their share of world 
trade does not mean much to the rest of the world.    
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This chapter will analyse the efforts to enshrine the right to development (RtD) as a universal 
human right, the current debates (which reflect the views of experts such as the UN 
independent expert on the right to the Rtd, scholars, leading economists and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)) and the legal status of the RtD side-by-side with the 
principles of the MFN and national treatment.  
 
3.1.1 Historical Background: Evolution of the Right to Development 
The right to development (RtD) comes under human rights which in international law are 
protected at the UN level by two legally binding covenants, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
6
 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
7
  The ICESCR emphasises the right to economic development, 
among others.
8
  Direct references and oblique allusions to economic development can be 
traced back to the Charter establishing the United Nations Organisation (UN).  The Preamble 
to the Charter states the determination of the UN ‘…. to promote social progress and better 
standards of life … to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples.’   Article 1 of the Charter sets out ‘promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’ as the purpose of the UN.  Article 55(a) links 
‘peaceful and friendly relations among nations’ to ‘conditions of economic and social 
progress and development.’  Article 60 entrusts the General Assembly (GA) with the 
responsibility for ‘international economic and social co-operation’ which it will discharge 
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through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  Article 68 empowers ECOSOC to 
form commissions which it did with the Commission on Human Rights formed in 1946.  
Under Article 13 the GA is mandated to conduct studies and make recommendations on the 
observance of both the ICCPR
9
 and the ICESCR.
10
   
 
The RtD is not expressly stated in the three most important human rights documents that 
followed the UN Charter and are together referred to as the Bill of Human Rights
11
 due to the 
political situation in the world at the time.  Both in politics and academia ‘first’ and ‘second’ 
generations have been used to characterise the rights contained in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR respectively with each demanding different duties from the state.  ‘[T]he first-
generation of rights invokes the duty to respect and protect, while the second-generation 
rights invoke the duty to protect and fulfil’ yet ‘both covenants identify the individual human 
person as the right-holder.’ 12  
 
At the UN, the Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) 1986
13
 was passed with a 
very large majority, but not a unanimous vote
14
 due to, in the views of the UN Independent 
Expert on the RtD Mr Arjun Senguta, ‘the conceptual differences … reflecting the tensions of 
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the Cold War period.’15  Those ‘conceptual differences’ divided the world into three parts 
with some rights identified with each position: the so-called First World, the industrialised 
countries of Western Europe and North America which oppose the right to development but 
champion civil and political rights, the socialist Second World of communist countries that 
supports economic, social and cultural rights and the Third World made up of the developing 
countries, mostly in Africa, who are the foremost advocates of the right to development and 
for a new international economic order (NIEO).
16
 
   
 
The UNDRD defines ‘development’ as ‘a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
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population of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.’17  Then Article 1 
defines the RtD itself as ‘an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be fully realised.’18  
 
Two dominant figures in the conceptualisation and advocacy of the right to development are 
Senegalese jurist Keba M’Baye and Karel Vasak, former director of UNESCO’s Division of 
Human Rights and Peace.  M’Baye in a 1972 lecture at the International Institute of Human 
Rights in Strasburg distinguished between ‘le droit du développement’ and the ‘le droit au 
développement’ (‘the law of development’ and ‘the right to development’).  He held the view 
that ‘every man has a right to live and a right to live better.’19  Vasak elaborated third 
generation or solidarity rights with the right to development as a key example.
20
   M’Baye’s 
assertion that ‘every man has a right to life and a right to live better’21 has been criticised by a 
commentator as having a ‘justification more in political-economic and moral terms, rather 
than in legal analysis.’22 
 
3.3 Hierarchy of Rights? 
A ‘third generation’ presupposes first and second generations.  Vasak has calibrated rights 
into the following three divisions with the right to development at the bottom: 
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a. First generation: civil and political rights such as those enunciated in the US 
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen with which governments may not interfere,  
b. Second generation: economic, social and cultural rights as embodied in the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and the New Deal in the United States which require affirmative 
actions by governments on behalf of citizens, and  
c. Third generation: solidarity rights – so called because unlike the first and second 
generations of rights which individual states can fulfil, the third generation rights 
require joint international action or solidarity.  They include the right to development, 
the right to peace and the right to a supportive and healthy environment.
23
 
The attendant problem of this categorisation is that it conflicts with the United Nations legal 
position that all rights are indivisible and interdependent.   In the same vein, if the right to 
development is seen as the mother of all rights, ‘the alpha and omega of human rights … the 
core right from which all the others stem,’24 it then follows that all other rights may be 
breached until it is fulfilled.
25
   
 
The revised criteria of the High Level Task Force on the implementation of the RtD at its 
fifth session shows that there are three components to the RtD, namely, ‘comprehensive 
human-centred development,’ ‘enabling environment’ and ‘social justice and equity.’26  With 
the introduction of environmental friendliness and sustainable development in the 1990s, the 
Bruntland Commission (1987) came up with an authoritative definition of sustainable 
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development as ‘development that meets the need of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’27 
 
The evolution of the RtD dates back to the 1950s and 1960s following the emergence of 
many countries form colonialism and their declaration of independence and subsequent 
joining of the UN.  It started with the leading role of Raul Prebisch, then director of CEPAL
28
 
who argued that the newly emergent developing countries were at a structural disadvantage in 
the existing international organisations.
29
   A consensus was reached only in 1993 when the 
United States officially supported the right to development at the Vienna Second UN 
Conference on Human Rights.
30
  The last part of this sub-section will look at the legal status 
of such a declaration. 
 
This chapter will therefore examine to what extent the elaboration of the right to development 
has been achieved or anchored in law beyond the level of rhetorical devices.  Petersmann 
laudably argues for an ‘integration approach’ which would put human rights into the law of 
worldwide organisations as opposed to the 1945 paradigm of “specialised agencies’ 
canvassing strongly that ‘[g]lobal integration law (e.g. in the WTO) should not focus one-
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constitute law.    
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sidedly on liberalisation.’31  As indicated above, seeing development as the ‘mother of all 
rights’ leaves it without parameters and as such, unrealistic of fulfilment.  An all-
encompassing view of development potentially triggers off the violation of other rights, 
equally deserving of observation, until it is fulfilled.  At the other end of the opposition to the 
RtD is the resigned feeling it generates that if it cannot be realistically enforced, it perhaps 
should not at all be enforced and is better left as a moral right without any force of law.  
Philip Alston’s stiff rebuttal describes Petersmann’s proposition as an ‘epistemological 
misappropriation’32 and it is to the clash of academics, diplomats, governmental and non-
governmental organisations, experts and protesters that I devote the rest of this chapter. 
 
3.4 Current Debates and Declarations 
Since the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development,
33
 arguments have ensued as to its 
real import and ramifications.  It has been a clash of opinions between economic law 
scholars, the UN independent expert, Nobel laureates in the economic sciences and NGOs.  
The UNDRD has a much longer preamble that even the Charter of the United Nations 
because of the difficult issue it attempts to grapple with.
34
  Article 1(1) declares: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be fully realised.  
 
While Article 1(2) recognises peoples’ ‘inalienable rights to full sovereignty over all their 
natural resources,’ it is Article 3 which provides that ‘States should realise their rights and 
fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based 
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on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all states’ 
that seemed to have upset the developed countries that either voted against it or abstained 
from voting entirely.  
 
3.4.1 The views of international economic law scholars 
Back in 1981, Alston asserted that 
in terms of international human rights law, the existence of the right to development is 
a fait accompli.  Whatever reservations different groups may have as to its legitimacy, 
viability or usefulness, such doubts are now better left behind and replaced by efforts 
to ensure that the formal process of elaborating the content of the right is a productive 
and constructive exercise.
35
 
 
Another commentator Bedjaoui was even effusive in his praise. He saw the RtD as the 
mother of all rights, ‘the core from which all others stem.’36  According to him it is, ‘the 
precondition of liberty, progress, justice and creativity.  It is the alpha and omega of human 
rights, the first and last human right, the beginning and the end, the means and the goal of 
human rights…’37 
 
However, many leading legal scholars have been less complimentary and even critical of the 
RtD.  Professor Stephen Marks’ article describes the RtD as a rhetoric or an expression of a 
political opinion lacking in legal certainty and he prefixes his writing with the two 
contradictory statements of the American President and that of the US to the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights to amplify the rhetorical undertone of the right: ‘Developed 
nations have a duty not only to share our wealth, but also to encourage sources that produce 
                                                          
35
 Philip Alston, ‘Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure As a Human Rights Strategy,’ in 
International Commission of Jurists eds. Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law 31, 106 1981 quoted 
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 Isabella D. Bunn, ‘The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, Am. U. Int’l L. 
Rev. (2000) 1435. 
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 Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘The Right to Development,’ in International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1177, 
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wealth: economic freedom, political liberty, the rule of law and human rights,’38 and ‘States 
… have no obligation to provide guarantees for implementation of any purported “right to 
development’”39  According to Marks, ‘the debate on the legal significance of the right 
ranges from hailing it as a major breakthrough in the history of human rights to debunking it 
as a distracting – if not dangerous – ideological initiative.’40  Prior to the appointment of an 
independent expert on the RtD by the U.N., the right to development had ‘received scant 
scholarly attention’41 with most of its advocates seen as being on the fringes of international 
economic law scholarship.  A commentator denounced it and said, 
If it achieves any significance, the right to development will divert attention from 
the pressing issues of human dignity and freedom, obfuscate the true nature of 
human rights, and provide increasing resources and support for the state 
manipulation (not to say repression) of civil society and social groups.  It will keep 
the international and diplomatic community engaged for many years in useless and 
feigned combat on the urgency and parameters of the right.
42
  
 
Pointing out what he feels is the major issue with the right to development, Ghai explains, 
‘[t]he value of the concept of a right is it creates entitlements, and the entitlements are easier 
to enforce if the contents and beneficiaries of the right are clearly specified.  In the case of the 
right to development, it is not clear who are the right and duty bearers.  Equally vague is the 
content of the right.’43 
 
A more vitriolic attack came from Carty.  According to him, ‘The debate about the right to 
development marks a crisis in legal theory, because it encompasses a determined attempt to 
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place material content before form and yet retain whatever advantages are supposed to attach 
to the use of legal language.’44  
 
3.4.2 The UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development 
Over the last two decades the United Nations has made great efforts to promote the right to 
development. It has pushed development into the forecourt of international discuss and global 
consultations
45
 with different expert working groups and a key agency the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) having a three pronged approach to realising the right to development as 
a human right.  The three levels of commitment for the UNDP are full realisation of the right 
to development, particularly the eradication of poverty, the grafting of human rights as part of 
development and the promotion of good governance. 
46
 Then following the Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 1998/72 and the UN General Assembly Resolution 53/155 the 
Chairman of the Commission appointed ‘an independent expert with high competence in the 
field of the right to development, with a mandate to present to the working group at each 
session a study on the current state of progress in the implementation of the right to 
development as a basis for a focused discussion.’47  The aim of the independent expert was to 
‘initiate a process of international confidence-building around the methods of realising the 
right to development.’48 
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In his first report, ‘Study on the current state of progress in the implementation of the right to 
development submitted by the independent expert, pursuant to the Commission on Human 
Rights and GA resolutions’, Sengupta reiterated his objective which was to elaborate on the 
measures ‘that could be taken for the more effective realisation of the right to development at 
the national and international levels’49 and made the following clarifications: 
The Declaration (on the RtD) is not a treaty and so would call for a different 
approach to its monitoring compared to that followed in the case of the two 
Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR)…. it should apply to all countries and all agencies 
and institutions of the international community.  The commitment to its provisions 
may not be legally binding, but they have the force of consensus and moral 
legitimacy which is almost equally binding on all. That would apply only a 
difference in the method but not in the importance, coverage and effectiveness of 
the monitoring itself.
50
 
 
The Independent Expert drew attention to the following mile stones in the evolution of the 
right to development: the Philadelphia Declaration
51
 (1944), the Proclamation of Tehran
52
 
(1968), the Declaration on Social Progress and Development
53
 (1969) The United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) and the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action
54
 (1993) Article 1 of which states very authoritatively that ‘The universal nature of 
these rights and freedoms is beyond question.’  Sengupta’s first study centred on the 
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evolution of an operational framework, explanation of development as a process,
55
 its 
contents
56
 and how it could be realised.
57
 
 
In his Fourth Report
58
 the Independent Expert focuses on international institutions, namely, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.  Two issues needing further discussions on them were presented 
as questions:  
(a) What happens when the chance of countries meeting their goals or improving on them 
is close to zero? and  
(b) What happens when another entity outside the State is at fault for he State’s not 
meeting goals? 
He concluded by drawing attention to the duties of states and international institutions to co-
operate as stated in Article 4 of the Declaration on the RtD.  
 
The Fifth Report of the Independent Expert declares that ‘All the elements, whose 
improvement constitutes development, depend on each other, both at a point in time and over 
time, and are realised progressively,’59 or as the Independent Expert puts it in his report to the 
57
th
 Session of the CHR, ‘all these elements are interdependent in the sense that the level of 
realisation of a right, say the right to health, depends on the level of realisation of other rights, 
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such as to food or to housing, or to liberty and security of person or to freedom of expression 
that included freedom of information.’60   
 
On the importance of economic development in the right to development, the Independent 
Expert says,  
For economic growth to be included as an element of the claims representing the right 
to development, it must satisfy the basic condition of facilitating the increasing 
availability of the corresponding goods and services in accordance  with the human 
rights norms. . .  From the very beginning, the developing  countries clamoured for 
an international social order and social arrangement  that would allow them to grow 
out of the quagmire of their underdevelopment, poverty and all-round deprivation to a 
higher level of income and living standard.
61
 
 
He explains ‘a rights-based development programme’ as ‘a process that is equitable, non-
discriminatory, participatory, accountable and transparent.’62  Each of these words he 
explains as follows: ‘equity’ means that there should be a diminishing of disparities; ‘non-
discrimination, that people should be treated equally regardless of their sex, race, language, 
political affiliation, or socio-economic status.  ‘Participation’ abhors a top-down approach to 
economic development; the beneficiaries must be involved in the decision making process 
and ownership of their development process.  ‘Accountability’ involves establishing 
monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms both state and alternative independent 
processes.  ‘Transparency’ denotes not openness, making sure that things are not just done 
but are seen to have been done.  All this, the report says should be done with the aim of 
meeting poverty reduction and social indicator targets with mutuality of obligations otherwise 
called ‘development compact’ between the State and the international community. 
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3.4.3 The Millennium Declaration 
As part of the activities marking the turn of the millennium, the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Millennium Development Goals.
63
  Its relevance to my thesis is the declaration of 
the ‘collective responsibility of States to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and 
equity at the global levels’ and ‘to making the RtD a reality for everyone and to freeing the 
entire human race from want’ as well as creating ‘an environment – at national and global 
levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty,’64 
(emphasis mine).  It stresses the fundamental principles of the UN and the international 
community: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared 
responsibility.  According to the Declaration, good governance is required at both national 
and international levels, together with transparency in financial, monetary and trading 
systems. They need to be open, predictable and rules-based.  Again the Declaration stresses 
the importance of democracy and the rule of law. 
 
 
3.4.4 The Monterrey Consensus 
In 2002 the UN Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Monterrey 
Consensus
65
 in Monterrey, Mexico.  It was aimed at financing the Millennium development 
goals with emphasis on those that address the issue of economic development and the right to 
development.  The key contribution of this consensus is the recognition of the complimentary 
role of the international legal environment to the State.  In addition to reinforcing the rule of 
0.7 per cent of GNP as ODA, it contains eloquent commitments in relation to a multilateral 
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trading system that is open, structurally non-discriminatory and rules-based.
66
 Issues of 
importance to developing countries such as debt relief, foreign investment and taxation 
together with economic and social infrastructures, the setting up of anti-corruption agencies 
and social security programmes are covered.
67
  The Consensus concludes on the need to 
expand the international economic decision-making and norm-setting to make the institutions 
both legitimate and democratic.
68
 
 
3.4.5 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
69
 which came at the instance of the OECD is like 
a multi-stakeholder agreement between developed and developing country governments and 
also a consortium of bilateral and multilateral development organisations. The aim is to 
increase the effectiveness of aid through a robust support for all the stakeholders both donors 
and recipients in order to raise development aid effectiveness.
70
   It sets targets to be met 
within a time frame, review, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms with mutual obligations 
for donors and recipients.  These are indexed and evaluated under the following heads: 
ownership,  participation of all the stakeholders especially the recipient country in designing 
development that is appropriate to their needs and taking part in the formulation of policies 
and the execution of programmes; alignment, aligning the donor’s activities to those of the 
recipient government’s structures and facilitating its projects, that is channelling aid through 
existing institutions; harmonisation, making donor’s action transparent and effective; 
managing results, ensuring that both decision-making and resources are in accord; and 
accountability, this has to be on all sides involved.
71
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3.4.6 The Lomè Conventions and The Cotonou Agreement 
The Cotonou Agreement
72
 is the successor to the Lomè Conventions.  It is a binding 
development cooperation agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States and the ACP countries.  Its aim is the integration of the ACP countries into the world 
trading system for the overriding goal of eradicating poverty.
73
  It provides for the 
observation of human rights, social and human development, security, economic 
development and the MDGs, especially as it relates to MDG 8 – ‘Developing a global 
partnership for Development’ covering, among others: 
a. the extent to which the partnership reflects human rights standards and a rights-based 
approach to development, 
b. the extent to which the partnership respects the right of each state to determine its own 
development policies,… 
c. The extent to which partner countries have incorporated human rights into their 
national development strategies and receive support from international donors and 
other development actors for these efforts to attain positive development outcomes; 
d. The extent to which partnership values and promotes good governance and the rule of 
law; 
e. The extent to which partnership applies itself and promotes the principles of 
accountability, transparency, non-discrimination, participation, equity, and good 
governance; 
f. The extent to which the partnership includes institutionalised mechanisms of mutual 
accountability and review, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism; 
g. The extent to which partnership ensures that adequate information is available to the 
general public for the purpose of public scrutiny of its working methods and 
outcomes; 
h.   The extent to which the partnership provides for the meaningful participation of the 
affected populations in processes of elaborating, implementing and evaluating the 
related policies, programmes and projects, and 
i. The extent to which, in applying the preceding criteria, indicators and benchmarks are 
identified to assess progress in meeting theme, and, in particular, whether the 
indicators used are reflective of human rights concerns, disaggregated as appropriate, 
updated periodically, and presented impartially and in a timely fashion.
74
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3.4.7 The Open-Ended Working Group 
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) passed a resolution
75
 mandating that a 
Working Group (WG) be established and charged with monitoring and reviewing progress 
made in the promotion and implementation of the right to development at the national and 
international levels as elaborated in the Declaration on the Right to Development, analysing 
obstacles and making recommendations, analysing reports from different stakeholders, and 
presenting to the Commission on Human Rights reports with respect to implementation of the 
right to development and suggesting technical assistance needed by different countries.
76
  The 
WG was to be supported by the Independent Expert who was succeeded in 2004 by a High 
Level Task Force on the implementation of the RtD.
77
 
 
 
3.4.8 The High Level Task Force (HLTF)  
 
The HLTF
78
 came into being in 2004 as a subsidiary of the WG
79
 with a one-year mandate, 
though renewable.  At its first meeting held from 13-17 December 2004 it considered the 
following three issues covering its national and international remits:  
(a) Obstacles to the implementation of the MDGs in relation to the RtD, 
(b) Social impact assessment in the areas of trade and development at the national and 
international levels, and  
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(c) Best practices in the implementation of the right to development. 
The second meeting of the HLTF was held in November 2005 ‘to examine MDG 8 on global 
partnership for development and to make suggests for its periodic evaluation’80 
 
3.4.9 The General Assembly Resolution 63/178 on the Right to Development 
General Assembly Resolution 63/178 on the Right to Development adopted on 18 December 
2008 seems to be the most adventurous and far-reaching of all the UN resolutions on 
development.  It left the hortatory and diplomatic language of its predecessors and spoke of 
the ‘consideration of an international legal standard of a binding nature.’81  It is a landmark 
resolution because no one before it ever mentioned a ‘legally binding’ instrument, yet it 
received the support of most of the developed countries in the EU.
82
  Months before that and 
in the previous session of the UN the countries had voted for ‘the further consideration of the 
elaboration of a convention on the RtD.’83  Having come this far, ‘What is necessary,’ says 
the Independent Expert on the RtD ‘is the political will, a determination by all the countries 
who have accepted the right to development as a human right that they would implement it in 
a time-bound manner through obligations of national actions and international cooperation.’84 
 
3.5 The Legal Status of the Right to Development 
An international convention, treaty or covenant on the RtD is still anticipatory and within the 
realm of legal fiction, de lege ferenda.  The USA has consistently opposed any instrument of 
                                                          
80
 E/CN/.4/2005/25, para. 54(i). 
81
 Resolution on the Right to Development, adopted by the GA at its 63
rd
 Session on 18 December 2008, UN 
Doc A/RES/63/178. 
82
 The GA resolution had 182 countries (votes) in favour, 4 against (Marshall Islands, Palau, Ukraine and the 
United States of America), and 2 abstentions (Israel and Canada). 
83
 Resolution on the Right to Development, adopted by the GA at its 63
2nd
 Session on 13 March 2008, UN Doc 
A/RES/62/161, para. 10(d). 
84
 Arjun Sengupta, Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.1 
130 
 
a binding nature; so have other leading and developed economies
85
 who fear a backlash from 
recognising the RtD as legally binding.    According to Felix Kirchmeier, ‘the RtD can be 
described as “soft law.” the term denotes a group of human rights which have been generally 
accepted by the world community and reaffirmed in declarations and resolutions by the 
leaders of many states.’86    What seems to be in issue is that the RtD belongs to those rights 
known as group rights, for example, protection of the environment, that are not usually 
attributed to individuals but groups of people.  The view of the positivist school is that if 
certain rights are not legally enforceable, they are not human rights, insisting on categories 
known as rights holders and duty bearers. The Independent Expert says that this is a wrong 
view because it confuses human rights with legal rights.  ‘Human rights precede law and are 
derived not from law but from the concept of human dignity.’87 
 
3.6 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1981 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
88
 has the distinction of being the only 
regional or continental instrument with the RtD clearly mentioned in it.  In Article 22 the 
Charter provides that 
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development 
with due regard to their freedom, and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage of mankind, 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively to ensure the exercise of the 
RtD.
89
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3.7 The MFN Treatment and Development 
At the current count of over 155
90
 Member States of the WTO out of the 190-plus
91
 (80 per 
cent) United Nations Organisation members on earth, it sounds illogical to use ‘most-
favoured’ to characterise any thing that gets to ‘most’ nations of the world.  It is argued that if 
tariff concessions to a country will apply to other countries based on the MFN principle, then 
the MFN in itself does not make any special provision for economic development and 
growth. 
 
3.8 National Treatment and Development 
The Appellate Body described the national treatment principal of non-discrimination as ‘a 
cornerstone of the world trading system.’92 Article III captioned ‘National Treatment on 
Internal Taxation and Regulation’ stipulates to Contracting Parties that ‘internal taxes and 
other charges … should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic products’93 and also that ‘[t]he products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products’94 and still further that the products imported 
from abroad ‘shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.’95  Again this 
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second arm or the GATT principle of non-discrimination does no more than ensuring equality 
of competitive opportunities. 
 
3.9 Object and Purpose of the National Treatment Principle  
The title of Article III is often used half-way: ‘National Treatment’ giving the wrong 
impression that all protection is prohibited.  If taken fully: ‘National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation,’ it will be clear that Article III endorses customs duties.  Therefore, 
Article III generally prohibits discriminatory internal taxation once the goods have been 
cleared through the customs.  The following cases bring out the object and purpose of Article 
III: 
 
In Italy – Agricultural Machinery the Panel held: ‘That the intention of the drafters of the 
Agreement was clearly to treat the imported products in the same way as the like domestic 
products once they had been cleared through customs. Otherwise indirect protection could be 
given.’96  Again, in US – Section 337, the Panel pointed out that ‘the purpose of Article III 
…is to ensure that internal measures are ‘not to be applied to imported or domestic products 
so as to afford protection to domestic production.’97 
 
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II the Appellate Body stated regarding Article III: 
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the 
application of internal tax and regulatory measures.  More specifically, the purpose of 
Article III ‘is to ensure that internal measures “not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic producers”’.  Toward this end, Article 
III obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products.  ‘[T]he intention of the drafters of 
the Agreement was clearly to treat the imported products in the same way as the like 
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domestic products once they had been cleared through customs.  Otherwise indirect 
protection could be given.
98
 
 
In sum the Appellate Body in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages stated the object and purpose of 
Article III as ‘avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions and 
protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships.’99  Article III of the GATT 1994 
covers de jure and de facto discrimination such as an ‘origin-based’ measure such as in 
Korea – Various Measures100 where the measure at issue was a dual retail distribution system 
selling imported beef in a separate store or a different section of a supermarket and ‘origin-
neutral’ measure as in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages where a tax legislation provided for 
higher taxes on vodka (domestic and imported) than on shochu (domestic and imported), that 
is, indirect discrimination in the form of a disproportionately negative impact on foreign 
goods is prohibited. The national treatment principle also extends to internal taxation on 
directly competitive or substitutable products.
101
 
 
3.10 National Treatment and TRIPS 
Underscoring the ‘fundamental significance of the obligation’102 in the TRIPS Agreement in 
US–Section 211 Appropriations Act the Appellate Body observed: 
Indeed, the significance of the national treatment obligation can hardly be overstated.  
Not only has the national treatment obligation long been a cornerstone of the Paris 
Convention and other international intellectual property conventions.  So, too, has the 
national treatment obligation long been a cornerstone of the world trading system that 
is served by the WTO.
103
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But even though national treatment is of much importance to TRIPS, its application to TRIPS 
is limited in scope to IP rights addressed in the TRIPS.  As the Panel noted in Indonesia – 
Autos  
As is made clear by the footnote to Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement, the national 
treatment rule set out in that Article does not apply to use of intellectual property 
rights generally but only to ‘those matters affecting the use of intellectual property 
rights especially addressed in this Agreement.
 104
 
 
The footnote states:  
For purposes of Articles 3 and 4 “protection” shall include matters affecting the 
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights 
specifically addressed in this Agreement. 
 
Article 1(2) TRIPS Agreement states that ‘”intellectual property” refers to all categories of 
intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II’.105  The 
implication of this for the developing countries is that their traditional knowledge is not 
covered by the TRIPS and as such enjoys no protection under the multilateral trading system. 
 
3.11 Applications of Article III of the GATT 1994 on Development 
While the principles of non-discrimination have been hailed as the pivot of the WTO,
106
 the 
developing countries that are writhing under a situation of near destitution see them as 
‘kicking away the ladder’ so that they will remain for ever undeveloped.107  Again while 
countries who have industrial goods and services for export see the GATT provisions as a 
means of extending their markets worldwide, those who have little for export and keen to 
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build and nurture their domestic industries see the principles as handicaps to their 
development, hence the paradox.   
 
 
Moreover, each WTO Ministerial Declaration enticed developing and least developed 
countries with some promise of economic growth; for example, in the Tokyo Declaration 
recognition was, as is always the case, given to the special needs of developing countries ‘so 
as to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of 
their exports (and) the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade…’108  But the 
preceding round of trade negotiations which held a similar promise offered little.  At the end 
of the Kennedy Round, ‘the less developed nations which participated issued a statement 
indicating their disappointment over the paucity of benefits that they had received.’109   Two 
major disappointments of the developing countries were their failure to achieve a reduction or 
elimination of duties on particular products that are of interest to them, ‘particularly tropical 
crops,’110 and the fact that non-tariff barriers remained much unaffected in the developed 
countries.  An independent analysis done by the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) found that the average tariff reductions were more on products of 
interest to developed countries and less on those of interest to developing countries.
111
  The 
odds are still against developing countries even after concluding a trade round of 
negotiations.   
 
3.12 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body and Development 
The DSB has a normative role of ‘legalisation’ of the policies of the WTO and 
‘legitimisation’ of Member States practices or as David Trubek and Patrick Cottrell put it the 
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organisation has ‘three functions: communication, facilitation, and coercion.’112  Regarding 
the dispute settlement mechanism, Chimni says that it is suffering from ‘indeterminacy’ due 
to (i) the object and purpose of the WTO agreements, (ii) the linguistic ambiguity and 
unanticipated gaps in the text (iii) the fact that legal texts are written in very general terms 
and then applied to complex factual situations, (iv) the inability to reach closure during 
negotiations on particular issues, and (v) the inapplicability of the formal doctrine of 
precedent.
113
 
 
Therefore it is the duty of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body to resolve different contending 
interests that are often fraught with political undertones.  As Chimni observed, ‘the rules of 
GATT/WTO have always favoured the developed world.’114  Could the interpretation of the 
rules be development-friendly?  The subsequent chapters will evaluate how the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism has been used to support or stifle development. 
 
Arguments have raged since the publication of Developing Countries in the GATT Legal 
System
115
 by Robert E. Hudec, the founding father of GATT/WTO law, in 1987.  While some 
people
116
 believe that the GATT/WTO law should be concerned with trade liberalisation and 
that development is peripheral to it, others
117
 insist that development should be at the heart of 
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it.  The following are the views expressed by some writers on the effects of WTO law on 
developing countries. 
 
Following Hudec and written in his honour George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis’ 
edited book WTO Law and Developing Countries
118
 is a review of key WTO agreements and 
their effects on developing countries.   
 
Nuno Limao and Marcelo Olarreaga
119
 examine the usefulness of the generalised system of 
preferences (GSP) or the Enabling Clause giving preferences to developing countries and 
question whether they speed up or slow down multilateral trade liberalisation. In their views, 
the GSP slows down trade liberalisation and they support their assertion with data from 170 
countries and more than 500 products on the effects of the GSP from the triad of the US, the 
EU and Japan. They urge the three and the WTO to switch from unilateral preferences for 
LCDs to an import subsidy scheme which, according to their calculations, adds 10 per cent to 
the estimated trade liberalisation gains of the Doha Round. According to them ‘the 
stumbling-block effect can be avoided by replacing the unilateral preferences by a fixed 
import subsidy, which,’ they argue, ‘generates a Pareto improvement… for each group: the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan ($2,934 million), LDCs ($520 million), and the 
rest of the world ($900 million).’  
 
Frederick Abbot’s “‘Law and Its Limitations’ in the Context of TRIPS”120 analyses the 
awkward position the United States and the European Union have found themselves in the 
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face of China that is unmindful of its TRIPS obligations under the WTO agreement nor 
bothered about the threat of withdrawal of concessions.  He asks two questions: ‘(1) will the 
United States be justified in imposing extra-WTO legal sanctions on China? and (2) if this is 
justified, will it be a good idea?’  He answers his own questions equivocatingly with 
‘probably yes’ and ‘probably no’ pointing out that the situation defines ‘the limits of the law 
in the WTO system.’121  The second answer is in the negative because, in his view, the ‘WTO 
dispute settlement is not designed to force immediate changes to government behaviour.’122  
Worthy of note in the article is the observation that ‘China’s entry into the WTO is not 
responsible for (its) transformation’ though he concedes that it ‘played an important role.’123  
What the accession to the WTO did for China, according to Abbot, ‘was to stabilise access to 
foreign markets’ (italics added).  But having stabilised her access, China ‘appears to perceive 
that its national interest is not aligned with its TRIPS Agreement and Accession protocol 
obligations’ and has chosen to ignore the rules and nobody seems willing to face the 
economic consequences of a stand-off with China within the WTO.  
 
Turning to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Juan Marchetti states that 
although the Doha Round of negotiations offers developing countries an opportunity to edge 
their way into the multilateral trading system, ‘trade liberalisation and integration into the 
world economy are not ends in themselves, but are powerful means to achieve…economic 
growth and development.’124  Therefore, one may ask, would the developing countries based 
mainly on agriculture and produce primary products be able to use the WTO forum as a 
‘means to …development?’ 
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Arising from Marchetti’s article, Kal Raustiala asks ‘why barriers to trade in goods are easy 
to dismantle but those for services are hard,’125 in relative terms.  According to him, ‘we can 
look at more than 50 years of marked success in reducing barriers to trade in goods through 
multilateral negotiations, but so little success in the area of services – especially when 
services comprise the bulk of economic activity in the most powerful and important WTO 
members.’126  The writer seems to imply here that trade discipline is swift in issues dealing 
with matters of interest to developing countries but slow with matters that concern the 
industrialised and developed countries.  Neither evidence from the WTO Agreements nor 
States practice seems to contradict the assertion, and I agree.   
 
3.13 Oxfam on the WTO and the Right to Development 
As noted in the middle section of this chapter, the RtD has multiple stakeholders which 
include the civil society and non-governmental organisations of which one of the very 
notable is the British charity Oxfam International.  Ironically based in England, the most 
vitriolic, scathing and co-ordinated attack on the WTO has come form Oxfam. This section 
will review eight briefing papers either published on their own on in conjunction with other 
organisations in a chronological order. 
 
i. ‘Eight broken promises: Why the WTO isn’t working for the world’s poor’127  The eight 
broken promises held out to the world’s poor are  
Promise 1 – open markets for poor countries  
industrialised countries have used their control of the IMF and World Bank to reinforce trade 
liberalisation through loan conditions.  One recent IMF review of 23 of its programmes found 
that they included 186 loan conditions…and that tariffs facing developing-country exports to 
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high-income counties are on the average four times higher than those facing exports by 
industrialised countries.
128
 
  
Promise 2 – Reduced agricultural protectionism – ‘At the end of the 1990s, subsidies 
accounted for almost 40 per cent of the value of OECD farm outputs, the same as in 1986-
88’129 before the WTO came into being. 
Promise 3 – Improved market access for textiles and garments – here as in other places, 
Oxfam points out that the ‘industrialised countries have found various ways to comply with 
the letter of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing while comprehensively violation its 
spirit.’130  
Promise 4 – A better deal for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) – apart from Cape 
Verde, none of the 49 countries classified as LDCs has managed to creep out of grinding 
poverty. 
Promise 5 – Special action for Africa – According to the briefing paper, ‘the challenge facing 
Africa is immense.  It has 12 per cent of the world’s population, but accounts for less than 
one per cent of exports , one quarter of the share it enjoyed in the 1970s’ despite almost all 
the countries in Africa belonging to the WTO. 
Promise 6 – Global patent rules that safeguard public health in poor countries – the TRIPS 
agreement of the WTO seems to have constrained the developing countries from adopting 
‘measures necessary to protect public health.’131   
Promise 7 – Aid and technical assistance to developing countries – ‘Of the 38 African 
countries in the WTO, 15 have no resident delegate; four maintain only one-person offices’ 
yet ‘there are 46 delegate meetings per week at the WTO.’132 
                                                          
128
 Ibid 3. 
129
 ibid 5. 
130
iIbid 6.  A classic example of how Canada circumvented the implementation of the WTO ruling in Canada – 
Autos is in Jacqueline C Krikorian, ‘Planes, Trains and Automobiles: The Impact of the WTO “court” on 
Canada in Its First Ten Years,’ Journal of International Economic Law, 8(4) 921-975 
131
 ibid 10.  
132
 ibid 12.  
141 
 
Promise 8 – The WTO will help create the conditions for sustained growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries – it is stated here by Oxfam that ‘WTO agreements restrict 
governments from introducing policies that might enable their countries to reap the benefits 
of integration into the global economy.’133 
 
ii. ‘Rigged Rules and Double Standards – trade, globalisation and the fight against 
poverty.
134
 This compendious paper from Oxfam acknowledges the benefits of international 
trade but notes that ‘there is a paradox at the heart’ of it.  The paper extols ‘trade as a force 
for poverty reduction’ and quotes a Vietnamese farmer Lam Van who said, ‘If you ask me 
how our lives compare with our parents’ lives, I will tell you that things are better.  We are 
still vulnerable.  But there is less poverty today.’135  However, the anger of Oxfam which one 
feels as one reads the briefing paper is that most of the poor have been left behind in the 
multilateral trading system.  The areas it points out as being most notable for the double 
standards of the richer countries are market access and agricultural trade. 
 
iii. ‘Africa and the Doha Round’ is the title of a 2005 Briefing Paper 80 from Oxfam.  In 
summary the paper states,  
As a result of unfair trade rules and falling commodity prices, Africa has  suffered terms-of-
trade losses and increasing marginalisation.  Ten years after  the Uruguay Round, the 
poorest continent on earth, which captures only one  per cent of world trade, risks even 
further losses, despite promises of a  ‘development round’ of trade negotiations.  This 
would be a great injustice.   There cannot and should not be any new round without an 
assurance of  substantial gains for Africa.
136
 
 
Briefing Paper 80 gives an example of a vegetable exporter from Uganda who would not be 
eligible for the duty-free access to the EU simply by using imported packaging from Kenya 
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because ‘the value of the Kenyan packaging outweighs the value of the product originating in 
Uganda.’137   
 
iv. Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) talks threaten development.  This joint NGO 
Briefing Paper gives six reasons why a fundamentally different approach is needed.  It 
declares that the current NAMA negotiations will not lead to pro-development outcomes’ 
because the ‘developed countries are demanding excessive opening of imports which, if 
agreed, could destroy local businesses and jobs in developing countries.’138 
 
v. Blood on the floor is another briefing paper form Oxfam showing how the rich countries 
have squeezed development out of the WTO Doha negotiations.  The paper is entitled blood 
on the floor because the rich countries extract ‘economically painful concessions’ from the 
poor ones.
139
  
 
vi. Blood from stone is the slimmest or shortest of the Oxfam briefing papers and as its 
alarmist title suggests, this paper focuses on the accession of the island Kingdom of Tonga in  
the South Pacific ‘on what are arguably the worst terms ever offered to any country.’  The 
question we need to address later is if the terms are very unfavourable to some countries, why 
do they join? 
 
vii. ‘What happened in Hong Kong’140 seeks to explain what usually happens at WTO 
ministerial conferences every other year by using the one held in Hong Kong as a case study.  
In Hong Kong the difficult decisions were put off till the following year.  As the time of 
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writing, five years after, those issues, reform of Northern agricultural policies, increased 
access to rich country markets for developing country farmers and industries and providing 
policy space for developing countries, have not been solved thereby lending credence to the 
reports from Oxfam. 
 
viii. ‘Partnership or Power Play – How Europe should bring development into its trade deals 
with Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries’141  In this extensive briefing paper, Oxfam 
evaluated the economic partnership agreement (EPA) against eight criteria and the EU-ACP 
EPA was found wanting on all counts.  The criteria are (a) integrate their economies with 
their regional neighbours, (b) develop new industries and create jobs, (c) overcome insecure 
access to food and support vulnerable farmers (d) upgrade their infrastructure, (e) have full 
access to Europe’s markets, (f) attract high quality investment, (g) provide affordable access 
to services, and (h) stimulate innovation and increase access to technology.
142
 
 
All the above show that the WTO is yet to garner praises from Oxfam or even from other 
development organisations like Actionaid, Solidar and Third World Initiative. 
 
3.14 Summary  
In the preceding sections, we have traced the evolution or rather the evolutionary process of 
the RtD, the debates surrounding it, the studies done by the Independent Expert within the 
five years he held office, the outcries for a right to economic development that marred WTO 
Ministerial Conferences in Seattle, Doha and Cancun. 
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We have also seen that there is no binding international instrument on the RtD and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
143
 is the only regional instrument that 
expressly mentions the right to development but without expressing it in a strong language 
carrying the force of law. 
 
In the last decade there have been expressions of disenchantment with the WTO and this has 
not only disrupted its ministerial conferences but brought the Doha Round into a deadlock.  
The criticisms of the WTO have been trenchant and scathing with the civil society and the 
non-governmental organisations leading the way.  The next chapter will analyse the processes 
of international standard setting by the WTO and efforts at harmonisation by the developing 
and least-developed countries within ECOWAS 
                                                          
143
 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) 
 
145 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Implications of the Legal Regimes of the WTO International Trade Harmonisation 
through International Standard Setting for ECOWAS 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
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4.1 Regulating or Restricting International Trade 
 
The international economic regime is ‘extraordinarily complex.’1   While the legal framework 
is formulated and supervised by the WTO,
2
 the technical regulations and standards are set by 
some international standard-setting bodies following ‘definitions adopted within the United 
Nations system’3 and the execution is shared between the WTO Member States and the 
WTO. While the Member States are charged with ‘conformity,’ ‘harmonisation’ and 
implementation,
4
 the WTO is vested with monitoring through its trade policy review 
mechanism.
5
 ECOWAS Member States find the multilateral framework of rules and 
disciplines governed by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) and  the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) structurally 
exclusive, legally challenging and economically frustrating as it appears to have excluded 
them as if it was set up to defeat their economic aspirations.  Jules Katz, a former US trade 
official and senior negotiator in the Uruguay Round once boasted that ‘[t]he WTO was 
created in the image of the US.  We are responsible for its strengths and weaknesses.’6 In 
political-economic terms, the purpose, according to Gill, being ‘to redistribute power and 
intensify inequality.’7  This chapter analyses how the exclusion of ECOWAS is achieved 
through standard-setting by some international organisations specified in the SPS Agreement 
and others not mentioned in the TBT Agreement and the negative effects it has on trade in 
agricultural products from ECOWAS and the legitimacy of the WTO.  Cassese describes 
international economic relations as an ‘abstruse admixture of law and economics,’8 but 
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international standard-setting is even more abstruse as it adds science and politics to the 
conundrum hence the technicality and complexity of this chapter.  Yet it is important that I 
analyse international standard-setting because the focus of my study is on the terms of trade 
and not on the volume of trade. 
 
The WTO system is organised in a voluntarist fashion and as such efforts should be made so 
that states obey the agreements without coercion, whether political or economic.  The 
compliance by ECOWAS Members has not been entirely voluntary because of the structural 
problems they encounter due to their peculiar circumstances, aspirations, challenges and 
economic realities, on the one hand, and the provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreements and 
developed Member States practices, on the other hand, which appear to be a contradiction in 
terms as will be discussed below.  Under such situations compliance becomes difficult if not 
impossible and the organisation suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the absence of inclusion 
and recognition of the peculiar needs of Member States. 
 
However, in order to achieve the desired conformity through harmonisation, ‘the source of 
every rule – its pedigree,’ writes Thomas M. Franck, ‘is one determinant of how strong its 
pull to compliance is likely to be.’9  Again, in order to ‘exert a pull to compliance’ or achieve 
legitimacy, a rule must derive ‘from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed 
that it has come into being in accordance with right process.’10  Add to that three other 
characteristics of fairness, justice and integrity
11
 (that is consistency) identified by Ronald 
Dworkin and the rule is very likely to achieve ‘consensual compliance’ as a self-enforcing 
obligation.  Critics, however, point out that Dworkin does not distinguish clearly enough tight 
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and loose coherence.
12
  This chapter will examine the process through which international 
standards and technical regulations are set to assess how fair and just or otherwise they are to 
developing countries generally and to ECOWAS in particular.  As signified above, the 
examination will be conducted following the standard-setting processes of international 
organisations working for the realisation of the SPS and TBT Agreements. 
 
Under the GATT 1994, Contracting Parties are allowed to take ‘measures necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health,’13  but are prohibited from applying such 
measures ‘in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination.’14  The SPS and the TBT Agreements are aimed at the facilitation of 
international trade.  The WTO is not a regulatory body with capacity to issue technical or 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  The governance of the SPS Agreement, as set out in 
the SPS Agreement itself, is entrusted to three international standard-setting organisations: 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), International Office of Epizootics (OIE), and 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)
15
 also known as “the three sisters.”  With 
respect to technical regulations, the TBT Agreement does not specifically mention any 
international standard-setting organisations but simply urges usage of ‘relevant international 
standards’ that ‘exist or their completion is imminent.’16 
 
Although the SPS and TBT Agreements are aimed at ‘improving efficiency of production and 
facilitating the conduct of international trade’17 recognition has been given to the fact ‘that 
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 L Alexander and K Kress, ‘Against Legal Principles,’ in A Marmor (ed) Law and Interpretation: Essays in 
Legal Philosophy (Claredon Press 1`995) 
13
 Article XX(b) the Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (hereinafter, the SPS 
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 Preamble, SPS Agreement, para. 1.  
15
 Article 3(4) SPS Agreement. 
16
 Article 2.4 & 2.5 Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter the TBT Agreement)  
17
 The Preamble, TBT Agreement, para. 3. 
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developing countries may encounter special difficulties in the formulation and application of 
technical regulations and procedures for assessment of conformity.’18  Yet the arguments 
surrounding these two important Agreements of the WTO revolve around ‘legitimacy,’19 the 
cortex of scholarly debates and the penchant of those from developing countries; ‘openness 
and consensus’20 as interpreted by the Appellate Body; ‘global acceptance and use by 
industry’21 as canvassed by the US; and ‘market technology relevancy’22 which is advocated 
by Japan. All, as it will be shown in this chapter, miss the issue that is of major concern to 
ECOWAS Member States and other developing countries, namely, market access and 
genuine integration into the world trading system as well as inclusion at the different stages 
of standard-setting from proposal to publication so that what the agreements aim to achieve 
theoretically will be realised in practice.
23
  John H. Jackson posits that most of the arguments 
about the regulation of international trade are ‘misleading’ and Joanne Scott refers to 
international trade regulation as ‘a world about which (lawyers) know too little.’24  The 
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 Yoshiko Naiki, ‘Accountability and Legitimacy in Global Health and Safety Governance: The World Trade 
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see J Thomas, ‘Time to Take Stock,’ ASTM Standardisation News (Aug. 2000), and for criticism of the ‘Geneva 
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 WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/121, Amendment of the TBT Agreement, proposal by Japan, 7 Oct. 1999, at para. 6. 
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Journal of World Trade, 43, No, 6 (2009) 1232-33 
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subsequent parts of this chapter will demonstrate how the WTO institutional framework and 
the practices of the big trading countries are impeding agro-food trade by maintaining SPS 
and TBT measures that are often too difficult
25
 to comply with by ECOWAS Member States.  
The institutional framework and procedure of the standard-setting organisations seem to be 
all but inclusive and consequently restrict trade from developing countries. The consequence 
of non-compliance is denial of market access, a negation of the very purpose for which 
Members acceded to the WTO Agreements.  Considering this, the focus of this chapter is on 
analysing the remits and organisational structure of the international standard-setting and 
regulatory bodies whose standards are used for monitoring and conformity to the SPS and the 
TBT Agreements from an International Economic Law perspective, that is, analysing law, 
policy and compliance and not from an International Trade angle of transactional parts of 
contracts, credit, volume of trade and balance of payment. The chapter ends with the Art. XX 
‘General Exceptions’ jurisprudence of what is regarded as an ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ or 
a ‘necessary measure’ under the GATT.  
 
We begin with the setup of the regulatory organisations to show how the facilitation of trade 
through the SPS and TBT Agreements seems to have remained fictitious or at best spurious 
for ECOWAS Member States and most of the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
objectives of the Agreements appear unimpeachable, but like most legislation, what makes 
them successful and admirable is not how they are drafted but how they are applied.  The SPS 
and TBT Agreements recognise that ‘developing countries may encounter special difficulties 
in the formulation and application of technical regulations and standards and procedures for 
assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards’26 (emphasis added).  Yet 
                                                          
25
 In the case of the TBT Committee, 212 concerns have been raised by the end of 2008.  See, 
G/TBT/GEN/74/Rev. 1 (18 Feb. 2009). The most frequent defendants were (1) against  the EC with 49 
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the only solution devised to counter the adverse effects of the agreements is the perfunctory 
desire lacking in concreteness ‘to assist’ the developing countries which includes ECOWAS.  
The promised assistance notwithstanding, compliance by ECOWAS is very difficult and 
costly due to the number and the stringency of the measures in different export markets.  
 
 
4.2 Standard Setting by Organisations Accepted by the WTO – a form of Structural 
Exclusion? 
 
As Yishiko Naiki acknowledges while commenting on the three standard-setting 
organisations to which the WTO ceded regulatory powers, ‘introducing such a new form of 
governance does not occur without complications’.27 This is especially so for those not 
present at their creation which is the case with ECOWAS and most Sub-Saharan African 
countries who were hardly consulted when the organisations were set up. 
 
Before looking at the set up or organisational structures of the standard-setting bodies, it is 
worthy of note that there are, generally speaking, six different stages which are followed 
before an international standard is said to have been established. These are:  
i. the proposal stage (in which it is confirmed that a particular international standard 
is needed), 
ii. the preparatory stage (where a working group is set up for the preparation of a 
working draft), 
iii. the committee stage (where comments are made on the first committee draft until 
a decision on a draft international standard is reached), 
iv. the enquiry stage (where a draft international standard is circulated for voting and 
comments), 
v. the approval stage (where the final draft international standard is circulated to all 
Member Bodies for a final ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote), and  
vi. the publication stage (in which the final text is published by the organisation’s 
secretariat).
28
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However, Schroder argues that the overriding consideration of any particular regulation 
should not be technical efficiency.  He is concerned with ‘the decision making process of 
relevant international bodies,’ and draws an analogy with ‘the QWERTY keyboard layout, 
which was designed to slow down typing speed to further reduce jamming.. Interestingly, this 
standard was technically deficient, but it prevailed as the de facto worldwide accepted 
standard.’29  By the same token, international standards and regulations should not just aim at 
finesse if too many countries will be left out.  It is necessary to examine the default setting of 
the international standard-setting organisations, so as to provide an analysis of how the 
standards are approved and whose interests they serve. 
 
4.2.1 The Codex Alimntarius Commission (CAC) 
A joint resolution by the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Health 
Organisation brought the CAC into being with the aim of protecting human health by 
ensuring food quality and safety.
30
 It sets out the Minimum Residual Levels (MRLs) for food 
additives and veterinary drugs minimum limits for pesticides used on food crops.
 31
   
According to the Codex Procedural Manual it currently has over 3,000 standards which it 
promotes through harmonisation of national standards to them in order to facilitate 
international trade. The CAC membership is open to all members of the FAO and the WHO 
and currently stands at 183,
32
 nearly as many as the UN.  The only other criterion that 
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countries who are already FAO and WHO members have to meet is an expression of interest 
in food standards.   
 
4.2.1.1 CAC Standard-Setting Procedure 
As may be inferred from the six standard-setting steps above, the procedure at the CAC is a 
much decentralised one with so many subsidiary bodies.
33
  Its Rules of Procedure states that 
the CAC could delegate its work to committees which handle the technical and preparatory 
work.  There are fifteen committees made up of experts who are delegates form Member 
States.
34
  The criterion for inviting the experts is personal merit and so they are not invited as 
representatives of their countries and as such mostly world-famous scientists
35
 get called.  
The implication is that scientists in countries without a strong scientific publication record 
may be left out especially as the Oxford and Cambridge University presses do not publish 
much from the universities within the ECOWAS sub-region. 
 
As pointed out above,
36
 the CAC procedure has eight steps; and as explained by the Panel 
and the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, 37 the CAC when nudged by a member initiates a 
project proposal but when initiated by a member it must be approved by the CAC before it 
can progress to the next stage.  At the second stage the CAC assigns the proposal to a 
committee of experts which prepares a draft proposal.  In the third stage the Secretariat 
receives the draft proposal and distributes it to members for comments.  Stage 4 involves 
feedback and redrafting; then in stage 5 the redrafted standard is submitted by the Secretariat 
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for possible adoption.  Next, if adopted it is sent to all members and other interested 
international organisations to assess its possible impacts especially with people whose 
economic interests might be affected. In stage 7 the comments received are remitted to the 
committee that drafted the proposal originally.  The last stage of approval is the voting 
process in which each member has one vote though most of the time approval is reached 
through consensus.
38
 
 
How do ECOWAS Member States and other developing countries trail in the institutional 
framework of an organisation that sets out and determines the standards they are to use?  First 
and foremost is the problem of participation.   The committees are not funded by the FAO 
and the WHO who are the joint owners of the CAC rather each committee is hosted by a 
member country and the host bears the full costs of transport, boarding and administration.  
The host country is rewarded with appointing the committee chairman.
39
   This affords the 
host country an opportunity to influence both the agenda and the decision-making of the CAC 
committee.  This is an influential structural advantage conferred on the rich and developed 
countries by default and for which ECOWAS Member States are financially and 
technologically ill equipped to ‘buy’.40 
 
Again the work at the committee level has been criticised for being very subjective.
41
  None 
of the CAC committees conducts any laboratory research; instead they call on individuals, 
governments, industry, and universities to make their contributions.  It follows that the result 
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of the contributions can only be as reliable as their sources.
42
  Expectedly the contributions 
are often country-specific and biased in favour of some countries and regions.
43
  There is a 
heavy reliance on companies based in developed countries for their research and development 
efforts and scientific evidence.  Moreover some industries may favour the technology at their 
disposal or a procedure they are familiar with so that, if approved, they will not overstretch 
themselves too much to meet the conditions.  
 
Another criticism is that much of the ‘independent’ research used is the research and 
development efforts of some companies who aim to reap economies of scales if approved as 
an international standard.
44
  Again in terms of outreach to governments for participation, it 
has been observed that only twenty government members of the CAC supply the data mostly 
used in committee’s risk assessment.45  These are developed countries which have the 
capacity to generate the data and submit to committees for consideration.  Therefore, the 
‘scientific’ inputs could simply be a reflection of government partisanship and corporate 
interests.   
 
Furthermore the committee work may not be free from political influence because ultimately 
approval only flows from the voting pattern or consensus of the CAC.  The delegates from 
developed countries include a large number of representatives of business and industry that 
could be affected by a proposed standard.  They bring their clouts and influence to bear on a 
supposedly scientific procedure.   
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Finally, for purposes of the WTO Agreement, ‘consensus’ means that ‘no member, present at 
the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.’46  An 
even weaker and paradoxically more puzzling is the definition of ‘consensus’ by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC); according to them ‘consensus’ can be defined as: 
[A] general agreement, characterised by the absence of sustained opposition to the 
substantive issues by any major part of the concerned interests and by a process that 
involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to 
reconcile any conflicting arguments.
47
 
 
In the case of the ISO and the IEC consensus need not imply unanimity.  Note that even when 
there is a ‘sustained opposition’ such opposition must come from an ‘important part of the 
concerned interest’ to be counted.  Who decides who or what is important is anybody’s guess, 
may be purely subjective and deeply flawed.  
 
4.2.2 The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) from the Greek ‘isos’ 
meaning ‘equal’ hence ISO 
The ISO is a Geneva not-for-profit
48
 organisation established in 1947 with the remit of 
publishing international standards in all fields save electrical, electronic and allied 
technologies.  Its aim is the development of worldwide standards to enhance the exchange of 
goods and services internationally.   It also aims to foster friendship in scientific, 
technological and intellectual areas.
49
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The ISO operates a three-membership
50
 category, namely, the member bodies, the 
correspondent members and the subscribing members.  The member bodies are the national 
groups which are in different countries that initiate and promote standardisation in their 
countries.  The correspondent members are composed of developing countries that have no 
thriving national branches and no developed national standards.
51
  Such members are under 
no obligation to take active parts in policy formulation and they are conferred with observer 
status.  They have no voting rights but could be informed of any work in progress deemed to 
be of interest to them.
52
  The subscribing members are countries with limited economic 
resources: they do not vote, take no active part in ISO activities and receive no standards 
even after approval but are sent bulletins and ISO publications.  ISO membership fee 
correspond to the category of membership
53
 and as with the Codex it excludes most 
ECOWAS Member States, only five out of the fifteen of them are full members.
54
   
 
4.2.2.1 Standard-Setting Procedure at the ISO 
The ISO operates through technical committees (TCs) and sub-committees (SCs) which have 
the specific role of drafting the standards.
55
  All national bodies have the right of participation 
as a participating member (P-Member) or an observing member (O-Member) with 
responsibilities corresponding to their names. Of all the five ECOWAS members of the ISO, 
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only Nigeria had a participating status of the three committees on conformity assessment, 
consumer policy and developing country matters of the organisation.  Mali and Senegal are 
mere observers on conformity assessment and consumer policy.
56
 
 
In terms of compositions the TCs and SCs are made up of experts with technical, industrial 
and business background.  In most cases the industries are those that have requested the 
specific standard and are those that are expected to put them into use on approval.  Unlike the 
Codex committees, the ISO SC and TC members operate as national groups.  Therefore they 
present both their industry-specific view points and their national perspectives too,
57
 casting 
some doubts as to their objectivity.   
 
The ISO follows the six-stage procedures outlined in paragraph 3.2 above.  Again it is 
necessary to sketch out the stages so as to highlight the problems ECOWAS Member States 
face at the participatory stages.  It has been stated above that the first stage involves the 
agreement that there is a need for a given standard.  Often such a need emanates from an 
industry which identifies it and alerts its national body that the standard in a given area be 
formulated.  It is the national body such as the Ghana Standards Board or the Standards 
Organisation of Nigeria (SON) or the British Standards Institution that files the proposal at 
the ISO as a new work item proposal.   It is also at the preparatory stage that the TC/SC 
would set up the working group that will come up with the committee draft (CD).  If all goes 
well and the draft progresses to the publication stage, the ISO Secretariat would publish it as 
the international standard. 
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Like the Codex, the work of the ISO TCs and SCs are not supported by the ISO Central 
Secretariat, the number of committees involved and the volume of work to be done frequently 
overwhelm the capacity of ECOWAS Member States and this puts them at a structural 
disadvantage.  The member that agrees to host the TC or SC must provide technical 
assistance and pay for the administrative support.  The financial burden attendant on this role 
puts off developing countries from ever thinking of hosting the committees.
58
  The 
consequence of this is the disproportionate hosting rights grabbed by developed countries.
59
 
 
Again like the Codex by placing the standard-setting procedure outside the confines of the 
WTO and by having consensus devoid of unanimity, voting is reduced to a mere token of 
goodwill.  The single vote that each member has which in their aggregate would have 
produce a combined effect for developing countries, including ECOWAS, are therefore 
without any legislative, advisory or even consultative powers.  
 
4.2.3 The International Office of Epizootics  
The World Organisation for Animal Health better known by its French abbreviation OIE (for 
Office International des Épizooties) is a veterinary services intergovernmental organisation 
set up in 1924 and based in Paris, France.  The OIE is the WTO reference organisation for 
standards relating to animal health and zoonoses.  Its remit is the harmonisation of national 
regulations and standards with its own for animal health, international trade in animals and 
animal products.
60
  It publishes two codes (Terrestrial and Aquatic) and two manuals 
(Terrestrial and Aquatic) as principle references for WTO Members.  Its membership which 
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was limited to European countries at its inception currently stands at 178
61
 because it is now 
open to all independent countries.  It has different categories of membership with the last 
group contributing only 12 per cent of the top group.  States are allowed to choose an entry 
point category and move up with time.  Arguably membership is on the bases of equality but 
the divergence of burdens resulting from the categorisation of memberships and the attendant 
fee rates obviously lead to differences in participations, decision-making and, of course, 
outcomes or benefits.  
 
4.2.3.1 OIE Standard-Setting Procedure 
The supreme organ of the OIE is the International Committee which is made up of technical 
experts representing Member States.
62
  This Committee does not undertake technical work on 
its own but delegates such work to the following four Specialist Commissions: 
1. The Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (‘Terrestrial Code 
Commission’), 
2. The Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (‘Scientific Commission’) 
3. The Biological Standards Commission (‘Laboratories Commission’), and  
4. The Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission (‘Aquatic Animals Commission’). 
 
The members of the Special Committees who are appointed by the International Committee
63
 
are people with long experience in veterinary science, medicine and regulation.
64
 
 
OIE’s standard-setting procedures are very much like those of the Codex and the ISO and 
starts with the identification of a need by a Member State or an expert.  Approval is based on 
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voting
65
 which in turn is based on a simple majority which is based again on a quorum of half 
of the delegates representing the Member States plus one.
66
  Such a quorum would have 
favoured the developing countries that make up a majority of the membership but for the fact 
that most developing country members do not attend the meetings due to financial problems.  
 
Unlike the other international standard-setting organisations discussed above, OIE meetings 
are covered by the OIE budget.
67
  Therefore, there seems to be no need to subrogate or cede 
legislative authority to a country that hosts a meeting of the Technical Committees and there 
is also no reason for a host country to exert undue influence on a committee.  Another 
potentially positive indicator for a more scientific outcome is the fact that the experts are 
appointed with geographical diversity in mind.
68
  Again decisions taken are binding despite 
controversies preceding it.  On the whole the OIE is the most inclusive of all the international 
standard-setting organisations because of the breadth of its specialist committees and the 
payment for the meetings from the OIE budget. 
 
4.2.4 The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 
The treaty that covers standard-setting in the botanical field is the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) which is under the supervision of the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) and deposited with its Director-General.
69
  The Convention is 
administered by the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) established under Article 
XI.  The FAO is the host and funder of the IPPC.  The IPPC was set up: 
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 With the purpose of securing common and effective action to prevent the spread and 
 introduction of pests of plants and plant products, and to promote appropriate measures for 
 their control, the contracting parties undertake to adopt the legislative, technical and 
 administrative measures specified in this Convention and in supplementary agreements 
 pursuant to Article XVI.
70
 
 
Art. XVI outlines the measures as: 
The contracting parties may, for the purpose of meeting special problems of plant protection 
which need particular attention or action, enter into supplementary agreements. Such 
agreements may be applicable to specific regions, to specific pests, to specific plants and 
plant products, to specific methods of international transportation of plants and plant 
products, or otherwise supplement the provisions of this Convention. 
 
This gives Member States the latitude to take measures deemed necessary to combat pests 
invasion.  Like sanitary measures, phytosanitary measures could also be used as ‘a means of 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction, particularly on international 
trade.’71  
 
All members of the FAO are eligible for membership of the CPM.  While the IPPC is binding 
on all the Contracting Parties, Art. XVIII on ‘Non-Contracting Parties’ provides:  
The contracting parties shall encourage any state or member organization of FAO, not a party 
to this Convention, to accept this Convention, and shall encourage any non-contracting party 
to apply phytosanitary measures consistent with the provisions of this Convention and any 
international standards adopted hereunder.  
Therefore, even though the Convention was designed to come into effect with it being ratified 
by three
72
 signatory states only, it was designed to play a global role by urging that even non-
contracting parties should be encouraged to apply its provisions as if it were a rule of 
customary international law.
73
  
 
4.2.4.1 Standard-Setting by the IPPC Commission 
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Each member of the Commission is entitled to delegate one person to the Commission and 
has one vote.
74
  What is unique about the delegates to the Commission is that they could be 
accompanied by advisers or experts though the advisers and experts do not have voting 
powers.   
 
The development of International Standards on Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) involves the 
following four procedures: the preliminary stage, the drafting stage, the consultation stage 
and the approval stage.  These stages are more or less like in the order organisations 
discussed above.  However, in terms of composition, the Standards Committee are twenty-
five in number and are drawn from the seven FAO regions, namely, Africa, Asia, the 
Caribbean, Europe, Latin America, North America, the Near East and the South-West 
Pacific.
75
  The CPM does not develop the standards by itself but delegates the work to a 
group of experts to draft.   At the consultation stage the contracting parties and relevant 
interest groups are given 100 days to submit their comments.  If adoption of the draft by 
consensus fails, voting follows and approval is by a two-thirds majority.
76
 
 
Although the funding for the IPPC committees comes from the IPPC budget which is from 
the FAO, the technical work is not done at the plenary sessions but at the select committee of 
expert levels.  The FAO has some collaborators that do give financial support to the host of 
the committee meetings and so influence the work of the experts.  Again although two-thirds 
is a high threshold, standards could nonetheless be adopted with a considerable opposition 
considering the fact that there is no minimum number of votes required. 
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4.2.5 The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
The IEC’s remit covers setting-standards in the fields of electricity, electronics and allied 
technologies.
77
  Its membership consists of national committees which could be public or 
private sector organisations or employees and could register as full members or associates.  
The full members participate in all IEC standard-setting processes and have voting rights.  
The associates, on the other hand, are accorded observer status and as such are without voting 
rights.  
 
The levying of annual dues and membership subscriptions is not demographic but rather 
economic and technical.  Each national committee’s dues are based not on the number of 
people in the country or the number of members but are based on the countries GNP and 
electricity consumption.  However,  
A country may apply for Associate Membership in order to pay reduced dues if its percentage 
of the total dues as calculated in accordance with the method approved by Council (i.e. based 
on its Gross National Product, Population and Electricity Consumption) is less than the lowest 
percentage of dues required for full membership, as decided annually by Council. 
 
 
Though laudable, the fact that the category of membership determines the degree of 
participation seems to put off the least developed countries in ECOWAS such as Mali and 
Burkina-Faso from joining the IEC.  Out of the fifteen Member States of the ECOWAS only 
Nigeria has an associate membership.
78
  The standard-setting procedures of the IEC and that 
of the ISO are very similar and what is presented above (under 3.1) about the ISO holds true 
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for the IEC as well.  Again many towns and communities within ECOWAS are without 
electricity, the basis of the calculation, that determines category of membership and influence 
and those that have electricity have very low consumption rates of less than six hours supply 
of power a day. 
 
The next subsection will analyse the provisions, ambit and applications of the SPS and TBT 
Agreements because while the latter refers to ‘relevant international standards,’79 the SPS 
Agreement specifically mentions the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the OIE and the 
‘organisations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection.’80  My 
choice of these two agreements is ‘due to their close link with agricultural trade’81 which has 
a direct impact on the economic development of ECOWAS Member States and also because 
they ‘are merely an elaboration of GATT rules on non-discrimination’82 which is the thrust of 
my thesis: the application of Articles I & III of the GATT on ECOWAS.  These two 
agreements also require deeper analyses because as Wouters and Meester observe ‘even if a 
measure is not discriminatory, it may form a trade barrier mainly by the fact that it exists and 
differs from the rules with which importers have to comply in their home country.’83  Again 
the two agreements take the GATT a step higher because apart from their substantive 
provisions on ‘increased trade scrutiny of national measures,’84 they take the GATT to a 
collaborative level by referring to international standards set by organisations outside the 
WTO. 
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4.3 SPS Measures and the Economic Development of ECOWAS 
An SPS measure is defined as  
 Any measure applied: 
a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the  Member from risks arising 
from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests;  or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the  Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests.  
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria;  processes and 
production methods;  testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures;  quarantine 
treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, 
or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport;  provisions on relevant 
statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment;  and packaging and 
labelling requirements directly related to food safety.
85
  
A study for the OECD provides the raison d’être for the SPS Agreement as well as its 
perverse side or unintended consequences. According to the study: 
It is widely recognized that SPS regulations, which are in general primarily aimed at 
safeguarding public health and avoiding losses from pests, diseases and contaminants in the 
domestic sphere, can have significant transboundary implications (OECD, 1999).
86
 Indeed, 
such regulations can become rather effective barriers to trade, and there have been concerns 
that negotiated reductions in tariff protection might be replaced through stringent SPS 
requirements.  In this context, agriculture and food exports from developing  countries 
are seen to be particularly vulnerable.
87
 
 
Put in other words, the SPS Agreement could and has been used as a justification or cover-up 
for practices that are thought to be contrary to the principles of non-discrimination set out in 
Articles I and III, GATT.  Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the developing 
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countries may be better off under the multilateral trading system than under bilateral or 
regional trade arrangements,  
For example, using a gravity model, Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001a) estimated the 
impact of a new harmonized aflatoxin standard set by the European Union (EU) on food 
exports from Africa. They found that the new EU standard, which is expected to  reduce 
health  risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, will decrease African exports of 
cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe by 64 per cent or $670 million,  compared to 
regulations set  through an international standard.
88
 
 
But what does the SPS Agreement cover and going by the analyses of the international 
standard-setting organisations above how could the developing countries reduce their 
vulnerability to the whims and caprices of the organisations bearing in mind that the cost of 
‘compliance with obligations concerning customs valuation, intellectual property rights, and 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) practices would in many least developed countries exceed 
an entire year’s development budget.’89 
 
 
As Van den Bossche points out, it is the purpose of applying a measure that makes it an ‘SPS 
measure’ which could be one of three, namely, to protect human or animal life or health from 
(a) food-borne risks, (b) pests and diseases or (c) to prevent or limit other damage from risks 
from pests.
90
  Therefore, SPS measures fall broadly speaking into two categories: those that 
prohibit discrimination and those that impose positive obligations to take measures (a) 
necessary to protect health, (b) based on scientific principles and (c) not maintained 
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arbitrarily but based on sufficient scientific advice.
91
  Although the GATT Contracting 
Parties are allowed to set their own level of acceptable risk, the Appellate Body has held that 
they are required to choose this level in a consistent way,
92
 (as will be discussed under Article 
XX ‘General Exceptions’ jurisprudence below).  But for present purposes, it is worthy of note 
that the burden of proof of justifying that an SPS measure is not ‘more trade protective than is 
required to achieve their appropriate level of protection,’93 stands in sharp contrast with the 
burden of proof for the positive obligations ‘necessary to protect public morals…human, 
animal or plant life or health, national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value, 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, etc,’94 as well as ‘national security 
interests.’95  While under the SPS Agreement the ‘necessary-test’ is for the respondent (the 
challenged party) to prove, that is, the respondent could use necessity as his defence, under 
Art. XX GATT, it is the complaining party that bears the burden of proof that ‘(a) a 
significantly
96
 less trade-restrictive measure was (b) reasonably
97
 available taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility and (c) would be able to achieve the appropriate 
level of protection.’98  In outlining the burden of proof, the Panel in EC – Sardines99 ‘ruled’: 
In paragraph 7.50, we determined that the European Communities, as the party  asserting 
that Codex Stan 94 is ineffective or inappropriate to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by 
the Regulation, has the burden of proving this assertion.  Although the burden of proof rests 
with the European Communities to prove that Codex Stan 94 is an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, we note that Peru has provided 
sufficient evidence and legal arguments, as set put below, to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 
is not an ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the 
EC Regulation. 
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Delving into the explication of the terms the Panel said, 
Concerning the terms ‘ineffective’ and ‘inappropriate’, we note that ‘ineffective’ refers to 
something which is not ‘having the function of accomplishing’, ‘having a result’, or ‘brought  
fitting’… An inappropriate means will not necessarily be an ineffective means and vice versa 
…. The question of effectiveness bears upon the results of the means employed, whereas the 
question of appropriateness relates more to the nature of the means employed (italics in the 
original).
100
 
 
By the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ it is clear that the respondent relying on Article 2.4 need not 
prove that a relevant international standard is ineffective and inappropriate.  It suffices to 
prove either of them.  The significance of this is that the burden of proof on the respondent is 
less onerous and so measures that restrict market access may scale through the legal huddle.  
 
4.3.1 The Scope of the SPS Agreement 
Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement limits its application to ‘all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade (italics mine).  
Therefore the underlying purpose of the Agreement is not scientific but commercial; not the 
eradication of pests and diseases, but the facilitation of trade across national borders.  The 
WTO, like many other international organisations, has legislative and quasi-judicial arms but 
no executive organ.
101
  Therefore, Art. 13 of the SPS Agreement provides that: 
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all obligations set 
forth herein. Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
support of the observance of the provisions of this Agreement by other than central 
government bodies. Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as regional 
bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply with the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement. 
 
                                                          
100
 ibid para. 116. 
101
 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2001) 116-118.  See also Dapo Akande, ‘International Institutions,’  and Gerhard Loibl, ‘International 
Economic Law,’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 277-306 
and 699-708 respectively. 
170 
 
The Panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada)102 held that the SPS measures taken 
by the state government of Tasmania in Australia was under the responsibility of Australia.  
The implication of this is that a country may be held liable for something done not by its 
government officials but by non-governmental and independent entities operating within its 
territories.  This underscores the importance of private standards in international trade; while 
they may be burdensome, they have the potential to boost international trade.   
 
Whether the SPS Agreement could apply retrospectively to measures already adopted and in 
place before the entry into force of the SPS Agreement has been raised by the European 
Communities before the Appellate Body.  In their report, the Appellate Body seems to have 
answered in the affirmative:  
If the negotiators had wanted to exempt the very large group of SPS measures in existence on 
1 January 1995 from the disciplines of provisions as important as Articles 5.1 and 5.5, it 
appears reasonable to us to expect that they would have said so explicitly.  Articles 5.1 and 
5.5 do not distinguish between SPS measures adopted before 1 January 1995 and measures 
adopted since; the relevant implication is that they are intended to be applicable to both.
103
 
 
Showing that in the absence of reservations, the SPS Agreement applies to measures prior as 
well as post of its entry into force.   
 
Where do the provisions of the SPS Agreement and the jurisprudence flowing from them 
leave ECOWAS Member States?  By the provisions they are mandated to use the resources 
they do not have to enforce some ‘international’ standards they (in many cases) opposed but 
were not listened to because they lacked the capacity to press on long enough with their 
objections to qualify as ‘sustained opposition’ and going by the rulings of the Panel and the 
Appellate Body they were expected to enforce the standards both retrospective and 
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prospective with little concrete assistance (whether technical, logistical or scientific) from the 
rest of the world for purposes of control, inspection and approval of procedures.
104
  
 
4.4 TBT Regulations and the Economic Development of ECOWAS 
It needs to be pointed out from the outset of this subsection that for purposes of the TBT 
Agreement, compliance with technical regulations is mandatory but compliance with 
standards is not.  The Annex to the TBT Agreement defines a regulation as a ‘[d]ocument 
which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, 
including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory’ but 
defines standards as a ‘[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related 
processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.’105  This appears 
understandable because, for example, an engine plug made by Bosch in Germany should be 
able to fit into a Toyota car engine made in Japan, otherwise it may not be sold or if sold, the 
market would be very limited.  
 
4.4.1 Scope of the TBT Agreement 
The TBT Agreement has three ambits covering ‘regulation,’ ‘standards’ and ‘procedures’ by 
governments in relation to conformity assessment and covers ‘terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to product, process or production 
method.’106 The Agreement does not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures.107  This 
rules out forum-shopping.  According to Peter Van den Bossche, if it were otherwise, it 
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would have been more advantageous for a complaining Member to challenge a measure 
under the SPS Agreement rather than under the TBT Agreement.
108
  
 
I am in agreement because the supermarket chains in the developed countries now set their 
own standards; for example, Sainsbury’s to flower growers in Kenya and grape farmers in 
South Africa.  In a report, ‘the island state of St Vincent and the Grenadines first drew the 
attention to the challenges it faced when trying to access the EU market due to strict 
standards set by commercial supermarket chains.’109  
 
It might be helpful to think of the SPS Agreement loosely as being biological in scope while 
the TBT Agreement is mechanical though ‘SPS measures may often take the form of 
technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures.’110  Article 1.3 TBT 
provides that its scope shall cover [a]ll products, including industrial and agricultural 
products’ and States have the right to adopt a level of technical regulations they consider 
appropriate but this cannot be in violation of their Most-Favoured-Nation and National 
Treatment obligations.
111
 Like the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement involves a ‘weighing 
and balancing’ of interests to assess the validity of the legitimate objective sought to be 
achieved through a TBT measure so as not to be a disguise for trade distortion.  In the 
‘weighing and balancing’ scientific evidence does not rank uppermost in the consideration as 
other contingent factors such as end-uses of the products are considered. The ‘TBT 
Agreement,’ according to one commentator, ‘has an open list of legitimate objectives,’112 and 
this may call some measures to question which may detract from the lofty objectives of the 
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Agreement authorising a Member State to set the protection ‘at the levels it considers 
appropriate.’113   
 
I am inclined to agree with the ‘open list’ assertion because the phrase ‘inter alia’ in Art. 2.2 
shows that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive; so the possibility exists that other 
objectives not explicitly mentioned could qualify as TBT measures.   
 
4.5 GATT Article XX ‘General Exceptions’ Jurisprudence 
4.5.1 The Provisions 
The WTO core policy of non-discrimination embodied in the MFN and National Treatment 
principles do not apply at large without exceptions.  Article XX warrants Member States to 
take sovereign actions that apparently seem to run counter to the overarching purpose of the 
GATT (Articles I & III) if such actions are:  
 (a) necessary to protect public morals,  
 (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,  
 (c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver,  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with        
the provisions of (the) Agreement,  
 (e) relating to products of prison labour,  
 (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures…  
 (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,  
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity         
agreement …  
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential      
quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry…, and  
 (j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply….   
 
The chapeau to Article XX provides a qualification to the ten exceptions to the general 
GATT rules by subjecting their application to ‘the requirement that such measures are not 
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applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries … or a disguised restriction on international trade.’114                                       
 
In US-Shrimp the Appellate Body emphasised that any claim founded on Art. XX must 
follow the ‘fundamental structure and logic’ of the Article.  According to them, the first thing 
to determine is whether the matter at issue falls within the listed exceptions (a) to (j) and see 
if the measure qualifies as ‘provisionally justified’.  This is the satisfaction of the ‘necessity 
test’.  Then, the next thing is to subject the measure for screening under the terms of the 
chapeau such as not being ‘a disguised restriction on international trade.’115  
 
4.5.2 The Chapeau to the General Exceptions 
The chapeau (introductory clause) to the GATT Article XX(a-j) ‘General Exceptions’ 
provides:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would  constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the  same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this  Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures …[(a), (b) and (d) used 
‘necessary to’ …, (c), (e) and (g) used ‘relating to’…and (j) used  ‘essential to’…to introduce the ten 
exceptions]. 
 
The reason for this chapeau as tellingly pointed out by the Appellate Body, in the 
determination of a similar provision
116
 with a corresponding application, is to ‘reflect the 
shared understanding of Members that substantive (WTO) obligations should not be deviated 
from lightly.’117 
 
                                                          
114
  In United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 
1996 at 22 and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (hereinafter, US-
Shrimp) para. 158. the Appellate Body held that the purpose of the chapeau (introductory clause) was to ensure 
that the exceptions are not abused or even wantonly resorted to. 
115
 Preamble, TBT Agreement, para 6 
116
 GATS Art. XIV and GATT Art. XX have similar chapeaux and it has been stated that the jurisprudence of 
one applied to the other.  See particularly para 291 of the US – Gambling Services which found that the previous 
decisions under the GATT Art. XX to be ‘relevant for (the) analysis under Art. XIV of the GATS.’  
117
 Ibid US – Gambling Services para. 308. 
175 
 
4.5.3 GATT Article XX(a) – ‘Public Morals’ 
As pointed out above, the jurisprudence under ‘GATT Article XX is relevant for analysis 
under GATS Article XIV’ because of the similarities of their chapeaux and subsections and 
presumably vice versa, the WTO dispute based on ‘public morals’ is US – Gambling 
Services.
118
  Although contested based on GATS Article XIV, it will be used to illustrate the 
meaning of ‘public morals’ as the Appellate Body adopted the definition of ‘public morals’ 
by the Panel as classic.  In its analysis of GATS Article XIV(a), (the equivalent of GATT Art. 
XX(a)), the Panel found that "the term 'public morals' denotes standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation."
119
  The Panel further found 
that the definition of the term "order", read in conjunction with footnote 5 of the GATS, 
"suggests that 'public order' refers to the preservation of the fundamental interests of a 
society, as reflected in public policy and law."
120
  The Panel then referred to Congressional 
reports and testimony establishing that "the government of the United States considers that 
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA were adopted to address concerns such as those 
pertaining to money laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage gambling and pathological 
gambling."
121
  On this basis, the Panel found that the three federal statutes are "measures that 
are designed to 'protect public morals' and/or 'to maintain public order' within the meaning of 
Article XIV(a) 
 
There are two differences though between GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article XIV(a).  
While Article XX(a) simply says ‘necessary to protect public morals,’ Article XIV(a) has an 
extension, ‘necessary to protect public morals and public order.’  Again, Art. XIV(a) has a 
qualifying or limiting footnote which provides that ‘[t]he public order exception may be 
                                                          
118
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invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.’ 
 
4.5.4 Definition of Terms: ‘Necessary’ versus ‘Relating to’ GATT Art. XX(a-j) 
The fact that the GATT Article XX makes use of different introductory words and phrases in 
the sub-paragraphs has been in contention and demanding judicial clarifications from the 
WTO Panel and Appellate Body.  While the interpretation of ‘relating to’ has been somewhat 
simpler,
122
 ‘necessary’ has been undergoing some metamorphosis and is still the subject of 
arguments and judicial reasoning.  
 
In interpreting ‘relating to’ the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp123 affirmed that it involves 
looking into the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ and seeing whether they are ‘reasonably related’.  So the 
first step is to analyse the measure itself and as pointed out in EC – Tariff Preferences,124 this 
means examining ‘the design, architecture and structure’ to see if they are related to the goal 
pursued.  For example, the Appellate Body held in the US-Shrimp that the ‘means and ends 
relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible , 
and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real one.’ 
 
Conversely, what has been held to be ‘necessary’ has not been abundantly clear and seems to 
be taken on a case-by-case basis.  Before the birth of the WTO, the GATT Panel in the US – 
Section 337 (in 1989) while called upon to determine the application of Article XX(d) 
concluded that:  
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a Contracting Party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as 
‘necessary’ in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could be reasonably 
be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available 
to it.  By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is 
not reasonably available, a contracting Party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably 
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with the GATT provisions.  
This statement reflects the traditional GATT interpretation of ‘necessary’, that a measure is 
not ‘necessary’ if there is a reasonably available alternative measure that leads to a lesser 
degree of inconsistency with GATT rules.
 125
 
 
The above Panel determination coupling ‘necessity’ with ‘a reasonably alternative measure’ 
has been amended in the Korea – Beef126 and the amendment amplified in Thailand – 
Cigarettes
127
 and also in US – Gambling Services128 as there will always be alternatives.  In 
the Korea – Beef the Appellate Body explained   
161 We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word 
"necessary" is not limited to that which is "indispensable" or "of absolute necessity" or 
"inevitable".  Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to 
secure compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of Article XX(d).  But other measures, 
too, may fall within the ambit of this exception.  As used in Article XX(d), the term 
"necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity.  At one end of this 
continuum lies  "necessary" understood as "indispensable";  at the other end, is "necessary" 
taken to mean as "making a contribution to."  We consider that a "necessary" measure is, in 
this continuum,  located  significantly closer to the pole of "indispensable" than to the opposite 
pole of simply "making a contribution to". 
 
After explaining that ‘necessity’ is like a spectrum or in their own word a ‘continuum’, the 
Appellate Body in the Korea – Beef went further in paragraph 162: 
In appraising the "necessity" of a measure in these terms, it is useful to bear in mind the 
context in which "necessary" is found in Article XX(d).  The measure at stake has to be 
"necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations … ,  including  those relating to 
customs enforcement, the enforcement of [lawful] monopolies … , the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices". Clearly, Article XX(d) 
is susceptible of application in respect of a wide variety of "laws and  regulations" to be 
enforced.  It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary 
to secure compliance of a WTO-consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases, take 
into account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or 
regulation to be enforced is intended to protect.  The more vital or important those common 
interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as "necessary" a measure designed as 
an enforcement instrument (emphasis added).  
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Therefore, on the authority of the Korea – Beef, the relevant factors for determining whether 
a measure is necessary are (a) its contribution to the enforcement of the law, (b) the 
degree/importance of the common interest or values protected by the measure adopted and (c) 
the effect of the impact on trade.  This has also been adumbrated in EC – Asbestos in which 
Canada accused France of violating GATT’s principle of non-discrimination enshrined in 
Article III by prohibiting the manufacture, sale, distribution or import of chrysotile asbestos 
fibres and products of the kind. Canada challenged the outright ban as being a means of 
protecting the French market for French substitutes. 
 
However, it seems to me that the steps outlined in US – Gambling for determining if a 
measure is ‘necessary’ are clearer.  As stated in paragraph 306 of the AB Report, (i) [t]he 
process begins with an assessment of the “relative importance’ of the interests or values 
furthered by the challenged measure, (ii) the contribution of the measure to the ends pursued 
by it, and (iii) the restrictive impact of the measure on international trade.’  
 
 
4.5.5 Article XX(b) Cases: US-Gasoline, EC-Asbestos and EC-Tariff Preferences 
4.5.5.1 US-Gasoline
129
 
The United States law purported to have been enacted to reduce motor vehicle emissions was 
found to violate the GATT core principle of non-discrimination
130
 for failing to accord 
‘treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin.’   The US 
made an affirmative defence that its law came under GATT Article XX(b) and was 
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.’  While subjecting the measure to 
the ‘necessity test’ the Panel made a finding of whether it would achieve its objective under 
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Article XX(b) and concluded that imported gasoline received ‘less favourable’ treatment and 
also that the law was not necessary. 
 
However, because the Americans did not appeal the findings under Article XX(a) – public 
morals - but predicated their appeal on Article XX(g) ‘the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources’ and ‘domestic production or consumption’ the Appellate Body refused to endorse 
the approach of the Panel of singling out the discriminatory aspect of the measure rather than 
the measure as a whole. This left the core and the often contested part of the issue untouched. 
 
4.5.5.2 EC-Asbestos
131
  
Because asbestos is commonly known to be harmful to human health, the Panel held that the 
French policy in question was covered by GATT Article XX(b) for being ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.’  A brief point that needs to be highlighted here 
is ‘that it is indisputable that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.’132  Therefore many 
powerful and big trading nations can mount technical barriers to trade and restrict the market 
access of developing countries like ECOWAS Member States under whatever guise. 
 
4.5.5.3 EC-Tariff Preferences
133
 
This case developed the GATT Article XX(b) as having two dimensions: the first is the 
‘necessity test’ based on the phrase ‘necessary to;’ and the other, the objective set out to be 
achieved, in other words, the means and the ends must correlate and be mutually re-
enforcing, much like the proportionality test which requires a balancing act.
134
   As this case 
illustrates, to be taken to ‘protect human, animal or plant life or health’ as provided in GATT 
                                                          
131
 EC-Asbestos (n 92) 
132
 ibid para 168 
133
 EC-Tariff Preferences (n 124) 
134
 TA Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, 96(5) Yale Law Journal 943- 1005 (1987) 
180 
 
Article XX(b), it must be so stated as the objective of the measure. In the Tariff Preferences 
case, the stated objective of ‘development policy, in particular, the eradication of poverty and 
the promotion of sustainable development in the developing countries’ was held to be too 
remote by both the Panel and the Appellate Body to have a direct and strong nexus with the 
protection of ‘human, animal or plant life or health.’135 
 
While agreeing with the Appellate Body on its key findings such as the fact that ‘the EC 
Regulation provides no monitoring mechanism on the effectiveness of the Drug 
Arrangements for protecting human life or health in the European Communities,’ it is hard to 
dismiss it as being entirely ‘insecure for the future.’  However, the legal reason for taking an 
exception to the judgment is that it seems to stand in contrast to the objectives and the 
jurisprudence of the WTO.  The backdrop to the WTO was that it came into being to counter 
the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ and ‘race-to-the-bottom’ policies that some countries practised 
which had adverse consequences on other countries. Conversely, a measure to curtail ‘the 
risk posed by narcotic drugs’ in one country could have a positive effect on another country.  
The underlying philosophy for creating the WTO is that ‘[t[he system helps to keep the 
peace’  In the words of the WTO itself: 
History is lettered with examples of trade disputes turning into war.  One of the most vivid is 
the trade war of the 1930s when countries competed to raise trade barriers in order to protect 
domestic producers and retaliate against each other’s’ barriers.  This worsened the Great 
Depression and eventually played a part in the outbreak of World War 2. 
  
 Two developments immediately after the Second World War helped to avoid a repeat of the 
pre-war trade tensions.  In Europe, international cooperation developed in coal, and in iron 
and steel.  Globally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created.  Both 
have proved successful, so much so that they are now considerably expanded – one has 
become the European Union, the other the Word Trade Organisation (WTO)’136 (emphasis 
mine). 
 
WTO jurisprudence shows that international co-operation or threat should not be dismissed 
with a wave of the hand.  The findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos 
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that the measure ‘protects human life or health’ and that no ‘reasonable available alternative 
measure’ existed and as such was justified under Article XX(b) and that it also satisfied the 
conditions of the chapeau of Art. XX shows that either ‘co-operation’ or ‘threat’ could be 
pleaded as a reason.  It was accepted in EC-Asbestos but rejected in EC-Tariff Preferences.  
 
It is therefore submitted that although the objectives of the Drug Arrangements between the 
EU and some developing countries were loosely put as ‘development policy, in particular the 
eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development in the developing 
countries,’ without even an oblique allusion to the control of narcotic drugs in the EC, it 
nonetheless was aimed at the control of illicit trafficking on those substances.  Perhaps what 
could be added here is that this is often the drafting style of many European directives or 
legislation which in order to appear noble in intent and charitable in conception leave their 
real intentions or motives eclipsed completely from non-discerning readers: legislative 
objective sacrificed on the altar of political correctness.
137
   
 
However, it has to be pointed out that the precautionary principle (as claimed by the EC in 
the EC-Preferences) has not taken roots within WTO jurisprudence.  In EC – Biotech 
GMOs,
138
 the Panel quoted with approval the following long passage from EC – Hormones: 
The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the 
subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges.  The 
precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general 
principle of customary international environmental law.  Whether it has been widely 
accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law 
appears less than clear.
139
  We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably 
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imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, 
but abstract, question.  We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive 
finding with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in international law 
and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international 
environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.
140
 
 
That notwithstanding, a relationship does exist between the precautionary principle and the 
SPS Agreement.  According to the Panel: 
It appears to us important, nevertheless, to note some aspects of the relationship of 
the precautionary principle to the SPS Agreement.  First, the principle has not been 
written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are 
otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in particular 
provisions of that Agreement.  Secondly, the precautionary principle indeed finds 
reflection in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.  We agree, at the same time, with the 
European Communities, that there is no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the 
relevance of a precautionary principle.  It is reflected also in the sixth paragraph of 
the preamble and in Article 3.3.  These explicitly recognize the right of Members to 
establish their own appropriate level of sanitary protection, which level may be higher 
(i.e., more cautious) than that implied in existing international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations.  Thirdly, a panel charged with determining, for instance, 
whether "sufficient scientific evidence" exists to warrant the maintenance by a 
Member of a particular SPS measure may, of course, and should, bear in mind that 
responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence 
and precaution where risks are irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human 
health are concerned.  Lastly, however, the precautionary principle does not, by itself, 
and without a clear textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of 
applying the normal (i.e. customary international law) principles of treaty 
interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
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The precautionary principle is a double-edged sword for both development and trade 
liberalisation: developed countries and supermarket chains may use it to restrict access to 
their market but it is hard to justify when used by developing countries because of its 
subjective nature.   On the relevance of the rule of international law to the interpretation of 
WTO Agreements, the Panel looked back to its constitutive document and source of authority 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and read it vis-à-vis the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties with a specific comment on Art. 31(3)(c). 
 
 Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, we are to interpret the WTO agreements "in accordance 
 with customary rules of interpretation of public international law".  These customary rules are 
 reflected, in part, in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
141
     
 Article 31 provides in relevant part:  
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
 
 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their  context and  in 
the light of its object and purpose. 
 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall  
  comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a)  any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b)  any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a)  any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b)  any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c)  any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
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It is important to note that Article 31(3)(c) mandates a treaty interpreter to take into account 
other rules of international law ("there shall be taken into account"); it does not merely give 
a treaty interpreter the option of doing so.
142
  It is true that the obligation is to "take account" 
of such rules, and thus no particular outcome is prescribed.  However, Article 31(1) makes 
clear that a treaty is to be interpreted "in good faith".  Thus, where consideration of all other 
interpretative elements set out in Article 31 results in more than one permissible 
interpretation, a treaty interpreter following the instructions of Article 31(3)(c) in good faith 
would in our view need to settle for that interpretation which is more in accord with other 
applicable rules of international law.
143
 
 
 
It pears that the taking of a precautionary measure based on GATT Art. XX(b) has not gained 
currency and crystallised as a customary rule of international law.  However, the combined 
effect of Art. 3.2 of the DSU (allowing importation of customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law) and Art. 31(1) of the VCLT (on interpretation based on ‘good faith’) 
may give repeated interpretations based on good faith a stamp of authority.  
 
4.6 ECOWAS Participation in the SPS and the TBT Processes of notification of draft 
measures and discussions of specific trade concerns 
 
The SPS and TBT Agreements provide for an advance notification of draft regulations and 
the discussion of their potential and actual trade effects in the relevant committees.  This is of 
huge importance to developing countries who deploy the administrative law approach in 
dealing with the world trading system instead of litigation as shown in chapter 5.  The SPS 
Agreement demands that ‘Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures and shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in 
accordance with the provisions of Annex B’144 (detailing the ‘publication of regulations,’ 
setting up ‘enquiry points’ and outlining the ‘notification procedures’) and also ‘encourage 
                                                          
142
 This view is confirmed by the negotiating history of Article 31(3).  The International Law Commission, in its 
commentary to Article 27 of the draft Vienna Convention, which contained language identical to the current 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, stated that "the three elements [the three sub-paragraphs of what is now 
Article 31(3)] are all of an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be considered to be norms of 
interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede them".  Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1966), Vol. II, p. 220, para. 9.    
143
 EC – Biotech (‘ GMOs’) (n 19) 328. 
144
 SPS Agreement, Art. 7. 
185 
 
and facilitate ad hoc consultations or negotiations among Members on specific SPS issues.’145  
Under the TBT Agreement notification requirement is worded differently.  It begins with a 
chapeau and provides in relevant part as follows: 
Whenever a relevant guide or recommendation issued by an international standardizing body 
does not exist or the technical content of a proposed conformity assessment procedure is not 
in accordance with relevant guides and recommendations issued by international 
standardizing bodies, and if the conformity assessment procedure may have a significant 
effect on trade of other Members, Members shall:
146
 
 ……… 
 
notify other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be covered by the proposed 
conformity assessment procedure, together with a brief indication of its  objective and 
rationale. Such notifications shall take place at an early appropriate  stage, when 
amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into account;
147
 
 
and in cases of ‘urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or national 
security,’ 
 notify immediately other Members through the Secretariat of the particular procedure and the 
 products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and the rationale of the procedure, 
 including the nature of the urgent problems.
148
 
 
The above requirements notwithstanding, the findings of Peter Walkenhosrt in his study (for 
the OECD) of the participation of the developing countries in the SPS process in 2003 is at 
variance with the 2010 trade monitoring and review report by the Director-General of the 
WTO to the Trade Policy Review Body.  According to Walkenshorst, ‘developing countries 
do not participate as intensively in the SPS implementation as their share of WTO 
membership would suggest.’149  He points out that ‘[d]eveloping countries in Africa make-up 
a third of WTO membership, but account for much less of the SPS implementation 
activities.’150   He describes the African group performance as falling ‘far short of their 
membership,’ being ‘considerably lower than their WTO membership share’ unlike 
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developing countries in Latin America who ‘are to a considerable extent “punching above 
their weight”.’  He concludes that ‘African countries have played only a marginal role’ and 
submits that his ‘analysis points to some particular groups of developing countries that might 
warrant special attention with respect to their trade policy capacities.’151  He suggests that 
‘complementary qualitative research’ (to his report), ‘perhaps in the form of case studies, 
seems warranted to establish to what extent developing countries have encountered obstacles 
during the implementation process.’  The reason for such research, in his view, is to ascertain 
‘whether the low participation rates of some groups of developing countries are a rational 
choice in the context of resource priority setting or the result of government failure’152 
(emphasis mine) which is the research I will undertake in the next chapter.  My findings 
might give Sub-Saharan Africa in general and ECOWAS Member States in particular a shot 
in the arm or at least make their plight clearly known to the world by presenting independent 
research of their situations and a ‘policy path’ different from the ‘often misleading’ 
‘roadmaps’ that currently exist as Jackson stated:  
The policy path through the many facts and circumstances which have good or bad effects on 
world economic situations, and thus on international economic law, is extraordinarily 
complex and unclear. This ‘landscape’ truly needs some roadmaps, but few of these exist and 
those that are used are often misleading (emphasis added).
153
 
 
For example, ECOWAS Member States have not learnt to pull their resources together and 
may be establish a mission in Geneva or to work closely with the Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law which was established to support developing and least-developed countries in the area of 
international economic law and practice.  There is no single case used in this study or even in 
the whole GATT/WTO disputes where ECOWAS  Member States presented a common front 
even as a third party which seems to suggest that they may be divided by disparate interests.   
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The Report to the Trade Policy Review Body (2010) from the Director-General on Trade-
Related Developments gives bewildering figures of sharp increases in notifications and 
specific trade concerns under the SPS and TBT Agreements.  According to the Report 
‘[d]uring the period from 1 November 2009 to 15 May 2010, 635 regular notifications and 50 
emergency notifications were submitted by Members…. Around 79 per cent of the 
notifications …came from developing countries (the corresponding figure for the same period 
in 2008-2009 was around 67 per cent).’154  The Director-General says that ‘[t]he higher 
number of notifications signals either an increase in regulatory activities or an improved 
implementation of the SPS Agreement.’  This is doubtful and does not admit an 
‘either…or…’ analysis as the Director-General has put it because there might be other factors 
such as the effect of globalisation that has not been factored into the analysis.  Another 
important thing to note is of the term ‘developing countries’ which amorphously is fast 
becoming a loose term for non-Western Countries. 
 
On the TBT the same Director-General’s Report states that 1,030 notifications were 
submitted between November 2009 and May 2010 and the percentage from developing 
countries was about 80 per cent.  However, the report makes it clear that the ‘rise is mainly 
driven by China, Korea, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia’155 which cuts off ECOWAS and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Again this highlights the importance of taking specific research on 
ECOWAS to determine the harmonisation,
156
 transparency,
157
 implementation and 
monitoring
158
 of their compliance procedures. 
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4.7 The Internal/Structural Weaknesses of ECOWAS  
This sub-section deals with the weaknesses within ECOWAS that have made it a mere 
observer, a follower and, as will be shown in the next chapter, a third party participant and 
not a front runner in the world trading system.  
 
Arguably, one of the worst weaknesses of ECOWAS is ethnic jingoism which sounds in self-
attrition as the terminated membership of Mauritania illustrates.  There is a strong tendency 
among Members not to co-operate to build a strong customs union or economic community.  
Mauritania was one of the founding Member of ECOWAS that signed the Treaty of Lagos on 
28 May 1975.  However it withdrew in December 1999 after twenty-four years in the 
Community, but Cape Verde had joined in 1977. 
[Mauritanian President] Ould Taya's stated reason for leaving ECOWAS is the organisation's 
decision to establish a common currency by 2004, for which the regime is not ready to give 
up its own currency, the Ouguiya. However, the real problem is that Mauritania has no 
intention to integrate or have an open-border policy with black Africa. Mauritania has not 
paid its membership contribution to ECOWAS for the last 16 years, since Colonel Ould Taya 
seized power through a coup.
159
 
 
Yet this is a country with its ethnic composition of 40-45 per cent being black African of the 
Fulani, Soninke, Wolof and Bambara hues and 25 per cent Moors who are of the Arab/Berber 
stock.
160
  The Moors dominate over 80 per cent of power positions in the country and 
discriminate against the black Africans to the extent that the results of the 1977, 1978 and 
1988 censuses were never published because they show them in the minority.  The 
government is accused of carrying out a proactive policy of ethnic cleansing and Arabisation 
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of the country as shown in the amnesty it issued on 29 May 1999 before the Vienna human 
rights summit to cover up its members of the armed and security forces who carried out the 
campaign of terror, torture, forceful expulsion and killing of black Mauritanians between 
1989 and 1993.
161
   
 
Although the official reason given by Mauritania for withdrawing from ECOWAS was to 
preserve its currency, it is argued that the main reason was to cover up gross human rights 
violations in the country and to foreclose inquiry and intervention because it was at the 1999 
ECOWAS summit that the Community agreed on a Protocol for the Establishment of a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security.
162
  
Contrastingly some members of the EEA have economic reasons not to be in the EU. 
 
Kufuor has identified many other weaknesses of ECOWAS that could be characterised into 
two as initial and systemic arising prior and subsequent to the Treaty of Lagos 1975 and from 
the 1993 Treaty respectively.  
 
Prominent among the initial problems, according to Kufuor, are the dependence of ECOWAS 
Members on trade taxes for government revenue, different ideological positions adopted by 
the Member States especially between the Francophone and the Anglophone countries,  lack 
of a strong Member that could bear the burden of open market by compensating losers in the 
trade liberalisation scheme, multiple regional integration bodies and the subsequent conflict 
of interests, the inadequacy of the organs of the Community created by the 1975 Treaty, the 
non-binding nature of the activities of the Community under the 1975 Treaty, national 
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interests put on a pedestal above Community interests, the existence of an ‘elite-mass gap’ 
and the decline in the economic fortunes of Nigeria, the ‘regional hegemon.’163 
 
Following the adoption of the revised ECOWAS Treaty 1993, Kufuor further outlines 
‘mimetic isomorphism,’ the ‘billiard-ball’ effect of the EU, that is, imperfect copying of a 
more advanced system, little demand for a supranational organisation, the ‘dissolution’ of the 
nation-state in the classic sense, the swoop move within ECOWAS as opposed to the 
‘incremental nature of the process in Europe,’ and the absence of long standing parliamentary 
democracies building up to international Community law with the characteristics of 
legitimacy, namely, ‘determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.’164 
 
In addition to the weaknesses outlined above, there are still other weaknesses plaguing 
ECOWAS among which are inability to stick together – yielding easily to centrifugal forces 
and paucity of market power.  As the Egyptian playwright Tawfik Al-Hakim dramatises in 
his Fate of a Cockroach, they only come together when there is a common thing to be shared 
and fight over it but not commit themselves to build anything; yet when turned on their back, 
none would be able to reverse itself and stand on its legs.  Secondly, the fact that in trade 
negotiations one’s relative market size is relative to one’s bargaining power165 seems to elude 
ECOWAS Members who put little into building the Economic Community.
166
  What they 
refuse in Abuja or Accra they humbly accept in Brussels or Washington.  
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4.8 Summary 
The chapter opened with the latitude given to WTO Members to take ‘measures necessary to 
protect public morals, human, animal or plant life or health,…or to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT] 
Agreement.’167  These apparently libertine provisions have been chaperoned with the SPS 
and TBT Agreements so that in taking such measures Members have to guard against using 
the measures as ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade’168 and as such 
they turn out to ‘be more trade-restrictive than is necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.’169  
The caveats are an indication that SPS measures or TBT regulations could facilitate or 
frustrate international trade especially market access for imported agricultural products.  As 
stated by the Director-General of the WTO in his 2010 Report, ‘measures that have the 
potential to restrict trade outnumbered those that facilitate trade by a factor of 3:2,’ and 
specifically ‘export restricting measures outnumber export facilitating measures by a factor of 
5:2’170 
 
It has been pointed out that the WTO itself does not set international standards that apply to 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures or technical regulations, therefore, that aspect of the 
work has been ‘farmed out’ to different organisations outside the WTO three171 of which are 
mentioned in the SPS Agreement but none in the TBT Agreement which simply refers to 
‘relevant international standards.’172 
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A review of the history of the international standard-setting organisations shows that they 
date back to when all the 15-Member countries of ECOWAS but one (Liberia) were under 
colonial rule, the OIE dates back to 1924 and the IEC even further back to 1906.  However, 
this does not seem a very good reason to question the legitimacy of such standard-setting 
organisations as accession to membership means acceptance of their legitimacy, at least 
implicitly.  It is humbly submitted that the formal legitimacy arguments or debates are 
‘misleading’ and misdirected because they leave out the issue of grave concern to ECOWAS 
and Sub-Saharan Africa which is inclusion or integration into the world trading system under 
the WTO multilateral agreements. Bandying the issue of market technology relevancy, 
legitimacy or use by industry seems tendentious and meretricious and therefore distractive 
from the core concerns of ECOWAS and other developing ‘countries where the same 
conditions prevail.’     
 
The issue is that despite joining the FAO and the GATT/WTO, ECOWAS Member States 
still find themselves ‘play(ing) only a marginal role with respect to SPS implementation 
activities.’173  Therefore, their exclusion from the international standard setting organisations 
seems structural and not political, but with economic consequences.  For ECOWAS Member 
States funding their participations in the organisations is an issue of epic proportions.  As 
stated above participants at some of the organisations are not funded and this alone screens 
off potential participants from countries in dire economic straits.  The Committee meetings of 
the organisations depend on the benevolence of the host countries that are understandably 
conferred with an advantage of formulating the agenda and influencing the outcome. 
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It was explained above that the reason for the choice to analyse the SPS and TBT Agreements 
was because of their direct effects on the agricultural trade.  However, when the General 
Agreement and the GATT/WTO cases based on it are juxtaposed with the ‘General 
Exceptions’ we find in the GATT Article XX, the emerging jurisprudence does not show a 
tendency to be purposive or inclusive enough to cater for the acknowledged ‘special 
difficulties’ that developing countries may encounter in the implementation of the 
Agreements.  Even though the Agreements provide for the international standards to be 
approved by consensus,
174
 it does not mean unanimity but rather the absence of ‘sustained 
opposition to a substantial issue by any major part of the concerned interests
175’ from (the 
subjective) ‘major part’ thereby making it easy to overcome the tepid oppositions from 
ECOWAS and other developing countries at both the formulation or drafting, and, the 
approval or voting stages.  The diction of the definition needs to be noted: ‘major’ not 
‘majority’ was used, therefore, a ‘major part’ could be the US or Japan, not necessarily the 
majority who are developing countries. 
 
Even when the participation of developing countries is said to be improving, some of the 
studies belie the real situation on the ground.  The two reports cited earlier by Peter 
Walkenhorst and Paschal Lamy, the WTO Director-General, are a bit suspect because of the 
participation indicators used.  For example, Walkenhorst used the generalities of per capita 
income, the importance of agriculture in the countries’ economies and the agricultural trade 
orientation of the countries.  None of them has specific country participation.  Walkenhorst 
acknowledges that  
Trying to determine whether countries have implemented their obligations under the SPS 
Agreement is an extremely difficult undertaking. The data requirements would be formidable.  
Even evaluating countries’ compliance with the transparency obligations and their 
participation in the SPS Committee is tricky, because only parts of the required information 
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are accessible. For example, a country might not have submitted any SPS notifications, but 
might be in perfect compliance with the SPS Agreement, if there were no changes in SPS 
measures that required reporting. On the other hand, some other country might have notified a 
considerable number of SPS measures and might, hence, appear to actively implement the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement. Yet, there might have been a number of other changes to 
SPS regulations that should have been notified but were not. Getting consistent information 
on such “passive noncompliance” seems virtually impossible.176 
 
This is why the analysis in the next chapter will focus on ECOWAS Members’ specific, 
active compliance practices of designated ‘notification authorities’ and established ‘enquiry 
points’177 with a comparative section on the EU.  
 
Lastly, although no accusation of imbalance or unfair reporting is intended here, there seems 
to be overreliance on reports commissioned by the Washington Consensus and the OECD.  A 
report funded by the OECD and carried out by an economist
178
 in the Trade Directorate of the 
Organisation would need to be corroborated with an independent research; so would a report 
from the Director-General of the WTO to the Trade Policy Review Body of the same 
organisation he is the head would need to be backed up from a neutral and independent 
source.  Research effectiveness and robustness are directly linked to integrity and integrity is 
directly linked to financial independence. 
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5.1 Object and Purpose of Trade Policy Reviews 
The WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) was set up ‘to contribute to improved 
adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements … and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading 
system by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members.’1  Although it is not intended to be used ‘for the enforcement of 
specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose 
new policy commitments on Members,’2 its ‘function is to examine the impact of a Member’s 
trade policies and practices on the multilateral trading system.’3  It has a great supportive role 
in enhancing ‘the inherent value of transparency of government decision-making’4 at the 
national level.  Interestingly the WTO states that ‘the implementation of domestic 
transparency must be on voluntary basis and take account of each Member’s legal and 
political systems’5 and surprisingly omits each Member’s level or stage of economic 
development.  Yet, the constitutive document establishing the Trade Policy Review Body 
(TPRB) in a seemingly contradictory provision stipulates that ‘[t]he trade policies and 
practices of all Members shall be subject to periodic review.’6  
 
The TPRM stipulates the frequency of reviews to be undertaken by Members to ascertain 
‘[t]he impact of individual Members on the functioning of the multilateral trading system.’  
The WTO Quad (USA, EU, Canada and Japan) are to be reviewed ‘every two years,’ the next 
sixteen ‘every four years,’ other Members ‘every six years’ except for least developed 
                                                          
1
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2
 Annex 3(a)(i). 
3
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6
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countries who may have ‘a longer period’ fixed for them.7  The reviews which must be in the 
Outline Format for Country Reports will be based on: 
a. a full report . . . supplied by the Member or Members under review, and  
b. a report, to be drawn up by the Secretariat on its own responsibility, based on the information 
available to it and that provided by the Member or Members concerned of their trade policies 
and practices.
8
 
 
Trade policy reviews (TPRs) attracted a flurry of attention from scholars and academic 
commentators
9
 between the dying years of the GATT and the first few years of the 
establishment of the WTO (1990 to 1996) with each commentator providing an overview and 
analysis of trade laws, policies and activities of a particular country of interest.  Following the 
establishment of the Trade Policy Review Division of the GATT in 1989, a few country-
specific Trade Policy Review Reports (TPRRs) and comments appeared on Australia, 
Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
10
  But even while the attention of 
scholars was on the TPRs, nobody commented on the Trade Policy Review Reports (TPRRs) 
of any of the ECOWAS Member States despite the importance of the surveillance measure 
for strengthening the multilateral trading system.  Therefore, this chapter will examine the 
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TPRRs of ECOWAS Member States to assess their implementation and compliance to the 
commitments they assumed under the WTO Agreements.  It will also analyse the 
participation of ECOWAS in the WTO dispute settlement and compare that with those of the 
new countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.  This will provide an indication of how 
well the Economic Community is operating and the challenges it faces in the effort to be 
integrated into the world trading system through the harmonisation of its trade law and 
policy.  As at May 2012 the WTO has not carried out any trade policy review on two 
(Portuguese-speaking countries) of the fifteen Member States of ECOWAS, namely, Cape 
Verde and Guinea Bissau and as such they will not form part of our analysis here.   The 
sparse population of Cape Verde (only 500,000 people flung across an archipelago of ten 
islands) and the economy being service oriented and not based on trade in goods does not 
support much of agricultural production; Guinea-Bissau is ravaged by political instability and 
ranked by the UNDP among the poorest countries on earth.
11
  
 
In his report to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), the Director-General of the WTO 
referred to trade monitoring exercise as being of ‘systemic value to the multilateral trading 
system.’12  But despite its importance, the recently published ‘Report on G20 Trade and 
Investment Measures’ covering mid-October 2010 to April 2011 shows that protectionist 
measures by the G20 are on the rise.  According to the joint report by the Secretary-General 
of the OECD, the Director-General of the WTO and the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, 
Over the past six months most G20 governments have put in place more new trade 
restrictive measures than in previous periods since the (2008/09 financial) crisis.  Their 
restraint to resist protectionism appears to be under increasing pressure.  The 
commitment to roll back export restrictions has not been followed; in fact, new export 
restrictions are on an increasing trend.
13
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The new trade restrictive measures were taken despite ‘their standstill commitment to resist 
protectionism until the end of 2013 (as agreed at the Toronto summit) and affirmed in Soul 
on 1 November 2010.’  The results are ‘[c]ontinued imbalances in the global economy, 
weaknesses in governments’ fiscal positions and commodity price volatility.’14 
 
Globally, there have ‘continued to be concerns raised by trading partners that some countries 
are restricting market access for imported agricultural product.’15  The prospect of that 
abating remains gloomy as export restricting measures are on the increase. 
 
ECOWAS Member States’ Trade Policy Reviews  
 
5.2 Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali
16
  
The TPRs of smaller members of the WTO is done jointly and so that of the Republic of 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali was done together and appeared as a single report in August 
2010.  The three French-speaking countries belong to the eight countries that make up the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which all together belong to the 
larger 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  All three 
countries have a common currency, the CFA (the African Financial Community) franc
17
 
pegged at a fixed parity to the Euro, import all their petroleum products and belong to the 
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).  There is little 
mechanisation of agriculture in all three countries and they depend on the budget-support 
                                                          
14
 ibid, 4.  
15
 (N 11) 2. 
16
 WT/TPR/S/236, 30 August 2010. 
17
 Article 12 of the WAMU Treaty. 
200 
 
furnished by their technical and financial partners for 3-6 per cent of their GDP’.18   
WAEMU has a common framework for agricultural and mining policy. 
 
4.2.1 Harmonisation with the MFN and National Treatment Principles of Non-
Discrimination by Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali 
The Investment Codes in the three economies proclaim the principle of national treatment 
and as WTO members they grant the MFN treatment to all their trading partners.  Again the 
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement has been transposed into the ECOWAS community 
which covers all the three countries.  On the harmonisation of their tariff bindings, the Report 
states, 
In each of the three countries, binding currently affects around 40 per cent of tariff 
lines; and for over 27 per cent of the bound tariff lines, the customs duties applied 
exceed the bound levels, sometimes by as much as 20 percentage…. The legislative 
competence of States essentially relates to consumer protection.  The national 
regulatory frameworks on government procurement have been harmonised by 
transposing the WAEMU directives, including those provisions giving a community 
preference; the implementing texts have not yet been adopted.  The three countries have 
signed the Bangui Agreement establishing the African Intellectual Property 
Organisation
19
 (OAPI) whose provisions are mostly in line with those in the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement.
20
 
 
The TPRRs on the three countries highlight the following challenges facing them: 
i. Lack of stable financing for their budgets.  Official Development Aid (ODA) is 
still indispensable to them as it is the source of 43 per cent of the State’s total 
current spending in Burkina Faso. 
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ii. Making the use of some approved customs agents mandatory.  Burkina Faso and 
Mali are landlocked and the national shippers’ council in Benin levies a series of 
additional duties and taxes on international trade. 
iii. There has not been any major change to the WAEMU CET (Common External 
Tariff) since the review of the three countries’ respective trade policies in 2004. 
iv. The production of cotton in the three countries has fallen partly because of the low 
global prices and poor governance of the subsector.   Again they have not been 
able to obtain quota-free access for cotton exports from least developed countries. 
v. There has been poor governance of the energy sector and a clear absence of long-
term investment. 
vi. Livestock farming which caters for 10 per cent of the GDP is facing a serious 
problem of land tenure and ‘poultry breeding farms face strong competition from 
imports of frozen poultry.  Because they did not meet the European Union’s health 
standards, Benin had to suspend its exports of fisheries products, including 
shrimps, to this key market as of July 2003’21 and the market is proving too hard 
to regain.  
Table 1: Notifications submitted to the WTO by or on behalf of Benin, Burkina Faso 
and Mali, January 2000 - May 2010
22
 
 
Agreement and subject Country/Entity Reference Date 
GATT 1994 - Regional Agreements 
WAEMU Treaty (Enabling Clause) Senegal WT/COMTD/N/11 03/02/2000 
ECOWAS Treaty (Enabling Clause) Ghana WT/COMTD/N/21 26/09/2005 
Agreement on Agriculture 
Article 18.2 - absence of export subsidies Burkina Faso G/AG/N/BFA/3 
G/AG/N/BFA/4 
11/01/2001 
14/12/2009 
Article 18.2 - absence of export subsidies Burkina Faso   
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures   
Import prohibition on poultry Benin G/SPS/N/BEN/5 28/07/2006 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 - notified measures (Article 16.4) 
1996:  no measures Benin G/ADP/N/22/Add.1/Rev.9 
G/ADP/N/16/Add.1/Rev.12 
27/04/2009 
1997:  no measures Benin, Burkina Faso G/ADP/N/29/Add.1/Rev.9 
G/ADP/N/35/Add.1/Rev.2 
27/04/2009 
1998:  no measures Burkina Faso G/ADP/N/41/Add.1/Rev.9 
G/ADP/N/47/Add.1/Rev.6 
27/04/2009 
1999:  no measures Burkina Faso G/ADP/N/53/Add.1/Rev.7 
G/ADP/N/59/Add.1/Rev.7 
27/04/2009 
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Agreement and subject Country/Entity Reference Date 
2000:  no measures Burkina Faso G/ADP/N/65/Add.1/Rev.7 
G/ADP/N/72/Add.1/Rev.7 
27/04/2009 
Agreement on Customs Valuation (Article VII of the GATT 1994) 
WAEMU regulations Burkina Faso G/VAL/N/1/BFA/1 30/10/2002 
 Burkina Faso G/VAL/N/1/BFA/1/Rev.1 21/01/2004 
Deferred application Benin WT/Let/331 24/02/2000 
Agreement on Rules of Origin 
Preferential rules of origin Mali G/RO/N/35 24/09/2001 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
Notification under Article 7.3 - regulation Burkina Faso G/LIC/N/3/BFA/1/Add.1 18/12/2000 
Notification under Article 7.3 - regulation Burkina Faso G/LIC/N/3/BFA/2 16/11/2009 
Legislation under Articles 1.4(a), 8.2(b) and 7.3 Mali G/LIC/N/1/MLI/1 27/08/2001 
Agreement on Safeguards 
Article 12.6:  no measures Burkina Faso G/SG/N/1/BFA/1 14/12/2009 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Notification for 2001 (absence of measures) Mali G/SCM/N/71/MLI 02/08/2001 
Notification (absence of measures) Burkina Faso G/SCM/N/186/BFA 14/12/2009 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Annex 3C (Code of conduct) Benin G/TBT/CS/N/142 14/05/2002 
Annex 3C (Code of conduct) Burkina Faso G/TBT/CS/N/158 10/11/2004 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Laws and regulations (Article 63.2) Burkina Faso IP/N/1/BFA/C/1 
IP/N/1/BFA/C/2 
IP/N/1/BFA/C/3 
IP/N/1/BFA/C/4 
IP/N/1/BFA/C/5 
08/07/2004 
Contact point (Article 69) Burkina Faso IP/N/3/Rev.10/Add.12 11/12/2009 
Absence of incompatible measures Mali G/TRIMS/N/2/Rev.9 28/09/2001 
Contact point (Article 69) Mali IP/N/3/Rev.6 01/03/2002 
Integrated Data Base (IDB)    
Applied tariffs, 2003 Benin, Burkina Faso G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.30 30/09/2009 
Applied tariffs, 2003-2008 Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali 
Data supplied by WAEMU 2010 
Imports, 2000-2003 Burkina Faso G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.30 30/09/2009 
Imports, 2003-2007 Benin Data supplied by WAEMU 2010 
Imports, 2003-2006 Burkina Faso 
Imports, 2006-2009 Mali 
 
With respect to Intellectual Property rights, all the WAEMU countries including Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Mali are signatories to the following subjects and terms of protection under 
the Bangui Agreement (1999) 
Table 2: Subjects and terms of protection under the Bangui Agreement (1999)
23
 
Agreement Bangui Agreement (1999) 
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Agreement Bangui Agreement (1999) 
Patents 20 years 
Utility models 10 years 
Trademarks and service marks 10 years, renewable every 10 years 
Industrial designs 5 years 
Trade names 10 years, renewable every 10 years 
Appellations of origin n.a. 
Literary and artistic property  
Copyright Lifetime of the author + 70 years 
Films, radio and audiovisual programmes 70 years 
Photographic works 25 years 
Related rights for performances 50 years 
Related rights for phonograms 50 years 
Related rights for radio broadcasts 25 years 
 
The above list does not seem to confer intellectual property rights to traditional knowledge 
nor does it have patents for local products such as wines made from palms growing in the 
countries. 
 
5.2.2 Relationship within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali together with all members of the WAEMU are founding 
members of ECOWAS
24
 which was established by the Lagos Treaty of 1975.  The Treaty 
establishing ECOWAS was revised in 1993 to enable economic integration.
25
  ECOWAS 
rules of origin
26
 were harmonised with those of WAEMU
27
 in 2003 with the long view being 
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the creation of a Common External Tariff (CET) which is a prerequisite for the conclusion of 
an EPA with the EU.  ECOWAS itself is part of a bigger step-by-step integration project of 
the African Union (AU)
28
  The AU is currently nurturing fourteen (14) regional economic 
communities (RECs)
29
 including ECOWAS with the aim of forming the African Economic 
Community
30
 and a monetary and economic union by 2034 that would finally lead to the 
United States of Africa.
31
 
 
5.2.3 Relations with the European Union and the United States of America 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali belong to the seventy-nine (79) African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries that concluded the Cotonou Agreement with the EU (to replace the Lomé 
Convention) covering the period up to 2020.
32
  By the terms of the Agreement the EU admits 
duty-free non-agricultural products
33
 and processed agricultural products originating in 78 
ACP countries (excluding South Africa). With the EU-ACP regime excluding agricultural 
products, the main stay of the economies of the ACP countries, it is suggested that the 
examination of the economic benefits of the Cotonou Agreement to both parties should form 
the subject of another study.  Since UNCTAD classified forty-nine countries as ‘least 
                                                          
28
 The OAU Charter was signed on 25 May 1963. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted at the 
summit held in July 2000 in Lomé (Togo). The African Union, which succeeded the OAU, was proclaimed on 11 
July 2001 at Lusaka in Zambia, after ratification of the Constitutive Act by more than 44 of the 53 member 
States of the OAU. The African Union was launched at the Durban Summit of 9 July 2002. 
29 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East 
African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA). 
30
 Instituted by the Treaty of Abuja 
31
 The Accra Declaration of available at http://www.africa-union.org 
32
 WTO Members had agreed to a derogation from the EU's obligations under Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994 (on MFN treatment) for the period from 1 March 2000 to 31 December 2007 (WTO document 
WT/MIN(01)/15 of 14 November 2001). 
33
 The non-inclusion of agricultural products casts a serious doubt on the usefulness of the Agreement to 
ECOWAS Member States who are all producers of primary agricultural products. 
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developed’ only Cape Verde left the cocoon and joined the next class, the so called 
‘developing countries.’34  
 
The EU plans to conclude a regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with all the 
West African countries which would replace the ones concluded with individual countries 
like Ivory Coast and Ghana that will allow all the member countries to enjoy duty-free access 
to EU markets for their products.  This project which is being led by the European Centre for 
Development Policy, a Maastricht-based think-tank, has raised some concerns by ECOWAS 
Member States due to the envisaged loss of government revenue and the wiping away of the 
competitiveness of domestic businesses as a result of the anticipated over-flooding of West 
African markets with products originating in the EU.
35
  This is because  
imports from the EU accounts for 10-15 per cent revenue in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, 
Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Senegal; 15-20 per cent of government revenue in Benin, 
Ghana, Guinea and Mali; 25-30 per cent of government revenue in Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Niger and Sierra Leone; and more than 30 per cent in the case of Togo.
36
 
 
Although the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative forms the basis of preferential access to EU 
markets since 1 January 2008 and allows all products (including bananas from 2006 and 
sugar and rice from September 2009), it is doubtful that these countries will be able to get 
equivalent or higher revenue through the initiative.  As the Trade Policy Report of the 
countries under analysis shows: 
                                                          
34 Cape Verde ceased to be an LDC on 1 January 2008 and is benefiting from the EU's "Everything 
but Arms" initiative for a transitional three-year period. Nigeria, which is not an LDC, benefits from the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). 
35 The negotiation of this EPA concerned trade in goods and services and investment, among other chapters. An 
overview is available on the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) website. ECDPM online 
information, "Overview of the Regional EPA Negotiations: West Africa-EU Economic Partnership Agreement". 
Viewed at: www.ecdpm.org visited 21 May 2011. 
36
 WT/TPR/S/236, p. 15. 
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 For the year 2008, about one third (36.4 per cent) of EU imports from Benin (which 
totalled  €77.9 million) entered duty-free under these preferences, while 46 per cent 
were admitted under MFN conditions (the remainder could not be allocated owing to 
statistical problems). More than 73 per cent of EU imports from Burkina Faso entered 
with MFN treatment, and only 5.4 per cent were admitted under these preferences. The 
proportion in the case of Mali was even smaller, with 4 per cent entering duty-free 
under these preferences; 60.6 per cent entered with MFN treatment, while the 
remainder (32.6 per cent) could not be allocated to any specific tariff regime.
37
 
 
 
This raises normative concerns over the complex institutional architecture built up by the EU 
for what appears to be a small gain.  The data from the US is even more worrying.  Although 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali are among the countries covered by the so called African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) to benefit from duty-free and quota-free access to the 
US market, only paltry sums came to each of them.  In 2008 the total US imports from Benin 
was US$31 million, Burkina Faso US$59,000.  Mali got only US$59,000 but imported US 
goods worth US$5.1 million.  The trade imbalance between Mali and the US is more than a 
ratio of 1:8.
38
  Therefore, the foreign-backed initiatives ostensibly aimed at boosting Africa 
trade need to be reviewed for relative effectiveness or marginal utility.    
 
5.2.4 “C-4” Trade Policy on Cotton 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali together with their distant eastern neighbour and fellow cotton-
producing country Chad adopted a common Sectoral Initiative on Cotton
39
 (SIC) because 
cotton represents more than 15 per cent of their GDP and more than half of their total export 
earnings.  They requested other WTO members to remove domestic production support 
                                                          
37
 ibid. 
38
 ibid. 
39
 WTO Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Poverty, Reduction: Sectoral initiative in Favour of Cotton: 
Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, WTO document TN/AG/GEN/4, adopted 16 May 2003 
in addition to other things calls for special treatment of cotton as a way of poverty reduction, the phasing out of 
all cotton subsidies, subsidies and tariffs, and a progressive mechanism to give financial support to least-
developed countries during the period of transition. 
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measures and export subsidies for cotton
40
 and to give duty and quota-free access for cotton 
exports from the least developed countries (LDCs).  In terms of cotton production, the “C-4” 
trail a long way after the world leading producers China, India and the United States and also 
fall far behind India and Uzbekistan, the leading exporters to the United States.  
 
Again they are also disadvantaged by the fact that their export earnings depend on the Euro-
US dollar exchange rate as the CFA franc is begged to the Euro. The second problem for the 
countries is that cotton trade is in the main carried out in American dollar.
41
  Therefore, the 
countries called for a reduction in aggregate measurement of support (AMS) with regard to 
cotton in line with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
42
 which called on WTO members 
‘to address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture 
negotiations in relation to all trade-distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of 
market access, domestic support and export competition.’43  Specifically the four countries in 
the SIC propounded a formula for cotton support reduction in which the specific reduction 
applicable to cotton as a percentage would be equal to the general reduction in AMS (as a 
percentage), that is, to cushion the volatility of the cotton market through support.  The rise in 
the world prices for cotton in 2007-08 did not benefit the countries as any appreciation was 
cancelled out by the depreciation of the US dollar.
44
  African farmers’ income has fallen 
steadily since 2004.  On market access, they requested the developed countries ‘together with 
developing countries that are in a position to do so’ to give duty and quota-free access to 
cotton from the least-developed countries (LDCs).  Then on export competition, they 
                                                          
40
 The United States, China and the EU (for Spain and Greece) give subsidies to cotton farmers.  
41
 The depreciation of West African currencies has been a course for concern.  First it was said to be good as it 
would boost the economy by attracting foreigners to buy ECOWAS products but with time the purchasing 
power of the local currencies fell so much that it was very difficult for the citizens to buy foreign goods. 
42
 Adopted 18 December 2005. 
43
 WT/MIN(05)/DEC 22 December 2005 
44
 The austerity measures which Nigeria was subjected to by the IMF never boosted the economy as the country 
never recovered to get back to the competitive position it had before 1982.  
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requested that ‘developed countries shall notify the legislative and regulatory measures they 
have adopted in order to fulfil their commitment to eliminate, by 31 December 2006, their 
export subsidies for cotton, including all of the disciplines applicable to export 
competition.’45   
 
5.2.5 Notifications of TBT and SPS Measures 
As shown in Table I above, Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have made use of notifications, 
especially concerning TBT.
46
  On a global scale, the WTO received 635 regular notifications 
and 132 emergency notifications
47
 from its members concerning SPS measures between 1 
November 2009 and 15 May 2010.  During the same period, there were 1,030 TBT 
notifications submitted.  As the TPRR of 2010 explains, the ‘higher number of notifications 
may signal either an increase in regulatory activities or an improved implementation of the 
transparency provisions of the (SPS and) TBT Agreement(s).’48  It needs to be noted that the 
increase is driven by China, Korea, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia as less than ten SPS and TBT 
notifications came from Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali within the ten-year period shown in 
Table I above.  Therefore, to say that ‘80 per cent of the notifications came from developing 
countries’ may hide the fact that not much is coming from the ECOWAS region.  As Mali 
points out, ‘Aid for Trade…should help the developing countries, in particular LDCs, to 
achieve the supply-side capacity and the trade-related infrastructure they need to be able to 
implement the WTO Agreements, derive benefits from them and, more generally, expand 
their trade.’49 
 
                                                          
45
 WTO document TN/AG/GEN/22-TN/AG/SCC/GEN/6 of 16 June 2006. 
46
 Benin G/TBT/CS/N/142 dated 14 May 2002 and Burkina Faso in G/TBT/CS/N/158 dated 10 November 2004. 
47
 WT/TPR/OV/W/3 p. 22. 
48
 ibid 23. 
49
 WT/TPR/G/236 ‘Trade Policy Review Report by Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali’ 30 August 2010, p. 44. 
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5.3.1 The Gambia, TPRR, August 2010. 
The latest WTO TPRR on the Gambia describes the country as ‘a small, least developed 
economy, with a very narrow economic base’50 mainly driven by tourism.  The Gambia was a 
contracting party to the GATT from 22 February 1965 and joined the WTO on 23 October 
1996
51
 and had its first TPR in February 2004.
52
  Despite the growth of the Gambian real 
GDP of nearly 6 per cent in the last six years, government revenue from trade-related taxes 
has fallen from 40 per cent in 2003 to 24 per cent in 2009; merchandise trade has also fallen 
from 70 per cent to 50 per cent within the same period,
53
 a situation attributed to ECOWAS 
tariff harmonisation which eroded the Gambia’s competitive advantage.  The economy has 
also been hit by higher oil prices and the collapse of the country’s export trade on groundnut, 
its major agricultural produce. 
 
5.3.2 Relations with the WTO 
The Gambia has its WTO goods and services schedules contained in Schedule CX and 
GATS/SC/112 respectively.  It applies MFN treatment to all trading partners other than 
members of ECOWAS who are covered by the ECOWAS trade liberalisation scheme.
54
  The 
country is neither a signatory nor an observer to any of the WTO’s plurilateral agreements.  
However, as tables 3 and 4 below show, The Gambia has enacted a number of laws and given 
some five notifications to the WTO as at March 2010.   
 
Table 3: Gambian Laws Relating to Trade and Investment  
                                                          
50
 The Gambia, ‘Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat,’ WT/TPR/S/233 dated 10 August 2010, p. vii. 
51
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed 30 May 2011. 
52
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#chronologically accessed 30 May 2011. 
53
 N 4. 
54
 Article 35 of the ECOWAS Treaty refers to Article 54 on the establishment of an economic union, a customs 
union with common external tariffs. 
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Area Instrument/text Entry into force 
Animal health Diseases of Animals Act 1965 
Banks and financial institutions:   
Prudential requirements and supervision Financial Institutions Act 2003 
Prevention of money-laundering Money-Laundering Act 2003 
Central Bank Central Bank Act 1992 
Civil aviation Civil Aviation Act 2004, revised 2008 
Competition:  domestic trade Competition Act 2007 
Customs and excise:  other public revenue Gambia Revenue Authority Act 
Income and Sales Tax Act  
Customs and Excise Act 
HS Tariff 2010 
2004 
2004 
2010 
2010 
Divestiture of State enterprises, State interest 
in other enterprises, and any related matter;  
establishment of The Gambia Divestiture 
Agency 
Divestiture Act 2001, repealed 2009 
Energy Electricity Act 2005 
Environmental standards, and environmental 
impact assessments 
National Environment Management Act 1994 
Establishment of private commercial 
enterprises 
Companies Act 
Business Registration Act 
1955 
2005 
Fisheries Fisheries Act 
Fisheries Regulations 
2007 
2008 
Food safety Food Act 2005 
Groundnuts Groundnuts Act 
Groundnut (Standard of Quality) Regulations 
Framework of Agreement between the Government of 
The Gambia and the Agri-Business Plan Association 
1952 
1965, revised 1999 
1999 
Hoarding of goods Hoarding Prohibition Act 2009 
Information and telecommunications Information and Communications Act 2009 
Insurance Insurance Act 2003 
Intellectual property:   
Copyright Copyright Act 2004 
Patents, industrial designs, and trade marks Industrial Property Act 2007 
Investment   
Company registration Companies Act 
Business Registration Act 
1955 
2005 
Investment incentives and free zones;  
creation of The Gambia Investment and 
Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) 
Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Act 2010 
Labour Labour Act 2007 
Mining and minerals Mines and Quarries Act 2005 
Petroleum Petroleum Act 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 
1921, amended 1963 and 1976 
2004 
Phytosanitary standards Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides Control and 
Management Act 
1994 
Public utilities regulation Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) Act 2001 
Ports Ports Act 1972 
Posts GAMPOST Act 2005 
Public enterprises Public Enterprise Act 2002 
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Area Instrument/text Entry into force 
Public health Public Health Act 
Public Health Act (Amendment) Decree 
Medicines Act 
1990 
1995 
1984, amended 2007 
Public procurement:  establishment of The 
Gambia Public Procurement Authority 
Public Procurement Act 2001 
River transport Inland Waterways Act .. 
Road transport Roads and Highways Act 1974 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures Food Act 2005 
Statistics Statistical Act 2004 
Tourism Tourism Authority Act 2001 
Source: Information provided by the Government of The Gambia. 
 
The Gambia’s new Customs and Excise Act, 2010, incorporates the WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement.  It also applies ECOWAS common customs tariff and an ECOWAS community 
levy of 0.5 per cent to all imports from outside the area since 2006.  Its tariff lines are fully 
aligned to ECOWAS CET.  The five notifications made by and on behalf of The Gambia to 
the WTO so far are as follows: 
Table 4: Notifications by, or on behalf of, The Gambia to the WTO since 2004 to 2010 
WTO Agreement Description of notification Periodicity Document symbol of latest notification 
Agreement on Agriculture 
Articles 10 and 18.2 Export subsidies Annual G/AG/N/GMB/3 
15 September 2005 (covers years 1998-04) 
Articles 10 and 18.2 Domestic support Two yearly G/AG/N/GMB/1/Rev.1 
15 September 2005 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  
Article 7.3 Questionnaire on import licensing procedures 
(concerns Medicines Act) 
Annual G/LIC/N/3/GMB/2 
27 September 2007 
Committee on Trade and Development   
Enabling Clause Notification (by Ghana, on behalf of 
members) of revised ECOWAS treaty 
Ad hoc WT/COMTD/N/21 
26 September 2005 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Article 7, Annex B Notification of Food Safety and Quality Bill 
(covering all food products destined for 
human consumption and also animal feed) 
Ad hoc G/SPS/N/GMB/1 
4 March 2010 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
5.3.3 Relations with the EU and the USA 
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The Gambia is in a similar situation with Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali discussed above 
because it is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries 
and enjoys the Everything But Arms scheme as well. 
 
The United States’ AGOA originally enacted in 2000, offers free access for some 
manufactured products originating in African countries that make progress in ‘establishing a 
market-based economy; developing political pluralism and the rule of law; eliminating 
discriminatory barriers to US trade and investment; protecting intellectual property;  
combating corruption; protecting human and worker rights;  and removing certain practices 
of child labour.’55  However,  
The Gambia has been eligible for AGOA benefits since 2003, and has held a "textile 
visa" since April 2008, qualifying it for the special textile and clothing provisions of 
AGOA
56
;  however, statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce show 
that: (a) The Gambia's total exports to the United States are minimal (US$641,000 in 
2008);  and (b) The Gambia's exports under AGOA provisions are even lower 
(US$36,000, all agricultural products, in 2007, nil in 2008).
57
 
 
As the 2010 TPRR on The Gambia sums up, the country ‘benefits form duty-free access to 
the United States under AGOA, although no exports have so far been recorded.’58  It has no 
list of import and export prohibitions but is a member of, and applies the import prohibitions 
under, the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions on pesticides and industrial chemicals.  The 
zero export from the Gambia to the US reveals a fundamental problem; provisional statutory 
entitlement is not enough, what is of crucial importance is the capacity to participate 
competitively in international trade.  
 
                                                          
55
 WT/TPR/S/233, p. 24 
56
 Gambia News, "US grants Gambia textile visa", 12 May 2008.  Viewed at:  
http://www.gambianow.com/news/News/-Gambia-News-US-grants-Gambia-AGOA-textile-visa.html. 
57
 AGOA.info online information, "Bilateral trade profile: US-Gambia". Viewed at:  
http://www.agoa.info/?view=country_info&country=gm&story=trade. 
58
 N 51 p viii 
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5.4.1 Niger and Senegal, TPRR 2009 
Niger and Senegal had joint TPRRs in 2003 and again in 2009, both are categorised among 
the LDCs (according to the UNDP’s human development indicators, in 2008, Niger ranked 
174
th
, out of 179 countries; Senegal was in the 156
th
 place), both depend heavily on official 
aid from their development partners for their government’s annual expenditures (one third in 
Niger and one quarter in Senegal).
59
  The two countries also belong to the WAEMU
60
 and to 
ECOWAS
61
 – one of the eight RECs62 nurtured to lead to the African Economic Community 
by the African Union.
63
  While Niger depends on export of uranium to France and cattle on 
hoof to Nigeria, Senegal depends on exporting petroleum products to Mali.  ECOWAS has a 
trade liberalisation scheme (TLS).
64
   It has been observed that despite the TLS ‘half of the 
                                                          
59
 WT/TPR/S/223, p. v. 
60
 The WAEMU Treaty was signed on 11 January 1994 by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo;  Guinea-Bissau acceded to the Treaty on 1 January 1997.  It was notified to the WTO in 
documents WT/COMTD/N/11 of 3 February 2000, WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.1 of 2 March 2001, 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.2 of 22 August 2001 and Corr.1 of 26 March 2002. WAEMU's main objectives are:  
strengthening the competitiveness of the economic and financial activities of the member States, multilateral 
oversight of national macroeconomic policies with a view to their potential convergence (Chapter I(2));  the 
harmonization of legislation;  the formulation and implementation of common sectoral policies;  and a common 
market  
61
 The revised 1993 treaty was notified to the WTO in 2005 by Ghana, on behalf of the ECOWAS member 
States (WTO document WT/COMTD/N/21 of 26 September 2005).  The text of the treaty is available under 
reference WT/COMTD/54. 
62
 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA). 
63
 N 29 
64
 Decision A/DEC.15/83 of 30 May 1983, as amended by Decision A/DEC.6/7/92 of July 1992.  The TLS is 
based on a timetable for the removal of tariff barriers on industrial products originating in the member States, 
and a mechanism for compensating for the loss of customs revenue.  In principle, the tariff barriers to 
originating industrial products (Chapter III(2)(v)) were to be removed asymmetrically, more rapidly for 
higher-income than for low-income countries:  Group I (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali and Niger) had a ten-year transition period, with a reduction rate of 10 per cent per year on approved 
products;  Group II (Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo) had an eight-year period, with a reduction 
rate of 12.5 per cent per year on approved products;  Group III (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal) had 
a six-year period, with a reduction rate of 16.6 per cent per year on approved products.  These periods have 
expired.  The mechanism for compensating for loss of customs revenue does not appear to have been put in 
place. 
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trade between ECOWAS member countries does not circulate freely’65 as there are estimated 
sixty-nine checkpoints between Abidjan and Lagos.
66
 
 
5.4.2 Relations with the WTO and notifications 
Both Niger and Senegal offer the MFN treatment to their trading partners. They have been 
trying to benefit from the WTO’s technical assistance but are hampered by their limited 
capacities.  Their notifications to the WTO of their trade policies have been patchy and 
outdated. 
Table 5: Niger's notifications to the WTO, December 2008  
 
Agreement WTO document Content 
Multilateral agreements on trade in goods 
GATT 1994 Schedule LIII - Niger, 15 April 1994 Tariff concessions 
Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VII of the GATT 1994 
WT/LET/301 of 1 June 1999 Delayed application 
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection G/PSI/N/1/Add.5 of 5 February 1997, Add. 7 
of 24 February 1998, Add. 8 of 28 September 
1999 
Laws and regulations 
Agreement on Rules of Origin G/RO/N/19 of 23 January 1998 Laws and regulations 
Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures 
G/LIC/N/1/NER/1 of 12 January 1998 Laws and regulations 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade G/TBT/2/Add.95 of 10 September 2007 Implementation and administration of 
the agreement 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 
 GATS/SC/64 of 15 April 1994 Schedule of Specific Commitments in 
Services 
 GATS/EL/64 of 15 April 1994 Article II (MFN) exemption list 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
 WT/MIN(01)/15 of 14 November 2001 Waiver of obligations under Article I.1 
of GATT 1994 for the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement 
                                                          
65
 WT/TPR/S/223, p. 13. 
66
 ECOWAS online information, "Achievements of ECOWAS:  Market Integration Programme".  Viewed at:  
http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/francais/achievements-1.htm [31 May 2011].   
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Agreement WTO document Content 
Enabling Clause   
 WT/COMTD/N/11 of 3 February 2000
a
, 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.1 of 2 March 2001
b
, 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.2 of 22 August 2001 
and Corr.1 of 26 March 2002
c
 
West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU)  
 WT/COMTD/N/21 of 26 September 2005
d Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) 
Source: WTO Secretariat, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s223-02_e.doc visited 31 May 
2011. 
 
 
Table 6: Documents relating to Senegal's participation in the WTO, April 2003 
Agreement List Content 
Multilateral agreements on trade in goods 
GATT 1994 Schedule XLIX - Senegal of 15 April 1994a Tariff concessions 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing G/TMB/N/122 of 9 August 1995 Transitional safeguard mechanism 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade G/TBT/CS/N/27 of 23 February 1996 
G/TBT/Notif 97.348 of 15 July 1997 
G/TBT/Notif 00/472 of 3 October 2000b 
G/TBT/Notif 00/473 of 3 October 2000b 
G/TBT/Notif 00/474 of 5 October 2000b 
Annex III 
Notification of measures 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures G/SPS/N/SEN/1 of 25 July 1996 Laws and Regulations 
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 
1994 
G/ADP/N/1/SEN/1 of 31 July 1996 Laws and Regulations  
G/ADP/N/4/Add.1/Rev.5 of 22 November 1996 
G/ADP/N/9/Add.1/Rev.3 of 21 November 1996 
G/ADP/N/16/Add.1/Rev.1 of 22 November 1996 
G/ADP/N/153/Add.1 of 17 April 2007 
Notification of absence of measures 
Agreement on implementation of Article VII of GATT 
1994 
G/VAL/N/1/SEN/1 of 27 September 2001 WAEMU regulations on customs 
valuation 
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection G/PSI/N/1/Add.4 of 9 October 1996 Laws and Regulations 
Agreement on Rules of Origin G/RO/N/10 of 16 August 1996 Laws and Regulations 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures G/LIC/N/3/SEN/1 of 11 February 1997  Replies to questionnaire 
G/LIC/N/1/SEN/1 of 23 October 2002 Update 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures G/SCM/N/3/SEN/Suppl.1, 
G/SCM/N/16/SEN/Suppl.1, G/SCM/N/25/SEN of 
21 November 1997, G/SCM/N/3/SEN, 
G/SCM/N/16/SEN of 27 January 1997 
Subsidies 
G/SCM/N/19/Add.1/Rev.1 of 26 November 1996 
G/SCM/N/12/Add.1/Rev.3 of 22 November 1996 
G/SCM/N/7/Add.1/Rev.4 of 21 November 1996 
G/SCM/N/153/Add.1 of 18 April 2007 
Notification of absence of measures 
Agreement on Safeguards G/SG/N/1/SEN/1 of 1 November 1996 Laws and regulations 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures G/TRIMS/N/2/Rev.16/Add. of 28 March 2008 Laws and regulations 
General Agreement on Trade in Services GATS/SC/75 of 15 April 1994 et Suppl. 1 of 
11 April 1997 and Suppl. 2 of 26 February 1998 
List of specific undertakings relating to 
services 
 GATS/EL/34 of 15 April 1994 and Suppl. 1 of 
26 February 1998 
List of exemptions under Article II 
(MFN) 
 S/C/N/441 of 10 March 2008 Laws and regulations on 
telecommunications services 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
IP/N/1/SEN/1 of 6 February 1997 Laws and regulations 
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Agreement List Content 
Enabling Clause WT/COMTD/N/11 of 3 February 2000 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.1 of 2 March 2001 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.2 of 22 August 2001 
WT/COMTD/N/11/Add.2/Corr.1 of 
26 March 2002 
West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) 
WT/COMTD/N/21 of 26 September 2005 Economic community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) 
a Schedule amended in accordance with the results of the GATT 1994 tariff negotiations under Article XVIII, which ended in 
1997. 
b Notified separately under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
Source: WTO Secretariat. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s223-02_e.doc visited 31 May 2011. 
 
5.4.3 Relations with the EU and the USA 
As with other ACP counties, Niger and Senegal are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement 
and beneficiaries of the EU’s EBA initiative.  In relations with the United States, they are 
among the forty countries eligible under the AGOA for free-duty and quota-free entry to the 
United States market (except apparel).  They were also eligible for the special treatment 
provisions of third-country fabrics in apparel that expired on 30 September 2012 and can also 
take advantage of the so called ‘Category 9’ goods concerning handmade, ethnic fabrics.  
However due to capacity problems, the provisions are not being exploited as only a few 
thousands of dollars have come to both countries under the AGOA: US$89,000 for Niger 
mainly jewellery, and for Senegal US$233,000 almost all from live birds, musical 
instruments, craft and leather products.
67
   Both countries have sought to finance their 
development projects through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and have 
benefited from the ‘MCC Threshold Programme.’68 
 
5.4.4 Challenges facing Niger and Senegal within the Multilateral Trading System 
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 WT/TPR/S/223, p. 19. 
68
 Each year, the MCC selects the countries eligible for financing.  In 2009, the 26 eligible countries are:  
Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, East Timor, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, 
Jordan, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Ukraine, and Vanuatu.  See Millennium Challenge Corporation (2009). 
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Credit is very difficult to obtain in both countries.  Niger is landlocked and is constantly 
rocked by political instability and natural disasters such as draught and famine.  Following 
the outbreak of avian influenza in Niger, its poultry export remained banned by the OIE since 
2006.  The domestic law on copyright and other aspects of intellectual property rights in 
Niger are still below the standards of the WTO TRIPS Agreement.  On its part, Senegal 
extended its copyright protection from fifty to seventy years after the author’s death. Again 
Senegal still gives protection to local producers far beyond the WAEMU’s CET.  There is the 
intractable problem of institutional poverty and illegal practices (including by the Customs 
and Excise Department and the Police) plaguing the whole region to which Niger and 
Senegal are not immune but are rather more vulnerable to because of their small economies. 
 
5.5.1 Ghana, TPRR 2008 
 
Ghana’s economic policy objective is to be a middle-income country by 2015.  Its economy 
is mainly driven by agriculture which provides employment to about 50 per cent of the 
population; the government relies on import duties (including VAT and excise duties) for 
public revenue.  While the European Communities are Ghana’s most important trading 
partner, its current account is mainly financed by official transfers and remittances from 
Ghanaians living abroad.
69
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Relations with the WTO 
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 Ghana, Trade Policy Review Report by the WTO Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/194, 17 December 2007, p. vii. 
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Ghana is an original member of the WTO and a signatory to the Fourth
70
 and Fifth
71
 
Protocols to the GATS but not a party to any of the plurilateral agreements including the 
Information Technology Agreement.  Ghana extends MFN treatment to all its trading 
partners.  It has never been a complainant or a respondent to any WTO case but was a third 
party in the EC – Bananas72 case between the European Communities and the United States 
on the importation, sale, and distribution of bananas.  Ghana does not have any non-
preferential rules of origin.  
 
Along with other developing countries, Ghana has submitted proposals on agriculture and 
market access for non-agricultural goods.
73
  Ghana also submitted a document stressing the 
importance of the special and differential treatment for developing countries at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Conference.
74
  Up to the TPR of 2007, Ghana has made the following 
notifications to the WTO but none yet on SPS measures: 
 
Table 7: Selected notifications to the WTO, 2007  
 
WTO Agreement Description of requirement WTO document number (latest if recurrent) 
Agreement on Agriculture   
Articles 10 and 18.2 Export subsidies G/AG/N/GHA/2, 21 August 2001 
Committee on Trade and Development   
Enabling Clause ECOWAS revised treaty  WT/COMTD/N/21, 26 September 2005 
Agreement on the Implementation of GATT Article VI  
Article 16.4 Semi-annual reports G/ADP/N/85/Add.1/Rev.3, 20 October 2004 
Understanding on the Interpretation of GATT Article XVII (State-trading) 
Paragraph 1 New and full notification G/STR/N/10/GHA, 19 April 2004 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
Articles 1.4(a), 8.2(b), and 7.3 Notification  G/LIC/N/1/GHA/1 and 3, 21 April 2004 
Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions  
 Quantitative restrictions G/MA/NTM/QR/1/Add.10, 28 March 2006 
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 Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications adopted at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1998. 
71
 Negotiations under the terms of the Second Decision on Financial Services adopted by the Council for Trade 
in Services on 21 July 1995 (S/L/9). 
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 WTO document WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997. 
73
 WTO documents TN/MA/W/27, 18 February 2003;  TN/AG/GEN/5, 29 July 2003;  and TN/MA/W/40, 11 
August 2003. 
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 WTO document WT/MIN(05)/ST/106, 16 December 2006. 
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WTO Agreement Description of requirement WTO document number (latest if recurrent) 
Agreement on Rules of Origin    
Article 5  Notification  G/RO/N/44,  6 May 2004 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Article 25.1  New and full notification G/SCM/N/95/GHA, 20 April 2004 
Article 25.11 Semi-annual reports G/SCM/N/81/Add.1/Rev.4, 27 April 2004 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Article 10.6 Notification of technical regulations WTO documents G/TBT/N/GHA/1-4, 
18 January 2005, 30 August 2005, 
13 October 2006, and 11 February 2007 
Annex 3C Notification of acceptance G/TBT/CS/N/144, 30 May 2002 
Article 15.2 Implementation and administration of 
the Agreement 
G/TBT/2/Add.76, 29 October 2003 
Article multiple  Notification  G/TBT/N/GHA/3, 13 October 2006 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Article 63.2 Laws and regulations IP/N/1/GHA/1, 22 April 2002 
Source: WTO documents. 
 
5.5.3 Trade Policy  
Ghana hopes to increase its volume and share of world trade and also attract foreign investors 
through a favourable economic climate.  It has no legislation on contingency measures and 
has not taken any anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures up to the time of its 
last trade policy review in 2007. It has no legislation of anti-competitive practices.  A bill in 
the Ghanaian parliament on anti-competitive practices has lingered for over seven years.
75
 
 
However, Ghana adheres to strict, mandatory technical regulations based mainly on 
international standards.  It has also adopted new laws on government procurement to increase 
efficiency and transparency.  Ghana seems to evince a strong political will to develop.  It re-
denominated the cedi, its national currency, by 10,000 to one new cedi.   Its sectoral policies 
have remained focused on cocoa and gold, the most important export products in the 
country.
76
  Another area of active policy that supports trade that is often not mentioned in 
WTO TPRRs is the thriving education sector.  Ghana has a number of very good educational 
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 N 69, p. ix.  
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institutions dating back to the old Achimota College of the colonial era.  Also important is 
that the government seems more determined to fight official corruption than most of their 
West African neighbours as shown not just in the number of the following pieces of 
legislation but the enforcement mechanism on the ground. 
Table 8: Main trade-related laws, 2007 
 
Area Legislation 
Imports and exports Export and Import Act,1995;  Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993; 
Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management)(Rates, Duties and Other Taxes) Act, 1994 
Taxation Value Added Tax Act, 1998 
Free zones  Free Zone Act, 1995 
Export finance and 
promotion 
Ghana Export Promotion Council Decree, 1969;  Export Development and Investment Fund Act, 2000 
Investment  Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 
Standards Ghana Standards Board (Food, Drugs and Other Goods), General Labelling Rules, 1992; Ghana 
Standards (Certification Mark) Rules, 1970; Seeds (Certification and Standards) Decree, 1972;  Food 
and Drugs Law, 1992 
Quarantine Animals (Control of Importation) Ordinance, 1952;  Economic Plants Protection Decree, 1979;  
Prevention and Control of Pests and Diseases of Plants Act, 1965 
Government procurement Public Procurement Act, 2003 
Privatization and small 
industry 
Divestiture of State Interests (Implementation) Law, 1993;  National Board for Small-Scale Industries 
Act, 1981 
Competition Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, 2000 
Intellectual property 
protection  
Patents Act, 2003; Industrial Designs Act, 2003;  Geographical Indications Act, 2003;  Trade 
Marks Act, 2004;  Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits Act, 2004;  Copyright Act, 2005 
Agriculture Cocoa Board Law, 1983;  Ghana Cocoa Board (Reorganization and Indemnity) Law, 1985;  
Cocoa Duty Decree, 1974;  Grains Development Board Act, 1970 
Forestry Forest Products Inspection Bureau Law, 1985;  Forest Protection Decree, 1974;  Timber Export 
Development Board Law, 1985;  Trees and Timber Decree, 1974;  Forestry Commission Act, 1993 
Fisheries Fisheries Act, 2002 
Mining and oil Minerals and Mining Act, 2006;  Petroleum Decree, 1973;  Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
Law, 1983;  Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984;  Precious Minerals Marketing 
Corporation Law, 1989;  Petroleum Income Tax Law, 1987 
Financial services Bank of Ghana Act 2002;  Banking Act, 2004;  Securities Industry Law, 1993;  Securities and 
Exchange Commission Regulations, 2003;  Insurance Act, 2006 
Communications Postal and Courier Services Regulatory Commission Act, 2003 
Transport Ghana Civil Aviation Authority Law, 1983;  Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority Law, 1986;  
Merchant Shipping Act, 1963;  Ghana Shippers' Council Decree, 1974 
Source: WTO Secretariat, based on information provided by the Ghanaian authorities. 
 
Ghana is also at the forefront of the ECOWAS Monetary Co-operation Programme, a 
measure aimed at improving sub-regional payments under the West African Clearing House 
(the West African Monetary Agency).  ECOWAS has a dual approach to its aim of a single 
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monetary zone, one for the Franco-phone countries and the other for the Anglo-phone 
countries.  It is not clear where the two Portuguese-speaking countries of Cape Verde and 
Guinea-Bissau belong.  While the WAEMU is for the French speaking countries, the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
77
 is mainly made up of the Anglophone countries. 
 
Ghana benefits from a number of non-reciprocal preferential treatments such as the GSP, 
GSTP (the Global System of Trade Preferences among developing countries), AGOA and 
NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) 
 The NEPAD's goals are to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; 
eradicate widespread and severe poverty; and promote accelerated growth and sustainable 
development.  Trade and trade-related measures outlined under the NEPAD to promote 
African exports include:  promotion and improvement of regional trade agreements;  inter-
regional trade liberalisation;  harmonisation of tariffs, rules of origin, and product standards; 
reduction of export taxes, and of costs of transactions and operations; and promotion of 
African exporting and importing companies.  The NEPAD also aims to ensure the active 
participation of African countries in the multilateral trading system.
78
 
 
Ghana has notified the WTO of its intellectual property laws and is a signatory to the 
following treaties.  
 
Table 9: Membership of WIPO treaties, 2007 
Treaty Entry into force 
Berne Convention (Literary and Artistic Works) 11 October 1991 
Paris Convention (Industrial Property) 28 September 1976 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 26 February 1997 
WIPO Convention 12 June 1976 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
 
5.6.1 Togo, TPR 2006 
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Togo’s latest TPR was carried out in 200679 and as an LDC it could only have its reviews 
done at six-year intervals or even longer.  Togo is a small West African country covering 
only 35,375 square miles (56,600 km
2
)
 
with a unique Constitution (Loi Fundamentale) 
promulgated in 1992 under which the WTO agreements may be invoked directly although 
this has never been the case.
80
  However, despite this monist system (the possibility for an 
individual to invoke international law), Togo has no commercial court, nothing like the 
Chancery Division
81
 of the High Court in England or the Federal High Court in Nigeria,
82
 so 
business disputes are dealt with by ordinary courts. According to the TPRR, 
The President of the Republic (or his delegate) negotiates, signs and promulgates treaties 
and international agreements ratified by a law of the National Assembly; the WTO 
Agreement entered into force in Togo under this procedure.  From the time of ratification, 
ratified treaties and agreements take precedence over laws, subject, with respect to each 
individual agreement or treaty, to its being applied by the other party (except in the case of 
human rights treaties).  These acts are directly applicable as law in Togo and enforceable 
ipso jure. 
83
  
 
Even though this seems an excellent constitutional provision, the UNDP points out that ‘the 
administration of justice is handicapped by a shortage of resources but more particularly by 
its lack of credibility in the eyes of the citizens and plaintiffs due partly to a climate of 
corruption and disregard for ethics and professional etiquette and partly due to the timid 
protection of rights by the judiciary.’84 Ironically, the Constitution enshrines the 
independence of the judiciary.
85
 
 
Togo’s economic environment is bleak because of the socio-political problem ravaging the 
country since 1992; its business climate is sluggish with its banks unable to finance business 
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and the country unable to benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative 
and the government unable to supply basic services such as water and electricity and the 
manufacturing and insurance sectors being at their rudimental stages: manufacturing being 
only of basic commodities such as beverages, soap and plastic/carrier bags mainly for the 
domestic market and insurance being mostly of export and motor vehicles. 
 
Togo is a member of the WAEMU which has a common monetary and exchange policy 
administered by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).
86
  The West African 
Financial Community (CFA) franc of the WAEMU countries has a fixed parity with the euro 
at CFAF 1,000 to €1.52449017.87 
 
5.6.2 Participation in the WTO 
With such a fragile and weak economy, Togo’s participation in the WTO has been modest as 
it has no mission in Geneva.  It has not made any notifications concerning contingency 
measures, SPS or standardisation accreditation procedure regime to the WTO.   
 
The ACP–EU pact under the Cotonou Agreement has run its course.  The derogation granted 
by the WTO to the EU from its obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 (on MFN 
treatment) up to 1 March 2000 and extended to 31 December 2007 has come to an end with 
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the transition to an EPA being the next line open to the parties.
88
  Nonetheless, Togo could 
still latch on to the ‘Everything but Arms’89 initiative under which the EU grants duty-free 
access, with no quantitative restrictions to products (other than arms and ammunition) 
originating from Togo and other LDCs.  The EU also grants LDCs the Generalised 
Preferences which had bananas added to it in 2005 and rice and sugar only in 2009.
90
  Togo is 
also eligible for the preferences as an LDC; however, its political turmoil and de facto one-
party state have cancelled its eligibility under the AGOA.
91
  The country also slipped from 
benefitting under the Integrated Framework both as originally conceived in 1997 and also as 
currently applied in its revised form.
92
 
 
5.7.1 Nigeria 
The TPR on Nigeria was published on 24 May 2011 and credited the country with ‘robust 
economic growth averaging 6% per year in real terms since 2005,’ adding that ‘growth has 
been quite broadly based.’93 Yet the same review states in the same paragraph that ‘oil and 
gas … continue to be critical for the economy as they make over 90% of exports and 80% of 
government revenue.’  The two statements appear contradictory.  As a frequent visitor to 
Nigeria and an observer of her trade policy and economic development, the economy is 
patchy and unbalanced. Patchy because following the rise of daring militants in the north, the 
northern states are virtually without effective governments as the towns have been disserted 
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and there are incessant clashes in the middle-belt states.  Only about fifteen states in the south 
and the Federal Capital Territory enjoy reasonably high levels of law and order and 
discernible economic growth.  The economically viable states represent only 40 per cent of 
the country (15 out of 36 states) and so the reliability of the economic statistic is low. 
 
Nigeria is an original member of the WTO having ratified the WTO Agreement on 
6 December 1994
94
  Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the WTO has no direct effect in the country because a 
treaty between the Federation and other country or group of countries can have the force of 
law only to the extent to which it has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.
95
  
Nonetheless, as a Member State of the WTO, Nigeria is harmonising her laws with the WTO 
regime and has made the following notifications:
96
 
 
5.7.2  Selected notifications to the WTO, March 2005 to January 2011 
 
WTO Agreement 
Description of 
requirement 
Most recent 
notification 
Date 
Period covered by 
notification 
Agreement on Agriculture     
Article 10 and 18.2  Export subsidy  G/AG/N/NGA/11 22/07/2010 2009 
  G/AG/N/NGA/10 17/07/2010 2008 
  G/AG/N/NGA/8 28/10/2008 2007 
  G/AG/N/NGA/6 11/04/2008 2006 
  G/AG/N/NGA/4 25/10/2006 1998-2005 
Article 18.2  Domestic support G/AG/N/NGA/12 22/07/2010 2009 
  G/AG/N/NGA/9 16/07/2009 2008 
  G/AG/N/NGA/7 28/10/2008 2007 
  G/AG/N/NGA/5 11/04/2008 2006 
  G/AG/N/NGA/3 25/10/2006 1998-2005 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures    
Article 25 Subsidies G/SCM//N/186/NGA 12/11/2009 2007-2008 
  G/SCM/N/155/NGA 19/04/2007 up to 2006 
Article 32.6 Laws and regulations G/ADP/N/1/NGA/1 11/05/2007 up to 2006 
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) 
   
Article 18.5 Laws and regulations G/ADP/N/1/NGA/1 11/05/2007 up to 2006 
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the 
GATT 1994 (Agreement on Customs Valuation) 
   
Article 22.2 Notification G/VAL/N/1/NGA/1 5/09/2008 one-off 
 Checklist of issues G/VAL/N/2/NGA/1 3/09/2008 one-off 
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WTO Agreement 
Description of 
requirement 
Most recent 
notification 
Date 
Period covered by 
notification 
GATT 1994     
Article XVII:4(a) State trading 
enterprises 
G/STR/N/12/NGA 6/11/2008  
Agreement on Import Licensing     
Article 7.3  Questionnaire on 
import licensing 
procedures 
G/LIC/N/3/NGA/6 26/07/2010 2009 
  G/LIC/N/3/NGA/5 21/07/2009 2008 
  G/LIC/N/3/NGA/4 19/11/2008 2007 
  G/LIC/N/3/NGA/3 24/04/2007 2006 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade    
Annex 3C Notification of 
acceptance 
G/TBT/CS/N/162 30/01/2006 one-off 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
These notifications evince some willingness to keep to the WTO agreements but Nigeria is 
yet to sign the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (ATCA) although she is an observer.  
Whether signing the ATCA will help reduce the spate of air crashes in the country can only 
be proved with time.  Nigeria is neither a signatory nor an observer  to the Agreement on 
Government Procurement.  
   
II. ECOWAS in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 
5.8.1 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in US – Upland Cotton 
 
This sub-section discusses a WTO cotton case in which some ECOWAS Members, though as 
third parties, played prominent roles and made the world know the herculean challenges they 
face in the WTO-supervised world trading system and how the system is undermining their 
trade and threatening their livelihood when the big trading nations refuse to play by the rules. 
It is a classic case of a subversion of the legal maxim ubi jus, ubi remedium, as there were 
findings of breaches (nullification and impairment) at the Panel, Appellate Body, Recourse to 
Article 21.5, Recourse to Article 22.6 arbitration but no remedy because of the prospective 
nature of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism which awards no damages or financial 
compensation. 
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5.8.2 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton97 
In US – Upland Cotton Brazil invoked the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994 alleging that the United States support measures to 
cotton farmers in the country amounted to prohibited and actionable export subsidies.  
Brazil’s allegation ‘include measures referred to as marketing loan programme payments, 
user marketing (step 2) payments, production flexibility contracts payments, market loss 
assistance payments, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance payments, 
cottonseed payments and export credit guarantee programmes.’98  Specifically, Brazil 
persuaded the Panel to find that Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture is in the nature of 
affirmative defence and does not exempt the US domestic support measures, that the 
Extraterritorial Income (ETI) Act 2000 is inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement and that Section 1207(a) of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 2002 
mandating payments of Step 2 ‘domestic’ payments is a violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994.
99
  In sum that all the various payments (GSM 102, GSM 103, SCGP) constitute export 
subsidies within the meaning of the covered agreements 
 
The effects of the prohibited subsidies, according to Brazil, are ‘suppressing upland cotton 
prices in the US, world and Brazil markets for upland cotton.… increasing the US share of 
the upland cotton world market …. and the United States having a more than equitable share 
of world exports of upland cotton’100 to the detriment of other cotton producers.   ECOWAS 
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Member State Benin together with Chad reserved their rights to participate in the Panel and 
Appellate Body proceedings as third parties.   
 
In her third party oral statement, Benin impressed on the WTO Panel the enormity of the 
challenges it faces.  In their own words, cotton accounts for ’90 per cent of our agricultural 
exports, and three-quarters of our export earnings over the past four years.  It generates 25 per 
cent of national revenues.’101  In comparison, ‘the subsidies paid by the United States to its 
25,000 cotton farmers exceed the entire gross national income of Benin … this demonstrates, 
rather dramatically, the impossibility of Benin ever competing with such subsidies…. 
Therefore, for us, the solution lies with the WTO.’102  If they could not deal with the problem, 
what would they like to see happen?  Benin concluded, ‘we are not seeking any special and 
differential treatment in this case.  We are simply asking that the United States abide by the 
disciplines that it agreed to at the end of the Uruguay Round.’103 
 
Again in a joint statement presented to the Trade Negotiations Committee on behalf of Benin, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso on 10 June 
2003 said, ‘our countries are not asking for charity, neither are we requesting preferential 
treatment or additional aid.  We solely demand that, in conformity with WTO basic 
principles, the free market rule be applied.  Our producers are ready to face competition on 
the world cotton market – under the condition that it is not distorted by subsidies.’104 
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WTO’s Deputy Director-General Dr Kipkir Aly Azad Rana expressed the same idea 
differently: 
They do not ask for add, which is the World Bank’s remit, nor do they make political appeals 
that belong to the United Nations.  They have just asked that WTO rules and disciplines apply 
also in sectors of interest to the poor – that a fair and market-oriented system be established in 
agriculture and that rich countries’ wasteful export and production subsidies be abolished and 
cease to undermine their comparative advantage.
105
 
 
Gung-ho as the ECOWAS Member States may sound, Petersmann notes that ‘the prevailing 
utilitarian conceptions of IEL outside Europe offer neither effective protection of ‘consumer 
welfare’ (which is nowhere mentioned in the 30,000 pages of WTO law),’ rather the system 
is geared ‘in favour of powerful producer interests (“producer welfare”).’106  The Panel found 
that the United States acted inconsistently with the covered agreements and was ‘under an 
obligation to take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or … withdraw the 
subsidy.’107 
 
On appeal the United States was also found to be in violation of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement.  The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that 
the ‘export credit guarantee programmes are prohibited export subsidies, under Article 3.1(a) 
of the SCM Agreement and are inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of that Agreement.’  
It therefore requested the United States to bring its measures ‘into conformity with its 
obligations under those Agreements.
108
 
 
                                                          
105
 ibid 35. 
106
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘JIEL Debate: Methodological Pluralism and Its Critics in International Economic 
Law Research,’ JIEL 15(4) (2012) 926. 
107
 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton 351. 
108
 Appellate Report US – Upland Cotton, paras 763 and 764. 
230 
 
At the Article 21.5 compliance panel Brazil alleged that the United States had ‘failed to 
comply with its obligation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement to “take appropriate steps 
to remove the adverse effects or withdraw the subsidy” and also failed ‘to withdraw the 
subsidy without delay’ in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture.109  Chad reminded 
the WTO and the Panel that because it was failing to address cotton ‘ambitiously, 
expeditiously and specifically’110 as Members agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference, the distorting domestic subsidies for cotton would make it impossible to attain 
the Millennium Development Goals.
111
 
 
Article 22.6 of the DSU provides for  
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations… However, if the Member 
concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and 
procedures set … have not been followed where a complaining party has requested 
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations…, the matter shall be referred to 
arbitration. 
 
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement provides that the arbitrator appointed pursuant to Article 
22.6 of the DSU ‘shall determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate.’  Once 
determined, Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement authorises the taking of countermeasures: 
In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the 
subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB adopts the 
panel report or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, 
the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, 
commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist. 
 
 
The arbitrator determined that Brazil’s claim of US$1.122 billion was excessive and scaled it 
down to US$147.4 million.  Brazil also requested to apply countermeasures and proposed to 
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suspend obligations under the GATT 1994, and also under the GATS and the TRIPS 
Agreements under Article 22.3(c) of the DSU which authorises the suspension of concessions 
‘under other agreements.’  The arbitrator ruled that ‘Brazil would be entitled to seek to 
suspend certain obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and/or the GATS.’112 
 
Cross stated that ‘Brazil’s victory in US – Upland Cotton Subsidies represents a ‘victory’ for 
‘all developing countries’ and ‘part of a broader shift within the WTO away from a system 
dominated by the US and the EC toward a system that increasingly is influenced by emerging 
markets economies.’113  But would the United States have bulged if not for the market size, 
economic influence and the credible threat from Brazil to resort to both the GATS and the 
TRIPS to retaliate for the injury caused to her economy by the United States?  Brazil fought 
the case through all the levels of WTO dispute settlement (panel, Appellate Body, recourse to 
Article 21.5 compliance panel and Recourse to Article 22.6 arbitrator).  It is doubtful whether 
based entirely on the rule of law any of the fifteen West African countries within ECOWAS, 
without the resources of Brazil
114
 or, indeed, all of them put together, wound have had the 
resources to muster a credible threat that would have made the United States change her trade 
policy.  According to Steinberg, ‘in trade negotiations, relative market size offers the best 
first approximation of bargaining power.’115  Yet there is a study that shows that the 
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developed countries may benefit more than the developing countries from total removal of 
subsidies on agriculture.
116
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8.3 Côte D’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal as third party participants: DS27 EC - 
Bananas
117
 
 
This section will deal only with the legal arguments marshalled by the parties in the EC – 
Bananas as the concluding chapter will analyse the commercial and political interests that 
sparked off the case.  Third party roles are founded in WTO law.  The rights of third parties 
are important and are dealt with in Article 10 and Annex 3 paragraphs 6 and 9 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).  Article 10(2) and (3) provides: 
Any member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its 
interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an 
opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.  These 
submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the 
panel report. 
Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting 
of the panel.
118
 
These provisions were reiterated in the working procedures of the DSB which authorises the 
DSB to invite third parties ‘in writing’ to present their view or ‘a written version of their oral 
statements’ to the panel and to ‘be present during the entirety of [the] session.’119 
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The protracted EC – Bananas case triggered decisions at three levels: GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement, the European Court of Justice and the German courts
120
 but it is the dispute at the 
GATT/WTO level that is of interest to us here because of the contested application of 
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 on the MFN and National Treatment principles and the 
involvement of ECOWAS Member States as third parties at the Panel and Appellate 
hearings.
121
  At both levels, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal joined nine other developing 
countries in presenting an argument in support of the EC’s line of argument.  The USA 
brought multiple complaints against the EC regarding its Framework Agreement on Bananas 
with the ACP countries.  The infringement of GATT rules by the EC as alleged by the USA 
is summarised in the introduction to the Panel report as follows: 
On 5 February 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States 
acting jointly and severally, requested consultations with the European Communities 
("the Community" or the "EC") pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT"), Article 6 of the Agreement 
on Import Licensing Procedures (to the extent that it related to Article XXIII of 
GATT), Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article 19 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture (to the extent that it related to Article XXIII of GATT), 
and Article 8 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (to the extent 
that it related to Article XXIII of GATT) regarding the EC regime for the 
importation, sale and distribution of bananas established by Council Regulation 
(EEC) 404/93,
122
 and the subsequent EC legislation, regulations and administrative 
measures, including those reflecting the provisions of the Framework Agreement on 
Bananas, which implemented, supplemented and amended that regime. 
 
The constituted three-man WTO Panel of Mr Stuart Harbinson (Chairman), Mr Kym 
Anderson and Mr Christian Habërli (members) examined the EC Framework Agreement on 
Bananas (FAB) with ACP countries as it relates to the EC’s obligations under the WTO 
agreements, especially Articles I and III of the GATT 1994.  
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Although the FAB was at the heart of the issue, the real economic interest of ECOWAS 
Member States affected was very marginal.  According to the statistics supplied by the EC for 
the 1989 to 1991 period on the shares of suppliers of bananas to the EC, whether as GATT 
Contracting Parties (Côte d’Ivoire) or non-GATT Contracting Parties (Cape Verde), Côte 
d’Ivoire supplied 98,908 tonnes or 3.8 per cent and Cape Verde 2,820 tonnes or 0.1 per cent, 
all of which amounted to less than 4 per cent
123
 in total. 
 
The Complainants specifically claimed that ‘(i) the conditions for operator B eligibility based 
on marketing of ACP bananas, (ii) the exemption of traditional ACP imports from operator 
category rules and (iii) the allocation of 30 per cent of the licences allowing imports of third-
country bananas at in-quota tariff rates to Category B operators, are inconsistent with the 
requirements of Article I:1 of GATT,’124 that is, that the discrimination complained of was 
not based on verifiable quality of the goods but origin-based.   
 
Article I.1 provides as follows: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed in the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, 
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other Members (emphasis added). 
 
On the National Treatment question, the Complainants brought an argument predicated on Article 
III.4 GATT 1994.  According to the them, 
 
the eligibility criteria for Category B operators and the allocation to Category B 
operators of 30 per cent of the licences required for the importation of third-country and 
non-traditional ACP bananas at the lower duty rate within the bound tariff quota are 
                                                          
123
 Panel Report, EC – Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA adopted 22 May 1997, para. 7.83. 
124
 ibid, para 7.188 
235 
 
inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT because this licence allocation amounts to a 
requirement or incentive to purchase EC bananas in order to be eligible to import the 
bananas of Complainants' origin.
125
 
 
Again Article III:4 provides in relevant part: 
The products of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of any other 
Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
 
The contested provisions of the Lomé waiver to ACP countries states: 
 
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement shall be waived, 
until 29 February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to 
provide preferential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the 
relevant provisions of the Fourth Lomé Convention, without being required to extend 
the same preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting party.
126
 
 
The Panel found 
 
that the application in general of operator category rules in respect of the importation of 
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates, in the absence of 
the application of such rules to traditional ACP imports, and in particular the allocation 
to Category B operators of 30 per cent of the licences allowing the importation of third-
country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates, are inconsistent with 
the requirements of Article I:1 of GATT.
127
 
 
On appeal the EC canvassed, among others,  
i. that the Panel endorsed a different interpretation of the Lomé Convention and the 
Lomé waiver
128
 from the one commonly accepted by the parties to the 
Convention, 
ii. that the decision taken by the EC Council in its meeting of 14 to 17 December 
1992 reflects a common understanding that the Lomé commitments will be met by 
allowing tariff-free imports from each ACP country as explained in Protocol 5 on 
Bananas to the Lomé Convention, 
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iii. ‘that Article 167 of the Lomé Convention states that the object of the Convention 
is to promote trade between the ACP States and the European Communities, and 
that the Lomé Convention highlights the importance of improving conditions for 
market access for the ACP States,’129 and 
iv. that tariff preferences alone have been shown to be insufficient to ensure market 
access. 
On the interpretation of Article I:1 of the GATT, I find the submission of the EC very 
persuasive; ‘the European Communities argues that discrimination occurs in treating identical 
situations differently, or in treating different situations in the same way.’130  In there view, 
‘nothing in Article I:1 forbids a Member to treat different situations on their merits.’131  What 
the WTO regime protects under the General Agreement is that ‘like’ products be accorded the 
same treatment irrespective of place of origin. 
 
Equally interesting are the EC arguments and grounds of appeal on Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994 (national treatment).  The EC argues that the Panel misunderstood a ‘border measure’ 
for an ‘internal measure’ which are two completely different things.  Referring to the Panel 
report in Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery ("Italian Agricultural 
Machinery") the EC asserts that the panel report in Italian Agricultural Machinery stands for 
the proposition that Article III applies only to measures applied to imported products "once 
they have cleared through customs."
132
 
 
In their joint third party submission, Côte ’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal, along with others, 
argue 
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i. that the Panel request by the Complaining Parties contains only ‘bare allegations 
of inconsistencies’ and does not provide, as required by Article 6:2 of the DSU, 
the summary of a legal basis for the allegations, 
ii. ‘that it is not the function of the Panel to cure errors in the submissions of the 
Complaining Parties,’ 
iii. that the right ‘to observe’ accorded the ACP third participants diminished their 
‘full participatory rights’ and ‘thereby tainted the whole proceeding,’ 
iv. that the purpose of the Lomé Waiver was not fully considered by the Panel, that 
the Panel erred in interpreting the recitals to the Lomé Convention and also 
misinterpreted the Panel report in United States – Restrictions on the Importation 
of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and 
Under the Headnote to the schedule of Tariff Concessions (‘United States – Sugar 
Waiver’).133   
v. that Protocol 5 should not be read in isolation from Article 168 of the Lomé 
Convention and that before 1990, there were no quantitative limitations on ACP 
exports to traditional markets, 
vi. that the Panel incorrectly determined that the EC commitments under the  Lomé 
Convention were of no legal effects, 
vii. that the preferences granted under the WTO agreements were of a superficial 
manner and ‘make the demise of the ACP banana industry inevitable,’ 
viii. that in the light of the ‘oligopolistic structure of the market, the Lomé Convention 
should be construed in the light of its object, purpose and context,  and  
                                                          
133
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ix. that the Panel misinterpreted the scope and application of GATS which is 
subsequent and supplementary to the GATT 1994 and as such that ‘Article II:1 of 
the GATS does not extend to the modifications of conditions of competition.’ 134         
 
With respect to Articles I of the GATT, the Complaining Parities/respondents (Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States) submit that the Panel correctly found 
that the procedures applicable to ACP bananas constitute a clear regulatory ‘advantage’ in 
violation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and, in support of their argument, they referred to 
the Panel report in United States – Non-Rubber Footwear.135  They countered the argument 
of the appellants that ‘different situations concerning the operators require a different 
allocation of quota rents’ by saying that it ‘legitimises regulations which discriminate 
explicitly among like products on the basis of their origin.’136  The Complaining Parties assert 
that the MFN principle apply to any ‘rules and formalities,’ and describe the argument put 
forward by the EC that measures intended to implement competition policies are ‘outside the 
WTO’ as ‘confused and groundless’. 
 
Subjecting the EC’s FAB to examination under the National Treatment principle of Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Complaining Party submit that the Panel correctly found the 
distribution of Category B licences to be inconsistent with the GATT.  They cited Italian 
Agricultural Machinery
137
 and also the Interpretative Note Ad 
138
Article III of the GATT 
1994.  They insist that the ‘dispositive issue under Article III:4 is whether a discriminatory 
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advantage is affecting the marketing of the domestic product., they argue that the object and 
purpose of Article III is to comply with the National Treatment principle and assert that the 
EC could not claim that their Category B rules treated imported products the same way with 
domestic products after the foreign products had gone through customs clearance.    
 
The findings of the Appellate Body (AB) read in relevant part that the AB 
(k) upholds the Panel’s findings that the non-discriminatory provisions of the GATT  
1994, specifically, Articles I:1 and XIII, apply to the relevant EC regulations, 
irrespective of whether there are one or more ‘separate regimes’ for the importation of 
bananas; 
. . .   
(o) upholds the Panel’s findings that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 applies to the EC 
import procedures, and that the EC practice with respect to hurricane licences is 
inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
 
The AB then recommends to the DSB to request the EC to bring its measures found to be 
inconsistent with the GATT and the GATS into conformity with the obligations of the EC 
under those agreements. 
 
It is submitted that the findings in the case frustrates market access and the realisation of the 
overriding objective of the WTO to help ‘developing countries, and especially the least 
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade,’139 or is the stated 
objective in the words of Westen an ‘empty idea.’140  This ruling subjects ECOWAS to 
double jeopardy: they can use neither the General Agreement nor a plurilateral or regional 
agreement to advance their economic interests.  The implications of GATT/WTO rulings for 
economic development are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
5.8.4 Nigeria as a third party participant in US – Shrimps WT/DS58 
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The US – Shrimp case affected many countries and at the WTO Panel level there were three 
cases, the first, brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
141
 jointly and, the other 
two, by Ecuador
142
 and Thailand
143
 individually.  In all three, the US measure at issue was 
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994 Articles I:1 (MFN), XI:1 
(Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions), XIII:1 (Non-discriminatory Administration of 
Quantitative Restrictions) and XX (General Exceptions).  
 
The United States enacted Section 106 of Public Law 101 – 102144 calling on the Secretary of 
State in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce to, inter alia, ‘initiate negotiations for 
the development of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of 
sea turtles, in particular with foreign governments of countries which are engaged in 
commercial fishing operations likely to affect adversely sea turtles.’145  Left like that, there 
would have been no problems or cases but Section 106  
further provides that shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect certain 
sea turtles may not be imported into the United States, unless the President certified to 
Congress by 1 May 1991, and annually thereafter, that the harvesting nation has a 
regulatory programme and an incidental take rate comparable to that of the United States, 
or that the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation does not pose a threat 
to sea turtles.
146
 
 
Research had found that ‘incidental capture and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp trawlers 
was the most significant source of mortality for sea turtles.’147  As a result of that the National 
Marine Fisheries Service developed turtle excluder devices (TEDs), ‘a grid trapdoor installed 
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inside a trawling net that allows shrimp to pass to the back of the net while directing sea 
turtles and other unintentionally caught large objects out of the net.’148 
 
The United States guidelines issued in 1991 required all shrimp trawl vessels to be fitted with 
TEDs.
149
  Those whose shrimp harvesting methods had no adverse effect on sea turtles were 
not affected by the law, nor did it apply to aquaculture shrimp.
150
  The scope of the law was 
limited to the ‘wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region.151  A revised guideline in 1993 based 
the condition for certification on commitment to require TEDs on all commercial trawl 
vessels by 1 May 1993 and to receive certification from 1994 all affected countries must 
demonstrate the use of TEDs. 
 
The US Court of International Trade (CIT) found
152
 both the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines to be 
‘contrary to law’ because of limiting the scope of Section 106 to wider Caribbean/western 
Atlantic and so the scope was changed to cover everywhere: ‘to prohibit not later than May 1, 
1996 the importation of shrimp or products of shrimp wherever harvested in the wild with 
commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely those species of sea turtles the 
conservation of which is the subject of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State’153 
(emphasis added).  As a result of the extraterritorial application of the US Section 106 Public 
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Law, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand jointly requested consultations with the US 
without any satisfactory solution and so a panel was set up.  Nigeria and Senegal reserved 
their third party rights in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU.   
 
According to the Panel ‘the US measure at issue is not within the scope of measures 
permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.’154  It then ‘recommends that the DSB requests 
the United States to bring this measure into conformity with its obligations under the WTO 
Agreement’155 (emphasis in the original).  In other words, the US Section 106 was seen as 
‘some artifice intended to protect the US fishing industry.’156 
 
The United States appealed and the issues raised on appeal were: 
(a) whether the Panel erred in finding that accepting non-requested information from 
non-governmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of the DSU as 
currently applied; and 
 
(b) whether the Panel erred in finding that the measure at issue constitutes unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail and thus is not 
within the scope of measures permitted under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
157
 
 
It is the second issue that is relevant to the subject of this thesis; it is also the line of argument 
taken by Nigeria. 
 
5.8.5 Nigeria at the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp  
At the Appellate Body Nigeria simply presented the same argument it had presented before 
the Panel as found in paragraphs 169
158
 and 171
159
 of the Report of the 1996 Committee on 
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Trade and Environment (CTE).  As shown in the footnotes below they sound more like an 
admonition than a legal argument. 
 
 
III. A comparison of ECOWAS Member States and the New EU Members and at the 
WTO 
 
5.9.1 Czech Republic 
 
An examination of the TPRs of the twelve new EU Member States before they joined the 
Union in 2004 and 2007 shows that they had been more active at the WTO than ECOWAS 
Member States. 
Table 10: TPRs of new EU members before joining the EU 
s/n Countries As 
Complainants 
As 
Respondents 
As Third 
Parties 
1 Bulgaria 0 0 0 
2 Cyprus 0 0 0 
3 Czech Republic 1 
DS159 
2 
DS148 
0 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and non-discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading system, it would also prove counterproductive to 
meeting environmental objectives and promoting sustainable development. Equally, and bearing in mind the 
fact that governments have the right to establish their national environmental standards in accordance with 
their respective environmental and developmental conditions, needs and priorities, WTO Members note that 
it would be inappropriate for them to relax their existing national environmental standards or their 
enforcement in order to promote their trade. The CTE notes the statement in the 1995 Report on Trade and 
Environment to the OECD Council at Ministerial Level that there has been no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between existing environmental policies and competitiveness impacts, nor of countries 
deliberately resorting to low environmental standards to gain competitive advantages. The CTE welcomes 
similar policy statements made in other inter-governmental fora." 
159
 Paragraph 171 of the Report states: "The CTE notes that governments have endorsed in the results of the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development their commitment to Principle 12 of the Rio 
Declaration that "Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the 
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global problems 
should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus." There is a clear complementarity between 
this approach and the work of the WTO in seeking cooperative multilateral solutions to trade concerns. The 
CTE endorses and supports multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the 
best and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or global 
nature. WTO Agreements and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are representative of efforts of 
the international community to pursue shared goals, and in the development of a mutually supportive 
relationship between them due respect must be afforded to both." 
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DS289 
4 Estonia 0 0 0 
5 Hungary 5 
DS143 DS148 
DS240 DS256 
DS279 
2 
DS35 
DS159 
2 
DS56 
DS76 
6 Latvia 0 0 0 
7 Lithuania 0 0 0 
8 Malta 0 0 0 
9 Poland 3 
DS122 
DS235 
289 
1 
DS19 
1 
DS114 
10 Romania 0 2 
DS198 
DS240 
0 
11 Slovak Republic 0 3 
DS133 
DS143 
DS235 
0 
12 0 0 0  0 
Total   9 10 3 
Source: Figures compiled with data available in the WTO website 
As the table above shows, even before they joined the EU, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland had complained about measures they considered to either directly or indirectly nullify 
or impair the benefits accruing to them or impede their attainment of the objectives of the 
WTO Agreements. 
In Hungary – Safeguard Measures160 the Czech Republic on 21 January 1999,  
requested consultations with Hungary in respect of the imposition of quantitative restrictions by 
Hungary on imports of a broad range of steel products from the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic 
alleged that Hungary imposed a safeguard measure in the form of an import quota on imports of a 
broad range of steel products from the Czech Republic, and that this measure only applies to the Czech 
Republic. The Czech Republic contended that these quantitative restrictions are in breach of Hungary’s 
obligations under GATT Articles I and XIX, as well as provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.161 
                                                          
160
 Hungary – Safeguard Measures on Import of Steel from Czech Republic, request for consultations received 
on 21 January 1999. 
161
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds159_e.htm 
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5.9.2 Hungary 
Before joining the EU, Hungary has been the most active user of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism among all the new members of the EU. 
Table 11: WTO cases involving Hungary  
Case 
Number 
As Complainant 
DS143 Slovak Republic – Measures Affecting Import Duty on Wheat 
from Hungary 
DS148 Czech Republic – Measures Affecting Import Duty on Wheat 
from Hungary 
DS240 Romania – Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour 
DS256 Turkey – Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary 
DS279 Croatia – Measures Affecting Imports of Live Animals and 
Meat Products 
  
As Respondent 
DS35 Hungary – Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural 
Products (Complainants: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Thailand and the USA). 
DS159 Hungary – Safeguard Measures on Import of Steel from 
Czech Republic 
 
As the TPRs of Hungary before joining the EU shows, Hungary had used the WTO platform 
to extract both the MFN and National treatments from other countries, especially its 
neighbours.  It is also worthy of note that none of the five cases involving Hungary as either 
complainant or respondent proceeded to full hearing by the Panel, all ended at the stage of 
requesting consultations.  However, in the case with Romania (Romania – Import Prohibition 
on Wheat and Wheat Flour), Hungary, basing its arguments on the nullification or 
impairment of its benefits under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, was able to get Romania ‘to 
abrogate its legislation on quality requirements for imported wheat and wheat flour’ and so 
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the request was withdrawn.
162
  Also the two cases
163
 based on the SPS Measure and the 
GATT Articles XI and XX ended in mutually agreed solutions by the parties. 
 
Even as a respondent, Hungary had used the WTO dispute mechanism as a shield to protect 
its agricultural subsidies as it was allowed ‘a waiver of its WTO obligations’164 and the case 
also ended in mutually agreed solutions. 
 
5.9.3 Poland 
 
Poland on its part has appeared as a complainant or respondent in four cases. 
 
Table 12 
Case 
Number 
As Complainant 
DS122 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and 
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland 
DS235 Slovakia – Safeguard Measures on Import of Sugar 
DS289 Czech Republic – Additional Duty on Imports of Pig-Meat 
from Poland  
  
As Respondent 
DS19 Czech Republic – Additional Duty on Imports of Pig-Meat 
from Poland 
 
In the three cases listed above in which Poland brought complaints to the WTO before it 
joined the EU, it succeeded in getting Thailand to revoke its duties
165
 which Poland alleged 
was impeding its attainment of the objectives of the WTO Agreements.  Thailand – Steel was 
the only case from the twelve new members of the EU that had full Panel and Appellate 
Reports on it.  
                                                          
162
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds240_e.htm  
163
 Turkey – Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary, DS256, request for consultations received on 3 May 2002 
and Croatia – Measures Affecting Imports of Live Animals and Meat Products, DS297, request for consultations 
received on 9 July 2003. 
164
 Hungary – Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural Products, DS35, request for consultations received on 
27 March 1996. 
165
 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams 
from Poland, WT/DS122/R adopted 5 April 2001 and Appellate Report WT/DS122/AB/R also adopted 5 April 
2001. 
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In Slovakia – Safeguard Measures166 ‘Slovakia agreed to a progressive increase of the level 
of its quota for imports of sugar from Poland between 2002 and 2004, and Poland agreed to 
remove its quantitative restriction on imports of butter and margarine’ which was a win-win 
situation. 
 
The third case
167
 from Poland concerned the additional duty on imports of pig-meat from 
Poland imposed by the Czech Republic.  Invoking its rights under the GATT Articles I, II and 
XXIII, Poland insisted that it be accorded the MFN treatment. 
 
IV. Summary 
5.10.1 Compliance with WTO Agreements 
In this chapter we have seen that the Member States of ECOWAS are complying with the 
WTO Agreements at great costs to their governments and citizens.  Yet despite the great 
economic difficulties facing them, they are taking legislative and administrative measures to 
bring their trade policies in line with the WTO Agreements.  At the regional level the 
ECOWAS Commission ensures that all the trade rules emanating from them are WTO-
compliant or tending to comply with the Agreements in a progressive manner.  All the 
countries apply the MFN treatment to their trading partners. 
 
The Gambia’s Customs and Excise Act 2010168 has incorporated the WTO customs valuation 
as a domestic law in the country.  Ghana is stringently adhering to the mandatory technical 
                                                          
166
 Slovakia – Safeguard Measures on Import of Sugar, DS235, request for consultations received on 11 July 
2001. 
167
 Czech Republic – Additional Duty on Imports of Pig-Meat from Poland, DS289, request for consultations 
received on 16 April 2003. 
168
 Cap 472, The Custom and Excise Act 2010, sections 127 and 128(B), see also the Finance Act No. 777 (C. 
31) 2011. 
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standards of international organisations such as the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).
169
  As explained in the last chapter, the West African 
countries that make up the ECOWAS have both national and institutional memberships of the 
international standard-setting organisations mentioned in the SPS Agreement.  The 
Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Togo 1992 (Loi Fundamentale) enshrines monism and 
the WTO Agreements can be invoked directly in the country as if national law. 
 
5.10.2 Notifications 
The provision for notifications in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO is 
frequently used by ECOWAS Member States.  Evidence of ‘the fullest possible degree of 
transparency’ has to be shown in ‘reports’ and ‘notifications made under the provisions of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements.’170  Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have given notifications 
on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures,
171
 Customs Valuation,
172
 TBT and TRIPS. 
 
The Gambia has also used the notifications provision to show how the WTO Agreements on 
Agriculture
173
 and SPS Measures could impinge on its laws.  Both Niger and Senegal have 
notified the TPRB of the effects of the GATT and GATS on them especially with respect to 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the TBT.
174
 
                                                          
169
 International Trade Centre, UNCTAD/WTO, Influencing and Meeting International Standards: Challenges 
for Developing Countries, Vol. 2 – Procedures Followed by Selected International Standard-setting 
Organisations and Country Reports on TBT and SPS (1
st
 endn ITC, Geneva 2004)  
170
 WTO Agreements, Annex 3, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Section D, ‘Reporting.’ 
171
 Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the GATT 1994, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures 
(Article 16.4).  
172
 Agreement on Customs Valuation, Article VII of the GATT 1994. 
173
 As it affects domestic support, Arts. 10 and 18.2 and export subsidies (G/AG/N/GM/1/Rev.1 15 September 
2005 and C/AG/N/GMB/3 of 15 September 2005) and the SPS Measures, Art. 7 (G/SPS/N/GMB/1 4 March 
2010) 
174
 In the case of Senegal, ‘Transitional Safeguard Mechanism’ G/TMB/N/122 of 9 August 1995 and on TBT, 
‘Notification of Measures,’ G/TBT/Notif97.348 of 15 July 1997 and G/TBT/Notif00472 to 00473 of 3 October 
2000
b
. 
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5.10.3 Market Access 
The thorny issue of market access has not gone to plan for the Member States of ECOWAS.  
This, according to the TPRR on Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, is mainly due to ‘poor 
supply-side capacity’ such as the absence of basic services like water and electricity or banks 
that are not able to offer credits to farmers and traders.  Despite the fact that almost all the 
countries are signatories to or involved in the Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement, 
bilateral investment treaties with the EU and the USA, the AGOA, the Everything but Arms 
initiative, the Bangui Agreement and the WTO Agreements, market access has, in the main, 
remained elusive.  Sometimes when they are granted at all, they do not cover agricultural 
products that are the major products of sub-Saharan or tropical Africa.  Even when they are 
covered, the political caveat excludes the countries they are ostensibly meant to benefit (as is 
the case with the AGOA which is administered according to the whims and caprices of the 
President of the United States).  The Gambia exported nothing under the AGOA in 2008 and 
poultry products from Niger to the EU have been banned by the OIE.
175
  
 
5.10.4 Unresolved Issues 
The powerful arguments marshalled by the EC, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal in the 
Banana case are still begging for answers.  According to the EC, ‘market preferences alone 
have been shown to be insufficient to ensure market access.’176  The African countries 
submitted that the ‘oligopolistic structure of the market’ made it necessary that the Lomé 
Convention be ‘construed in the light of its object, purpose and context’ otherwise an adverse 
ruling would ‘make the demise of the ACP banana industry inevitable.’177 
 
                                                          
175
 N 56 
176
 EC – Bananas, WTO document WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997 
177
 ibid paras. 106 to 113. 
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Following the steady fall in government revenue in the Gambia from taxes (16 per cent) and 
merchandise trade (30 per cent) from 2003 to 2009, to cite one example, it seems to beg the 
question that the WTO architecture as presently drawn and built will be able to deliver the 
promises held out to acceding countries in the Preamble to its Agreement signed in 
Marrakesh.  Recent efforts
178
 at addressing the issues are yet to receive the approval of ‘the 
GATT epistemic community’179 and have remained apocryphal.  Whether this is due to 
‘rational ignorance’180 or ‘Westphalian power politics,’181 the fact remains that the WTO is 
yet to work for the World’s poor as the TPRs we have examined in this chapter show.  Again 
the fact that the DDA appears to have been stalled since it was launched in 2001 seems to 
suggest lack of will on the part of the world leading trading nations, namely, the USA, EC, 
Japan and Canada to reposition the WTO to work for all. 
 
The next chapter will examine the adjudication of the MFN and National Treatment 
principles at the WTO. 
                                                          
178
 Jane Kelsey, Serving Whose Interests? The Political Economy of Trade in Services Agreements (Oxford, 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), see also Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 
179
 Steve Charnowitz, ‘What Is International Economic Law? Journal of International Economic Law, 14(1) 
March 2011, p.22. 
180
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Economic Law, “Public Reason”, and Multilevel Governance of 
Interdependent Public Goods,’ Journal of International Economic Law, 14(1) March 2011, p.24. 
181
 ibid, p.25. 
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6.1 Introduction  
Promoting economic development through trade is considered one of the policy objectives 
that the WTO Agreements recognise as legitimate
1
 and the principal benefit of assuming the 
substantive WTO obligations. 
 
The WTO cases selected for analysis in this chapter are the key ones in which the measures at 
issue have been the prohibitions on the importation and placing on the market of the products 
of one WTO Member by another.  The underlying factor in the cases is ‘the economic 
development of all trading partners and the development of developing countries.’2  
Expectedly while the issues have revolved around market access, trade liberalisation and 
economic development, the provisions of the WTO Agreements most hotly contested are the 
principles of non-discrimination (MFN and National Treatment),
3
 quantitative restrictions
4
 
and the SPS and TBT Agreements (discussed in chapters 1, 3 and 4).  The cases are selected 
for reasons of ‘compensatory constitutionalism,’ that is, how the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism nurtures transnational justice in the international sphere where national courts 
lack jurisdiction and because of the central role of the DSB in fostering the ‘rule of law in 
transnational relations,’ as well as in ‘clarifying disputed interpretations of (world trade) 
rules, principles, and incomplete agreements,”’5 and holding up itself as ‘exemplar of public 
                                                          
1
 The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (UNTS 3; 33 ILM 1125 at 1144) mentions 
‘economic development’ as one of the objectives of the Organisation and in the substantive part provides for  
the ‘progressive development of the economies of all contracting parties’ in Part IV, GATT Article XXXVI-
XXXVIII (GATT Final Act 2
nd
 Sp.Sess.25).  Note that Part IV (added 8 February 1965) has no UNTS number. 
2
 Para. 2, Preamble to the GATS. 
3
 GATT Article I and III respectively. 
4
 GATT Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions), Article XIII (Non-discriminatory 
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions) and Article XVIII (General Assistance to Economic Development, 
Balance of Payments).  
5
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Economic Law, ‘Public Reason’, and Multilevel Governance of 
Interdependent Public Goods,’ Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 14(1) March 2011, 71.  See also E. 
U. Petersmann, ‘Constitutional Theories of International Economic Adjudication and Investor-State Arbitration,; 
in P. M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E. U. Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 137-94.  
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reason.’6  ‘Justice’ in this context means the promotion of the aims of the GATT and the 
WTO of ‘raising the standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand . . . to ensure that developing countries, 
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade.’7  Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to examine how the DSB has through its 
adjudicatory role facilitated and enhanced or impeded and forestalled the quest for world 
market share of ECOWAS Member States all of who are either ‘developing’ or ‘least 
developed;’ as Steve Charnovitz puts it, how the DSB places ‘economic and social actors at 
the center of the analysis of how to maximize market freedom while respecting human 
dignity,’8 in other words, how the DSB tries to balance the conflicting interests for trade 
liberalisation and private profits of the transnational corporations vis-à-vis the development 
and market access yearnings of a majority of WTO members including ECOWAS Member 
States (emphasis mine). 
 
The DSB’s approach to the interpretation of the WTO Agreements is markedly different from 
the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) approach to the interpretation of the EU Treaty; while 
the DSB is literal and mechanistic, the ECJ is creative, purposive and teleological.  For 
                                                          
6
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) 231.  As Petersmann, above, 
explains,  
The context of Rawlsian ‘public reason’ comprises substantive principles of justice (such as 
fundamental rights) as well as procedural principles of justice (such as due process of law, 
independence and impartiality of courts, democratic governance) that tend to be applied most 
consistently by Supreme Courts as the only democratic institution that has to justify its reasoning on 
constitutional grounds.  Habermas’ theory of ‘deliberative democracy’ focuses on the role of courts as 
guardians of the constitutional conditions of procedural legitimacy: ‘if one understands the constitution 
as an interpretation and elaboration of a system of rights in which private and public autonomy are 
internally related (and must be simultaneously enhanced), then a rather bold constitutional adjudication 
is even required in cases that concern the implementation of democratic procedure…’ (italics in the 
original).  
All that is said here also apply to the WTO’s DSB more or less if one would substitute ‘constitution’ with ‘WTO 
Agreements’ and in place of ‘Supreme Courts’ insert ‘the DSB.’ 
7
 The Preambles, GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement 1994. 
8
 Steve Charnovitz, ‘What Is International Economic Law,’ Journal of International Economic Law, 14(1) 3-22 
at 22.  
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example, in the EC – Chicken Cuts9 the Panel and the Appellate Body devoted 95 and 67 
pages, respectively, explicating the meaning of the word ‘salted’ which appeared as part of a 
tariff heading. The ECJ, on the other hand, follows the purposive rule which seeks to find out 
the purpose of the legislative body in enacting a piece of legislation and interpreting the law 
so as to bring out the prime purpose of the EU legal system.  To cite one example, in the 
Kadi
10
 judgment the ECJ overruled the judgments of the Court of First Instance in two cases 
Kadi
11
 and Yusuf
12
 in deference to the EU Law which accords greater protection of 
fundamental rights to EU citizens.  The ECJ is so strong in upholding EU Law that Kadi is 
said to have raised ‘a number of questions regarding its effects on the structure of the 
international legal order… whether the primacy of UN Charter obligations is jeopardised.’13 
In effect, this approach of reciprocal concessions only works if there is a way to implement 
UN Security Council resolutions in conformity with fundamental rights of the EU. If it would 
only be possible to put a resolution into effect by adopting a Community act which breaches 
fundamental rights—if there were a real conflict between obligations arising under the UN 
Charter on the one hand and EU fundamental rights as “principles that form part of the very 
foundations of the Community legal order” on the other—EU fundamental rights prevail. 
Thus, the ECJ’s commitment to accept the primacy of UN Charter obligations and the 
integrity of UN Security Council resolutions ends in the absence of discretional power to 
implement such resolutions in a fundamental rights-friendly way.
14
 
 
Gerard Conway points out that the DSB ‘follows relatively restrained and conserving 
methods of interpretation’ in contradistinction to the ECJ.15  On the different approaches 
between the EU court and the WTO judicial arm, Ehlermann’s explanation bears quoting 
extensively: 
                                                          
9
 Panel Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, Complaint made by Brazil, WT/DS269/R, paras 7.84 – 7.424; modified by 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 
WT/DS269/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2005, paras 170 – 346.  See also Isabelle Van Damme, ‘The 
Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments,’ 41(1) Journal of World Trade 1 (2007). 
10
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P. Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of European Union, 3 C.M.L.R. 41 
(2008). 
11
 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649. 
12
 Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533. 
13
 Albert Posch, ‘The Kadi Case: Rethinking the Relationship between EU Law and International Law,’ 15 
Colum. J. Eur. L Online 1 (2009) 4.  See also Ramses A. Wessel, ‘The Kadi Case: Towards a More Substantive 
Hierarchy in International Law? International Organisations Law Review 5(2008) 323 – 327 available at 
www.brill.nl/iolr  
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge University 
Press 2012) 22-23.  
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42. According to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, “a Treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Among these three criteria, the 
Appellate Body has certainly attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e. “the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty.” This is easily illustrated by the frequent references in 
Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the Shorter Oxford dictionary, which, 
in the words of certain critical observers, has become “one of the covered agreements”. The 
second criterion, i.e. “context” has less weight than the first, but is certainly more often used 
and relied upon than the third, i.e. “object and purpose”. 
43. For somebody having spent most of his professional life observing the European Court of 
Justice in interpreting European Community law, the difference in style and methodology 
could hardly be more radical. I do not remember that the EC Court of Justice has ever laid 
down openly and clearly the rules of interpretation that it intended to follow. What I do 
remember is that among the interpretative criteria effectively used by the EC Court of Justice, 
the predominant criterion was – and probably still is – “object and purpose”. While the 
Appellate Body clearly privileges “literal” interpretation, the EC Court of Justice is a 
protagonist of “teleological” interpretation.… 
47 …This choice has given clear guidance to members of the WTO and to panels….The 
heavy reliance on the “ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty” has protected 
the Appellate Body from criticisms that its reports have added to or diminished the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements (Article 3.2, third sentence, DSU). On a more 
general level, the interpretative method, established and clearly announced by the Appellate 
Body, has had a legitimising effect, and this from the very beginning of its activity.
16
 
 
The determination of nullification or impairment
17
 of any benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to WTO Member States and other findings by the DSB have been of enormous 
interest to trading nations and the GATT/WTO epistemic community because a dispute 
settlement system such as exists within the WTO framework should ‘reflect, promote, and 
depend on “public reason” as a necessary restraint on the rational egoism of the homo 
economicus’18 which is the justification for the shift from the power-oriented GATT 1947 to 
the rules-based WTO multilateral trading system.  While Petersmann urges the WTO as a 
body to overcome the ‘Anglo-Saxon conceptions of markets as neutral arenas,’19 he also 
stresses that the DSB should apply itself to ‘protecting… against abuses of “rule by law” … 
                                                          
16
 C-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’, 
Robert Schuman Centre Policy Paper No. 02/9 (2002), paras 43-47. 
17
 Article XXIII GATT 1994. 
18
 Petersmann (n 5) 26. 
19
 ibid 39. 
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and … departures from “rule of international law.”’20  There is a tension between the idea of 
a system of rules as the legal paradigm and the idea that the judiciary should seek to achieve 
substantive justice, because the latter involves policy trade-offs that cannot really be reduced 
to rules, although there have been attempts, most famously by Robert Alexy, to argue that the 
balancing of incommensurable interests is objective.
21
  This also touches on the distinction 
between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law,
22
 or institutional roles and 
suitability or fitness for purpose and democratic legitimacy.
23
 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts: this introduction, the second part which examines 
some WTO cases in which the provisions on the MFN, National Treatment, quantitative 
restrictions and the SPS Agreement have been disputed and the last part which summarises 
the work.  
 
6.2.1 European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones)
24
  
                                                          
20
 Ibid 36. 
21
 TA Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, (1987) 96(5) Yale Law Journal 943-1005; R 
Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’, (2005) 3(4) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572-581; K  Möller, ‘Balancing and the structure of constitutional rights’, (2007) 5(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 453-468  
22
 B Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
23 N Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (University of 
Chicago Press 1994) 
24
 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (hereinafter EC – Hormones) 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R Complaint by Canada and the United States 16 January 1998.  There are 
many scholarly articles in the Journal of International Economic Law entirely devoted to  or with passing 
comments on the Hormones: Joost Paulwelyn, ‘Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement,’ 
(1998) 1(2) 227-258; Maurts Lugard, ‘Scope of Appellate Review: Objective Assessment of the Facts and 
Issues of Law,’ 1998 1(2) 323-327;  Dona Roberts, ‘Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations,’ (1998) 1 (3) 377-405; G S Desmedt, ‘Hormones: 
‘Objective Assessment’ and (or as) Standard of Review,’ (1998) 1(4) 695-698; R Quick and A Blüther, ‘Has the 
Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case,’ (1999) 2(4) 
603-639; Joost Paulwelyn, ‘The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures As Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes: EC – Hormones, Australian – Salmon and Japan – Varietals,’ (1999) 2(4) 641-
664. M McNelis, ‘The Role of the Judge in the EU and WTO: Lessons from the BSE and Hormones Cases,’ 
(2001) 4(1) 189-208; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Latest on the Indirect Effect of WTO Law in the EC Legal 
Order: The Nakajuma Case Law Misjudged? (2001) 4(3) 597-608; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ‘Navigating by the 
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In the EC – Hormones the Panel dealt with two complaints against the European 
Communities (EC) relating to an EC prohibition of importation and placing on the market 
meat and meat products treated with certain hormones from the United States and Canada.  In 
both cases the same conclusion was reached: that the EC had acted inconsistently with the 
requirements contained in Articles 2.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement by adopting arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions… which resulted in  ‘discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.’25  
 
The EC disagreed with the Panel and made claims of errors in law by the Panel on the burden 
of proof, standard of review, the precautionary principle, objective assessment of facts and 
procedural issues including the interpretation of certain articles of the SPS Agreement and so 
appealed the decision.  On appeal, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the 
precautionary principle could not override the explicit wording of Article 5 paragraphs I and 
2, that the SPS Agreement applies to measures that were enacted before the entry into force 
of the WTO Agreement, but that remain in force thereafter, that the EC measures at issue 
were inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement; but reversed 
the Panel’s conclusions that the term ‘based on’ as used in Articles 3.1 and 3.3 has the same 
meaning as the term ‘conform to’ as used in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, also reversed 
that the EC by maintaining, without justification under Article 3.3, SPS measures which were 
not based on existing international standards, acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement, further reversed the Panel’s finding that the term ‘based on’ as used in Article 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stars,’ (2002) 5(1) 17-89; Alan Wm. Wolff, ‘What do Doha Do? An Initial Assessment,’ (2002) 5(1) 202-
206;Yuji Iwasawa, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement As Judicial Supervision, (2002)  5(2) 287-305; Chi Carmody, 
‘Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement,’ (2002) 5(2) 307-329; Jiaxiang Hu, ‘The Role of 
International Law in the Development of WTO Law,’ (2004) 7(1) 143-167; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘EC Liability 
for Non-implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decision – Are the Dice Cast?’ (2004) 7(2) 483-490; 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law,’ (2004) 7(3) 491-521; Steve 
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5.1 of the SPS Agreement entailed a ‘minimum procedural requirement’ that a Member 
imposing an SPS measure must submit evidence that it took into account a risk assessment 
when it enacted or maintained the measure and finally reversed the Panel’s findings and 
conclusions on Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
26
 
 
With all due respect to the Appellate Body, the above reversals of the findings of the Panel is 
baffling and incites curiosity and even questions if not doubts as to the reasonableness of the 
decisions of the AB in view of the ‘history of events’ which the Panel stated lucidly in 
paragraphs II.26 to II.29 of their report containing the report of the EC’s own committee of 
experts that the hormones in question were in no way harmful to human health. 
The EC Council of Ministers adopted its first Directive on the issue (81/602/EEC) on 31 July 
1981. In that Directive, and in regard to five of the hormones at issue (all but MGA), the 
Council directed the Commission to provide, not later than 1 July 1984, a report on the 
experience acquired and scientific developments, accompanied, if necessary, by proposals 
taking into account these developments. Accordingly, the Commission set up a Scientific 
Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal Production, chaired by Professor G.E. Lamming (the 
"Lamming Group"). The question addressed to the Lamming Group was: 
 
"Does the use for fattening purposes in animals of the following substances: 
oestradiol-17β, testosterone, progesterone, trenbolone and zeranol present any 
harmful effect to health?"
27
 
 
The Lamming Group issued an interim report on 22 September 1982 (the "Lamming 
Report"). The Lamming Report concluded as follows: 
 
"The Scientific Working Group is of the opinion that the use of oestradiol-17β, 
testosterone and progesterone and those derivatives which readily yield the parent 
compound on hydrolysis after absorption from the site of application would not 
present any harmful effects to the health of the consumer when used under the 
appropriate conditions as growth promoters in farm animals.
28
 
 
It is worthy of note that the following three other eminent groups supported the Lamming 
Report: the EC Scientific Veterinary Committee on 9 November 1982, the EC Scientific 
                                                          
26
 Para. 253 of the Appellate Report, EC – Hormones n 19 above. 
27
 Report of the (EC) Scientific Veterinary Committee, Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition and the 
Scientific Committee for Food on the Basis of the Report of the Scientific Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal 
Production, pp. 1 & 12. 
28
 EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/R/USA, para. II.28. 
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Committee for Animal Nutrition on 17 November 1982 and the EC Scientific Committee for 
Food on 4 February 1983 and all ‘supported the conclusions and recommendations of the 
Lamming Report.’29  Therefore, the EC ban could not have been based on the ‘scientific 
justification’ provision of Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement which is an acceptable exception 
to ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members’ and ‘a disguised restriction 
on international trade.’30 
 
With respect to harmonisation, Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement provides that: 
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a 
higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures 
based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification, or as a consequence if the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.  Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in 
a level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved 
on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any 
other provision of this Agreement.
31
 
 
Other provisions of the SPS Agreement contested in EC – Hormones were Articles 3.1 
enjoining Members to ‘base their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations,’ 5.1 to ‘ensure that their SPS measures are based on an assessment … of 
the risks to human, animal or plant life or health,’ and  5.5 stressing for ‘consistency in the 
application of the concept of appropriate level of SPS protection against risks’ so as to ‘avoid 
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 ibid para. II.29 
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 The Preamble para 1 and Article 2.3, SPS Agreement 
31
 The footnote to paragraph 3 of Article 3 reads, 
For the purposes of Article 3.3, there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and 
evaluation of available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection. 
Also Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement provides the following: 
In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel should seek advice 
from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the 
panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the 
relevant international organizations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own 
initiative" (emphasis added). 
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arbitrary or unjustified distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different 
situations,  if such distinctions result in discrimination or disguised restriction on 
international trade.’ 
 
Both at the Panel and the Appellate Body, the EC never argued that its measures were ‘based 
on international standards’32 but rather that ‘a measure may deviate – but not substantially – 
from the content of a recommendation of the Codex and still be considered as ‘based on’ that 
recommendation for the purposes of Article 3.1.’  Again ‘that Article 3 employs the term 
‘based on’ in paragraphs 1 and 3, whereas it uses the term ‘conform to’ in paragraph 2 and 
that the ‘terms differ in meaning.’33  The reasoning of the Panel is enunciated in the following 
lines:  
 
According to Article 3.3 all measures which are based on a given international standard 
should in principle achieve the same level of sanitary protection. Therefore, if an international 
standard reflects a specific level of sanitary protection and a sanitary measure implies a 
different level, that measure cannot be considered to be based on the international standard
34
 
(original italics). 
 
Then in conclusion, ‘We find, therefore, that for a sanitary measure to be based on an 
international standard in accordance with Article 3.1, that measure needs to reflect the same 
level of sanitary protection as the standard,’ says the Panel. 
 
In respect of the first part of Article 5.5 the Panel was of the view that ‘[c]onsistency is not 
imposed as an obligation but as an objective which has to be taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of Article 5.5’ (italics mine).  In the view of the Panel, what creates an 
obligation is the second part of the first sentence of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because 
                                                          
32
 Para 3(a) of Annex A of the SPS Agreement defines international standards as: ‘International standards, 
guidelines and recommendations for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by 
Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, 
contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice.’  
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 EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R paras. 20 & 21. 
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it stipulates that ‘each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions’ so as not be 
in breach of Article 2.3.
35
  Being constrained because ‘the European Communities has not 
provided evidence of an identifiable risk related to the presence of five of the six hormones at 
issue for which international standards exist when these hormones are used for growth 
promotion purposes in accordance with good practice,’36 the Panel found that the EC had ‘not 
established’ its case (italics mine).  
 
Before analysing the views of the Appellate Body it is necessary to contextualise EC – 
Hormones. The case is older than the WTO as its history or the precursor to it goes back to 
the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations during the GATT years.  The following 
two paragraphs of the Panel Report tell the history and how the use of blocking (in the 
Hormones case) prevalent under the GATT frustrated proceedings. 
In March 1987, the United States raised the issue of the EC ban under the Tokyo Round 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"). Bilateral consultations 
between the United States and the European Communities failed to resolve the dispute. 
Arguing that the EC Directive was not supported by scientific information, the United States 
requested the establishment of a technical experts group ("TEG") under Article 14.5 of the 
TBT Agreement to examine the question. This request was denied following the EC response 
that the use of growth promotants was a process and production method (PPM), and that 
parties to the TBT Agreement only had an obligation not to use PPMs to circumvent the 
Agreement. The European Communities favoured the establishment of a panel "to evaluate 
the rights and obligations of Parties deriving from Article 14.25 (of the TBT Agreement)". 
The dispute went unresolved. 
On 1 January 1989, the United States introduced retaliatory measures in the form of 100 per 
cent ad valorem duties on a list of products imported from the European Communities. The 
European Communities consequently asked for the establishment of a panel. This request was 
denied by the United States. In 1989, a joint US/EC Task Force agreed on certain measures 
which allowed imports into the European Communities of US meat certified to have not been 
produced with hormones. This resulted in the United States withdrawing some products from 
the retaliation list. The other EC products figuring in the list remained subject to the 
retaliatory action. On 19 June 1996, the European Communities requested the establishment 
of a panel to examine this matter. On 15 July 1996, after this Panel was composed, the United 
States terminated its retaliatory action in its entirety.
37
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6.2.2 A critique of the reasoning of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones 
Paragraph 6 of Article 17 of the DSU provides that ‘[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of 
law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.’  According 
to paragraph 12 of the same article, ‘[t]he Appellate Body shall address each of the issues 
raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding’ and ‘may uphold, 
modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel’ as stated in paragraph 13 
(italics added).  Therefore, these three paragraphs do not only limit the Appellate Body to 
‘issues of law and legal interpretations’ but clearly provide that it should base its findings and 
conclusions solely on law and legal interpretations unlike a panel which hears a case for the 
first time and whose ‘terms of reference’ and ‘functions’ cover making ‘findings’38 and an 
‘objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of facts of the 
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements’39 
(emphasis added).  It is, therefore, humbly submitted that the Appellate Body does not have 
the dual role which the DSU assigns to the Panel of assessing facts and conformity with the 
law rather the Appellate Body is restricted to law and its interpretations as stated by the 
Panel.  It cannot go on a frolic of its own. 
 
In line with the views of Ehlermann endorsed by Conway above
40
 that the Appellate Body 
favours ‘literal interpretation’ over and above the ‘object and purpose’ of the covered 
agreements and the jibe that ‘the Oxford Shorter Dictionary has become one of the covered 
agreements,’ the Appellate Body in reversing the interpretation of ‘base on’ as given by the 
Panel cites a dictionary twice in the same paragraph, the only difference is that this time it is 
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40
 N 15. 
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The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles.
41
  In the opinion and 
interpretation of the Appellate Body,  
"based on" and "conform to" are used in different articles, as well as in differing paragraphs 
of the same article. Thus, Article 2.2 uses "based on", while Article 2.4 employs "conform 
to". Article 3.1 requires the Members to "base" their SPS measures on international standards; 
however, Article 3.2 speaks of measures which "conform to" international standards. Article 
3.3 once again refers to measures "based on" international standards. The implication arises 
that the choice and use of different words in different places in the SPS Agreement are 
deliberate, and that the different words are designed to convey different meanings. A treaty 
interpreter is not entitled to assume that such usage was merely inadvertent on the part of the 
Members who negotiated and wrote that Agreement.
42
 
 
Ironically, the Appellate Body thought of itself as pursing the ‘object and purpose’ of the SPS 
Agreement and not the Panel.
43
  I would like to point out here that the ‘object and purpose’ of 
the SPS Agreement as pointed out in its preamble is ‘to further the use of harmonised sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures between members on the basis of international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant international organisations… so 
that measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute … a disguised restriction 
on international trade.’  Since international standards were available for five of the six 
hormones in dispute and the EC did not follow one of them, it is not surprising that the 
findings and recommendations of the Appellate Body invited more critical than favourable 
comments from international economic law scholars and world trade policy commentators 
around the world.
44
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 ‘We are unable to accept this interpretation of the Panel. In the first place, the ordinary meaning of "based on" 
is quite different from the plain or natural import of "conform to". A thing is commonly said to be "based on" 
another thing when the former "stands" or is "founded" or "built" upon or "is supported by" the latter.
150
 In 
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Again on the issue of ‘risk assessment,’ the Appellate Body seized on the term ‘risk 
management’ used by the Panel to draw the attention of the EC that it was leaving its duty 
and doing something else.  It is submitted here that while the term used by the Panel to 
explain itself is important, the legal issue is whether the EC based its ban on an objective 
assessment of ‘the risks to human, animal or plant life or health.’  ‘Risk assessment’ is 
defined as 
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within 
the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic 
consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
food, beverages or feedstuffs.
45
 
 
Therefore, the reasoning of the Appellate Body for reversing the findings of the Panel 
beggars belief because it left the legal argument or interpretation and picked the linguistic 
nuances that were not the basis of the findings by the Panel.  They said: 
The Panel observed that an assessment of risk is, at least with respect to risks to human life 
and health, a "scientific" examination of data and factual studies; it is not, in the view of the 
Panel, a "policy" exercise involving social value judgments made by political bodies. The 
Panel describes the latter as "non-scientific" and as pertaining to "risk management" rather 
than to "risk assessment". We must stress, in this connection, that Article 5 and Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement speak of "risk assessment" only and that the term "risk management" is 
not to be found either in Article 5 or in any other provision of the SPS Agreement. Thus, the 
Panel's distinction, which it apparently employs to achieve or support what appears to be a 
restrictive notion of risk assessment, has no textual basis. The fundamental rule of treaty 
interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the words actually used by the 
agreement under examination, and not words which the interpreter may feel should have been 
used.
46
 
 
An Appellate Body has the advantage of the last word on an issue which acts as a foreclosure 
but that does not mean that it should dispense with superior reasoning or more convincing 
and, with respect to the object and purpose of the covered agreements, pro-market, WTO-
compliant and both SPS- and TBT-friendly findings and conclusions.  
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Going by the history of events under the GATT and the WTO, a likely effect of the findings 
and conclusions of the Appellate Body is that a powerful State could in disregard of 
international standards and without any identifiable risk assessment impose any SPS measure 
as a façade of its restriction on international trade and get it endorsed by the DSB as not being 
inconsistent with the covered multilateral agreements thereby defeating the object and 
purpose of the World Trade Organisation. 
 
Had the Appellate Body wanted to base its upholding, modifications and reversals on ‘issues 
of law and legal interpretations’47 as it is outside its remit to make findings of fact, it would 
have provided answers to all or most of the following questions: 
1. What requirements must be met for the SPS Agreement to apply to a specific 
measure? 
 
2. What is the relationship between the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994? If a 
measure falls under both, how should a panel proceed? 
 
3. How does the treatment of health measures under the SPS Agreement differ from that 
under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994? 
 
4. What options do Members have with regard to international harmonised standards? 
 
5. When is an SPS measure ‘based on’ a risk assessment? In assessing risk, what factors 
can be looked at? 
 
6. When can Members invoke the ‘precautionary principle’ in justification of SPS 
measures that are not based on scientific evidence as is the case in EC - Hormones? 
What is the status of this principle in international law and the applications of this in 
areas other than trade? 
 
Finally, in view of the fact that the Appellate Body Report on EC – Hormones did not address 
all those, Hélèn Lambert asks ‘does the Appellate Body Report in the Hormones case suggest 
deference to the Members of the WTO or rather judicial activism?’48 
 
                                                          
47
 In keeping with its mandate in the DSU, Article 17 paras 6 and 13. 
48
 This question as well as numbers 1 to 6 above were formulated by Dr Hélèn Lambert as part of the 
postgraduate Lecture/seminar on International Economic Law for the class of 2006/07 and used for Lecture 12 
on 15 January 2007.  Both lecture notes and seminar questions are in file with author. 
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Joost Pauwelyn
49
 has attempted to shade light on the above questions with the help of two 
other cases Australia – Salmon50 and Japan – Varietals51 decided like EC – Hormones and 
based on the SPS Agreement and in answer to the first question above she states that ‘[w]hat 
counts is the objective or purpose of the regulation.  Was it enacted with a view to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health? Only if that is the case can it be an SPS measure.’  This 
brings a bigger question, since the EC measure was based on the hype of sometimes self-
serving NGOs and ‘consumers’ concern’ and ‘suspicion’ coupled with the fact that ‘three EC 
Member States (Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom) sought to have the three natural 
hormones remain available both as therapeutic drugs and as growth promotion agents and 
Ireland and the UK also argued for the retention of the synthetic hormones, trenbolone and 
zeranol,’52 can it be validly argued that the EC ban had bases in law as an SPS measure and 
deftly justified as such?  In my view, the answer is in the negative as will be shown below, 
and I am in very good company. 
 
On risk assessment Pauwelyn further states that ‘the risk evaluated in a risk assessment must, 
nevertheless, be an “ascertainable risk”.  Theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk to be 
assessed.  The existence of unknown and uncertain elements does not justify a departure from 
the risk assessment requirement.’53  The writer endorses the finding of inconsistency of the 
EC measures in the following words, 
In EC – Hormones, the Panel – applying the ‘food-borne’ risk assessment definition – 
followed a two-step analysis.  First, did the EC identify adverse effects?  Second, did it 
evaluate the potential of occurrence of these effects?  The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones 
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 Joost Paulwelyn, ‘The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures As Applied in the 
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adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS18/R and WT/DS18/AB/R (complaint by Canada). 
51
 Report of the Appellate Body on Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, adopted on 19 March 
1999, WT/DS76/AB/R. 
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concluded that the EC had not actually proceeded to such risk assessment and found that the 
EC had violated the SPS in this respect
54
 (original italics). 
 
Yet, the same Appellate Body had cause to modify and reverse most of the conclusions of the 
Panel thereby tilting the outcome in favour of the EC. 
 
In respect of the case, Reinhard Quick and Andreas Blüther ask, ‘Has the Appellate Body 
Erred?’ and offer ‘an appraisal and criticism of the ruling in the WTO Hormones case.’55  
They pick the apogee of the Appellate Body’s reasoning and bluntly disagree with them, 
The most striking sentence the AB chooses for its reasoning concerning Article 5.1 SPS is the 
following: 
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment 
under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under 
strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, 
in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real 
world where people live and work and die. 
Whilst this reference helps to make this ruling politically acceptable, it constitutes an 
unnecessary broad interpretation of risk assessment (emphasis same as in the original).
56
 
 
So they see the Appellate Body’s ‘findings and conclusions’ as politically motivated and 
‘politically acceptable.’  Their second reason for disagreeing with the Appellate Body is that 
the ‘AB’s broad interpretation might also be in conflict with the intention of the drafters of 
the SPS, which required scientific justification.’57  
 
I am persuaded by the explanation given by Quick and Blüther and remain unconvinced by 
the Appellate Body.  The distinction made by Quick and Blüther between GATT Article XX 
and the SPS Article 2 punctures the reasoning of the Appellate Body as flawed.  They 
explain: 
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 Ibid.  See also J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System (WTO: Geneva 1995)  236; J. J. Schott, The 
Uruguay Round, An Assessment (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1994) 52. 
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It seems to us that the AB does not take into account the importance which Article 2.2 
SPS should give to the other provisions of the SPS.  This might indicate that the AB 
failed to appreciate the general aims of the SPS as laid down in Article 2 SPS as a 
whole.  One of the main problems with GATT Article XX prior to the drafting of the 
SPS was the so-called ‘necessity test’.  The test applied to the measure as such and 
did not set any criteria for the decision making process.  Under the SPS, it is not only 
the measure and its application that is verified but the decision-finding process that 
leads to the measure.  This extension of the SPS to the process by setting objective 
criteria was aimed at making national health-related measures more transparent so as 
to distinguish between trade and health protection.
58
  
 
Undoubtedly, jettisoning the requirement that the ‘criteria for the decision-making process’ 
must be based on scientific justification which is objective would mean a return to the 
subjective ‘necessity test’ of the GATT years that left restriction on international trade to the 
whims and caprices of the Contracting Parties.  In fact, inconsistency in national health 
protection while relying on the SPS Agreement may serve as an indictor for a disguised trade 
restriction.   
 
Finally, Quick and Blüther award a pass mark to the Appellate Body’s findings ‘in political 
terms’ but fault it due to ‘legal weaknesses’ because ‘the AB interprets the obligations … 
without always providing a clear legal reasoning for its action’ which ‘leaves a certain 
suspicion of arbitrariness and capriciousness.’59  A closer insight into the Hormones case 
reveals no winners and losers because ‘[g]iven the AB’s rather extensive interpretation of 
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 SPS, the ruling could develop into a formidable obstacle for exports of 
foodstuffs from the European Union into third countries.’ 60 The case neither enhances 
market access nor adherence to the WTO rules; rich and powerful nations could defy the 
rules and pay compensations or accept retaliatory action while poor countries have to 
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implement them.  This would be a ‘destabilization of the WTO dispute settlement process’61 
whose most outstanding selling point is that it is rules-based. 
 
Natalie McNelis did a comparison of the opposing decisions of the WTO Appellate Body in 
the Hormones case and the ECJ in the BSE case, two cases with ‘undeniable similarities’: ‘the 
same actor (the EU institutions), the same product (beef), the same type of measure (a total 
ban) and the same type of justification for the measure (serious concerns about public health) 
– and yet, … opposite conclusions.’62  The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (‘BSE’) also 
known as ‘mad cow disease’ affected cows in the UK.  It was discovered in 1996 that the 
BSE held a potential risk to human beings that consumed affected beef by causing Creutzfeld 
Jacob Disease (‘CJD’), a degenerative brain disease, without a known cure.  The European 
Commission adopted a precautionary emergency measure, a total ban of beef exports from 
the UK to other EU Members.  The UK challenged the ban and the ECJ upheld the 
Commission’s decision to impose the ban.  According to her, the difference lies in the 
standard of review and the relationship between the judge and the ‘judged’.  On the standard 
of review, while in the BSE case ‘manifest error’ must be found before the respondent could 
be held liable, the benchmark used in the Hormones was proof of ‘objective assessment’ by 
the respondent.  However, McNelis says that this is not the key determinant of the different 
outcomes in the two cases.  According to her the major determinant was ‘the “insider” 
looking ‘in”’ (the ECJ judging an act of one of its sister institutions – the BSE case) and ‘the 
“outsider” looking “in”’ (the WTO Appellate Body judging the act of a fraction of its [153]-
odd Members – the Hormones case).  While she does not applaud the Appellate Body or 
sound overly critical of it, she explains a congruence that must be attained for better 
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outcomes in terms of implementation of Panel’s and Appellate Body’s findings and 
conclusions:  
…where the burden of a risk (however minimal) is internal, and the benefit of lifting a ban is 
largely external, it will always be difficult for an authority to justify to its population taking a 
less trade-restrictive stance perhaps for cases like Hormones to ever come to a BSE-like 
resolution, the internal benefit of the less trade-restrictive measures must be more readily 
apparent to the citizen.
63
 
 
This compliance benchmark of ‘less trade-restrictive measures’ being ‘more readily apparent 
to the citizen(s)’ will be taken up further in the next chapter which concludes this study. 
 
6.3.1 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas 
EC – Bananas64 gave the WTO dispute settlement Panel, the Appellate Body and the Article 
21.5 and arbitral panels an extensive opportunity to examine and make findings based on the 
pivotal principle of non-discrimination – Articles I (MFN) and III (National Treatment) of the 
GATT 1994.  Also in contention were GATT Article XI (Quantitative Restrictions), Article 
XXIII (Nullification and Impairment) and DSU Article 22 (Compensation and the 
Suspension of Concessions).  On Article I the Appellate Body upheld the finding of the Panel 
‘that the activity function rules, which applied only to the licence allocation rules for imports 
from other than traditional ACP countries, were inconsistent with Article 1:1.’65  The activity 
function rules refer to the EC rules for allocating import licences based on geographical 
indicators or place of origin of the goods.   Again on National treatment, the Appellate Body 
did not see any reason to deviate from the finding of the Panel ‘that the EC procedures and 
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 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 
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requirements for the distribution of licences for importing bananas from non-traditional ACP 
suppliers were inconsistent with Art. III:4.’66  What led to all this? 
 
EC – Bananas is arguably one of the most challenging cases that the DSB has ever been 
seized with
67
 and as Eliza Patterson observes ‘also among the more legally and politically 
complex.’68 
6.3.2 The Contested Facts in EC – Bananas  
As the Panel Report explains: 
The common market organisation for bananas, as established by Council Regulation (EEC) 
404/93 (Regulation 404/93), replaced the various national banana import regimes previously 
in place in the EC’s Member States.  Subsequent EC legislation, regulations and 
administrative measures implemented, supplemented and amended that regime. 
 
Under the previous national import regimes, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom restricted imports of banana by means of quantitative restrictions and licensing 
requirements.  Spain maintained a de facto prohibition on imports of bananas.  The French 
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market was supplied principally from the overseas department of Guadeloupe and Martinique, 
with additional preferential access granted to ACP States of Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon.  
The United Kingdom granted preferential access to bananas from the ACP States of Jamaica, 
the Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), 
Belize and Suriname.  Bananas from ACP countries were permitted duty-free into all EC 
Member States.  The Spanish market was almost exclusively supplied by domestic production 
from the Canary Islands.  A major part of Portuguese supply came from Madeira, the Azores 
and the Algarve, with additional volumes being imported from Cape Verde and any 
remaining requirements being imported from third countries.  The Greek market was in part 
supplied by bananas from domestic sources (Crete and Lakonia) and in part by third 
countries.  Italy offered preferential access to bananas from Somalia.  Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands did not apply quantitative restrictions 
and, except for Germany, used a 20 per cent tariff as the sole border measure.  These 
countries almost exclusively imported bananas from Latin America.  Germany had a special 
arrangement, set out in the Treaty of Rome, permitting duty-free bananas reflecting the level 
of estimated consumption.
69
  
 
Regulation 404/93
70
 has five titles with Title IV specifically regulating trade with third 
countries and dividing the third countries into three groups: (i) traditional imports from 
twelve ACP countries,
71
 (ii) non-traditional ACP bananas,
72
 and (iii) third country bananas.
73
  
In EC – Bananas I and II Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela 
challenged the EC Regulation 404/93 and in EC – Bananas III the complaining parties 
changed to Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the USA and with the entry of 
Mexico and the USA, the case acquired more ferocious commercial attrition and political 
partisanship than clear legal reasoning.  While Mexico asserts that it challenges the EC 
measures ‘both from the point of view of Mexico’s rights under the GATT and from the point 
of view of its interest in the international banana trade,’ the involvement of the US 
Government in the case turned into a subject of debate because the US had not been known 
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as a banana exporter and, in the opinion of the EC, ‘had no legal right or no legal or material 
interest in the case’ and, by the same token, ‘no legal right or interest in obtaining a ruling 
from the Panel’ because ‘under the GATT/WTO system the United Sates could not set itself 
up as private attorney-general and sue in the public interest.’74 
 
Such a debate arose because the action for compensation or loss of market originated from 
US companies, not the government.  In September 1994 Chiquita Brands International and 
the Hawaii Banana Industry Association basing their action on section 302(a) of the Trade 
Act 1974 challenged the EC regime and the Framework Agreement as discriminatory because 
they reduced their market share by more than 50 per cent.  The companies also got fifty 
members of the House of Representatives to back up their application by urging the US Trade 
Representative to take up their case.  It was the first of such a case under the then new 
Clinton administration. 
 
Common Cause released a study at the time identifying the Chairman and CEO of Chiquita 
International Brands, Inc, and affiliated companies and executives as among the largest 
contributors to the Democratic and Republican parties in the 1993/94 election cycle.
75
  This 
revelation raised questions as to the true motives of the Administration in pursing Chiquita’s 
case, particularly in light of the fact, much noted by critics, that the Chiquita facilities 
allegedly injured by the EU banana policy are located outside the US and have a largely non-
US workforce. 
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Despite the political steam generated by the case, the legal issue presented to the Panel by the 
EC was that its banana regime was a legitimate part of the Lomé Convention for which the 
EU had a WTO waiver.  The complaining parties argued that it was not. 
 
6.3.3 The Lomé Waiver 
The operative paragraph of the Lomé waiver on which the EC based its case provides as 
follows: 
The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the General Agreement shall be waived, until 29 
February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide 
preferential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant 
provisions of the Forth Lomé Convention, without being required to extend the same 
preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting party.
76
 
 
The Panel also looked at the provisions of Article 168 and Protocol 5 of the Lomé 
Convention.  Article 168 generally requires that ACP products be admitted duty-free to the 
EC.  Paragraph 2(a) requires that they be (i) accorded duty-free treatment if there are no non-
tariff measures applicable to their import or (ii) if (i) is not applicable (as is the case with 
bananas), given ‘more favourable treatment than that granted to third countries benefitting 
from the most-favoured-nation clause for the same products’. According to the Panel  
for those imports, the basic requirement of Article 168, as expressed in its first paragraph, has 
been met, and we see no requirement in Article 168 that the EC must provide favourable 
treatment beyond such duty-free treatment.  The Lomé waiver should not be interpreted to 
permit breaches of WTO rules that are not clearly required to satisfy the provisions of the 
Lomé Convention.
77
 
 
Protocol 5 of the Lomé Convention provides that in respect of banana exports to the 
Community markets, no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional 
markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable condition than in the past 
or at present. 
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I emphasise the last phrase here because the Panel stated very categorically that ‘nothing in 
the Lomé Convention specifically requires a licensing system for third-country and non-
traditional ACP banana imports, such as is provided by the application of the operator 
category-activity function system to third-country and non-traditional ACP imports.’78  
Therefore in their ‘summary of findings’ the Panel stated that: 
- the allocation of tariff quota shares to ACP countries in excess of their pre-1991 best-ever 
exports to the EC is not required by the Lomé Convention.
79
 
 
Yet they observed that: 
- it was not unreasonable for the EC to conclude that the Lomé Convention requires the EC to 
allocate country-specific tariff quota shares to traditional ACP banana supplying countries in 
an amount of their pre-1991 best-ever exports to the EC.
80
 
 
And even added that 
- the failure of Ecuador’s Protocol of Accession to address banana-related issues does not mean 
that Ecuador must accept the validity of the BFA as contained in the EC’s Schedule or that it 
is precluded from invoking Article XIII:2 or XIII:4
81
 
 
thereby handing out sweet victory to a country that failed in its accession bid to the WTO.
82
  
On appeal, the Appellate Body wholly upheld 21 out of the 24 issues [numbered (a) to (x)] it 
ruled on, reversed only two [(c) and (j)] and partly reversed and partly upheld (m).
83
 
 
It is possible to see the findings and conclusions in EC – Bananas from different 
perspectives: as another nail in the coffin of developing countries’ quest for access to the 
markets of developed countries or as a ruling in favour of trade liberalisation; as an example 
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of a ‘muted trumpet’ or as judicial activism.   As the Panel acknowledges, the case was ‘an 
exceedingly complex one’ involving ‘six parties (one representing 15 Member States) and 20 
third parties,
84
 meaning that almost one-third of Members (were) involved in the case.’85 
 
6.3.4 The Rule of Law and Spirit of the Law? 
One of the basic objectives of the GATT was to raise the standard of living and progressively 
develop the economies of all Members, particularly developing country Members.
86
  The 
Panel buttressed the provisions of the GATT by stating that ‘[f]rom a substantive perspective, 
the fundamental principles of the WTO and WTO rules are designed to foster the 
development of countries, not impede it.’87  Therefore, taking the provisions of the GATT 
and the pronouncements of the Panel and the Appellate Body together, it is submitted that the 
findings and conclusions in EC – Bananas apparently stands against protectionism and 
favours market access but market access for who?  It is market access for Chiquita 
International Brands, Inc., the Hawaii Banana Industry Association and the banana 
distribution company Del Monte and not developing countries.  Perhaps the truth of the 
matter lies in the argument ironically presented by the EC in the Tuna Panel
88
 that (t)he 
GATT does not protect actual trade flow, but trading opportunities created by tariff bindings 
and other rules’ (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, if the GATT is used to protect trading opportunities, the question that we may 
examine next which was the point of view presented by Mexico to the Banana Panel is 
whether ‘the interpretation of the WTO’s provisions varied according to the characteristics of 
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the countries involved in a dispute?’89  This is because US – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act 
1974 (commonly known as ‘Section 301’) had, in the main, remained a domestic debate in 
the US and never came to the international attention until it was used to attack the DSU.  The 
EC requested for the establishment of a panel on 26 January 1999 because by ‘imposing 
specific, strict time limits within which unilateral determinations must be made and trade 
sanctions must be taken, Sections 305 and 306 of the Trade Act 1974 do not allow the United 
States to comply with the rules of the DSU in situations where a prior multilateral ruling 
under the DSU on the conformity of implementing measures has not been adopted by the 
DSB.
90
  Simply put, the EC’s argument was that the US legislation relating to compliance 
with WTO rulings  was a violation of Article 23 (Strengthening of the Multilateral System) of 
the DSU which enjoins Member States to ‘seek redress of a violation of obligations’ and 
provides in paragraph 2 that: 
Members shall not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits 
have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements 
has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the 
findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration 
award rendered under this Understanding; 
 
(a) follow the procedure set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for 
the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and 
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of 
concessions and other obligations and obtain DSB authorisation …91 
 
The GATT Section 301 Panel held that a law ‘reserving the right for unilateral measures to be 
taken contrary to the DSU rules and procedures, may (as is the case with Section 304) 
constitute an ongoing threat and produce a “chilling effect” causing serious damage in a 
variety of ways’ and concluded demonstratively that ‘carrying a big stick is … an effective 
means of having one’s way as actually using the stick.’92  There is some discussion in the 
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literature about whether there may be a fallback on general public international law countermeasures 
in the event that the dispute settlement system of the WTO fails or is incomplete, e.g. if a Member 
State does not comply with a Panel or Appellate Body ruling.
93
  Again what came to be known as 
the ‘sequencing problem’ between Articles 21.5 and 22 got its seed sown in the Section 301 
Panel when it got to the examination of Section 306.  It came to fruition in the Banana ‘saga’.  
 
6.3.5 Procedural or Sequencing Problem 
It is submitted here that the Bananas Case twisted the DSU Articles 21.5 and 22.6 out of 
context mainly because of the parties involved.  Any dispute that involves any of the 
dominant WTO quad
94
 members easily cascades out of proportion and engulfs everybody like 
a bush fire in summer.  It is this researcher’s view that the European Communities arrived at 
a right conclusion in a wrong move and that has tainted its sound reasoning.  It is like going 
to equity with dirty hands.  The European bananas tariff having been pronounced to be WTO-
inconsistent three times (in Bananas I, II, III), the EC position that an Article 21.5 panel 
should dispose of the matter before it prior to a request for retaliation was, therefore, not well 
received.  However, this is likely to be the line of future amendment of the DSU as borne out 
by present practice
95
 of bilateral agreements aimed at avoiding the sequencing problem.  
Apart from concluding the matter before a compliance review panel first before requesting 
for retaliation pursuant to Article 22, the EC’s position makes sense at another level.  
Exhausting the measures in Article 21.5 before resorting to those under Article 22 helps 
avoid the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.  The role of the arbitrator should be to determine 
the level of suspension so that the compliance panel set up pursuant to Article 21.5 and the 
arbitrator referred to in Article 22.6 will each have exclusive jurisdictions; one on 
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surveillance of implementation of recommendations, the other on compensation and 
suspension of concessions.  
 
The right to appeal is enshrined in Article 17.4 of the DSU.  In 2002 the EC suggested that an 
anticipated DSU review should include a systematic right of appeal against rulings of 
compliance panels.  But how far should it go?  One appeal, or ad infinitum?  As the EC – 
Bananas shows, the EC used its resort to an Article 21.5 compliance panel to evade U.S. 
retaliation that was looming after the expiry of the stipulated period.  
 
Again it is noteworthy that no appeals ensued from the first four Article 21.5 decisions but 
once the possibility was revealed in Brazil – Aircraft, five of the next six cases had their 
compliance panel decisions appealed.  Therefore, the line needs to be drawn somewhere, 
once.  Allowing only one appeal from an Article 21.5 panel decision is important because the 
purported compliance measure might in itself be WTO-inconsistent.
96
  Stopping litigation 
somewhere is in line with the stated aim of the WTO of affording security and predictability.  
Certainty is an aspect of the rule of law.  Article 22.7 says that an arbitrator’s report cannot be 
appealed. The same should apply to a compliance review panel report but in a modified form 
of allowing only one appeal.  This is because in many cases, resort to Article 21.5 is the third 
leg of the litigation where it has gone through (DSU) Article 6 panel and the Appellate Body.  
 
An interesting trend is emerging at the WTO where parties to a bilateral agreement state 
categorically that a complainant “will not request authorisation to suspend concessions until 
after the review panel has circulated its report”.97  The three bilateral agreements flowing 
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from Brazil – Aircraft,98 Canada – Aircraft,99 and Australia – Salmon100 stipulate that a 
compliance panel precedes a request for authorisation to retaliate for failure to comply. 
 
Therefore, the determination by the arbitrator in the EC – Bananas that Article 22 does not 
require the finding of non-compliance before a party can seek authorisation to retaliate and 
that a determination of non-compliance can be made either by a compliance panel under 
Article 22.5, or by an arbitrator under Article 22.6
101
 is no longer in vogue and cannot be said 
to reflect either the correct position of the law or the trend of practice currently within the 
WTO.  It is anticipated that future amendment of the DSU will be in line with the current 
practice in bilateral agreements.  The fact that Article 21.5 (compliance review) comes before 
Article 22 (retaliation) makes it logical that determination of non-compliance be made before 
withdrawal of concessions is triggered off.  Again resorting to retaliation is seen as a 
breakdown of peaceful judicial process and an end to voluntary discharge of one’s 
obligations under the covered agreements and so should be invoked as a last resort after the 
conclusion and circulation of the compliance panel report and the expiration of the 30-day 
“reasonable period of time” stipulated by Article 21.3 of the DSU.  This position finds 
support in Article 3 of the DSU which lists the four remedies available under the DSU, 
namely, settlement, withdrawal, compensation and suspension, and specifically states in 
Article 3.6 that settlement is the “preferred” outcome. 
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The WTO stands on clay feet, so to speak, and equally of concern, is that it is suffering from 
good faith deficit.  While some members are espousing its agreements and using them to have 
unimpeded access from their landlocked countries to the sea, others are fighting off the 
effects of the agreements in their countries or regions, picking and dropping which and when 
they should apply.  Reflecting on the foundations of the WTO and how it now works in 
practice, Stoler captioned his article interrogatively, “WTO Dispute Process: Did the 
Negotiators Get What They Wanted?” and says that today we find ourselves in the situation 
of asking not “Is this the outcome they wanted?” but rather “Is this an approach to WTO 
dispute settlement WTO members still want?”  According to him, “many commentators on 
the subject have answered “no”.102 
 
The reason for the answer in the negative is lack of goodwill.  The GATT was grinding to 
stagnation before metamorphosing into the WTO in 1995 due mainly to the mala fide act of 
“blocking” by the dominant Contracting Parties hence the DSU reformed it by introducing 
negative consensus for the setting up of panels and the adoption of reports.  It also 
democratised the multilateral trading system and introduced one member one vote with no 
member having a veto.  It appears that what the major trading nations and the dominant 
members of the WTO want now is either weighted voting (according to volume of trade or 
population of the country as done in the European Union) or something akin to the veto some 
countries have as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.  However, if 
the WTO was set up to liberalise trade, the dispute settlement should be liberalised too 
through equality of all Member States and decisions based on due process of law as the DSB 
is doing now.  There is an argument about externalities, that is, the impact of one State’s 
democratic decision-making on people in another state who are not represented in the former 
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State’s decision-making process – this is an argument that interdependence justifies assigning 
powers to multilateral institutions.
103
 
 
However, the State seems to remain the decisive unit of legitimate political sovereignty, so 
equal voting both recognises the interdependence of States, while also reflecting the 
continuing role of States as the main centre of legitimate political representation.  To reverse 
it and return to the old GATT quagmire is to take the whole world back by more than half a 
century.  The voting pattern of the General Council and the decision-making process of the 
DSB should remain as they were designed at the Uruguay Round and endorsed in the 
Marrakesh Agreement.    
 
The GATT/WTO EC – Bananas case has given rise to the following separate proceedings: 
i. Bananas I104 
ii. Bananas II105  
iii. Bananas III106 
iv. General consultations under Article 4 of the DSU.107  
v. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the EC.108 
vi. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador.109 
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vii. Recourse to Article 22.6 of the DSU by the United States.110 
viii. Recourse to Article 22.6 of the DSU by Ecuador. 
ix. US – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.111 
x. US – Import Measures on Certain Products from the EU,112 and  
xi. The European request for “Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article 9.2 of 
the DSU.
113
 
xii. EC – Bananas, Article 21.5 II (AB) (Ecuador)/Article 21.5 (AB)(US).114 
 
6.3.6 Article 21.5 Recourse Brief 
6.3.6.1 Measures taken to comply with the DSB’s recommendations 
EC Regulation No. 1637 was adopted to amend Regulation 404/93, that is, the measure at 
issue in the original dispute, together with EC Regulation No. 2362/98 which laid down 
implementing rules for the amended Regulation for the importation of three categories of 
bananas (a) traditional ACP imports, (b) non-traditional ACP imports, and (c) imports form 
third (non-ACP) countries into the EC market.  The effect of the amendment was to provide a 
level-playing and fairer ground for everybody, ACP Member or not. 
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6.3.6.2 Findings 
The Panel found that the Regulation was inconsistent with GATT Art. XIII:1 as it resulted in 
disparate treatment between the traditional ACP suppliers and other non-substantial suppliers 
and third countries by not being “similarly restricted” as required by the GATT.  This finding 
rips the heart out of the Lomé Convention and confines the ACP States to their pre-Lomé and 
pre-WTO precarious situations without levers for their economic development.    
6.3.6.3. Legal Principle Established or Affirmed 
 Private Counsel: The Appellate Body ruled that private lawyers may appear on behalf 
of a government during Appellate Body oral hearing.  (The Panel did not allow them 
but that was reversed). 
 The arbitrators nominated pursuant to Article 22.6 determined that an Article 22.6 
procedure is not subsequent to the outcome of an Article 21.5 panel and confirmed the 
US right to retaliate even before the finalisation of an Article 21.5 panel procedure. 
The second preceding point is ironical because while appointing the Article 21.5 and 
arbitration Panel, the Chairman of the DSB said: 
There remains the problem of how the panel and the arbitrators would coordinate their work, 
but as they will be the same individuals, the reality is that they will find a logical way 
forward, in consultation with the parties. In this way, the dispute settlement mechanisms of 
the DSU can be employed to resolve all of the remaining issues in this dispute, while 
recognizing the right of both parties and respecting the integrity of the DSU (emphasis 
added).
115
 
 
No case has questioned the rights of the parties, defied implementation and challenged the 
integrity of the DSU’ like EC – Bananas.  
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6.4 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products116 
In Turkey – Textiles and India – Quantitative Restrictions117 the appropriate institutional 
balance between the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the WTO were contested. 
 
In Turkey – Textiles India complained about Turkey’s quantitative restrictions pursuant to 
Turkey-EC customs union on the grounds that they were inconsistent with Articles XI 
(General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) and XIII (Non-discriminatory 
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions) of the GATT 1994, and Article 2.4 of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (the ‘ATC’).  Turkey relied on Article XXIV 
(specifically paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 8) of the GATT providing for ‘territorial application, 
frontier traffic, customs union and free-trade areas’ which, according to Turkey, provides an 
‘exception’ from GATT obligations in the contested articles as well as Article I on the Most-
Favoured-Nation.  Both the Panel and the Appellate Body upheld India’s argument and 
recommended that Turkey should bring its measures found to be inconsistent with Articles XI 
and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the ATC into conformity with its obligations 
under the agreements. 
 
However, the AB was quick to sound a note of caution on its findings: 
We wish to point out that we make no finding as the issue of whether quantitative restrictions 
found to be inconsistent with Article XI and Article XIII of the GATT 1994 will ever be 
justified by Article XXIV.  We find only that the quantitative restrictions at issue in the 
appeal in this case were not so justified.  Likewise, we make no finding on many other issues 
that may arise under Article XXIV.
118
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This is judicial economy at its briefest concluded in less than twenty pages and in sixty-six 
paragraphs.  It is also noteworthy that all the three third participants – Hong Kong, China, 
Japan and The Philippines all sided with the respondent/appellee India whose argument was 
pro-market access.  Japan in her submission, for example, pointed out that ‘the basic tenet of 
the WTO Agreement is the primacy of the multilateral trading system based on the core 
principle of the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’ and 
added that ‘[r]egional trade agreements are only allowed if they are complementary to the 
multilateral trading system,’119 a view which WTO panels and the Appellate Body strongly 
support in their jurisprudence.  
 
On judicial economy, although the AB asserts in Turkey – Textiles, ‘[w]e do not believe it 
necessary to find more than we have found here to fulfil our responsibilities under the 
DSU,’120 Marc L. Busch and Krzysztof J. Pelc suggest other reasons behind the tendency of 
the AB to resort to judicial economy. According to them, ‘the AB not only tolerates but 
promotes the use of judicial economy’ and by ‘conventional wisdom’ ‘politics probably plays 
a role’ and it ‘is an appropriate means of avoiding “controversial issues” in rendering a 
decision.’ 
 
Another reason given by Busch and Pelc why the AB exercises judicial economy is that ‘the 
AB has no fact-finding ability of its own.  Furthermore, because it cannot remand matters, 
this means that, on appeal, judicial economy sometimes leaves potentially valid claims 
unexamined, making the dispute more difficult to resolve, as occurred in EC – Suger. 121  
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When judicial economy is exercised by the panel, it is, according to Busch and Pelc used to 
‘practice self-restraint in cases in which a broader ruling may be politically untenable’ and 
also used to ‘limit the precedent set by a ruling where the wider membership is ambivalent 
about its scope.’122  A panel does not aim to dispose of all the legal issues raised but precisely 
aims at gaining litigants’ compliance and avoiding appeal, or should the litigants choose to 
appeal, to have their findings and conclusions upheld by the AB.  In Bartels’ view, judicial 
economy is used to ‘avoid judicial activism’ in the WTO.123  
 
Therefore, legality does not seem to be the primary concern of the AB but the substantial 
support of the WTO membership.  This explains why the WTO panels and the AB most 
heartily welcome third party participation which serves them as an antenna for getting 
broader WTO membership feelings beside the complainant and the respondent.
124
  One study 
of WTO disputes finds that partisan third parties, as in Turkey – Textiles where all the third 
parties sided the complainant, that there is a significant difference in the direction of the 
outcome.  When the third party participants are pro-complainant, the likelihood of a finding 
in favour of the complainant rises by ‘one-half’, and that pro-defendant ruling rises by ‘one-
third’ as well.125 
 
Furthermore, could the brevity of the AB ruling in Turkey – Textiles be attributed to the 
parties to the dispute: two developing country members who apparently did not have much to 
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explain to the AB?  It has been suggested that the developed countries have greater capacity 
and are better able to put their views across to the WTO panels and the AB.
126
  Or could it be 
that the effects of a decision involving developing countries are not as diverse and tumultuous 
as the one involving the big trading nations or groups such as the USA and the EU. In any 
case, any pronouncement of a WTO panel or the AB carries the weight of precedent even 
though the DSU is not predicated on the doctrine of precedent.  One commentator has 
described this practice as ‘de facto stare decisis in WTO adjudication.’127  Parties often cite 
previously decided cases; for example, Canada in EC – Sugar cited the ruling against her in 
Canada – Dairy.128  
 
Again the ruling in Turkey – Textiles granted direct market access to India without the arm 
twisting and mudslinging we saw in the two cases we have analysed above.  Turkey as a 
defendant in the case used Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 without mentioning the SPS or 
the TBT Agreement which could have complicated matters. 
 
The relevant provisions of the GATT which Turkey relied on are Article XXIV:5 which 
provides that, 
. . . the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of 
an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area 
and paragraph 8 provides definitions and gives explanations as follows: 
 
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for 
two or more customs territories, so that  
(i) Duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) 
are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the 
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constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all 
the trade in products originating in such territories 
. . . . 
 
The Appellate Body agreed that the chapeau to GATT Article XXIV ‘shall not prevent’ the 
formation of a customs union and the adoption of some measures to facilitate trade within the 
union.  Again according to the Appellate Body, ‘the chapeau makes it clear that Article 
XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is inconstant 
with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a possible ‘defence’ to a finding 
of inconsistency.’129 
 
Joost Pauwelyn finds the argument that GATT Article XXIV would altogether prohibit intra-
regional safeguards ‘unconvincing’.  This, according to him, is because ‘the argument could 
be made that since intra-regional safeguards are (or could be) imposed, restrictions on 
“substantially all the trade” within the region have not been eliminated.’130  He also points out 
that the list in Article XXIV:8 is illustrative and not exhaustive as it does not cover Article 
XIX on safeguards, Article XXI on security exceptions and XXIII:B on balance of 
payments.
131
 
 
Pauwelyn’s argument finds support in the analysis of the Appellate Body itself ‘that 
“substantially all the trade” is not the same as all the trade, and also that “substantially all the 
trade” is considerably more than merely some of the trade.’132  However, with regard to trade 
with third countries, sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires that ‘substantially, the same duties and 
                                                          
129
 Turkey Textiles, WT/DS/34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999, para 45. 
130
 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements, JIEL 7(1) 126 
131
 ibid. 
132
  Turkey Textiles, para. 48. 
290 
 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade 
of territories not included in the union.’133  
 
The Appellate Body confirmed that the GATT 1994 Article XXIV provides exceptions to the 
general rules against discrimination: 
we are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain 
other GATT provisions.  However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this 
“defence” is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the 
benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the 
formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 
5(a) of Article XXIV.  And, second, that party must demonstrate that the formation of that 
customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue.  
Again, both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article 
XXIV.
134
 
 
As the Appellate Body pointed out, the Panel overlooked the first step which was to establish 
whether the regional trade arrangement between the EC and Turkey qualified as a customs 
union.  The Appellate Body did not wade into that ‘on the basis of the principle of judicial 
economy’ and ruled that ‘the defence afforded by Article XXIV under certain conditions is 
not available to Turkey’135 in the case.  Conscious of its avoidance technique, the Appellate 
Body declared, ‘we make no finding on the issue of whether quantitative restrictions found to 
be inconsistent with Article XI and Article XIII of the GATT 1994 will ever be justified by 
Article XXIV… we make no findings either on many other issues that may arise under 
Article XXIV.’136  It is this habit of side-stepping an important legal issue and postponing it 
till ‘another day’ that made Marc L. Busch and Krzysztof J. Pelc describe the Appellate Body 
practice as ‘Ruling Not to Rule.’137  This leaves ECOWAS High Contracting Parties and 
other regional economic organisations not certain of how far they could use their 
organisations to facilitate the economic development of the regions.    
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6.5 Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry 138 
 
This was a case brought by the largest trading and most powerful members of the WTO: the 
EC (WT/DS54/R), Japan (WT/DS55/R) and the USA (WT/DS59/R) against Indonesia.  
Article 9 of the DSU provides in respect of multiple complainants that ‘[w]here more than 
one Member requests the establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a …single panel 
should be established to examine such a complaint whenever feasible’139 and so all the three 
actions were consolidated for hearing. 
 
The measure at issue was Decree No. 114/1993 of Indonesia which defined ‘local 
components’ or ‘local sub-components’ as ‘parts or sub-parts of motor vehicles which are 
domestically made and have local contents at a level of more than 40 per cent for (light 
commercial vehicles and passenger cares)’ and ‘if the local content of a passenger car was 
less than 20 per cent, the importer paid an import duty of 100 per cent.’140 
 
Decree No. 114/1995 was followed by other decrees (No. 647/1993, No. 223/1995, No. 
31/1996, and No. 36/1997 as well as ‘The February 1996 Programme, the Presidential 
Instruction No. 2/1996 and Government Regulation No. 20/1996) with varying schedules in 
respect of tax and tariff based on the local contents of various categories of motor vehicles.  
 
All the three complainants requested the Panel to find that the National Car Programme of 
Indonesia violated Articles I:1, III: 2 & 4 of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs, Article 3 of 
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the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement and so request Indonesia 
to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994, the TRIMs 
Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement and the SCM Agreement.
141
  
 
Indonesia announced the presence of two private lawyers as members of its delegation; the 
United States objected and the Panel ruled in favour of Indonesia: 
 
We conclude that it is for the Government of Indonesia to nominate the members of its 
delegation to meetings of this Panel, and we find no provision in the WTO Agreement or the 
DSU, including the standard rules of procedure included therein, which prevents a WTO 
Member from determining the composition of its delegation to WTO panel meeting.  Nor 
does past practice in GATT and WTO dispute settlement point us to a different conclusion.
142
 
 
Indonesia based its argument in part that the SCM Agreement was the only applicable law to 
the dispute and not the GATT otherwise there would be a conflict between the two 
agreements, because, in its view, the application of Article III of the GATT to the dispute 
would reduce the SCM Agreement to ‘inutility’.  This was rejected by the Panel because ‘the 
obligation contained in the WTO Agreement are generally cumulative, can be complied with 
simultaneously.’143 
 
On the relationship between the TRIMS Agreement and Article III of GATT, the Panel noted 
that the TRIMs Agreement is a full-fledged agreement in the WTO system
144
 pointing out 
                                                          
141
 ibid, paras 3.2 & 3.5. 
142
 ibid, para. 14.1 
143
 ibid, para. 14.56. 
144 The Panel stated, ‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT") is defined as to consist of: 
(a) the provisions in the General Agreement on Custom duties and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to 
the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (excluding the Protocol of Provisional Application), as rectified, 
amended or modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force before the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement; (b) the provisions of a series of the legal instruments (protocols and 
decisions) set forth below that have entered into force under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into 
293 
 
that ‘the TRIMs Agreement has an autonomous legal existence, independent from that of 
Article III.’145  What sounded like a distinction without a difference by the Panel was that 
‘when the TRIMs Agreement refers to “the provisions of Article III”, it refers to the 
substantive aspects of Article III; that is to say, conceptually, it is the ten paragraphs of 
Article III that are referred to in Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and not the application 
of Article III in the WTO context as such’146 as if Article III has a life of its own.  The Panel 
chose to examine the claims under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs first because it is ‘more specific 
that Article III:4 in keeping with the procedure adopted by the Appellate Body in Bananas III 
while discussing the relationship between Article X of the GATT and Article I.3 of the 
Licensing Agreement and by both the Panel and the Appellate Body in the Hormones case. 
 
A clarification also made by the Panel is that the use of the broad term ‘investment measures’ 
does not apply to measures taken specifically for purposes of foreign investment. So it is not 
the nationality of an enterprise that determines whether it is covered by the TRIMs 
Agreement.
147
 
 
It is also noteworthy that the Panel in this case did not exercise judicial economy unlike the 
Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles.  In countering the argument of Indonesia, the Panel 
stated, ‘[w]e do not agree with Indonesia that we are precluded from considering the effects 
of the subsidies pursuant to the June 1996 car programme when analysing whether the 
subsidies in this case have caused serious prejudice to the interests of the complainants.’148 
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In the light of the foregoing, Indonesia’s local content requirements of the 1993 and of the 
1996 car programmes were declared in violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.  The 
sales tax aspects in favour of domestic motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage 
value of domestic products was also declare to be in violation of Article III:2 of GATT; and, 
the customs duty and sales tax benefits in violation of Article I of GATT.  Relying on Article 
7.8 of the SCM Agreement providing that ‘[w]here a Panel report or an Appellate Body 
report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to 
the interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or 
maintaining the subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall 
withdraw the subsidy,’ the Panel recommended that Indonesia should conform with its 
obligations under the covered WTO Agreements. 
 
These findings constrain the economic development of ECOWAS and other developing and 
least-developed countries.  The local-content requirement was meant to boost other 
subsidiary industries that make car components or accessories such as glass, tyres, cables, 
batteries or paint that are located far from the car assembly plant and provide jobs to millions 
of people across the country. Again important as this case is in bolstering the WTO objective 
of trade liberalisation, it has only been cited once in the leading Journal of International 
Economic Law in connection with the ‘presumption of consistency’149 in the practice of treaty 
interpretation.  
 
6.6 India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial 
Products
150
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In India – Quantitative Restrictions the United States complained against quantitative 
restrictions imposed by India on imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products on 
2,714 tariff lines.  India stated that it based its actions on the defences afforded by the 
balance-of-payment justifiable under Article XVII:B of the GATT 1994.  The United States 
argued that the action by India was a violation of Article XI and Article XVIII:11 of the 
GATT 1994, and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures.  The Panel found India in violation of the WTO Agreements. 
 
India appealed by submitting that there was a principal legal error because the Panel failed ‘to 
take into account that each organ of the WTO must exercise its power with due regard to the 
powers attributed to the other organs of the WTO,’151 in other words the WTO should adhere 
to ‘the principle of institutional balance’152 by applying separation of powers within its 
organs. 
 
India argued that there should be separation of powers between the political and the judicial 
organs of the WTO and that ‘the question whether one organ created by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES could encroach upon the jurisdiction of another arose in the context of Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1947 in EC – Citrus and in EC – Bananas I’153 pointing out that the key 
to getting the balance right was striking the right balance between a Committee and a Panel.  
India stated that it was not ‘whether or not panels may review agreements notified under 
Article XXIV:7, but the extent to which they should review them.’154 
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India contended that the Panel recognised a ‘dual track system’ by allowing both the BOP 
Committee and the Panel to have concurrent jurisdiction to examine balance-of-payments 
justification of measures notified under Article XVIII:B and stated that it was, in her view, 
incompatible with Article 3.2 of the DSU to permit Members to invoke the DSU in a way that 
would diminish the rights of the defendant under the WTO Agreements. 
 
In a subsidiary claim of legal error, India canvassed that an immediate removal of all 
restrictions was bound to reduce India’s reserves below the levels considered adequate by the 
IMF. India also stated that the IMF confirmed that removing all her quantitative restrictions 
would necessitate changes in her macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies. India 
also submitted that while the IMF based its policy advice on ‘economic efficiency 
considerations,’ it was up to a WTO Member to choose what policy instrument to use taking 
into account the ‘structural, institutional and political constraints’ that might follow.  What 
the IMF calls ‘economic efficiency’ at the global level may be against the national interests 
of some countries and domestic policies may dictate otherwise. 
Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 provides: 
In carrying out its domestic policies, the contracting party concerned shall pay due regard to  
the need for restoring equilibrium in its balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and 
to the desirability of assuring an economic employment of productive resources.  It shall 
progressively relax any restrictions applied under this Section as conditions improve, 
maintaining them only to the extent necessary under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article 
and shall eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such maintenance; Provided that 
no contracting party shall be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a 
change in its development policy would render unnecessary the restrictions which it is 
applying under this Section (italics mine). 
 
The proviso to Article XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 clarifies the provisions of the paragraph 
thus: 
The second sentence in paragraph 11 shall not be interpreted to mean that a Contracting Party 
is required to relax or remove restrictions if such relaxation or removal would thereupon 
produce conditions justifying the intensification or institution, respectively, of the restrictions 
under paragraph 9 of Article XVIII (italics mine). 
297 
 
 
Paragraph 9 allows a WTO Member to take measures ‘to safeguard its external financial 
position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementations of its economic 
development’ (emphasis added). 
 
The United States disagreed with all the issues raised above which was tantamount to arguing 
against the GATT itself (as these are clear provisions of the Agreement) and urged the 
Appellate Body to find that India’s actions were inconsistent with its obligations under the 
covered agreements. 
 
Spectacularly the Appellate Body found all the arguments of India to be ‘completely beside 
the point.’  In an unguarded moment as if making the case for the United States and very 
much like economists rather than a bench of judges in an international trade dispute, the AB 
stated, ‘[s]tructural adjustments are needed to cause an increase in foreign exchange receipts 
from export and foreign investment so as to offset the rise in foreign exchange 
expenditure.’155 
 
What the Appellate Body did not do was state how the structural adjustments based on the 
National Treatment principle would operate in practice knowing full well that without the 
quantitative restrictions India would have to pay for the foreign goods imported without 
internally generated revenue and also without a corresponding export capacity. 
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The Appellate Body concluded that ‘the Panel did not require India to change its 
development policy and, therefore, did not err in law with regard to the proviso to Article 
XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994.’156 
 
Again another blind spot: it is not clear how India would bring its balance-of-payments 
restrictions, as recommended by the Panel and the Appellate Body, into conformity with its 
obligations under Articles XI:1 and XVIII:11 of the GATT 1994 and with Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture without ‘a change to its development policy’. 
 
Still again, India – Quantitative Restrictions, like Indonesia – Autos is a ‘road not taken’ by 
the mainstream epistemic community of International Economic Law as it has not attracted 
even one scholarly comment (to my knowledge) in the leading journal even though it was 
contested up to the Appellate Body. 
 
6.7 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry157 
Another key Articles I and III GATT case is Canada – Autos.  In it Japan and the European 
Communities filed a complaint against Canada because of the Agreement Concerning 
Automotive Products between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States (the “Auto Pact”), a treaty between the two countries which entered into force in 
January 1965.  The dispute sprang because Canada accorded certain motor-vehicle 
manufacturers established in Canada the right to import motor vehicles without paying the 
generally applicable customs duties provided they achieved a minimum amount of Canadian 
value added (CVA).  In order to qualify as a motor vehicle manufacturer under the Auto Pact, 
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the manufacturer must have produced in Canada during the base year (1963-64), and (i) must 
have maintained a certain ratio of the sales value of its local production of vehicles of that 
class to the value of that sold in Canada of a prescribed minimum, and (ii) must have 
achieved a minimum amount of CVA in its production of whole motor vehicles or parts. 
 
Before the Auto Pact was concluded, ‘the Canadian Government requested from the Auto 
Pact manufacturers some commitments in form of Letters of Undertaking specifying how 
each company viewed its operations in relation to the Auto Pact.’158  The Letters to the 
Government, according to Canada, were not legally enforceable.  The GATT set up a 
Working Party in March 1965 to examine the Auto Pact but while 
 
It was the general consensus of the Working Party that, if the United States implemented the 
Agreement in the manner proposed, United States action would be clearly inconsistent with 
Article I and it would be necessary for the United States Government to seek a waiver from 
its GATT obligations
159
 
 
there was not consensus ‘on whether Canada was in violation of its GATT commitments’160 
or not.   
 
To pre-empt any dispute with the complainants in Canada – Autos, the United States sought 
and obtained a waiver under Article XXV:5 in 1965
161
 and renewed it in November 1996 
until 1 January 1998.
162
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It is worthy of note that on the same day the waiver was to expire, the US and Canada entered 
into another agreement, the Canada – United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) for 
trade in automotive parts which was suspended because of the entering into force of the 
NAFTA on 1 January 1994 when Mexico joined the two north American nations and the US 
leaned on Article XXIV for justifications under the ‘Customs Union and Free-trade Areas’ 
exceptions provision. Realistically, the favourable conditions existing between the United 
States and Canada have not been extended to other countries but have been shielded and 
guarded jealously from others under one form of treaty or another which was why the 
European Communities stated that both the CUSFTA and the NAFTA were ‘directly relevant 
to the dispute’ and Japan contended that ‘the agreements amplified and exacerbated the 
discriminatory effects of the measures.’163   Why the EC and Japan stopped short of 
formulating legal issues for determination on the CUSFTA and NAFTA arrangements is not 
clear. 
 
The conditions under which the duty free entry would be permitted were given effect 
domestically in Canada through the Motor Vehicle Traffic Order (MVTO) 1965.
164
  There 
were replacements of the instruments by later MVTOs in 1988
165
 and 1998.
166
  In addition to 
a CVA and variable production to sales ratios of between 75 to 100 and 100 to 100 in 
Canada, the MVTO 1998 laid down the following for the calculation of the CVA: 
- the cost of parts produced in Canada and of materials of Canadian origin that are incorporated 
in the motor vehicles; 
-  direct labour costs incurred in Canada; 
- manufacturing overheads incurred in Canada; 
- general and administrative expenses incurred in Canada that are attributable to the production 
of motor vehicles; 
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- depreciation in respect of machinery and permanent plant equipment located in Canada that is 
attributable to the production of motor vehicles; and 
- a capital cost allowance for land and buildings in Canada that are used in production of motor 
vehicles.
167
 
 
The Panel found that 
 
(a) Canada acted inconsistently with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by according the advantage of 
an import duty exemption to motor vehicles originating in certain countries, pursuant to the 
MVTO 1998, 
(b) Article XXIV of the GATT does not provide a justification for the inconsistency with 
Article I, 
(c) Canada acted inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by according less favourable 
treatment to imported parts, materials and non-permanent equipment than to like domestic 
products with respect to their internal sale or use, as a result of application of the CVA 
requirements as one of the conditions determining eligibility for the import duty exemption on 
motor vehicles under the MVTO 1998, the SROs and as a result of conditions concerning 
CVA requirements contained in certain Letters of Undertaking; 
(d) Canada acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement 
by granting a subsidy which is contingent in law upon export performance, as a result of the 
application of the ratio requirements as one of the conditions determining eligibility for the 
import duty exemption on motor vehicles under the MVTO 1998 and the SROs;
168
 
 
At the end of its conclusions, the Panel drew attention to Article 3.8 of the DSU which 
provides that 
 
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered 
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or 
impairment.  This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has 
an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it 
shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge 
(boldface added).
169
 
 
Again at the end of its recommendations, the Panel drew attention to Article 4.7 of the SCM 
Agreement and made the following pedantic analysis: 
 
With respect to the time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn, Article 4.7 of 
the SCM Agreement requires a Member to withdraw the prohibited subsidy "without delay" 
and it is "in this regard" that a panel must specify a time-period within which the prohibited 
subsidy must be withdrawn. The noun "delay" has been defined to mean, inter alia, "the 
action or process of delaying; procrastination; lingering; putting off", while the verb to 
"delay" has been defined, inter alia, as to "put off to a later time; postpone, defer". Thus, in its 
ordinary meaning, the phrase "without delay" suggests that the Member must not put off, 
postpone or defer action, but must rather act as quickly as possible to withdraw the prohibited 
subsidy. Thus, in examining what time-period would represent withdrawal "without delay" in 
a particular case, we consider that we may take into account the nature of the steps necessary 
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to withdraw the prohibited subsidy. We do not, however, agree with Canada that we should 
take into account the existence or absence of adverse or trade-distorting effects resulting from 
the prohibited subsidy, nor the time required to design replacement measures, as these factors 
are not related to the consideration of what time-period would represent withdrawal "without 
delay".
170
 
 
It is not clear why the Panel had to draw the attention of the parties to the provisions of the 
DSU and the SCM Agreement as it did in the quoted paragraphs above, more so when the 
dispute was between the leading members of the WTO who often make use of the dispute 
settlement system.  By pointing out that a finding of inconsistency is only considered prima 
facie to constitute a case of nullification and impairment of benefits, it was like the Panel was 
nudging Canada to appeal its findings.  Again of more concern to world trade lawyers is the 
last sentence of Article 3.8 (DSU) that ‘it shall be up to the Member against whom the 
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge’ which seems to accord a premier position to 
economics, and not law, in the final determination of a trade dispute.  This appears to be the 
correct interpretation that is supported by the diction of the Panel that the ‘European 
Communities and Japan have failed to demonstrate that . . . .’  The use of ‘demonstrate’ 
rather than ‘prove,’ it is humbly submitted, demands for evidence based on sound economic 
theories and econometric analysis, not just legal arguments.  Again gathering material and 
statistical data do ‘demonstrate’ nullification and impairment may be too difficult in some 
developing and least-developed countries due to very poor national records and poor 
communication and transport facilities.     
 
Moreover, the pedantic explication of ‘without delay’ by the Panel would seem to suggest 
that the determination of SCM cases should be followed by immediate compliance measures 
while other GATT disputes do not call for the same urgency in response.  I leave it to further 
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research to show whether SCM disputes have been followed by immediate or shorter 
compliance periods than other GATT cases. 
 
6.7.2 Some twists and turns of the Panel in Canada – Autos  
The Panel in Canada – Autos refused to countenance precedents for the Appellate Body.  In 
her submission, Japan stated, 
Despite the fact that the Government of Japan does not discuss in detail the inconsistency of 
the manufacturing requirement with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 or Article 2.1 of the 
TRIMS Agreement in its arguments to the same extent as was discussed in its Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel (WT/DS139/2), the Government of Japan reserves its right to 
elaborate during the course of the panel deliberation on these claims already contained in the 
said request.
171
 
 
Canada objected to Japan’s reservation of ‘its right to elaborate during the course of the Panel 
deliberation’ backing up its objection with the Appellate Body decision in EC – Bananas III 
that a complaining party is not permitted ‘to eke out its claims incrementally during the 
various stages of the case’.172  The Panel countered with the following argument, 
However, the situation here is unlike that in EC – Bananas III, where the Appellate Body 
stated that "Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the claims, but not the arguments, must all be 
specified sufficiently in the request for the establishment of a panel in order to allow the 
defending party and any third parties to know the legal basis of the complaint" 
(WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 143) In the case before us there is no Article 6.2 issue of specificity 
of the measures identified in the panel request. Japan in this dispute has not attempted to 
reserve a right to present a new claim at a later stage of the proceedings; rather, it appears that 
Japan has simply indicated that it may wish to further elaborate its arguments as to claims 
already set out in the panel request and in its initial arguments.
173
 
 
It then ruled preliminarily that Canada would not be prejudiced in its ability to defend itself. 
 
Again also in EC – Bananas III (referred to in Indonesia – Autos174) the Appellate Body had 
ruled that ‘a claim should be examined first under the agreement which is the most specific 
with respect to that claim,’ a kind of lex specialis.  Here instead of a refusal to follow the 
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Appellate Body, the Panel distinguished Canada – Autos from EC – Bananas by saying, ‘we 
are not persuaded that the TRIMs Agreement can be properly characterized as being more 
specific than Article III:4 in respect of the claims raised by the complainants in the present 
case,’175  I fully support the position taken by the Panel here since Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
merely refers to Article III or Article XI of the GATT, is not specific on either, and does not 
give any details than either of the GATT articles it makes reference to. 
 
While some scholars have examined the findings and conclusions of both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body in Canada – Autos, others have made tangential and oblique references to the 
case.  Jacqueline D. Krikorian
176
 analysed how the WTO dispute settlement system has 
impacted on Canada by looking at eight cases involving the country whether as complainant 
or respondent in the first ten years of the WTO, one of which was Canada – Autos.  After 
stating the perception and opposition of Canadians to the WTO Agreement as a ‘Corporate 
Bill of Power,’177 ‘a kind of international constitutional order to entrench market – over 
citizen – rights,’178 and a ‘phenomenon of global substantive lawmaking,’179 she asks the 
fundamental question of whether there is ‘sufficient evidence to contend that the tribunal’s 
(WTO dispute settlement) decisions are placing the interests of the market over the public.’  
She argues that in Canada – Autos, ‘the WTO dispute settlement mechanism broadly 
interpreted the WTO Agreement, and, arguably, extended the scope of its provisions beyond 
what the drafters originally intended.’180  She gives some examples: the Pharmaceutical 
Patent Case where ‘political considerations were influential’ because the only plausible 
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explanation for ‘the legal reasoning used to distinguish the stockpiling and the regulatory 
review mechanism exemptions under the TRIPS Agreement are difficult, if not impossible, to 
reconcile;’181 and, the Wheat Board and the Milk and Dairy cases where the WTO tribunal 
‘endorsed the social policy objectives underpinning them.’182  She was convinced that ‘power 
politics, and not international trade law, dictated the outcome.’ As she puts it, [p]olitics – as 
much as law – is an integral and necessary component of the operation of the WTO ‘court,’’ 
for example, Canada lost the Canada – Autos case but effectively circumvented ‘the goals of 
those who initiated the dispute’ by denying Honda and Toyota (Japan claiming MFN) a 
participation in the Auto Pact arrangement by dismantling the Pact and ensuring that all car 
companies would be allowed to participate in it, thereby denying Japan the exclusive 
privilege Honda and Toyota wanted to enjoy. 
 
Tangentially, Andrew Green
183
 mentioned the Canada – Autos case while discussing the 
regulatory policy of the WTO on climate change.  He stated that the Panel in Canada – Autos 
interpreted the term very broadly when it stated that for the action of a private party to be a 
‘requirement’  that all that was needed was a ‘nexus between that action and the action of a 
government such that the government must be held responsible for that action.’184  It was also 
his view that the Panel’s interpretation of ‘affecting’ as covering laws, regulations and 
requirements directly governing the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products was a very broad one.  
Krikorian endorses Stephen Gill’s argument that the ‘new constitutionalism’ which the WTO 
represents entrenches market interests at the international level and limits the ability of 
governments to act in the public interest and that at the WTO ‘court’ it is ‘the economic 
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strength of the hegemonic power’ and not the letters of the WTO Agreement that counts 
most.  Again, both Krikorian and Gill state that the WTO Agreements create a policy chill on 
future government initiatives. 
 
I would like to note here that the sectoral free trade agreement (the Auto Pact) which was 
declared by the Panel and the Appellate Body to be GATT-inconsistent was seen by 
Canadians as a ‘powerful symbol of prosperity and patriotic pride’185 and was enormously 
successful for the 35 years it lasted.  Canadians saw it like they were told to commit 
economic suicide and Roy MacLaren, the Minister of Trade was seen as a traitor for yielding 
to WTO pressure.  If a highly developed Western country experienced the impact of 
hegemonic power and cried out, developing countries and the least-developed countries with 
no government-sponsored social security will all the more so.   
 
 
 
6.8.1 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries
186
 
 
EC – Tariff Preferences represents a classic example of a clash between the WTO core 
principles of ‘trade and development’ (market access for exports from developing countries) 
with non-economic values, ‘trade and human rights’ (environmental standards and labour 
rights).  It split the Panel with one of the three members submitting a strong and persuasive 
dissenting opinion. India complained against the European Communities for having special 
arrangements with twelve developing countries and economies in transition to combat drug 
production and trafficking which was given effect by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2501/2001 of 10 December 2001.
187
  The Regulation applied a scheme of generalised tariff 
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preferences for a period of three years (1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004) and was also 
meant to implement the Drug Arrangements and provided for 
(i) The General Arrangement, 
(ii) the Special Incentive Arrangements for the protection of labour rights, 
(iii)  the Special Incentive Arrangements for the protection of the environment, 
(iv)  the special Arrangements for least-developed countries, and  
(v) the Special Arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking (the ‘Drug 
Arrangements’188). 
By the way the arrangements were calibrated, India benefited under ‘General Arrangements’ 
((i) above) but not from the other four, that is, (ii) to (v). 
 
Article 10 of the Regulation provides: 
1. Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on products, which according to Annex IV, are 
included in the special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking referred to in 
Title IV and which originate in a country that according to Column I of Annex I benefits from 
those arrangements, shall be entirely suspended.  For products of CN code 0306 13, the duty 
shall be reduced to a rate of 3.6 per cent. 
 
2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
entirely suspended, except for products for which Common Customs Tariff duties also 
include ad valorem duties.  For Products of CN codes 1704 10 91 and 1704 10 99 the specific 
duty shall be limited to 16 per cent of the customs value. 
  
India filed a complaint and requested the Panel to find that the Drug Arrangements set out in 
Article 10 of the Regulation are inconsistent with Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994 and not 
justified by the Enabling Clause.
189
  The Panel summarised the Regulation as giving different 
opportunities to different countries.
190
  The Panel was then faced with deciding whether the 
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‘Enabling Clause’ (that is the generalised preferences to developing and least-developed 
countries) was an ‘exception’ to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and whether the Clause 
precludes the applicability of the Article. 
 
The European Communities posited that the Enabling Clause excludes the application of 
Article I:1 but India argued that the Enabling Clause would do so only to ‘the extent 
necessary to implement the GSP schemes, but does not exclude the operation of Article I:1 
altogether.’191  India also argued that (i) nothing in the Enabling Clause exempted the EC 
from the obligation under Article I:1, (ii) that under the Enabling Clause differential and 
more favourable treatment could not be granted ‘unconditionally,’ (iii) that ‘conditional’ as 
used in Article I:1 means ‘the granting of tariff preferences in exchange for some form of 
compensation, and (iv) that the Enabling Clause only prohibits the condition of reciprocity.
192
 
 
The European Communities relied heavily on the ‘object and purpose’ of the Enabling 
Clause
193
 arguing that it was meant to promote ‘the trade of all developing countries 
commensurate with their development needs,’ and that ‘the interpretation of the term “non-
discriminatory” should further the objectives of the Enabling Clause and the WTO 
Agreement.’194 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Arrangements but not in the General Arrangements, the 12 beneficiary countries are granted duty free access 
to the European Communities' market, while all other developing countries must pay the full duties applicable 
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the exception for products of CN codes 0306 13, 1704 10 91 and 1704 10 99, the 12 beneficiary countries are 
granted duty-free access to the European Communities' market, while all other developing countries are 
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The Panel concluded that India had demonstrated that the European Communities’ Drug 
Arrangements were inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 but that the European 
Communities ‘failed to demonstrate’ that the Drug Arrangements were justified under 
paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and also ‘failed to demonstrate’ that it was justifiable 
under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.  Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, ‘demonstrated’ cases 
of infringement constitute prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits of the 
complaining party under the multilateral trade agreements. It then recommended that the EC 
should bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994. 
 
6.8.2 The Dissenting Opinion by One Member of the Panel 
It is rare in WTO dispute settlement to have a dissenting opinion.
195
  The EC – Preferences 
Panel was composed of Mr Julio Lacarte-Muró (Uruguay), Professor Marsha A. Echols 
(United States) and Professor Akio Shimuzu (Japan) with Mr Lacarte-Muró as chairman.  
The Panel split two-to-one and because the majority decision does not have the names of the 
two panellists that authored it, it is difficult to state categorically who the third that handed 
down the dissenting opinion was but textual evidence (an abundance of GATT negotiating 
history [the Tokyo Round] and the copious footnotes of Contracting Parties’ statements) 
suggests compellingly the work of a GATT-participant and trade diplomat among them, 
namely, Mr Julio Lacarte-Muró.  Whoever he or she was, the dissenter traced the history, 
object and purpose of the Enabling Clause to the arguments of the developing countries in 
UNCTAD in the 1960s and 1970s that ‘the benefits expected to result from freer trade had 
not occurred and that a new approach was needed.’  Therefore, the ‘1971 Waiver,’ according 
to the dissenting opinion, ‘which was expressly  cross-referenced in paragraph 2(a) and 
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footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, was created to permit a rebalancing, to improve trade 
benefits for the many developing countries that had joined the multilateral trading system in 
the 1960s and 1970s.’196 
 
It stated that the Enabling Clause was ‘widely understood and intended’ to serve the purpose 
of the ‘lifting of the Article I obligation of the preference-granting countries’ and a ‘departure 
from the basic most-favoured-nation principle.’197  Therefore, the dissenter submitted, ‘(i)f 
there had been a dispute under the waiver, the complaining party would not have claimed 
under Article I because its rights under that provision had been relinquished, as had 
contractual MFN obligation of the preference-giving country.’198 
 
Concluding his or her opinion, the dissenter stated: 
If India's claim is limited to Article I – as India says – it has chosen the wrong theory to 
characterize this matter and the complaint should be dismissed. A panel may not address legal 
claims falling outside its terms of reference and, to protect the rights of Members whose 
measures are challenged, should not add claims and theories to those put forward by the 
complaining party.
199
 
 
So the dissenter was saying that ‘India’s claim should be raised under the Enabling Clause’200 
and not predicated on Article I of the GATT 1994 and because India failed to do so, India’s 
action should fail too. 
 
The European Communities responded to the WTO finding that the Enabling Clause was 
inconsistent with the multilateral agreements by replacing the Drugs Arrangements with what 
is popularly known as the ‘GSP+ Arrangement’.  Under the new arrangement, additional 
tariff preferences were made available (duty free) to the developing countries that signed up 
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to a list of sixteen human rights
201
 and eleven good governance
202
 conventions
203
 by 31 
October 2005.  They also had to give an undertaking that they would accept regular 
                                                          
201
 Article 9(1)(a) of Council Regulation 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 [2005] UJ L169/1.  The next two references 
to Articles are to this Regulation. 
202
 Article 9(1)(b) 
203 CONVENTIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9 OF THE EU GSP REGULATION 
Core human and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
5. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
8. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No 138) 
9. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst              
    Forms of Child Labour (No 182)     
10. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105) 
11. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No 29) 
12. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal  
      Value (No 100) 
13. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No 111) 
14. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (No 87) 
15. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain  
      Collectively (No 98) 
16. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
      Conventions related to the environment and governance principles 
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their  
      Disposal 
19. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
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surveillance of implementation.
204
  On the face of it, this appears to have addressed the MFN 
problem raised by India but Lorand Bartels states that it does not conform to the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of the Enabling Clause ‘because of the substantive criteria chosen by 
the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries.’205  Of relevance to this research is the fact that the 
following criteria set by the EC cut off many ECOWAS countries because of the percentage 
share of export required. 
(i) An applicant had to ratify and implement a list of sixteen human rights conventions 
by 31 October 2005, and give an undertaking that it would continue to maintain 
ratification and accept regular monitoring and review of implementation. 
Exceptionally, applicants facing constitutional constraints had until 31 December 
2006 to ratify and implement a maximum of two conventions.  This list of 
conventions is set out in Part A of Annex III to the GSP Regulation. 
(ii) An applicant had to ratify and implement at least seven of eleven listed ‘good 
governance’ conventions by 31 October 2005, and the remainder by 31 December 
2008, and give an undertaking that it would continue to maintain ratification and 
accept regular monitoring and review of implementation. This list of conventions is 
set out in Part B of Annex III to the GSP Regulation. 
(iii)  An applicant had to be a ‘vulnerable’ country. This is defined in terms of three 
cumulative conditions: (a) poverty (i.e. not classified by the World Bank as a high-
income country); (b) non-diversification of exports (i.e. its five largest sections 
represent more than 75% of its GSP-covered exports to the EU) and (c) share of EU 
GSP-covered imports (i.e. no more than 1% of these imports).
206
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
21. Convention on Biological Diversity 
22. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
24. United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) 
25. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) 
26. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances  
      (1988) 
27. United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico) 
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The original GSP did not favour any African country nor did the new GSP+ arrangement 
include them.
207
  Sub-Saharan Africa in general and ECOWAS in particular are often below 
the WTO radar as most policies cut them off.  Sometimes the reasons for these are as much 
political as they are economic
208
 considerations of the GSP-giving or developed countries 
rather than the ‘economic development’209 or ‘development, financial and trade needs’210 of 
developing countries as stated in Recital 7 of the GSP Regulation.
211
  Bartels does not fault 
the decision in EC – Tariff Preferences on ‘selectivity’ because he agrees with the Appellate 
Body that ‘certain development needs may be common to only a certain number of 
developing countries;’212 he faults the decision because it ‘underlines how ineffective the 
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preferences are designed to promote further economic growth and thereby to respond positively to the need 
for sustainable development. . . . (emphasis mine). 
212
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Appellate Body’s test is in preventing ‘development needs’ from being selected 
illegitimately.’213  Another problem Bartels finds with the GSP+ arrangement is that it is a 
closed list with no possibility of adding any country to it after the 31 October 2005 deadline. 
 
Steve Charnovitz has remarked that ‘[i]n an interconnected world, value-free trade is a 
fiction.’214  While he was the European Commissioner for Trade in September 2004, Paschal 
Lamy propagated a controversial idea he called ‘collective preferences’ for the multilateral 
trading system, but even that, according to Charnovitz, is fraught with dangers and not 
significantly better than the Generalised System of Preferences or the Decision of 28 
November 1979, the Enabling Clause.  Nonetheless, Charnovitz agrees with Lamy that it is 
important ‘to safeguard the WTO from a mercantilist zeal that could undermine public 
support for the trading system,’215 or as Henry Gao and CL Lim put it less diplomatically, to 
‘save the WTO from the risk of irrelevance’216 to an overwhelming majority of its 
membership.  
 
The next case is not an MFN or National Treatment dispute; it is rather an SPS measures 
dispute, but I have included it because of its relevance to market access as it demonstrates the 
problems identified in chapter 4 of this research on ‘International Trade Harmonisation 
through International Standard-setting.’ 
 
6.9 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products
217
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The United States, Canada and Argentina complained to the WTO against two distinct 
matters carried out by the European Communities: ‘(1) the operation and application by the 
European Communities of its regime for the approval of biotech products; and (2) certain 
measures adopted and maintained by the EC Member States prohibiting or restricting the 
marketing of biotech products.’218 
 
The Panel found that the way the EC applied its moratorium of approvals of biotech products 
was not aimed at achieving EC level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection and so was not 
an ‘SPS measure’ according to Article 5.2 or 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  Again none of the 
safeguard measures taken by the EC Member States was based on a risk assessment as 
required by Article 5.1 which provides that: 
Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risk to human, animal or plant life or 
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organisations. 
 
Again Article 2.2 demands specifically that ‘Members shall ensure that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence…’ 
 
But assuming, arguendo, that the complaint was brought by Argentina only (without the US 
and Canada who have the diplomatic band weight to create market access) would the 
outcome have been as gratifying as this.  The case did not go on appeal partly because of the 
strong language used by the Panel to condemn the measures taken by the EC Member States. 
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Yet despite the fact that the Dispute Settlement Body has in this case followed ‘object and 
purpose’ contrary to its usual practice of literary interpretation and citation of the Oxford 
Shorter Dictionary, it has been suggested that the DSB should in popular cases bow to public 
sentiments instead of the spirit and letter of the WTO Agreements when the dispute concerns 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
219
  The problem with the suggestion is that it would 
remove the ‘security and predictability’ in the law and defeat the main objective of the world 
trading system which is to create a rules-based multilateral trading system and not to ‘add or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’220  For example, 
what the EC regarded as an ‘SPS Measure’ was held not to be one at all. 
 
6.10 Summary 
In a very extensive and analytical work on ‘winners and losers in the Panel stage of the WTO 
dispute system,’ it has been pointed out that the focus of most researchers has been on the 
propensity of developing countries to participate as complainants, respondents and third 
parties and giving such reasons as lack of economic or legal capacity, market size and limited 
scope for a credible threatening retaliation as reasons for their poor participation.
221
  The 
researchers argue that ‘reduced participation does not capture the damage done to developing 
countries’ and instead chose to examine ‘whether the outcomes with regard to legal claims 
differ between developing and developed countries’222 (original italics).  Still the researchers 
rightly acknowledge the problem with ‘assessing outcomes’ or using outcomes (‘win’ or 
‘lose’) as a unit of measurement because ‘it is very difficult, if not impossible, for researchers 
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to determine what “really matter(s)” and what (does) not’223 to Member States or parties to a 
dispute.  They therefore abandoned Hudec’s stipulation that the ‘appropriate measure of the 
outcome of a Dispute Settlement case is the policy result of a dispute, that is, whether the 
case lead to the implementation of policy changes.’224  The result was that after a review of 
351 WTO disputes initiated out of which 144 had Panel reports circulated and adopted 
between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2006 (12 years), the researchers reached the 
conclusion that ‘in WTO DS cases – if measured by the share of claims ‘won’ – is broadly 
similar across industrialised and developing countries, despite the differences in ‘capacity’ 
and ‘administrative sophistication’.  This the researchers regard as being ‘counterintuitive’, a 
breakthrough in deed.  They hasten to add, ‘(a)s things stand, absent additional research on 
these questions, the data do not support the argument that the DEV (developing countries) 
group is disadvantaged.’225  Their conclusion is the justification, the raison d’être of my 
research: to go beyond statistical data and use decided WTO cases to show that the 
developing countries are structurally disadvantaged in the world trading system and that the 
dispute settlement system offers little hope or help.   
 
With all due respect, I take exception to this conclusion as the analysis of Table 7 of the 
researchers data show in their own words that ‘DEV countries have been much less 
successful against IND (industrialised) countries.’226  Even going by the criteria chosen by 
Hoekman, Horn and Mavroidis, the fundamental problem with the conclusion is that it misses 
the point of what ‘matters’ to parties to the dispute which in the case of ECOWAS Member 
States in particular and the developing countries in general is market access for their mainly 
agricultural products and not merely trade liberalisation or just ‘winning’ a dispute. 
                                                          
223
 ibid 153. 
224
 Robert E Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, 
(Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers 1993).  
225
 N 220 above 165. 
226
 ibid 161. 
318 
 
 
Therefore, the above analysis has been undertaken as a turn away from ‘textbook 
prescription’ and a priori conclusions in order to see how the principles of non-
discrimination embodied in the MFN and National Treatment provisions of the GATT 
1947/94 are protected and enforced through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. From 
the analysis of the foregoing cases on the MFN and National Treatment principles, what 
stands out is that ‘separating legal and economic issues is difficult because the two sets of 
issues tend to occupy the same ground;’ moreover, ‘in the GATT (and the WTO), legal 
measures are never taken for their own sake.’227   
 
Hudec calls the ‘reciprocity doctrine’ ‘a bargain with the devil.’228  Again, Edwini Kessie’s 
statement that ‘the developing countries have not benefited significantly’229 from (the world 
trading system) seems to be borne out by the outcome of the WTO jurisprudence.  The 
outcome of the cases that would have created market access to the developing countries and 
the least developed countries ended with the measures targeting poverty reduction and even 
the reduction of drug trafficking being declared inconsistent with either Article I or Article III 
of the GATT thereby closing the way to the poor for a share of the world market. 
 
In terms of market access for the developing countries, EC – Bananas could not have been 
their finest hour as it closed the gate to bananas export from many developing countries to the 
European Communities; Turkey – Textiles ruled out the leverage to use domestic measures to 
mitigate the flooding of local markets with foreign goods and thereby stifling the growth of 
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domestic industries and exacerbating unemployment.  Indonesia’s local content requirements 
of the 1993 and 1996 car programmes were declared in violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs 
Agreement and so was the sales tax aspects in favour of domestic motor vehicles declare to 
be in violation of Article III:2 of GATT.  The IMF confirmation that the removal of the 
contested restrictions would push India’s reserves below the adequate level was not enough 
to secure a ‘win’ for India in India – Quantitative restrictions.  Canada only survived the 
WTO ruling in Canada – Autos because it is already an industrialised country with the 
diplomatic means to flex its muscles; EC – Tariff Preferences removed the advantages 
secured with a notification to the WTO for developing and least developed countries and 
forced everyone onto the conveyor belt of the world trading system.  As Israel told the GATT 
Council, ‘equal rules for unequal partners did not bring about equality of trading 
opportunities;’230 and Peru submitted that ‘economically unequal countries had to be treated 
unequally.’231 
 
None of the cases analysed here nor the 144 examined by Bernard Hoekman, Henrik Horn 
and Petros Mavroidis show any substantial improvement in the local production of goods and 
significantly increased export capacity and, by the same token, the foreign exchange position 
of the developing countries.  Is the plenitude of aims and objectives in the preambles to the 
WTO Agreements mere rhetoric?  As shown above in Canada – Autos and EC – Tariff 
Preferences even when there is a finding of inconsistency with a measure, the actions taken 
by the respondents to bring the measure into conformity with their obligations under the 
covered agreements amount to inaction and in reality leave the complainants not better than 
before.  Therefore, despite the somewhat ambiguous, diplomatic and artful language of the 
WTO, the GATT evinces strong characteristics of non-discriminatory discrimination.  
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The next and concluding chapter will examine the efforts within and outside the WTO which 
the developing countries have resorted to in order to improve their international trade and 
economic development.  It will conclude with the thesis of this research and point out areas 
for further research 
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7.1 Introduction 
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The economic development argument advanced in this dissertation is one of the systemic 
debates at the heart of the GATT due to its adventitious origin traceable to Chapter IV of the 
Havana Charter.
1130
  The GATT was established to reflect the economic interests of its 
founders, the developed and trading nations.
1131
  Hudec writes, ‘the GATT did not believe in 
law, but in pragmatism’1132 and its ‘very unusual concept of “nullification and impairment” 
… provides equitable remedies.’1133  It was intended for guidance on how Contracting Parties 
were expected to act toward one another but not taken as hard law.  It is saturated with the 
language of polite diplomacy captured in the words ‘ruling’ or ‘finding,’ ‘recommendation’ 
and ‘request’ as against a ‘cease or desist (legal) order.’  Its distinctive jurisprudence has been 
described as a ‘jurisprudence puzzling to lawyers’ because ‘it is primarily the work of 
diplomats rather than lawyers.’1134  The practice of seeing the GATT as a trade organisation 
and not a legal institution has continued till this day: a member of the Appellate Body Mr 
Ujah Singh Bhatia (India) appointed in 2011 is an economist and not a lawyer.
1135
 
 
This research has sought to analyse the application of the principle of non-discrimination in 
the GATT 1994 and subsequently in the WTO on the economic development of ECOWAS 
Member States.  The focus is on the legal drawbacks or binding constraints on economic 
development within the GATT 1994.  Cassese states that we live in a world ‘divided 
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economically, politically, and ideologically to such an extent that their relations are daily 
beset with friction and tensions’ which are ‘inherent in their existence.’1136  Both the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the WTO seek to promote 
economic development and growth through the market economy model but both the 
developed and developing countries are apprehensive of what it would mean to them for two 
different reasons.  The developed and industrialised countries of Europe and North America 
are not sanguine about the prospects of promoting development because of anticipated 
competition from emerging economies and newly industrialised countries (NICs).  The 
developing countries, especially within ECOWAS who are mainly producers of primary 
products, on their part, worry about their exposure to the international markets because of the 
volatility of their products;
1137
 they lose control of imports, while exposing their export 
potential to unmanageable market forces that could unleash their power with menace.  
 
This study has sought to analyse the root causes and not the effects or the participation of 
developing countries in the multilateral trading system, even though it has been noted that in 
GATT studies, it is hard to separate legal, political and economic issues.
1138
  The 
documentation of the scale and scope of the GAT T’s principle of non-discrimination I leave 
for economists.  This research posits that the GATT served its stated aims and objectives and 
functioned well within the first decade of its existence (1947-57) but outlived its usefulness 
thereafter with the birth or independence of new nations such as Ghana (1957), Nigeria 
(1960), and The Gambia (1965) (as well as the realisation of majority rule in Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa which was the culmination of the democratisation of politics in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa) and the accession of the new nation-states to the GATT.  Even before 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the fulcrum and the dynamics of world politics 
and trade had shifted considerably with the breakup of the USSR in 1990 which resulted in 
some former Socialist Republics joining the European Union and embracing the free market 
economy.  Again, China joined the WTO in 2001 bringing with it more trading opportunities 
and ideological tensions.  Ever since, it has been a struggle to find the relevance of the GATT 
to the new nations who now form an overwhelming majority of the membership
1139
 but 
without a corresponding volume of trade. 
 
7.2 Plurality of ‘Objectives’  
The WTO core principles of economic development, the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade and trade liberalisation have been referred to as binding 
‘norms’.1140  In the substantive part of the GATT, non-discrimination is enshrined as Articles 
I  and III and standardised through the SPS and TBT Agreements and interpreted, elaborated 
and upheld by the panels and the Appellate Body as if it were the sole aim of the WTO.  The 
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introduction forms chapter 1, MFN and National Treatment chapter 2, development debates 
chapter 3, standard-setting, that is, SPS and TBT chapter 4, ECOWAS trade policy reviews 
chapter 5 and disputes founded on the principles non-discrimination chapter 6, all of which 
this chapter brings to a conclusion. 
 
This dissertation has shown that while trade liberalisation is one of the core objectives to be 
pursued, it represents a part and not the sole objective of the multilateral trading agreements.  
It argued that having accepted development as Part IV of the GATT in 1964 it should be 
enforced through the WTO dispute settlement system by panels and the Appellate Body keen 
on applying the telos, object and purpose approach to interpreting the covered agreements.  
Unlike labour standards or environmental protection that is regarded as being outside the 
GATT, economic development is part of the GATT/WTO system.  It is submitted that the 
argument that the hortatory language of Part IV makes it non-binding misses the nature of 
international trade law as a whole and so the WTO Member States should be held to account 
for their development efforts towards the realisation of the GATT objective, among others.  It 
is also submitted that while the terms of reference of the WTO Panel pinpoints ‘an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and of conformity with the relevant 
covered agreement’1141 and limits the Appellate Body to ‘issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel’1142 they should, as a matter of 
principle, pursue the object and purpose of the WTO Agreements and ensure that their 
findings and conclusions are development-friendly. 
The issue is to what extent the promotion of development can be achieved through legal rule-
application which does not necessarily involve the judiciary engaging in complex policy 
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choices. There is literature on the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, but it 
is controversial because justiciability is seen as a juridifiction of what are essentially political 
complex trade-offs between social and economic goals and policies.
1143
 To what extent is 
development something that can be integrated into WTO jurisprudence in a more legal, rule-
like fashion, without risking greater politicisation of WTO adjudication? 
 
Sometimes GATT/WTO panels feel uncomfortable with the Agreement they have to apply.  
For example, the Panel on EEC – Bananas II confessed that it ‘was well aware of the 
economic and social effects of the EEC measures on the ACP banana exporting countries,’ 
but nonetheless concluded that the ‘purpose of (the) procedures is not to modify the rights 
and obligations under the existing provisions in the light of social and economic 
considerations.’1144  In other words, as seen in chapter 6, the decision was against market 
access and anti-development but that was beside the point as long as what was done was 
considered inconsistent with Articles I and III and not within the allowed exceptions to the 
GATT rules. 
 
Articles I and III of the GATT are ideal for fairly equal trading partners: not discriminating 
between Italian Fiat, German Mercedes, French Peugeot, British Vauxhall and American T-
Ford once they have entered the domestic market of any of the another Contracting Parties.  
To have the same rules applying between those industrialised countries and the vulnerable 
economies that have less than five export commodities, and none out of the five an industrial 
                                                          
1143
 Isabella D Bunn, The Right to Development and International Economic Law (Hart Publishing 2012); 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 2009); 
Mashood A Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford 
University Press 2007)  
1144
 EEC – Bananas II, DS38/R dated 11 February 1994 para. 168  (unadopted). 
327 
 
product, is a legal farce, ‘a somewhat surrealistic situation – the world’s leading organisation 
in the field of international trade explaining its policies to the world in terms of voodoo 
economics rejected by virtually every professional economist in the field.’1145  The classical 
economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, it has been remarked, ‘were not writing a 
textbook for university students’ and ‘were not particularly concerned about developing 
formal models that could easily be applied to answer several related questions about trade, 
growth, and income distribution.’1146  
 
Development (Part IV) is a late comer to the GATT and so does not fit or seat resplendently 
with the other provisions of the Agreement.  Parts I to III have the United Nations Treaty 
Series numbers but there is none for Part IV.
1147
  It seems like stating the obvious or sounds 
otiose because people engaged in trade should experience economic development as a result.  
As Hudec observes, ‘GATT law appears somewhat anomalous.  If liberal trade policy is in 
every country’s interest, why do the governments of developed countries consider it 
necessary to enter international legal commitments requiring it?’1148  The political rhetoric of 
the Atlantic Charter pledging to seek ‘the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victors and 
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world which are 
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needed for their prosperity’1149 appears to have seeped into the language of trade diplomats. 
However, the reality of the free market economy is different and demands reciprocity.
1150
  
 
 In the sixty years of the existence of the GATT, there have been legal landmark changes 
effected to accommodate the interests of developing countries.  Article XVIII was expanded 
in 1954-55 to include Article XVIII:B allowing for use of quantitative restrictions for 
‘balance of payments difficulties,’ the addition of Part IV (Articles XXXVI to XXXVIII) on 
Trade and Development in 1965 and the adoption of the Enabling Clause in 1979.  Equally 
important and outside the WTO, the agitation for development to be central to the purpose of 
the GATT/WTO led to the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1964.  Yet none of those achievements touched the heart of the matter which 
is the binding provisions in Articles I and III of the GATT on MFN and National Treatment 
principles, and the absence of anything in the DSU directing WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body to ensure that their findings and rulings are development-friendly.  Until the substantive 
and judicial changes are effected, the GATT in its present form will continue to work against 
development and arguments will continue to rage between disputing parties and scholars. 
 
This research argues that though welcome, the above changes are not enough and fail to 
address the root causes.  Again it is disappointing that the scholarly community, including 
many from developing countries, has distractively joined the participation debate
1151
 instead 
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of querying the legal rules that determine participation in the world trading system.  This is 
what this research has done.  The analysis in chapter 4 has dealt with how the SPS and TBT 
Agreements aimed, on the surface of it, at tackling the standardisation of food and technical 
products so as not to constitute trade barriers are structurally exclusive to the disadvantage of 
ECOWAS Member States and other developing countries. 
 
It is also the conclusion of this study that calls for reforms of the WTO is mistaken, 
misdirected and borne out of a misunderstanding of the very nature of international trade law.  
Incidentally, even those calling for reforms agree that the WTO is working as it was intended 
to work.
1152
  The former UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food Professor Olivier De Schutter 
points out that ‘[t]he WTO was deliberately placed outside the remit of the United 
Nations,’1153 very much like NATO1154 to defy democratisation and control by the world 
community.  Jacqueline D Krilorian does not believe that any improvement of the dispute 
settlement system would work, ‘perhaps, for now,’ because ‘the dispute settlement system is 
as “effective” as the public can handle.’1155  For the avoidance of doubt, Hudec reminds 
everybody that ‘the GATT did not arrive at its present legal policy through mistakes in 
economics or ideology,’1156 so it was well thought out.  He states in his influential book that 
‘[t]he GATT’s current legal policy towards developing countries cannot promise any 
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significant improvement.’1157  He then concludes that ‘[n]othing will change until developed 
countries are willing to see the latter group (developing countries) walk away’1158 from the 
GATT. Writing about what he calls ‘the seductive logic of mercantilism’ and ‘the seductive 
teachings of the GATT reciprocity doctrine,’ Hudec states, ‘[i]t is not an exaggeration to say 
that developing countries wishing to pursue a liberal trade policy would be better off  leaving 
the GATT entirely than trying to conduct policy changes on the GATT’s present policy.’1159 
Nonetheless, he rather taunts the developing countries that ‘[t]he critics of the current policy 
do not have a better answer’ and suggests ‘the strengthening of the GATT’s MFN obligation 
in all respects.’1160  This is the principal problem with the current GATT: both the US and the 
EU know that it does not make for development but leave it as it is because they know they 
cannot be ignored; an alternative world trade body without them would be unviable, if not 
catastrophic.  
 
This thesis argues that in the light of the honest statements made by one of the founding 
fathers of the GATT himself that the system was not made for and has no room for 
developing countries; his recommendation of strengthening the GATT’s MFN obligations is 
only good for the developed country members.  Anything short of a total transformation, a 
bottom-up approach leading to a new GATT would not serve the interests of developing 
countries.  ‘…each round of negotiations,’ write Faizel Ismail and Brendan Vickers, ‘is based 
on the inequalities of previous rounds.  This generates repeated stand-offs whereby 
developing countries seek to remedy past anomalies and injustices, while developed countires 
seek to protect sectors of decreasing competitiveness, and to open new areas of economic 
                                                          
1157
 ibid, 227 
1158
 ibid, 233 
1159
 ibid 171 
1160
 ibid 228 
331 
 
opportunity.’1161  It is my submission that the interests of the developing countries is the 
enlightened and long-term interests of the developed countries as it would contribute to world 
peace, in Cassese’s words, ‘to avert the political risk of rebellion’1162 and a more stable, more 
prosperous and mutually beneficial international trade.  It has been argued that the 
GATT/WTO ‘golden’ triangle of decision-making, that is, the dominance of the major 
contracting parties, the consensus principle and the single undertaking do not reflect the 
realities of modern international trade and lead to ‘deals that do not generate either new trade 
flows or new rules for dynamic markets’1163 for developing and least-developed countries.  
 
7.3 The Rationale for the Articles I and III Provisions in the GATT 1994: Yoking Unequal 
Parties 
The GATT is a product of its unique time in history.  It was part of the post World War II 
reconstruction arrangements.  Writing about such post-conflict treaties and agreements, 
Henkin observes, ‘these arrangements are really an attempt by the victors to reap the fruits of 
victory and with other controlling powers to legislate rearrangement of international 
society…  These agreements are in large hegemonial… legislative… deeply political… 
capricious…and usually reflect the glow of victorious alliance.’1164 
 
It was one of the aims of this research to correct the misunderstanding that is often cited by 
some scholars even on book covers that ‘the WTO is not functioning as envisioned.’1165  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  The truth which is the argument in this thesis is that 
the WTO is working very well as ‘envisioned’; it is also keeping very close to the spirit of the 
GATT but not the letters of the Agreement.  As Spivak states, ‘the coloniser constructs 
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himself as he constructs the colony.  The relationship is intimate, an open secret that cannot 
be part of official knowledge.’1166  In other words, the raison d’être of the WTO is different 
from what was put out to the public in the Marrakesh Agreement; the letters are different 
from the intendment or the underlying motives or aims it was set out to achieve.  Ralph Wilde 
states that colonisation, ‘trusteeship and the civilising mission never went away’ but subsists 
in a more subtle form.  What has changed is the modus operandi, instead of control from 
within; it is now being done by institutional apparatuses located faraway leaving ‘sovereignty 
as a title’.1167 
 
Those who posit that ‘the WTO is not functioning well’ are either ignorant of how nations 
behave or the nature of international trade law.  Still, it might be a case of selective amnesia.  
They have chosen to forget why the International Trade Organisation (ITO) was stillborn and 
that the GATT/WTO did not begin as a legal system, that the GATT did not even have a legal 
unit until 1973, that it was the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the 
strengthening of the GATT with the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that has given 
the WTO its current, dominant legal character.
1168
  As Louis Henkin sums up, ‘[t]hose who 
do not see much role for law in foreign policy do not know where to look.’1169 
 
On the advice to ‘walk away’ nothing could be worse.  Any international organisation 
without the principal architects of the GATT/WTO, namely the US and the EU is bound to 
fail.   As Louis Henkin puts it, ‘if the view rejecting international (economic) law reflected 
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the realities of international relations and the attitudes and practices of governments, 
international (economic) law would be frivolous; universities teaching it would be 
perpetrating fraud.’1170 
 
This dissertation has also shown that part of the problem with ECOWAS and other 
developing countries is psychological: wanting to be seen as helpless and waiting to be 
helped instead of taking proactive steps, in concert with others, regionally, continentally and 
globally to address the international economic order that the world trading system that is 
skewed against them.
1171
  This mental attitude and holding out hands for charity need to stop 
and an inward search for solutions carried out.  The Nigerian Deputy High Commissioner to 
the United Kingdom, Ambassador Dozie Nwanna stresses that ‘seizing power always 
involves a fight, at least a contest.  Nobody gives you power, whether economic or political.  
You have to fight for it.’1172  Henkin shares the same view that ‘there is no law requiring 
social and economic assistance by the very rich to the very poor, or providing community 
relief even to the starving.’1173  According to Junji Nakagawa, Japan did not become a 
‘member of the “Great Powers” with full membership in modern International Economic Law 
until it defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.’1174  So ECOWAS and other 
developing and least-developed countries must win their economic and technological battles 
so as to count or matter to the rest of the world.  A 1989-91 figure shows that ECOWAS 
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accounted for only 0.5 per cent of world production of bananas
1175
 and Africa as a whole a 
negligible 1.6 per cent of world trade.
1176
  The dismal performance from a continent that is 
home to over 13 per cent of the population of the world calls for urgent action.  
 
It has also been noted in this work that while many human rights academic lawyers and 
advocates are critical of the WTO, the mainstream international economic law epistemic 
community are resigned if not supportive of the Organisation.
1177
  While it is acknowledged 
that different areas of specialisation prime or dispose people to different approaches to a 
given issue, lawyers, on the whole, should question how the substantive provisions of an 
agreement evince legitimacy and promote rule of law and also the avowed commitments of 
nations to international agreements they have signed.
1178
 
 
The real aim of the GATT/WTO is to confer an advantage to the developed country founding 
members of the GATT (1947) spelt out only in the NATO Treaty as ‘Europe, North America 
(and) the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.’1179  It has been pointed out by 
some international economists that Ricardo is being quoted out of context. 
In the Ricardian paradigm, all countries gain from trade if none of them imposes restrictions.  
But, if one limits access to its own market while all others provide free access to their 
markets, the country that imposes restrictions may gain even more.  The gain occurs in the 
form of better terms of trade, as the country receives a higher price for the exports its 
producers sell compared to what foreigners receive for the goods that are imported.
1180
 
 
Therefore, knowing full-well the benefits they will derive from the vigorous pursuit of the 
MFN and National Treatment clauses, the WTO framework is marketed as a sure route to 
economic development and out of poverty, but that is yet to happen.  What the reality has 
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shown, however, is a general feeling of frustration for unrealised expectations and agitations 
for correction of the imbalance.  No matter how hard the developing countries tried within the 
GATT/WTO system, their lot remained worsening economic situations; ‘it has meant the 
relegation to a permanent status of underclass nations’1181 (emphasis mine).  Even 
concerning the ‘security and predictability’ of trade which is given as the ‘central element’ 
for the existence of the WTO’s dispute settlement system,1182 it has been found that 
GATT/WTO membership makes little difference between comparable members and non-
members.  In his extensive research Rose concludes, ‘I find no consistent substantial 
difference in the trade volatility between GATT/WTO insiders and outsiders: membership 
does not appear to bring the privilege of predictability.’1183  Still it could if transformed.  
 
In another study, the Generalised System of Preferences of the United States whose primary 
objective was to promote industrialisation and economic development of less developed 
countries has been described as a ‘dismal performance’.1184  WTO’s Special and Differential 
Treatment has not helped matters either as most of the schemes aimed at ameliorating the 
effects of the GATT/WTO on developing countries are usually undercut and undermined by 
other intricate, subtle, internal measures.
1185
  Sarah Joseph then asks perceptively, ‘trade to 
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live or live to trade’ pointing out that ‘[o]ngoing extreme poverty deprives people of their … 
right to development’ and submits that ‘international trade should be a means to such ends, 
rather than an end in itself.’1186 
 
7.4 Legal and Diplomatic Attempts to Put Development in the GATT/WTO 
Having realised the true situation, the developing countries have made the following efforts 
aimed at getting the WTO to address their needs as ostensibly flaunted in the Preamble to the 
Marrakesh Agreement. 
A Summary of Attempts to put development at the heart of the GATT/WTO by 
developing countries and LDCS 
1947 Twelve of the original 23 signatories to the GATT were developing countries.  
They acceded on ‘parity of obligations’ because they were colonial territories 
or as in the case of Pakistan had just been granted independence three months 
earlier. 
1954-5 Article XVIII:B on quantitative restrictions was added to the Article XVIII of 
the GATT but for purposes of correcting balance of payments ‘arising manly 
from efforts to expand their internal markets as well as from the instability in 
their terms of trade.’ The sole purpose for which this is allowed is ‘for 
restoring equilibrium in its balance of payments’ needed for economic 
development.  The WTO dispute settlement body refused to uphold India’s 
argument relying on the article. 
1964 UNCTAD (set up to tackle the problem of developing countries in 
international trade) was established.  The developing countries demanded to be 
part of the decision making bodies in the IMF, World Bank and the GATT 
during the Dillon Round of trade negotiations (1962-4) to address their needs 
but all they got was UNCTAD which lacks the powers of those three financial 
and economic organisations.  The International Trade Centre is also created. 
1965 The GATT gets a new Part IV on ‘Trade and Development’ with no legal 
force.  Still it is all ambiguous and artful language without any substantive 
improvement in the Agreement, no room for a departure from the basic MFN 
principle.  
1968 UNCTAD persuades the US to accept to voluntarily grant the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) to developing countries and the ITC turns into a 
joint venture agreement with the US. 
1971 Granting of waivers: (1) Under the GATT for tariff preferences in connection 
with the GSP and (2) the Geneva Protocol on trade negotiation among 
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developing countries. 
1973-9 The Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations.  99 countries participated with over 
70 of them developing countries.  The Enabling Clause is adopted and the 
concept of ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ makes the 1971 waivers 
permanent.  
1986 The launching of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations at the Punta del 
Este Ministerial Conference with many SDT references. 
1994 Accession to the WTO Agreement by over 100 developing country GATT 
Contracting Parties. 
1997 The Singapore Ministerial Conference creates the Integrated Framework for 
Trade Related Technical Assistance for least developed countries. 
1999 The Seattle Ministerial Conference agenda dominated by developing countries’ 
concerns.  Conference ends in a deadlock. 
2000 The US passes the so called African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) 
allegedly granting duty and quota-free market access to African countries.  
This was a unilateral act of the US, no African country was consulted and none 
made an input and the decision of who to give or not give is the exclusive 
prerogative of the President of the United States. 
2001 The Doha Ministerial Conference launches the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA).  Developing and LDCs object to calling it a trade negotiation ‘Round’ 
like the previous trade rounds.  ‘Development’ was inserted in the title instead 
of simply calling it the Doha Round on the suggestion of the British Overseas 
Development Secretary Claire Shot to calm the developing countries and entice 
them to participate in the negotiations after the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial.  Not much progress yet. 
2002 A WTO Global Trust Fund established to support developing countries’ 
participation in trade negotiations. 
2003 A developing-country G20 including Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
(BICS) emerge.  ECOWAS LDC members, the Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Mali team up with Chad) push for a sectoral ‘Initiative on Cotton.’ 
2005 Agreement is reached at the Hong Ministerial Conference for industrialised 
countries to grant 97 per cent of trade duty- and quota-fee access to developing 
countries. 
2006 The call for Aid for Trade is sounded by WTO taskforce.  
2008 World financial crisis threatens the WTO.  The WTO waiver for the EU-ACP 
preferences expires on 1 January and the Enhanced Integrated Framework is 
put in place between the LDCs and donors to keep the hope of the developing 
and the least-developed countries in the WTO still alive. 
 
These efforts, it must be pointed out, are somewhat misdirected and belated: none addressed 
the main substantive parts of the GATT and all after the developing countries had acceded to 
the GATT as a single undertaking.  By way of a contrast, even though China is a big trading 
nation, an ancient civilisation and a major world power with a veto at the UN Security 
Council, it sought to be treated as a developing country from its accession to the WTO 
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Agreements.  Although China was a signatory to the GATT in 1947 it ceased to participate 
immediately the Communist party came to power in 1949 and even though it came back 
during the Uruguay Round, the US refused to grant China unconditional MFN status until 
2000 when it got Congressional approval.
1187
  Although there are political and ideological 
dimensions to Russia’s accession to the WTO, the Soviet Union participated in the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 and Russia negotiated its terms of accession from 1993  to 2012 
when it extracted some concessions and joined.
1188
  Not being a big trading nation, the 
Soviets did not see the Anglo-American led and free market-oriented GATT as being 
appropriate for them.   Most developing countries simply signed the WTO Agreements 
without any regard to the paucity of their economy or their capacity to meet basic GATT 
commitments in order to enjoy its benefits.  
 
Despite the efforts above, access to the markets of the developed countries has eluded 
ECOWAS and other developing countries. It is time they turned inward to active trading 
within the regional market.  Even with the much bandied Doha Development Agenda, ‘it 
would appear that the development objective has been significantly watered down or 
abandoned.’1189  Going through the proposal, it has not got much on development and there is 
no agenda item on renegotiating Articles I and III.
1190
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This work has sought to demonstrate that the theory and the practice of International 
Economic Law are at variance.  It is in ‘double speak’ when it speaks to ECOWAS and other 
developing countries, on the one hand, and to the developed countries, on the other hand.
1191
  
From the outset, this thesis invites the reader to think beyond the substantive provisions of the 
GATT to its function in world trade, its application, the nature of its influence, its stated aims, 
its strengths and weaknesses, the opportunities if offers and the threats and limitations that it 
imposes. There is much literature on developing countries in the GATT/WTO legal system 
and reforms of the world trading system
1192
 but, as far as I know, none has identified and 
focused on the MFN and National Treatment principles as the lynch-pins of economic 
development and none has focused on the application of the principles to the ECOWAS 
Member States or how they are adapting their trading systems and harmonising their laws to 
the key provision of Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 on non-discrimination, the subject 
of this research.  
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The two views of International Economic Law analysed in chapter 1 of this study could be 
called International Law of Development, that is, law as it presently is (de lege lata) which is 
in contradistinction to International Law for Development, that is, law as it should be (de lege 
ferenda) to bring development.
1193
  When the 1971 Waiver to Article 1 (MFN) obligations 
was introduced to permit a rebalancing of world trade ‘to improve trade benefits to 
developing countries that had joined the multilateral trading system during the 1960s and 
1970s and to supplement Part IV of the GATT’1194 the Government of India called it ‘an 
historic moment,’1195 Jamaica said the move had ‘considerable potential … for the 
improvement of the conditions governing international trade of developing countries;’1196 
Uruguay described it as ‘a decision of enormous importance, not only for the future of 
international trade relations, but in terms of interpretation and meaning of the General 
Agreement itself.’1197  The United Arab Republic noted that ‘the GATT would be different 
from what it had been so far.’1198  Greece and Argentina expressed similar views.   
 
It should be noted that UNCTAD had advised the developed countries to obtain the necessary 
‘legislative’ amendments to the GATT so as to be able to implement the preferences given to 
the developing countries but they deliberately chose a waiver which is temporary, at the 
behest of the developed or preference-giving country and legally not of the same rank with 
Article I.
1199
  This deliberate choice of the developed countries is neither surprising nor 
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uncharacteristic.  This is because the Enabling Clause aims at better market access for the 
exports from developing countries which the developed countries would not like to see as a 
substantive binding provision.  Article I GATT should begin with a proviso or have a 
chapeau that may be drafted thus: ‘Subject to the preferences given to the developing 
countries and the least-developed countries that is contained in an agreement of which the 
WTO has been notified ….’  The requirement of an agreement and notification of the WTO 
or deposit at the WTO secretariat in Geneva will strengthen the predictability of the world 
trading system and the WTO legal regime and also address the issue of treating nascent or 
fragile economies in the same way as developed and strong economies.  This dissertation has 
shown that until there is a legislative amendments to Articles I and III obligations, every 
other effort would remain cosmetic and ECOWAS Member States and the rest of the 
developing and the least-developed countries would remain mired in acute poverty, hunger 
and disease and, of course, underdevelopment. 
 
7.5 The GATT Knots on the Developing and Least-developed Countries 
Even with the reprint of Hudec’s Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System that came 
out in 2011, the message from J. Michael Finger remains the same with that of Hudec back in 
1987 when it was first published: that the GATT was not created with developing countries in 
mind: they lack ‘the economic size or power for it (the GATT) to provide them great 
leverage.’1200  The GATT/WTO legal system creates a momentum for trade liberalisation 
among trading nations.  The WTO is currently in a ‘rut’ because its membership has been 
overwhelmed by developing countries that acceded to it forgetting it was not meant for non-
export economies.  Again any examination of the GATT/WTO system without reference and 
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even more so, acknowledgement of it as a diplomat’s jurisprudence is like decrying the 
behaviour of an adolescent without reference to his childhood.  Its dispute settlement system 
is not like other international courts and tribunals.  It does not award compensations to 
‘winners’ with the effect that apart from using it to push one’s way into a particular market if 
one has something to export, there is little else to gain.  It therefore holds little appeal for 
developing or least-developed countries even when they decry the activities of multinational 
corporations causing environmental disasters or putting local industries out of business. 
 
Some economists point out that even though the Uruguay Round is hailed as having broken 
ground in many new areas
1201
 that ‘it merely marked the status quo in some of them’1202 and 
used coded words to limit the potential exports of the developing countries that overwhelmed 
the GATT/WTO in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century and the first decade of the 21
st
 century.  
The economists point out that ‘where learning allows costs to fall at a constant rate as 
cumulative output rises, the initial innovator of a product has a tremendous advantage.  A 
late-comer will never catch up.’1203 Again, that where ‘one large country produces only goods 
where learning occurs (high tech goods such as cars and electronics) and one small country 
produces only those goods where learning has been exhausted (primary products), the same 
pattern of trade will be maintained into the future and the technological gap between them 
will grow.’1204  The only way out, they say, is if ‘the less advanced country is larger and 
thereby able to consume a wider range of goods and achieve a faster rate of technical 
progress,’1205 (Brazil, China and India are good examples).  Within ECOWAS only three 
                                                          
1201
 For example, the DSU with permanent members of the Appellate Body.  
1202
 For example, with respect to realisable trading opportunities for developing and least-developed countries. 
1203
 Alwyn Young, ‘Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106: 369-405. 
1204
 Theo S. Eicher, John H. Mutti and Michelle H. Turnovsky n 8 above 309 
1205
 ibid. 
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countries have a population of over 20,000,000 people while three have a population of less 
than 2,000,000 people each.
1206
   
 
But it is not all down to population, large territories and export trade.  There are other views 
on the high priority assigned to export trade as the ‘engine of growth.’  Dani Rodrik’s study 
of Korea and Taiwan ‘suggests that the exports are too small a share of national output to 
explain these economies’ strong growth.’  He attributes their growth to their escape of ‘the 
problem of a self-serving elite dictating policy.’1207  So while exporting labour-intensive 
goods is important, efficient allocation of resources counts as well, as even the World Bank 
maintains that there is no single way to move forward.
1208
 
 
There is a clear lack of the political will to do something really serious to step up 
development in different regions of the world trapped in poverty like ECOWAS.  The current 
SDT agenda
1209
 on the table for the DDA are mute on Articles I and III of the GATT, yet the 
DDA has not seen much progress after ten years, making it the longest running trade round in 
the history of the GATT/WTO. 
 
Again the WTO, unlike the UNO, has no foundation in common interest.
1210
  ‘The new law 
which the developed states have sought is law that would reinforce the system as they have 
known it’1211 and so insisting on geographic distribution of power or governance and even of 
the appointment of members of the Appellate Body in a trade organisation misses the point 
                                                          
1206
 Ivory Coast 20.6 million; Ghana 24,.2 million and Nigeria 167.0 million while Cape Verde is 567,000, 
Guinea-Bissau is 1.6 million and The Gambia 1.7 million < http://www.population.gov.ng> 
1207
 Dani Rodrik, ‘Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich,’ Economic Policy, 10: 
55-107 cited in Theo S. Eicher n 8 above 324 and 333. 
1208
 The World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (2005) 
1209
 See the appendix  
1210
 Louis Henkin, n 31 above 83 
1211
 Ibid 194 
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and will never be countenanced by the developed and big trading nations.  Neither a global 
government nor global development is on anybody’s agenda.  A world government is 
unrealistic; what is feasible is a form of order or at least a semblance of it.   
 
The greatest merit of the WTO is its semblance of justice.  The GATT though rules-based, 
could not lay claim to the application of the rule of law in support of the multilateral trading 
system.  It was a matter of economic and diplomatic power.  However, under the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, aggrieved parties could assert that ‘where there is law, there is 
a remedy’ despite the fact that WTO’s equitable remedies are only prospective.   
 
If under the world trading system that the GATT 1994 seeks to achieve, the profits made by 
one country were used as commonwealth to develop another country or other people in 
faraway places, there would, perhaps, be no need for the GATT, ab initio.  By the same 
token, the GATT/WTO law would have been to everybody’s benefit if there was a world 
government that determined how the gains or profits from international trade would be used 
to develop all parts of the world, very much like national governments use proceeds from 
minerals to develop the whole country and not just the particular community or region from 
where the mineral is mined or drilled.  This hypothesis explains the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces on international trade and why there are tensions.  It does not advocate a 
world government, nor does it suggest that such a government is desirable.  
 
However, if the present dichotomy and asymmetric practice is not addressed legislatively 
with a new GATT ameliorating the application of Articles I and III, the developing countries 
and especially the least-developed countries will hardly ever develop because the MFN and 
National Treatment provisions lay them bare to compete in very unequal markets. 
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  Development which was examined in chapter 3 is defined by the UN Independent 
Expert/Repporteur on Development Sengupta as a ‘process’1212 requiring incremental 
elaboration both at the national and international levels.  In order to make development 
‘sustainable’ it has to ‘meet the needs of present generation without compromising the ability 
of future generation to meet their own needs.’1213  The present unfavourable terms of trade is 
mortgaging the future of the next generation of developing country to be unable to creep out 
of their debt burdens.  The world trading system is also seen as a ‘process’ and a form of 
‘governance’ broadly defined to include ‘principles and norms as well as the institutional 
architecture through which rules and practices for managing global trade are made, 
implemented and enforced.’1214  Lowenfeld states that ‘international economic law – like all 
law but perhaps more so – is a process.’1215 
 
7.6 ECOWAS ‘Great Expectations’ 
It is a competitive world but this fact ECOWAS and other Sub-Saharan African countries do 
not seem to grasp much.  All the proposals put forward by President Blaise Campaore of 
Burkina Faso on behalf of the ‘Cotton Four’ have one latent defect: they all depend on the 
developed countries doing something or refraining from doing something.
1216
  They are all 
external solutions and as such very precarious.  Development is home-grown, articulated by 
the government and facilitated with inputs from abroad, not dependent on foreign goodwill.  
                                                          
1212
 The Preamble, The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 December 1986, 
GA Res. 41/128 UN GAOR, 41
st
 Sss. 
1213
 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press 
1987).  See also A. Lindroos, ‘The Right to Development,’ Forum Iuris Publications of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 1999, 40. 
1214
 Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed), Making Global Trade Work Governance Work for Development: Perspectives 
and Priorities from Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press 2011) 580 
1215
 Andreas Lowensfeld, International Economic Law, (Oxford University Press 2008) 927. 
1216
 Quoted by Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile n 38 above 78 
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Seen dispassionately some of the suggestions are ridiculous because they amount to asking 
foreign governments to harm their citizens or hurt their voters. 
 
7.7 Loosening the GATT Knots on Economic Development 
Instead of asking the US or China to phase out support for their cotton farmers, Campaore 
should say how the government of Burkina Faso will support Burkinabe farmers to 
counterbalance what the US and China do for their farmers.  ECOWAS governments should 
revive their abandoned farm settlements and marketing boards to support their own farmers 
in growing high yielding crops and marketing them internationally, even if it is only within 
the region and within the African Union. 
 
In Nigeria, for example, the Cocoa Research Institute, the National Institute for Oil Palm 
Research and the tannery for hides and skin have all virtually closed down and so have the 
marketing boards.  The marketing boards were popular in the colonial days when the 
countries operated under the auspices of their mother countries or colonial masters and 
exported their produce to the imperial countries; as independent countries subjected to WTO 
GATT disciplines, the routes are closed.  There is a near absence of extension service officers 
disseminating research results from the universities and research centres to the farmers in 
their co-operatives.  All that is left now are individual holdings with aging farmers and 
declining productivity, with no access to loans and no clout and access to even the regional 
market.  The examples of comparable economies such as Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and 
Taiwan bode well for ECOWAS and other SSA countries. 
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Deere Birkbeck’s and other contributors’ debates on ‘how development should feature in the 
mandate and core principles of the WTO’1217 misses a salient but important point.  This 
research points out that it has already featured.  ‘Trade and Development’ is Part IV of the 
GATT, but it is flouted, frustrated and emasculated by the big trading nations and sidelined in 
the Dispute Settlement Body with development-stalling findings and recommendations.  The 
challenge is how to actualise the substantive provision which seems to have been put in 
Articles XXVI-XXXVIII in a mere perambulatory and hortatory language on purpose.  
Chimni calls for recasting the SDP principle in the language of ‘hard law.’1218  It is submitted 
that the GATT needs to be renegotiated with both the SDP and GSP forming substantive and 
binding exceptions to Articles I and III. 
 
ECOWAS and other developing and least-developed countries should follow the track record 
set by Dr Arjun Sengupta by first getting the WTO to accept ‘nullification and impairment’ 
of economic development as constituting ‘actionable damage,’ a ‘compensatable head of 
damage’ or a ‘recoverable head of damage’1219 to borrow a phrase from, tort law; then insist 
that much like the European Court of Justice makes unification and the supremacy of the 
Union law its target in judicial interpretations, the WTO panels and the Appellate Body must 
be development-friendly in their findings and rulings.  As noted earlier, the DSU limits the 
terms of reference of panels to ‘facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with 
the relevant covered agreements’1220 and the Appellate Body ‘to issues of law covered in the 
panel report and legal interpretation.’1221  It is submitted that these are too restrictive and 
make the dispute settlement system too mechanistic and out of tune with current judicial 
trends as they leave the object and purpose of the WTO outside the terms of reference.  
                                                          
1217
 Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed) (n 85) 611 
1218
 ibid 614. 
1219
 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 
1220
 DSU Article 11. 
1221
 DSU Article 17(6). 
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The developing countries should emulate the UN that designates a year ‘International Year of 
…’ by adopting a sectoral approach to international trade and development.  They could start 
with basic infrastructures such as electricity, water, transport network, education/capacity 
building before taking on small scale industries, large scale industries and export promotion.  
Friedrich List
1222
 and Ha-Joon Chang
1223
 explain that all industrialised and big trading nations 
did the same and built up their effective economic influence.  The argument put forward in 
this research is that ECOWAS and other developing and least-developed countries who feel 
being unduly repressed by the application of Articles I and III should build up effective 
influence through regional organisations and incrementally unite for a common purpose.  
Both development and International Economic Law have been described as a ‘process’ and it 
is submitted that the New International Economic Law with amended Articles I and III of the 
GATT be undertaken as a process.
1224
 
 
ECOWAS should not leave the participation of its Member States at the WTO Ministerial 
Conferences to the financial capacity of individual members.  It should be provided for in the 
ECOWAS regular budget because of the incidence of the macro-economic decisions taken at 
the WTO level on the national economy of every Member State.  This will boost the 
confidence of ECOWAS delegates and give them freedom of thought and of expression.  The 
government officials attending the WTO Ministerials should have the active intellectual 
support of development-friendly scholars in academia and from research centres and 
organisations.  Deere Birkbeck remonstrates that ‘to date (2011), the visibility of 
                                                          
1222
 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, (Longmans, Geen and Co 1885) 
1223
 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, (Anthem Press 
2005) 
1224
 Andreas Lowensfeld, International Economic Law, (2
nd
 ed, Oxford University Press 2008) 927 
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development perspectives on the scholarly debates on global trade governance has been 
weak.’1225 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
There is much misunderstanding about the participation of the developing and the least-
developed countries in the world trading system.  They are using the WTO system at the level 
it suits them best, even if not how they like it most which Kufuor describes as ‘tactical 
participation.’1226  Chapter 4 of this research on trade policy reviews shows that ECOWAS 
Member States are using the administrative law mechanisms
1227
 rather than the litigation or 
dispute settlement mechanism which attracts more media and scholarly attention.  
Administrative law is by no means less law than litigation or the judicial process.  In the 
WTO legal system, trouble-shooting through notifications, consultations, good offices, 
conciliation and mediation are preferred to judicial settlement.
1228
 
 
ECOWAS Member States feel the pangs of the application of the MFN and National 
Treatment principles (Arts I and III) but are navigating their way through them by using 
notifications which serve the purposes ‘commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development.’1229  Their understanding of ‘development is at cross-purposes with the 
industrialised countries.
1230
 
 
                                                          
1225
 Caroly Deere Birkbeck (n 85) 579 
1226
 KO Kufuor, World Trade Governance and Developing Countries: the GATT/WTO Code Committee System 
(The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Blackwell Publishing 2004) 55  
1227
 All ECOWAS Member States have made several notifications of MFN, NT, TBT and SPS measures to the 
Trade Policy Review Body in full compliance with Annex 3 ‘Trade Policy Review Mechanism’ to the GATT 
1994. 
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 See Articles 4, 5 and 22 of the DSU. 
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 Para. 2, The Preamble to the WTO Agreement. 
1230
 M Stocchetti, ‘The Development Dimension or Disillusion? in Y Ngangjoh-Hodu and FAST Matambalya 
(eds), Trade Relations Between the EU and Africa: Development, Challenges and Options Beyond the Cotonou 
Agreement (Routledge 2012) 40-54. 
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There is an inherent paradox in international economic law.  The most important principle of 
international law, Henkin tells us, is pacta sunt servanda
1231
 (agreements are to be kept), the 
nature of world trade law, Hudec highlights is that it is the diplomat’s jurisprudence and so 
the agreements are not meant to be enforced to the letter.
1232
  
 
Again instead of talking about the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) as if development has 
just been newly introduced into the WTO norms, the emphasis should be on giving a legally 
binding force to some Articles of the GATT.  No WTO agreement is hard law.  Perhaps the 
current division between the General Agreement (in force between all WTO Members) and 
the Plurilateral Agreements (in force between WTO Members that signed up to them only) 
needs to be extended further so that the GATT will have a part everybody knows to be legally 
binding and a part that depends on members committing to it.  For the ‘security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’ this thesis argues that it is necessary to have 
a new GATT with some legally binding provisions which no WTO Member State is allowed 
to ‘cherry-pick’ from and a DSB that is pro-development in its interpretation of the 
agreements.  Although Article 96 of the Havana Charter was not carried into the GATT, it 
provided for a legally binding judgment by reference of dispute to the International Court of 
Justice: 
The Organization may, in accordance with arrangements made pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, request from the International Court of Justice 
advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the 
Organization.
1233
 
  
International trade will neither be predictable nor stable until the GATT features a provision 
similar to Article 96 of the Havana Charter.  It provided in paragraph 5 that the ‘Organisation 
                                                          
1231
 Henkin (n 35) 200. 
1232
 Hudec (n 3) 21. 
1233
 Article 96(1) The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter 
for an International Trade Organisation 24 March 1948. 
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shall consider itself bound by the Court’ and so was never reflected in the GATT 1947 or 
1994.  The door to abuse the ‘rules-based’ system was intentionally left open in the interest of 
leading trading nations who prefer the door ajar. Nevertheless I recommend a progressive 
legal development from codes to agreements to economic law; from the Tokyo Codes to the 
WTO Agreements to binding international economic law enshrining the three GATT 
principles of non-discrimination, open markets and fair trade because non-discrimination 
invokes images of market and fairness and is empty of meaning without either of them 
legally embedded in it. 
 
An effective treatment starts with diagnosis of ailment.  All the works published so far from 
Hudec’s Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System in 1987 to the two brilliant 
collection of essays published in 2011: Carolyn Deere Birkbeck edited Making Global Trade 
Work for Development and Tomer Broude and others edited The Politics of International 
Economic Law focus on the effects of the GATT/WTO on developing countries and reforms 
of the WTO.  None of them has identified Articles I and III of the GATT as the linchpins that 
were used to hammer the developing countries to a permanent state of underdevelopment.  
Despite being able to assemble twenty-six stellar scholars for her book from around the 
‘world,’ Carolyn Deere Birkbeck registers one regret that her ‘book does not include a 
dedicated chapter on the particular challenges African countries face in the global trading 
system.’1234  This work fills that yawning gap in literature with a special focus on the fifteen 
West African countries that make up the ECOWAS. 
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ECOWAS lacks visibility in the GATT/WTO system.  Kufuor states that ‘[q]uestion marks 
hang over ECOWAS relevance as an economic body.’1235  No proposal, so far as I know, has 
been presented by ECOWAS as a negotiating coalition whether previously to the GATT or 
currently to the WTO.  As at writing, there has also not been any institutional submission by 
ECOWAS to a WTO panel or the Appellate Body.  Yet each member of ECOWAS is 
inconsequential on its own and insufficiently beneficial to the big trading nations such as the 
US, China the EU or Japan.  The legal analyses carried out here and the legal approaches 
recommended, in sum, show that leaving the GATT is not an option.  Those who left (China, 
Lebanon, Syria and Liberia) fared worse on their own and have either come back or are 
renegotiating their accession. 
 
The GATT 1994 resulting from the Uruguay Round was a renegotiation and 
multilateralisation of the Tokyo codes where like-minded countries agreed to new, legally 
binding commitments without having all GATT Contracting Parties on board.  There is an 
increasing convergence that the GATT is not a balanced and ‘fair’ agreement.1236  Therefore, 
ECOWAS should team up and form a strong coalition with the G11, G20 and G90 as well as 
with the African Union, the ACP countries and other pro-development states to renegotiate 
both the MFN and the National Treatment principles and refuse to be distracted by pressure 
or with ‘inducements’ from the developed countries.  The US and France introduced labour 
standards in Singapore (the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ which the developing countries saw 
as an attempt to cancel out their competitiveness in the labour market) in 1996 and the US 
sponsored the formation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
1237
 and 
lured some countries away from the G20 made up of developing countries when it was 
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2006) 128 
1236
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getting better organised, more articulate and respected and so reduced their momentum and 
weakened their influence. 
 
The first approach should be a legislative amendment that will substantially alter the GATT 
1994 without inciting the US and the EU to turn their back on the GATT.  Taking on a 
hodgepodge of issues, all at the same time, is self-defeating.  Multilateral trade negotiations 
are a process and should be pursued incrementally as such.  ‘By 1939,’ writes Hudec, ‘the 
organising principle for rich-poor relationships had been colonialism;’1238 this research adds 
that after the Second World War, the organising principle changed from colonialism to 
institutionalism, chiefly, through the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO.  Since the 
nationalist movements were able to force the imperial powers to give up the odious forms of 
colonialism, they can also be ‘forced’ to relinquish the ‘wrong and harmful’ aspects of 
institutionalism through a protracted but persistent process of trade negotiations. 
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Appendix 1 
ANNEX 1 
 
WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
 
 
WT/DS246/7 
8 January 2004 
 (04-0070) 
  
 Original:   English 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANTING OF  
TARIFF PREFERENCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities 
under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") 
 
 
 The following notification, dated 8 January 2004, from the Permanent Delegation of the 
European Commission, is being circulated to Members.   
 
_______________ 
 
 Pursuant to Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the 
European Communities hereby notifies its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of 
law covered in the report of the panel established in response to the request from India in the dispute 
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European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries  
(WT/DS246R). 
 
 The European Communities seeks review of the Panel's legal conclusion that the Special 
Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking provided in Council Regulation (EC)  
No. 2501/2001 (the "Drug Arrangements") are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the  General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade 1994 (the "GATT"). This conclusion is based on the following erroneous legal 
findings:  
 
- that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT;  
 
- that the Enabling Clause does not exclude the applicability of Article I:1 of the GATT;  
 
- that the EC had the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements were consistent with the 
Enabling Clause. 
 
 The above legal conclusion, and the related legal findings and interpretations are set out in 
paragraphs 7.31 to 7.60 and 8.1 (b) and (c) of the Panel report. 
 
 India did not make any claims under the Enabling Clause and, therefore, the Appellate Body 
should refrain from examining the consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause. 
However, if the Appellate Body were to uphold the Panel's conclusion that the Drug Arrangements 
are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT, or if the Appellate Body were to decide that India made 
a valid claim under the Enabling Clause, the European Communities appeals subsidiarily the Panel's 
legal conclusion that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements 
are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause". That conclusion is based on the following 
erroneous legal findings: 
 
- that "the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a) requires that identical 
tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, 
except for the implementation of a priori limitations"; and 
 
- that the term "developing countries" in Paragraph 2(a) means all developing countries. 
 
 This legal conclusion and the related legal findings and interpretations are set out in 
paragraphs 7.61-7.177 and 8.1(d) of the Panel report. 
 
 Finally the EC seeks review of the Panel's legal conclusion that the European Communities 
has nullified or impaired benefits accrued to India under GATT 1994, which is set out in 
paragraph 8.1(f) of the Panel report  
 
_______________ 
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Appendix 2 
 
ANNEX 2 
 
DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT 
RECIPROCITY AND FULLER PARTICIPATION 
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Decision of 28 November 1979 
(L/4903) 
 
 Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES  decide as follows: 
 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties 
may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries
1
, without according 
such treatment to other contracting parties. 
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:
2
 
 
 (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products 
originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences,
3
 
 
 (b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the 
General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments 
multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT; 
 
 (c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting 
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions 
which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination 
of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another 
 
 (d) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the 
context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries. 
 
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: 
 
  (a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not 
to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties; 
 
 (b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis; 
 
 
1
 The words "developing countries" as used in this text are to be understood to refer also to developing 
territories. 
2
 It would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an  ad hoc  basis under the GATT 
provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and more favourable treatment not falling within the 
scope of this paragraph. 
3
 As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment 
of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" 
(BISD 18S/24). 
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 (c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to 
developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries. 
 
4. Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 
and 3 above or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or withdrawal of the differential 
and more favourable treatment so provided shall:
4
 
 
 (a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the information they 
may deem appropriate relating to such action; 
 
 (b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any interested 
contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. The CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such contracting party, consult with all contracting parties 
concerned with respect to the matter with a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such 
contracting parties. 
 
5. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade 
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing countries, i.e., the 
developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to 
make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade 
needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting 
parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latters' development, financial 
and trade needs. 
 
6. Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, financial 
and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall exercise the utmost 
restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments made by them to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, and the least-developed countries shall 
not be expected to make concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of 
their particular situation and problems. 
 
7. The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by developed and less-
developed contracting parties under the provisions of the General Agreement should promote the 
basic objectives of the Agreement, including those embodied in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI. 
Less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions or negotiated 
concessions or take other mutually agreed action under the provisions and procedures of the General 
Agreement would improve with the progressive development of their economies and improvement in 
their trade situation and they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of 
rights and obligations under the General Agreement. 
 
8. Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed countries in 
making concessions and contributions in view of their special economic situation and their 
development, financial and trade needs. 
 
9. The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the operation of these 
provisions, bearing in mind the need for individual and joint efforts by contracting parties to meet the 
development needs of developing countries and the objectives of the General Agreement. 
 
4
 Nothing in these provisions shall affect the rights of contracting parties under the General 
Agreement. 
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Appendix 3 
Consolidated Version of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement 
Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 and revised 
again in Ougadougou on 22 June 2010 
ARTICLE 34 
Objectives 
1. Economic and trade cooperation shall aim at fostering the smooth and gradual 
integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for their political 
choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and 
contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries. 
 
2. The ultimate objective of economic and trade cooperation is to enable the ACP States to 
play a full part in international trade. In this context, particular regard shall be had to the 
need for the ACP States to participate actively in multilateral trade negotiations. Given the 
current level of development of the ACP countries, economic and trade cooperation shall be 
directed at enabling the ACP States to manage the challenges of globalisation and to adapt 
progressively to new conditions of international trade thereby facilitating their transition to 
the liberalised global economy. In this context, close attention should be paid to many ACP 
countries' vulnerability resulting from their dependency on commodities or a few key 
products, including value-added agro-industry products, and the risk of preference erosion. 
 
3. To this end economic and trade cooperation shall aim, through national and regional 
development strategies as defined in Title I, at enhancing the production, supply and trading 
capacity of the ACP countries as well as their capacity to attract investment. It shall further 
aim at creating a new trading dynamic between the Parties, at strengthening the ACP 
countries trade and investment policies, at reducing their dependency on commodities, at 
promoting more diversified economies and at improving the ACP countries’ capacity to 
handle all issues related to trade. 
 
4. Economic and trade cooperation shall be implemented in full conformity with the 
provisions of the WTO, including special and differential treatment, taking account of the 
Parties’ mutual interests and their respective levels of development. It shall also address the 
effects of preference erosion in full conformity with multilateral commitments. 
 
 
ARTICLE 35 
Principles 
1. Economic and trade cooperation shall be based on a true, strengthened and strategic 
partnership. It shall further be based on a comprehensive approach which builds on the 
strengths and achievements of the previous ACP-EC Conventions. 
 
2. Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP 
States. Cooperation in support of regional cooperation and integration as defined in Title I 
and economic and trade cooperation shall be mutually reinforcing. Economic and trade 
cooperation shall address, in particular, supply and demand side constraints, notably 
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interconnectivity of infrastructure, economic diversification and trade development measures 
as a means of enhancing ACP States' competitiveness. Appropriate weight shall therefore be 
given to the corresponding measures in the ACP States' and regions' development strategies, 
which the Community shall support, in particular through the provision of aid for trade. 
 
3. Economic and trade cooperation shall take account of the different needs and levels of 
development of the ACP countries and regions. In this context, the Parties reaffirm their 
attachment to ensuring special and differential treatment for all ACP countries and to 
maintaining special treatment for ACP LDCs and to taking due account of the vulnerability of 
small, landlocked and island countries. 
 
 
ARTICLE 36 
Modalities 
 
1. In view of the objectives and principles set out above, the Parties agree to take all the 
necessary measures to ensure the conclusion of new WTO-compatible Economic Partnership 
Agreements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing 
cooperation in all areas relevant to trade. 
 
2. The Economic Partnership Agreements, as development instruments, aim to foster smooth 
and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, especially by making full 
use of the potential of regional integration and South-South trade. 
3. The Parties agree that these new trading arrangements shall be introduced gradually. 
O.J. L287 04 November 2010. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement  
The Cotonou Agreement’s main objectives are the reduction and eventual eradication of 
poverty and the gradual integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific States into the global 
economy, whilst adhering to the aims of sustainable development. 
ACT 
Partnership agreement 2000/483/EC between the members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000. 
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SUMMARY 
The Cotonou Agreement offers a framework for the European Union’s (EU) cooperation 
relations for the economic, social and cultural development of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific States (ACP). 
Centred on the target of reducing, and in the longer-term, eradicating poverty, the cooperation 
must also contribute to the peace and security and the democratic and political stability of the 
ACP states. In this regard, the partners to the agreement shall act jointly to gradually achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The Cotonou Agreement is based on equality between the partners and ownership of the 
development strategies. It was signed on 23 June 2000 for a period of 20 years and may be 
revised every five years. 
Political dimension  
The Agreement has a strong political dimension resulting in: 
 regular political dialogue, aimed at strengthening cooperation and promoting an 
effective system of multilateralism; 
 peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution. In this field, the 
partnership concentrates on regional initiatives and on building local capacities, and 
also on the involvement of regional organisations such at the African Union; 
 promoting human rights, democratic principles based on the rule of law and 
transparent and accountable governance. A new procedure has been developed for 
cases of violation of these elements, stressing the responsibility of the country in 
question; 
 identifying questions of common interest connected with general (regional 
integration) or specific (trade, military expenditure, drugs, organised crime, child 
labour and discrimination) issues; 
 developing cooperation strategies, including an agenda for aid efficiency, sectoral 
policies concerning the environment, climate change, gender equality and migration; 
 attention paid to the subject of security, in particular with regard to countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, provisions on the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, provisions on international cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism and illegal trafficking. 
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The political dialogue is conducted in a flexible way, under either a formal or an informal 
framework and at the most appropriate territorial level. The regional organisations and 
national parliaments may also participate. 
The Agreement envisages a substantial role for non-State actors (NSAs) during the design 
and implementation of development strategies and programmes. In particular, the NSAs are 
local authorities, civil society organisations and the private sector, which have access to 
specific partnership financing. 
Development strategies and poverty reduction  
The Agreement is based on an integrated approach which includes actions for promoting 
economic, social and human development, as well as regional integration. The action 
priorities are set for each country in accordance with the principle of differentiation. 
Economic development focuses on: 
 macro-economic and structural policies and reforms; 
 sectoral policies (in particular, developing the industrial, agricultural, tourism, fisheries 
and traditional knowledge sectors); 
 investment and development of the private sector, in particular the cooperation supports 
public sector investment in infrastructure which promotes the development of the 
private sector, economic growth and poverty eradication. 
The key elements of social and human development concern: 
 sectoral social policies regarding improving education, health and nutrition systems; 
 youth issues, in particular participation in public life and exchanges between the 
partner countries; 
 health and access to services, fighting diseases connected with poverty and sexual and 
reproductive health protection; 
 cultural development. 
Regional cooperation and integration are aimed at facilitating development in all sectors. 
Cooperation must also support inter- regional and intra-ACP cooperation schemes and 
initiatives, including those involving non-ACP developing countries. Regional cooperation 
and integration seek, among other things, to: 
 accelerate diversification of the ACP States' economies; 
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 promote and expand trade, which equally benefits the least developed countries 
(LDCs) among the ACP States; 
 implement sectoral reform policies at regional level. 
Lastly, the development strategies systematically take into account three cross-cutting 
issues: 
 gender equality; 
 sustainable management of the environment and natural resources; 
 institutional development and capacity building. 
Economic and trade cooperation  
The Agreement complies with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. It enables the 
ACP States to play a full part in international trade. 
It provides for the negotiation of regional economic partnership agreements with a view to 
liberalising trade. 
The Agreement highlights the vulnerable situation of the ACP states and the importance of 
cooperation and trade assistance. In this respect, cooperation on trade matters is not restricted 
to trading activities; it also extends to the protection of intellectual property rights and 
compliance with international labour standards. 
The most vulnerable states  
Special treatment is granted to the least developed, landlocked and island ACP States, and to 
post-conflict countries. They receive special attention in certain areas, namely on matters 
relating to food security, regional cooperation, transport infrastructure and communications. 
Joint institutions  
The Council of Ministers meets once a year. It consists of members of the Council of the 
EU, the Commission and a member of the government of each ACP State. The presidency is 
held in turn by a member of the Council of the EU and by a member of the government of an 
ACP State. 
It conducts the political dialogue and ensures that the Agreement is properly implemented. It 
may take decisions that are binding on the parties and draw up resolutions, recommendations 
and opinions. It may also delegate responsibilities to the Committee of Ambassadors. It 
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presents an annual report to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the implementation of the 
Agreement. 
The Committee of Ambassadors assists the Council of Ministers. It is made up of each 
Member State permanent representative to the EU, a Commission representative and a head 
of mission for each ACP State to the EU. Its presidency is held in turn by the representative 
of an EU Member State and by an ACP State. 
The Joint Parliamentary Assembly is an advisory body made up of an equal number of 
Members of the European Parliament and representatives of the ACP States. The Assembly 
may adopt resolutions and submit recommendations to the Council of Ministers. It meets 
twice a year in plenary session, alternating between the EU and an ACP country. The 
members of parliament may also meet at regional or subregional level if desired. 
Violation of essential elements of the Agreement  
The Agreement lays down measures in cases of non-compliance with the requirements of 
essential elements of the Agreement, namely respect for human rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law. 
The Agreement provides for a preliminary consultation procedure, however, in the absence of 
an acceptable solution, supplementary measures may be taken, including suspension of the 
Agreement, although this is a last resort. 
Context  
The Cotonou Agreement represents a new phase in the cooperation between the ACP states 
and the EU. For certain ACP states, the cooperation started with the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. It was extended with the two Yaoundé conventions and the four Lomé 
conventions. 
Source: 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r121
01_en.htm> accessed 20 June 2012. 
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Appendix 4 
EEC Treaty of Rome 1957  
PART FOUR — The Association of Overseas Countries 
and Territories 
Article 131 The Member States hereby agree to bring into association with the Community 
the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. These countries and territories, hereinafter referred to as 
“the countries and territories”, are listed in Annex IV to this Treaty. 
The purpose of this association shall be to promote the economic and social development of 
the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the 
Community as a whole. 
In conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, this association shall 
in the first place permit the furthering of the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of 
these countries and territories in such a manner as to lead them to the economic, social and 
cultural development which they expect. 
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A/RES/41/128  
 
General Assembly 
Distr. GENERAL   
4 December 1986  
ORIGINAL: 
ENGLISH 
 
 
                                                   A/RES/41/128 
                                                   4 December 1986 
                                                   97th plenary meeting 
  
         41/128.    Declaration on the Right to Development 
  
     The General Assembly, 
  
     Having considered the question of the right to development, 
  
     Decides to adopt the Declaration on the Right to Development, the text 
of 
which is annexed to the present resolution. 
  
  
                                    ANNEX 
                   Declaration on the Right to Development 
  
     The General Assembly, 
  
     Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations relating to the achievement of international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
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humanitarian 
nature, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language 
or 
religion, 
  
     Recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, 
cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of 
the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis 
of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in 
the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom, 
  
     Considering that under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully 
realized, 
  
     Recalling the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 
  
     Recalling further the relevant agreements, conventions, resolutions, 
recommendations and other instruments of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies concerning the integral development of the human 
being, economic and social progress and development of all peoples, 
including those instruments concerning decolonization, the prevention of 
discrimination, respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
further promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter,  
  
     Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of 
which they have the right freely to determine their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, 
  
     Recalling also the right of peoples to exercise, subject to the 
relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, full 
and complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources, 
  
     Mindful of the obligation of States under the Charter to promote 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status, 
  
     Considering that the elimination of the massive and flagrant 
violations of the human rights of the peoples and individuals affected by 
situations such as those resulting from colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, foreign 
domination and occupation, aggression and threats against national 
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and threats of war 
would contribute to the establishment of circumstances propitious to the 
development of a great part of mankind, 
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     Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as 
well as to the complete fulfilment of human beings and of peoples, 
constituted, inter alia, by the denial of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, and considering that all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that, in order 
to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion 
of, respect for and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental 
freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, 
  
     Considering that international peace and security are essential 
elements for the realization of the right to development, 
  
     Reaffirming that there is a close relationship between disarmament and 
development and that progress in the field of disarmament would 
considerably promote progress in the field of development and that 
resources released through disarmament measures should be devoted to the 
economic and social development and well-being of all peoples and, in 
particular, those of the developing countries, 
  
     Recognizing that the human person is the central subject of the 
development process and that development policy should therefore make the 
human being the main participant and beneficiary of development, 
  
     Recognizing that the creation of conditions favourable to the 
development of peoples and individuals is the primary responsibility of 
their States, 
  
     Aware that efforts at the international level to promote and protect 
human rights should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new 
international 
economic order, 
  
     Confirming that the right to development is an inalienable human right 
and that equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of 
nations and of individuals who make up nations, 
  
     Proclaims the following Declaration on the Right to Development: 
  
                                  Article 1 
     1.   The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be 
fully realized. 
  
     2.   The human right to development also implies the full realization 
of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to 
the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, 
the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their 
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natural wealth and resources. 
  
                                  Article 2 
     1.   The human person is the central subject of development and should 
be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development. 
  
     2.   All human beings have a responsibility for development, 
individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full 
respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their 
duties to the community, which alone can ensure the free and complete 
fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore promote and 
protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for 
development. 
  
     3.   States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate 
national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of 
their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the 
fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom. 
  
                                  Article 3 
     1.   States have the primary responsibility for the creation of 
national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the 
right to development. 
  
     2.   The realization of the right to development requires full respect 
for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and 
co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.  
  
     3.   States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring 
development and eliminating obstacles to development.  States should 
realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote 
a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well 
as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights. 
  
                                  Article 4 
     1.   States have the duty to take steps, individually and 
collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view 
to facilitating the full realization of the right to development. 
  
     2.   Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of 
developing countries.  As a complement to the efforts of developing 
countries, effective international co-operation is essential in providing 
these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their 
comprehensive development. 
                                  Article 5 
     States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant 
violations of the human rights of peoples and human beings affected by 
situations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racism and 
racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and occupation, 
aggression, foreign interference and threats against national sovereignty, 
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national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to 
recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. 
  
                                  Article 6 
     1.   All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, 
encouraging and strengthening universal respect for and observance of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion. 
  
     2.   All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to 
the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
  
     3.   States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development 
resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
  
                                  Article 7 
     All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and 
strengthening of international peace and security and, to that end, should 
do their utmost to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control, as well as to ensure that the resources released by 
effective disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development, in 
particular that of the developing countries. 
  
                                  Article 8 
     1.   States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary 
measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, 
inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the 
fair distribution of income.  Effective measures should be undertaken to 
ensure that women have an active role in the development process.  
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view 
to eradicating all social injustices. 
  
     2.   States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as 
an important factor in development and in the full realization of all human 
rights. 
                                  Article 9 
     1.   All the aspects of the right to development set forth in the 
present Declaration are indivisible and interdependent and each of them 
should be considered in the context of the whole. 
  
     2.   Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or as 
implying that any State, group or person has a right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the violation of the rights set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International 
Covenants on Human Rights. 
 
                                  Article 10 
     Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive 
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enhancement of the right to development, including the formulation, 
adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other measures at 
the national and international levels. 
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Resolution adopted by the General Assembly  
3201 (S-VI). Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order  
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The General Assembly  
Adopts the following Declaration:  
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order 
We, the Members of the United Nations,  
Having convened a special session of the General Assembly to study for the 
first time the problems of raw materials and development, devoted to the 
consideration of the most important economic problems facing the world 
community,  
Bearing in mind the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations to promote the economic advancement and social progress of all 
peoples,  
Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work urgently for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign 
equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, 
irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities 
and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap 
between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily 
accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present 
and future generations, and, to that end, declare:  
1. The greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades has 
been the independence from colonial and alien domination of a large number of 
peoples and nations which has enabled them to become members of the 
community of free peoples. Technological progress has also been made in all 
spheres of economic activities in the last three decades, thus providing a solid 
potential for improving the well-being of all peoples. However, the remaining 
vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial 
discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be 
among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the 
developing countries and all the peoples involved. The benefits of technological 
progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community. 
The developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world's population, 
account for only 30 per cent of the worlds income. It has proved impossible to 
achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under 
the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and 
the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at 
a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent 
States and which perpetuates inequality.  
2. The present international economic order is in direct conflict with current 
developments in international political and economic relations. Since 1970 the 
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world economy has experienced a series of grave crises which have had severe 
repercussions, especially on the developing countries because of their generally 
greater vulnerability to external economic impulses. The developing world has 
become a powerful factor that makes its influence felt in all fields of international 
activity. These irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world 
necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in 
the formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international 
community.  
3. All these changes have thrust into prominence the reality of 
interdependence of all the members of the world community. Current events have 
brought into sharp focus the realization that the interests of the developed 
countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from 
each other, that there is a close interrelationship between the prosperity of the 
developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, 
and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon 
the prosperity of its constituent parts. International co-operation for development 
is the shared goal and common duty of all countries. Thus the political, economic 
and social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever 
on co-operation between all the members of the international community on the 
basis of sovereign equality and the removal of the disequilibrium that exists 
between them.  
4. The new international economic order should be founded on full respect 
for the following principles:  
a. Sovereign equality of States, self-determination of all peoples, 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;  
b. The broadest co-operation of all the States members of the international 
community, based on equity, whereby the prevailing disparities in the 
world may be banished and prosperity secured for all;  
c. Full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all countries in 
the solving of world economic problems in the common interest of all 
countries, bearing in mind the necessity to ensure the accelerated 
development of all the developing countries, while devoting particular 
attention to the adoption of special measures in favour of the least 
developed land-locked and island developing countries as well as those 
developing countries most seriously affected by economic crises and 
natural calamities, without losing sight of the interests of other developing 
countries;  
d. The right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it 
deems the most appropriate for its own development and not to be 
subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result;  
e. Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and 
all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is 
entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with 
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization 
or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of 
the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to 
economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and 
374 
 
full exercise of this inalienable right;  
f. The right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, 
alien and colonial domination or apartheid to restitution and full 
compensation for the exploitation arid depletion of, and damages to, the 
natural resources and all other resources of those States, territories and 
peoples;  
g. Regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations 
by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the 
countries where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of 
the full sovereignty of those countries;  
h. The right of the developing countries and the peoples of territories under 
colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation to achieve their 
liberation and to regain effective control over their natural resources and 
economic activities;  
i. The extending of assistance to developing countries, peoples and 
territories which are under colonial and alien domination, foreign 
occupation, racial discrimination or apartheid or are subjected to 
economic, political or any other type of coercive measures to obtain from 
them the subordination of the exercise of their sovereign rights and to 
secure from them advantages of any kind, and to neo colonialism in all its 
forms, and which have established or are endeavouring to establish 
effective control over their natural resources and economic activities that 
have been or are still under foreign control;  
j. Just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, 
primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods 
exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary 
commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment imported by 
them with the aim of bringing about sustained improvement in their 
unsatisfactory terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy;  
k. Extension of active assistance to developing countries by the whole 
international community, free of any political or military conditions;  
l. Ensuring that one of the main aims of the reformed international 
monetary system shall be the promotion of the development of the 
developing countries and the adequate flow of real resources to them;  
m. Improving the competitiveness of natural materials facing competition 
from synthetic substitutes;  
n. Preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, 
wherever feasible, in all fields of international economic co-operation 
whenever possible;  
o. Securing favourable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to 
developing countries.  
p. Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern 
science and technology, and promoting the transfer of technology and the 
creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing 
countries in forms and in accordance with procedures which are suited to 
their economies;  
q. The need for all States to put an end to the waste of natural resources, 
including food products;  
r. The need for developing countries to concentrate all their resources for 
the cause of development;  
s. The strengthening, through individual and collective actions, of mutual 
economic, trade, financial and technical co-operation among the 
developing countries, mainly on a preferential basis;  
t. Facilitating the role which producers' associations may play within the 
375 
 
framework of international co-operation and, in pursuance of their aims, 
inter alia assisting in the promotion of sustained growth of the world 
economy and accelerating the development of developing countries.  
5. The unanimous adoption of the International Development Strategy for the 
Second United Nations Development Decade (Resolution 2626 (XXV)) was an 
important step in the promotion of international economic co-operation on a just 
and equitable basis. The accelerated implementation of obligations and 
commitments assumed by the international community within the framework of 
the Strategy, particularly those concerning imperative development needs of 
developing countries, would contribute significantly to the fulfilment of the aims 
and objectives of the present Declaration.  
6. The United Nations as a universal organization should be capable of 
dealing with problems of international economic co-operation in a comprehensive 
manner and ensuring equally the interests of all countries. It must have an even 
greater role in the establishment of a new international economic order. The 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, for the preparation of which the 
present Declaration will provide an additional source of inspiration, will 
constitute a significant contribution in this respect. All the States Members of the 
United Nations are therefore called upon to exert maximum efforts with a view to 
securing the implementation of the present Declaration, which is one of the 
principal guarantees for the creation of better conditions for all peoples to reach a 
life worthy of human dignity.  
7. The present Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order shall be one of the most important bases of economic relations 
between all peoples and all nations.  
2229th plenary meeting  
1 May 1974  
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Appendix 7 
Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on 
Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 
at 3 (1968). 
 
The International Conference on Human Rights, 
Having met at Teheran from April 22 to May 13, 1968 to review the progress made in the 
twenty years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to 
formulate a programme for the future, 
Having considered the problems relating to the activities of the United Nations for the 
promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted by the Conference, 
Noting that the observance of the International Year for Human Rights takes place at a time 
when the world is undergoing a process of unprecedented change, 
Having regard to the new opportunities made available by the rapid progress of science and 
technology, 
Believing that, in an age when conflict and violence prevail in many parts of the world, the 
fact of human interdependence and the need for human solidarity are more evident than ever 
before, 
Recognizing that peace is the universal aspiration of mankind and that peace and justice are 
indispensable to the full realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Solemnly proclaims that: 
1. It is imperative that the members of the international community fulfil their solemn 
obligations to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinctions of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinions; 
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2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding of the peoples 
of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human 
family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community; 
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination as well as other conventions and declarations in the field of 
human rights adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and 
the regional intergovernmental organizations, have created new standards and obligations to 
which States should conform; 
4. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the United Nations has 
made substantial progress in defining standards for the enjoyment and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. During this period many important international 
instruments were adopted but much remains to be done in regard to the implementation of 
those rights and freedoms; 
5. The primary aim of the United Nations in the sphere of human rights is the achievement by 
each individual of the maximum freedom and dignity. For the realization of this objective, the 
laws of every country should grant each individual, irrespective of race, language, religion or 
political belief, freedom of expression, of information, of conscience and of religion, as well 
as the right to participate in the political, economic, cultural and social life of his country; 
6. States should reaffirm their determination effectively to enforce the principles enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations and in other international instruments that concern human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; 
7. Gross denials of human rights under the repugnant policy of apartheid is a matter of the 
gravest concern to the international community. This policy of apartheid, condemned as a 
crime against humanity, continues seriously to disturb international peace and security. It is 
therefore imperative for the international community to use every possible means to eradicate 
this evil. The struggle against apartheid is recognized as legitimate; 
8. The peoples of the world must be made fully aware of the evils of racial discrimination and 
must join in combating them. The implementation of this principle of non-discrimination, 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and other international instruments in the field of human rights, constitutes a most urgent task 
of mankind at the international as well as at the national level. All ideologies based on racial 
superiority and intolerance must be condemned and resisted; 
9. Eight years after the General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples the problems of colonialism continue to preoccupy the 
international community. It is a matter of urgency that all Member States should co-operate 
with the appropriate organs of the United Nations so that effective measures can be taken to 
ensure that the Declaration is fully implemented; 
10. Massive denials of human rights, arising out of aggression or any armed conflict with 
their tragic consequences, and resulting in untold human misery, engender reactions which 
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could engulf the world in ever growing hostilities. It is the obligation of the international 
community to co-operate in eradicating such scourges; 
11. Gross denials of human rights arising from discrimination on grounds of race, religion, 
belief or expressions of opinion outrage the conscience of mankind and endanger the 
foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world; 
12. The widening gap between the economically developed and developing countries 
impedes the realization of human rights in the international community. The failure of the 
Development Decade to reach its modest objectives makes it all the more imperative for 
every nation, according to its capacities, to make the maximum possible effort to close this 
gap; 
13. Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil 
and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is 
impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is 
dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and 
social development; 
14. The existence of over seven hundred million illiterates throughout the world is an 
enormous obstacle to all efforts at realizing the aims and purposes of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
International action aimed at eradicating illiteracy from the face of the earth and promoting 
education at all levels requires urgent attention; 
15. The discrimination of which women are still victims in various regions of the world must 
be eliminated. An inferior status for women is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
as well as the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The full 
implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is a 
necessity for the progress of mankind; 
16. The protection of the family and of the child remains the concern of the international 
community. Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number 
and the spacing of their children; 
17. The aspirations of the younger generation for a better world, in which human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are fully implemented, must be given the highest encouragement. It is 
imperative that youth participate in shaping the future of mankind; 
18. While recent scientific discoveries and technological advances have opened vast 
prospects for economic, social and cultural progress, such developments may nevertheless 
endanger the rights and freedoms of individuals and will require continuing attention; 
19. Disarmament would release immense human and material resources now devoted to 
military purposes. These resources should be used for the promotion of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. General and complete disarmament is one of the highest aspirations 
of all peoples; 
Therefore, 
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The International Conference on Human Rights, 
1. Affirming its faith in the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international instruments in this field, 
2. Urges all peoples and governments to dedicate themselves to the principles enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to redouble their efforts to provide for all 
human beings a life consonant with freedom and dignity and conducive to physical, mental, 
social and spiritual welfare. 
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Appendix 8 
UNGA Resolution 32/130, Alternative Approaches and Ways within the United Nations 
System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
1. Decides that the approach to the future work within the United Nations system 
with respect to human rights questions should take into account the following 
concepts:  
a. All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil 
and political, and economic, social and cultural rights; 
b. ‘The full realisation of civil and political rights without the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible; the achievement 
of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent 
upon sound and effective national and international policies of 
economic and social development’ as recognised by the Proclamation 
of Tehran of 1968 (paragraph 13);  
c.  All human rights and fundamental freedoms of the human person and 
of peoples are inalienable. 
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Appendix 9 
The TREATY OF  ECOWAS, Cotonou, 24 July 1993 
CHAPTER II  
 ESTABLISHMENT, COMPOSITION, AIMS AND 
  OBJECTIVES AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
 OF THE COMMUNITY 
 ARTICLE 2 :  ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION  
1. THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, by this Treaty, hereby re-affirm the 
establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): and decide 
that it shall ultimately be the sole economic community in the region for the purpose of 
economic integration and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic 
Community.  
2. The members of the Community, hereinafter referred to as "the Member States," shall be 
the States that ratify this treaty.  
ARTICLE 3 : AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
1.  The aims of the Community are to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its 
peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member 
States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent.  
2.   In order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, ensure;  
a) the harmonisation and co-ordination of national policies and the promotion of integration 
programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, 
industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, 
economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, 
technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters;  
 b) the harmonisation and co-ordination of policies for the protection of the   environment;  
 c) the promotion of the establishment of joint production enterprises;  
 d) the establishment of a common market through:  
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i) the liberalisation of trade by the abolition, among Member States, of customs duties levied 
on imports and exports, and the abolition among Member States, of non-tariff barriers in 
order to establish a free trade area at the Community level;  
ii)  the adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-a-vis third 
countries;  
iii)  the removal, between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
goods, service and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment;  
 
e) the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common policies in the 
economic, financial social and cultural sectors, and the creation of a monetary union.  
f) the promotion of joint ventures by private sectors enterprises and other economic operators, 
in particular through the adoption of a regional agreement on cross-border investments;  
g) the adoption of measures for the integration of the private sectors, particularly the 
creation   of an enabling environment to promote small and medium scale enterprises;  
h) the establishment of an enabling legal environment;  
i) the harmonisation of national investment codes leading to the adoption of a single 
Community investment code;  
j) the harmonisation of standards and measures;  
k) the promotion of balanced development of the region, paying attention to the special 
problems of each Member State particularly those of landlocked and small island Member 
States;  
 l) the encouragement and strengthening of relations and the promotion of the flow of 
information particularly among rural populations, women and youth organisations and socio-
professional organisations such as associations of the media, business men and women, 
workers, and trade unions;  
m) the adoption of a Community population policy which takes into account the need for a 
balance between demographic factors and socioeconomic development;  
n) the establishment of a fund for co-operation, compensation and development; and  
o) any other activity that Member States may decide to undertake jointly with a view to 
attaining Community objectives.  
 
CHAPTER III  
 INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY - ESTABLISHMENT,  COMPOSITION 
AND FUNCTIONS  
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 ARTICLE 6 : INSTITUTIONS  
1. The Institutions of the Community shall be:  
a) the Authority of Heads of State and Government; 
b) the Council of Ministers; 
c) the Community Parliament; 
d) the Economic and Social Council; 
e) the Community Court of Justice; 
f) the Executive Secretariat; 
g) the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development; 
h) Specialised Technical Commissions; and 
i) Any other institutions that may be established by the Authority.  
2. The Institutions of the Community shall perform their functions and act within the limits of 
the powers conferred on them by this Treaty and by the Protocols relating thereto.  
 
 ARTICLE 13 
 THE COMMUNITY PARLIAMENT  
   1. There is hereby established a Parliament of the Community.  
   2. The method of election of the Members of the Community Parliament, its composition. 
functions, powers and organisation shall be defined in a Protocol relating thereto.  
 ARTICLE 14 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL  
1. There is hereby established an Economic and Social Council which shall have an advisory 
role and whose composition shall include representatives of the various categories of 
economic and social activity.  
2. The composition, functions and organisation of the Economic and Social Council shall be 
defined in a Protocol relating thereto.  
 ARTICLE 15 THE COURT OF JUSTICE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS  
1. There is hereby established a Court of Justice of the Community.  
2. The status, composition, powers, procedure and other issues concerning the Court of 
Justice shall be as set out in a Protocol relating thereto.  
3.  The Court of Justice shall carry out the functions assigned to it independently of the 
Member States and the institutions of the Community.  
4. Judgements of the, Court of Justice shall be binding on the Member States, the Institutions 
of the Community and on individuals and corporate bodies.  
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ARTICLE 16 ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS  
   1. There is hereby established an Arbitration Tribunal of the Community.  
   2. The status, composition, powers, procedure and other issues concerning the Arbitration 
Tribunal shall be as set out in a Protocol relating thereto.  
Appendix 10 
 
ECOWAS Member States   
   The Republic of BENIN 
   BURKINA FASO 
   The Republic of CABO VERDE 
   The Republic of COTE D'IVOIRE 
   The Republic of GAMBIA 
   The Republic of  GHANA 
  The Republic of GUINEE 
   The Republic of GUINEE BISSAU 
   The Republic of LIBERIA 
   The Republic of MALI 
 
   The Republic of NIGER 
   The Republic of  NIGERIA 
   The Republic of SENEGAL 
   The Republic of SIERRA LEONE 
  TOGOLESE Republic 
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Appendix 11 
The Leutwiler Report: Trade Policy for a Better Future 
Introduction and Summary by Arthur Dunkel, Director-General, GATT 
 
The decade of inflation, unemployment and stagnation which began in 1973 has been 
succeeded by the beginning of an economic upturn – but that long-sought recovery is far 
from secure. 
 
In the industrialised nations, unemployment remains high and growth is still relatively weak.  
In the developing world, there is a shortage of the domestic and external resources needed for 
growth, and in some countries huge foreign debts threaten to abort recovery before it can 
begin.  Even in the United States, where the economy has improved most visibly, it remains 
an open question whether and how long the growth can be sustained. 
 
The challenge is clear.  How can the current upturn become the beginning of a new era of 
non-inflationary growth, lower unemployment and rising standards of living? 
 
Open international trade is a key to sustained growth.  Trade opens vast markets to each 
nation’s enterprises.  It carries technology and innovation around the world.  It spurs each 
nation to greater productivity.   
 
Today, however, the world market is not opening up; instead it is being choked by a growing 
accumulation of restrictive measures.  Demands for protection are heard in every country, 
and from one industry after another.  The trading rules set under the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade are increasingly ignored or evaded.   
 
In the industrialised world, countries have imposed a patchwork of restrictions on their 
imports, sometimes disguising them with the polite name of ‘voluntary export restraints’.  
Everywhere, governments increasingly provide subsidies to favoured industries and to 
farmers.  In many developing countries, measures to protect infant industries and preserve 
foreign exchange have outlived their usefulness. 
 
Demands for protection may be understandable during periods of economic stagnation and 
hardship.  To workers facing the loss of their jobs, the real but intangible promises of free 
trade must come as cold comfort.  But trade restrictions act only as brakes on each economy’s 
ability to take advantage of new technology, and to grow.  If today’s threatened workers – 
and their children – are to be assured of abundant jobs in growing economies, they will need 
the opportunities offered by more open trade.  They will also need bold programmes to 
enable them to benefit from these opportunities, including short-term adjustment assistance 
and long-term education.   
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If the trend towards trade restrictions continues, the sustained economic growth we seek will 
become impossible.  The current signs of worldwide recovery will turn out to be only a sad 
illusion.  And deteriorating trade relations will also create new political conflict.   
 
The alternative is a new commitment to open trade, backed up by improvements in the 
operation of the GATT system.  Both developed and developing countries have a contribution 
to make in this process. 
 
But better trade policies alone cannot put the world economy securely on the path to growth.  
That achievement will require the wide use of monetary and fiscal policies and of debt and 
development policies. 
 
Our Report is in three chapters: 
 
Chapter One, The Challenge of Economic Change, examines the role of international trade in 
the world economy. It argues that: 
- Advances in technology, industrial change and population trends, as well as rising 
demand and output in developing countries, give the world economy the potential to 
achieve a new era of growth.  Expanding trade will be essential to achieving growth. 
- Rapid change will be painful for the labour market, as old jobs cease to exist and 
workers are forced to move on to new jobs and skills.  The temptation simply to resist 
change will be very great.  But change is not only inevitable; it is the key to growth 
and to a better future. 
- Economic prospects will be critically influenced by the financial and monetary 
developments, and by the world’s success in co-ordinating macroeconomic policies, 
confronting the debt crisis, and maintaining flows of development aid. 
- Trade has a vital part to play in helping the world economy to take advantage of 
change.  But the trading system itself, the rule of law embodied in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is suffering serious and continuing erosion. 
- Trade rules that are consistently enforced and kept up-to-date enhance everybody’s 
freedom of action, give the trading system a sense of fairness, and minimise political 
conflict.  They help stimulate and promote investments by providing a reasonable 
confidence that markets will remain open. 
- The trade rules are no longer seen as fully effective, nor generally obeyed.  Countries 
have abused the system’s flexibility and have sought advantage through national 
measures not adequately dealt with in negotiations or the GATT rules. 
- In some areas, such as agriculture, countries have failed to live up to GATT rules 
from the beginning.  In others, they have found new ways to evade the intent of the 
rules, by erecting such trade barriers as ‘voluntary export restraints’ and by providing 
subsidies to domestic industries.   
- Developing countries have been placed in a separate and supposedly privileged 
category from which they have in fact benefited little. 
 
Chapter Two: Why Open Trade Is Better Trade, looks at the pros and cons of liberal trading 
policies.  It makes the points that: 
- Although the classic theory of international trade remains valid today, the real world 
is more complicated than the economist’s abstract model suggests.  Unemployment 
and labour difficulties, exchange rate misalignments, security considerations and the 
need of developing countries to launch infant industries have all led governments to 
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impose protectionist restrictions.  But these valid arguments are seized on as excuses 
for wholesale protection of special-interest industries.   
- Virtually all protection is introduced to avoid the consequences of economic change.  
But since economic growth is a process of adjustment to change, attempts to avert it 
by imposing trade restrictions inevitably stunts an economy. 
- The ‘benefits’ of protectionism are immediate and visible, while its costs are long-
term and largely invisible.  As a result, those who lose out rarely know that they are 
being made to bear the costs.  In all countries, this creates a fundamental imbalance in 
the process of making trade policy: the advocates of protectionism start with built-in 
advantages.   
- In most public discussion of protection, the right questions are seldom asked, What 
will the total costs be if trade restrictions are imposed?  Is protection the most 
efficient way to help the industry in trouble?  Will paying higher consumer prices 
protect jobs for more than just the short run?  What will be the effects on inflation?  
On the long-term economic growth? 
- Protection also carries political costs.  Attempts to restrict and mange trade inevitably 
increase the conflicts among nations.   
- Contrary to widespread belief, protection cannot protect jobs for long.  Indeed, in 
many cases protectionist measures actually eliminate jobs.  Jobs which are ‘saved’ 
from the competition of imports are preserved only at the expense of jobs lost in the 
same country’s export sector.  
- Instead, job losses in import-competing industries can be remedied in two ways.  One 
is the creation of new jobs, in export industries and through faster economic growth.  
The other is energetic policies to help workers adjust, including policies to make high 
quality education available to all. 
- Nor is protection an effective means of securing other objectives such as preservation 
of the farm sector, overcoming exchange rate difficulties, or seeking economic and 
social stability. 
 
Chapter Three, The Way Forward, contains our recommendations for the concerted action we 
believe necessary to put the world trading system on the right path. 
 
We put forward the following fifteen recommendations for specific, immediate action to meet 
the present crisis in the trading system: 
1. In each country, the making of trade policy should be brought into the open.  The 
costs and benefits of trade policy actions, existing and prospective, should be analysed 
through a ‘protection balance sheet’.  Private and public companies should be 
required to reveal in their financial statements any subsidies received.  Public support 
for open trading policies should be fostered. 
2. Agricultural trade should be based on clearer and fairer rules, with no special 
treatment for particular countries or commodities.  Efficient agricultural producers 
should be given the maximum opportunity to compete. 
3. A timetable and procedure should be established to bring into conformity with GATT 
rules voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements, discriminatory import 
restrictions and the other trade policy measures of both developed and developing 
countries which are inconsistent with the obligations of contracting parties under the 
GATT. 
4. Trade in textiles and clothing should be fully subject to ordinary rules of the GATT. 
5. Rules on subsidies need to be revised, clarified and made more effective.  When 
subsidies are permitted, they should be granted only after full and detailed scrutiny.   
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6. The GATT ‘codes’ governing non-tariff distortions of trade should be improved and 
vigorously applied to make trade more open and fair. 
7. The rules permitting customs unions and free-trade areas have been distorted and 
abused.  To prevent further erosion of the multilateral trading system, they need to be 
clarified and tightened up. 
8. At the international level, trade policy and the functioning of the trading system 
should be made more open.  Countries should be subject to regular oversight or 
surveillance of their policies and actions, about which the GATT Secretariat should 
collect and publish information.   
9. When emergency ‘safeguard’ protection for particular industries is needed, it should 
be provided only in accordance with the rules: It should not discriminate between 
different suppliers, should be time-limited, should be linked to adjustment assistance, 
and should be subject to continuing surveillance.   
10. Developing countries receive special treatment in the GATT rules.  But such 
treatment is of limited value.  Far greater emphasis should be placed on permitting 
and encouraging developing countries to take advantage of their competitive 
strengths, and on integrating them more fully into the trading system, with all the 
appropriate rights and responsibilities that this entails.  
11. Governments should be ready to examine ways and means of expanding trade in 
services, and to explore whether multilateral rules can appropriately be devised for 
this sector.   
12. In support of improved and strengthened rules, GATT’s dispute settlement procedures 
should be reinforced by building up a permanent roster of non-governmental experts 
to examine disputes, and by improving the implementation of panel 
recommendations.  Third parties should use their rights to complain when bilateral 
agreements break the rules. 
13. We support the launching of a new round of GATT negotiations, provided they are 
directed towards the primary goal of strengthening the multilateral trading system and 
further opening world markets.   
14. To ensure continuous high-level attention to problems in international trade policy, 
and to encourage prompt negotiation of solutions to them, a permanent Ministerial-
level body should be established in GATT. 
15. The health and even the maintenance of the trading system, and the stability of the 
financial system, are linked to a satisfactory resolution of world debt problem, 
adequate flows of development finance, better international co-ordination of 
macroeconomic policies, and greater consistency between trade and financial 
policies.
1239
  
 
 
 
The Report was commissioned by the Director-General of GATT. The members of the group 
of seven eminent persons who wrote the Report and their qualifications are as follows: 
 
                                                          
1239
 According to Arthur DunkeL, Diretor-General GATT, ‘the Report is not an official GATT publication’. It 
first appeared in 1985, received minor amendments and reappeared as a new publication in 1987 to mark the 
40
th
 anniversary of the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade… to set the report in an historical 
context an to relate it to …the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (launched in 1986).  Its first 
edition was made possible by the financial contributions of a number of sponsors.  See Arthur Dukel (ed) Trade 
Policies for a Better Future – The ‘Leutwiler Report’, the GATT and the Uruguay Round (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1987) vii, 9-15. 
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1. Dr Fritz Leutwiler – Chairman (Swiss) was until the end of 1984 Chairman of the 
Swiss National Bank and President of the Bank for International Settlements.  At the 
time of his appointment as a member for the group, he was the Chairman of the 
Brown Boveri, Baden, Switzerland.  
2. Senator Bill Bradley (American) was a United States Democrat Senator from New 
Jersey from 1979 to 1997.  He was a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, 
and its Sub-Committee on International Trade. 
3. Dr Pehr Gyllenhammar (Swedish) was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of AB 
Volvo, Göteborg, Sweden.  He also chaired the informal Roundtable of European 
Industrialists.  
4. Dr Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere (French) was Vice-President of the International Court 
of Justice, He was legal adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; earlier, he 
headed the Ministry’s service dealing with the United Nations and the international 
organisations.   
5. Dr Indraprasad G. Patel (Indian) was Director, London School of Economics and 
Political Science.  He has previously been Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and 
Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme. 
6. Prof. Mario Henrique Simonisen (Brazilian) was Director of the Post-graduate School 
of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro.  He is a former 
Minister of Finance and Minister of Planning of Brazil. 
7. Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (Indonesian) was a Professor of Economics at the 
University of Indonesia.  He served in the Indonesian government successively as 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister of Finance, and Minister of State for 
Research. 
 
The Director-General GATT then Mr Arthur Dunkel (Swiss) was a man of shining eminence 
in his own right: 1956: Degree in Economic and Commercial Sciences, University of 
Lausanne. 
 
Same year: Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs (Department of Public Economy), 
Bern. 
 
Successively Head of the sections for OECD matters (1960), for co-operation with 
developing countries (1964), for world trade policy (1971). In 1973 appointed Permanent 
Representative to GATT with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. In 1976 promoted 
Delegate of the Federal Council for Trade Agreements, Ambassador Plenipotentiary. In this 
capacity, in charge of world trade policy matters, multilateral trade and economic relations 
with developing countries, industrialisation, trade in agriculture and primary products, 
bilateral trade relations with various partners. Head or acting head of the Swiss delegations to 
the Tokyo Round negotiations, UNCTAD IV and V, UNIDO, Commodities Conferences, etc. 
 
International functions: Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur of UNCTAD 
 
Intergovernmental Group on Supplementary Financing (1968); Rapporteur of UNCTAD 
Board (1969); Chairman of Balance-of-payments Committee of GATT (1972/75); Chairman 
of the United Nations Conference on a new Wheat Agreement (1978), etc.  
 
Director-General GATT 1980-1993. 
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